ORAL ORDER Heard Mr. Ramesh Kumar Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Bimlendu Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the decree holder-sole opposite party. 2. This Civil Revision application is directed against the order dated 03.02.2009 passed by learned Sub Judge-1st, Bhagalpur in Title Execution Case No. 4 of 2003, whereby the learned court below has been pleased to allow the application filed by the decree holder-opposite party under Order 21 Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’) and directed the judgment debtor-petitioner to deposit cost quantified at Rs. 3433.50 to the decree holder as also to deliver the possession of the suit property to him and his failure to do so would entail civil imprisonment for a period of seven days. 3. The facts of the case briefly stated is that the suit in question was filed by the plaintiff-opposite party seeking, inter alia, a relief of perpetual injunction prohibiting the defendant-petitioner from evicting him from the suit premises except only after following the due process of law. It is the case of the decree-holder that despite notices validly served, the judgment debtor did not appear leading to an ex parte judgment and decree passed on 17.6.2003/27.6.2003 decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff and by a decree in the nature of prohibitory injunction, the judgment debtor was restrained from evicting the plaintiff except by due process of law. The further case of the decree holder is that the judgment debtor failed to observe the decree of injunction and put a lock in the premises on 18.8.2003, following which the Execution Case No. 4 of 2003 was filed on 27.8.2003. An amendment was prayed by filing an application in this regard on 18.7.2004 placed at Annexure-4 and which was contested by the judgment debtor but was allowed on 4.9.2004. By the said amendment the decree holder sought to incorporate a prayer for restoration of possession. The matter being contested at the level of the execution court, the order impugned was passed requiring the judgment debtor to discharge his obligation and hence the present application. 4. By the said amendment the decree holder sought to incorporate a prayer for restoration of possession. The matter being contested at the level of the execution court, the order impugned was passed requiring the judgment debtor to discharge his obligation and hence the present application. 4. On the facts noted, two issues arises for consideration in the present case and which are as follows: (i) Whether the judgment debtor has violated the decree of prohibitory injunction which was perpetual in nature entailing penalty/civil imprisonment as provided under Order 21 Rule 32(1) of the Code and; (ii) Whether the decree holder is entitled to restoration of possession of the suit premises. 5. Mr. Ramesh Kumar Choudhary, learned counsel has appeared for the judgment debtor. He has submitted that the judgment debtor-petitioner being aggrieved by the conduct of the decree holder-opposite party had instituted an F.I.R. giving rise to Kotwali (Tilka Manjhi) P.S. Case No. 16 of 2003 registered on 08.01.2003 for offences punishable under Sections 447, 441, 323, 504 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and the provisions of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. It is stated that the decree holder following the institution of the criminal case had himself vacated the suit premises. While denying the service of notice in the Title Suit, it is submitted that it is only at the stage of execution proceedings that he became aware of the judgment and decree and since the decree holder himself had left the premises, prior to passing of the decree in question, the decree was not capable of execution. It is stated that the F.I.R. was instituted on 8.1.2003 by the petitioner and as a retaliatory action the suit in question was filed by the decree holder on 12.2.2003 and in which an ex parte decree was passed on 17.6.2003/27.6.2003. It is stated that in between under the orders of the excise authorities, the premises were sealed with effect from 21.6.2003 and which continued until 18.8.2003. It is further the case of the judgment debtor that as the seal was removed on 18.8.2003, it was a natural consequence that the petitioner put his lock as the decree holder had himself shifted out from the premises. It is further the case of the judgment debtor that as the seal was removed on 18.8.2003, it was a natural consequence that the petitioner put his lock as the decree holder had himself shifted out from the premises. The execution case was filed on 27.8.2003 and which has been contested by the petitioner by filing a show cause present at Annexure-3 to the present proceedings and the learned court below has misdirected itself when it has ordered for handing over of the possession of the suit premise to the decree holder, even in absence of a decree to that effect. It is further submitted that in absence of any evidence substantiating violation of the injunction decree by the petitioner, the order requiring the petitioner to undergo civil imprisonment for his failure to carry out the direction for alleged violation of the decree of permanent injunction, is without sanction of law. It is the case of the judgment debtor as advanced by Mr. Choudhary that evidences have been adduced by him in the court below substantiating the fact that the decree holder had shifted out on his own. It is further the case of judgment debtor that as neither the decree holder had prayed for recovery of possession in the eventuality of dispossession nor any such relief was granted by the trial court, no order to that effect could be passed by the executing court. Mr. Choudhary has further submitted that the petitioner realizing this limitation has taken recourse to an independent suit giving rise to Title Suit No. 46 of 2003 filed under the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act requiring restoration of possession of the suit property. 6. The argument has been contested by Mr. Bimlendu Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the decree holders. It is submitted that the petitioner had all along knowledge about the ex parte decree and there are evidence on record to show that the petitioner had got the records examined through counsel and thus he cannot feign ignorance of the decree. It is further submitted that the very fact that the judgment debtor-petitioner never chose to question the ex parte decree by taking recourse to the remedies as was available to him in law, by itself would prove that he had knowledge about the decree and has accepted the same. It is further submitted that the very fact that the judgment debtor-petitioner never chose to question the ex parte decree by taking recourse to the remedies as was available to him in law, by itself would prove that he had knowledge about the decree and has accepted the same. It is the case of the decree holder that even when the premises was under the seal of the excise authorities, the moment the seal was removed on 18.8.2003 under orders of the excise authorities, an obligation was cast upon the petitioner as a judgment debtor under the decree, to hand over the possession of the premises to the