JUDGMENT By Court.- The petitioner has challenged order of penalty dated 25.9.2000, appellate order dated 8.1.2001, whereby his appeal against the order of punishment dated 25.9.2000 was rejected and revisional order dated 25.7.2001. The petitioner has been awarded punishment of lowering down his scale to the lowest scale of Rs. 3,050/- for 5 years and it has also been ordered that he would not get any increment during the' above period and the period of suspension between 08.10.1999 to 4.1.2000 shall not be counted on duty and he would get only the subsistence allowance for the period of suspension. 2. The petitioner was appointed as Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force. During 1999 Parliamentary elections, he was deployed at Shatabdi Bhawan Strong Room, A.N. College, Patna. On 7.10.1999 he completed his duty from 5.00 hrs. to 9.00 hrs and on rotation he had to join his duty between 17.00 hrs to 21.00 hrs. on the same day. It is the case of the petitioner that at about 15.00 hrs. he experienced severe stomach pain and loose motion and therefore, after informing his Guard Commander, namely K.D. Tiwari and after entrusting his arms, ammunitions and other articles, he rushed to the doctor for the treatment. On the way he further suffered vomiting and thereafter, he got himself examined in the clinic of Dr. B.N. Mishra, who was employed in Patna University. He remained under the treatment of Dr. B.N. Mishra till morning hours of 8.10.1999 and thereafter he immediately came to the Shatabdi Bhawan where he found that the Company was already withdrawn from the deployment and therefore, he proceeded for Dhanbad. He received his arms and ammunitions and produced the medical certificate of Dr. B.N. Mishra. The petitioner was put under suspension on 8.10.1999 and he was served a charge-memo dated 9.11.1999 for his absence from duty on 7.10.1999 from 17.00 hrs. to 21.00 hrs. During the enquiry the petitioner submitted his show-cause reply contending that he has not committed any misconduct or dereliction of duty. The Guard Commander, namely K.D. Tiwari, who was examined as prosecution witness also supported the plea of the petitioner that after informing him about his illness and depositing his arms and ammunitions, the petitioner had left for medical treatment. The evidence of Shri K.D. Tiwari is corroborated by the prosecution witness Shri C.M. Jha also. The Guard Commander, namely K.D. Tiwari, who was examined as prosecution witness also supported the plea of the petitioner that after informing him about his illness and depositing his arms and ammunitions, the petitioner had left for medical treatment. The evidence of Shri K.D. Tiwari is corroborated by the prosecution witness Shri C.M. Jha also. The enquiry officer submitted his report dated 12.6.2000 holding the charge against the petitioner proved. In response to the show-cause notice dated 30.6.2000, the petitioner submitted his reply reiterating his stand that due to illness he had to rush to a doctor and before leaving 'for medical treatment the petitioner had duly communicated and deposited his arms and ammunitions to Shri K.D. Tiwari. The disciplinary authority passed the order of penalty as noticed above. The petitioner preferred appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.I.S.F., however, the appeal was dismissed by order dated 8.1.2001. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the Inspector General, C.I.S.F., 'which was also rejected by order dated 25.7.2001 holding that the petition was devoid of merit. Therefore, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed in which the respondents have taken a stand that in a disciplined force, unauthorised absence from duty is viewed very seriously. The charge against the petitioner was grave and he has been found guilty in the departmental enquiry. The petitioner was• afforded full opportunity during the departmental enquiry and the order of punishment has been passed on due consideration of the materials on record and therefore, no interference is called for in the present case. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that during departmental enquiry the explanation offered by the petitioner has been rejected on frivolous ground. The evidence of Shri K.D. Tiwari has been ignored by the enquiry officer on the ground that he had not informed the Coy Commander. He further submitted that order of penalty suffers from non application of mind and it has been passed in a mechanical manner ignoring the materials on record. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents, while supporting the order passed by the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and the revisional authority, has submitted that orders passed against the petitioner are just and proper. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents, while supporting the order passed by the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and the revisional authority, has submitted that orders passed against the petitioner are just and proper. 5. A reading of the order of penalty elated 24/25.9.2000 reveals that during the departmental enquiry the Company Commander, namely Amit Kumar Singh has admitted that Shri K.D. Tiwari had stated that the petitioner had deposited his rifle, ammunitions and his personal belongings to him. Other witnesses have also admitted that they had the information that the petitioner had left for hospital after informing Shri K.D. Tiwari and depositing his arms and ammunitions to him. However, the plea of the petitioner has been rejected on the ground that the Guard Commander namely, K.D. Tiwari had no authority to permit the petitioner to remain absent. The petitioner had not taken order from any competent authority. The medical prescription of Dr. B.N. Mishra was also disbelieved on the ground that on the medical prescription the timing of the clinic was mentioned between 19.00 hrs. to 22.00 hrs. whereas the petitioner had started for his treatment at 15.00 hrs. 6. In the case of "Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors." reported in (2006)4 SCC 713 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there is a distinction between some evidence and no evidence but the question which was required to be posed and necessary should have been as to whether some evidence adduced would lead to the conclusion as regards the guilt of the delinquent officer or not. The evidence adduced on behalf of the management must have nexus with the charges. The enquiry officer cannot base his findings on mere hypothesis. Mere ipse dixit on his part cannot be a substitute of evidence. 7. Learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is excessive and grossly disproportionate to the charge that he did not take permission of the competent authority before proceeding for hospital for taking treatment. Admittedly, the petitioner had to report for duty between 17.00 hrs. to 21.00 hrs. and the petitioner left for hospital after informing Shri K.D. Tiwari and depositing his arms and ammunitions to him. Admittedly, the petitioner had to report for duty between 17.00 hrs. to 21.00 hrs. and the petitioner left for hospital after informing Shri K.D. Tiwari and depositing his arms and ammunitions to him. Not informing the Coy Commander before leaving for hospital, may be a mistake on the part of the petitioner and for that he could have been warned but by no stretch of imagination an order of penalty can be imposed upon the petitioner in such a situation. 8. In a case where 11 workmen, under some misconception treating 2nd January as holiday were proceeded against in a departmental proceeding and after enquiry, were ordered to be dismissed from service, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the punishment imposed was excessive and disproportionate to the misconduct against him. In the said case of "Hind Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd. vs. Workmen" reported in AIR 1965 SC 917 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "7. In our judgment, this is one of those cases in which it can plainly be said that the punishment imposed was one which no reasonable employer would have imposed in like circumstances unless it served some other purpose. There was a practice of substituting for a holiday falling on a Sunday, the day next following. This appears to have 'been done in the appellant Company for a number of years. In this year also the 2nd of January would have been a holiday but for the contrary decision of the Management. From the record it does not appear that there was anything very special requiring attention on that day. But assuming there was the absence of the eleven workmen on the 2nd was not something for which no lesser punishment could have been imposed. The absence could have been treated as leave without pay the workmen might even have been warned and fined. It is impossible to think that any other reasonable employer would have imposed the extreme punishment of dismissal on its entire permanent staff in this manner. Assuming for a moment, that three workmen were warned and taken back, the employer knew very well that they could not join in view of the intervention of the Union. It is impossible to think that any other reasonable employer would have imposed the extreme punishment of dismissal on its entire permanent staff in this manner. Assuming for a moment, that three workmen were warned and taken back, the employer knew very well that they could not join in view of the intervention of the Union. On the whole, therefore, though we emphasis again that a Tribunal should not interfere with the kind or severity of punishment except in very extraordinary circumstances, we think that interference was justified in this case because the punishment was not only severe and out of proportion to the fault, but one which, in our judgment, no reasonable 'employer would have imposed." 9. In the case of "Manager, Reserve Bank of India vs. S. Mani", reported in (2005)5 SCC 100 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "39. The findings of the learned Tribunal, as noticed hereinbefore, are wholly perverse. It apparently posed unto itself wrong questions. It placed onus of proof wrongly upon the appellant. Its decision is based upon irrelevant factors not germane for the purpose of arriving at a correct finding of fact. It has also failed to take into consideration the relevant factors. A case for judicial review, thus, was made out. 10. In the case of "Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India & Ors." reported in (1987)4 SCC 611 [: 1987 PLJR (SC) 79], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even on proved charges of disobedience of order of superior officer to eat food sentence of one year and thereafter, dismissal from service with added disqualification of being declared unfit for future civil employment was disproportionately excessive. The Honble Supreme Court has held as under:- "25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the "decision-making process". The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review...... " 11. In the case of "Bhagat Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors." reported in (1983)2 SCC 442 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:- "It is equally true that the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India." 