decree holder. As the request was turned down, the decree holder moved the court below for execution of the ex parte decree. It is stated that following the amendment in the Code under the 2002 Amendment, the provision of Order 21 Rule 32(5) stood modified enabling the executing court to pass such orders to effectuate the injunction granted, during the course of execution, even in absence of any such order in the decree. It is submitted by Mr. Mishra that the decree is in the nature of perpetual injunction prohibiting the judgment debtor - petitioner from evicting the decree holder from the premises without following the due process of law and yet the decree holder is not able to enter the premises. Responding to the arguments of Mr. Choudhary that in absence of any decree as to restoration of possession of the premises, the executing court had gone beyond the decree, Mr. Mishra relying upon a judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in AIR 2009 Punjab and Haryana 188 (Kapoor Singh vs. Om Prakash) submits that the High Court while interpreting the amended provisions of Order 21 Rule 32(5) has observed in paragraph 10 and 11 that the executing court has all the powers to implement its order. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials on record. The facts are not in dispute. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials on record. The facts are not in dispute. Whether or not the judgment debtor-petitioner had notice and knowledge about the suit in question apart, that he never took steps to set aside the ex parte decree by taking recourse to the remedies available to him under the Code, is an admitted position and this single aspect by itself binds the judgment debtor to the decree which has to be obeyed by him. It is again admitted position that the judgment in suit was passed on 17.6.2003 and the decree was sealed and signed on 27.6.2003 while the premise in question was in a sealed condition under the orders of the excise authorities since 21.6.2003. This position is not disputed by either of the parties meaning thereby the decree holder in any event could not enter the premises until the seal was removed. Again under the orders of the statutory authorities under the Excise act, the seal was directed to be removed and was admittedly removed on 18.8.2003. There is again complete absence of evidence except oral statement of the decree holder that he drew the attention of the judgment debtor requiring him to discharge the obligation cast upon him under the ex parte decree. In absence of substantive evidence demonstrating violation of the decree by the judgment debtor, this statement is not sufficient to nail the petitioner. On the contrary the judgment debtor while contesting the claim of the decree holder has specifically contended that following removal of the seal, as the decree holder had voluntarily shifted out, the judgment debtor had no option but to put his own lock. I have already noted that there is no documentary evidence in the form of a notice by the decree holder or a legal notice through his counsel reminding of the obligation cast upon the judgment debtor, under the decree. 8. The provisions underlying Order 21 Rule 32(1) of the Code, is penal in nature and there has to be a finding proving conscious violation of the decree of a competent court by a judgment debtor and nothing can be presumed nor read into it. 8. The provisions underlying Order 21 Rule 32(1) of the Code, is penal in nature and there has to be a finding proving conscious violation of the decree of a competent court by a judgment debtor and nothing can be presumed nor read into it. The facts as discussed hereinbefore does not in any manner indicate any contemptuous conduct of the judgment debtor of a deliberate violation rather putting of a lock in the premises would be a natural consequence by the landlord, following the removal of the seal by the excise authorities. It is rather surprising that the executing court having noticed this aspect that the premise was under the seal of the excise authorities and that there was no evidence to demonstrate that the decree holder had invited the attention of the judgment debtor about the decree, yet in a routine manner has held the petitioner guilty and directed him to undergo civil imprisonment for seven days. 9. This Court is under no confusion to hold that the order has been passed contrary to the evidence on record and even in absence of a specific finding that the judgment debtor-petitioner had violated the decree deliberately, willfully and in full consciousness of the consequences. The order, thus insofar as the petitioner has been held guilty of violation of the decree of injunction passed by the Executing Court in exercise of powers vested under Order 21 Rule 32(1) of the Code, cannot be upheld and is accordingly set aside. 10. That brings me to the second question which is whether the executing court could order for restoration of possession. Whereas the landlord has led evidence that the decree holder had left the premise voluntarily before the decree was passed, the position is denied by the decree holder. Be that as it may but even in dispute on this issue, one aspect is very relevant and that is that as until 16.8.2003, the possession of the decree holder had continued over the suit property when the seal of the excise authorities was removed. Be that as it may but even in dispute on this issue, one aspect is very relevant and that is that as until 16.8.2003, the possession of the decree holder had continued over the suit property when the seal of the excise authorities was removed. If the decree holder had shifted out from the premises, the judgment debtor would be expected of taking recourse to remedies for removal of the seal but he did not choose to do so rather allowed the seal to continue from 21.6.2003 until its removal on 16.8.2003 meaning thereby he admitted to the possession of the decree holder over the premises. The natural consequence of the removal of the seal would be that the injunction order became operative on that date and since the possession of the decree holder was existing in the suit premises obviously he could not be dispossessed without following the due process of law. The order passed by the learned executing court requiring the petitioner to hand over the possession of the premises is only a consequence of the removal of the seal from the premises and cannot be termed to be beyond the decree passed in the suit rather is a consequence thereof. The observation of the Rajasthan High Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Kapoor Singh (supra) as found in paragraph 9 to 11 is in tune with the expanded jurisdiction of an executing court under the amended provision of Order 21 Rule 32(5). 11. For the reasons aforementioned there is neither any jurisdiction error nor any material irregularity in the order of the Executing Court requiring the judgment debtor to hand over the possession of the suit premises to the decree holder warranting interference by this Court in revisional jurisdiction and the Civil Revision application insofar as the challenge to the order of restoration of possession is concerned, stands dismissed. 12. In consequence, this Civil Revision is allowed in part.