12. In the case of "Management of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry vs. Their Workman, Shri R.K. Mittal" reported in (1972)1 SCC 40 , the allegation against the workman was that he issued legal notices to the Federation and to the International Chamber of Commerce, which brought discredit to the Federation. In the departmental enquiry, the charge against the employee was found proved and an order of termination from service was passed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after holding that the punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and established, has observed:- "The Federation had made a mountain out of a mole hill and made a trivial matter into one involving loss of its prestige." 13. In a case where an employee remained absent from duty for more than 6 months and was removed from service, the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that since the employee fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reason for his absence by stating that he did not have any intention or desire to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company's rules and regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control, the punishment was not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations. In the said case of "Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and Another vs. Mukul Kumar Choudhari and Others" reported in (2009)15 SCC 620 [: 2010(1) JLJR (SC)19], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well-recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision-maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in excess to the allegations cannot claim, immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review." 14. In the case of "Krushnakant B. Parmar vs. Union of India & Anr." reported in (2012)3 SCC 178 , the Government servant, who was working as Security Assistant, was found unauthorizedly absent from duty during three consecutive periods and therefore, a departmental enquiry was instituted and the charges were found proved. Since there was no finding recorded during departmental enquiry that the absence was willful, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while interfering with the order of punishment, has observed as under:- "16. In the case of the appellant referring to unauthorised absence the disciplinary authority alleged that he failed to maintain devotion to duty and his behaviour was unbecoming of a Government servant. The question whether "unauthorised absence from duty" amounts to failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a Government servant cannot be decided without deciding the question whether absence is willful or because of compelling circumstances. 17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be willful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean willful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a Government servant. 18. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a Government servant. 18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is willful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct." 15. I also find that medical prescription produced by the petitioner has been disbelieved on the ground that it does not bear the registration number of the doctor and also signature of the patient has not been attested by the doctor. The revisional order dated 25.7.2001 reveals that the revisional authority has 'Stressed on the fact that since the petitioner failed to approach the Coy Commander or the Platoon Commander and left the place of duty without obtaining permission, it was a gross misconduct on his part which cannot be condoned. In view of the fact that the petitioner was to report for duty between the period 17.00 hrs to 21.00 hrs and he proceeded for hospital at about 15.00 hrs. after duly informing K.D. Tiwari and after depositing the arms and ammunitions to the said K.D. Tiwari, the reasons assigned by the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority are not tenable. If on the medical certificate the registration number of the doctor was not mentioned, the medical certificate cannot be disbelieved on that ground. There is no requirement that the patient's signature should have been verified on the medical certificate issued by the doctor. The impugned orders are not sustainable in law and are liable to be quashed. 16. It is also clear from the order of punishment dated 24/25.9.2000 that the petitioner would be paid only the subsistence allowance during the period of his suspension however, it is not appearing from the said order, before passing such order, the petitioner was given 2nd show-cause notice. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that before passing such order a fresh show-cause notice should have been issued to the petitioner, which has not been done in this case, therefore, order of penalty is liable to be quashed on this ground alone. The learned Sr. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that before passing such order a fresh show-cause notice should have been issued to the petitioner, which has not been done in this case, therefore, order of penalty is liable to be quashed on this ground alone. The learned Sr. Counsel has submitted that it has been held by this Court in the case of "Sharafat Hussain Vs. State of Bihar & Anr." reported in 2003(3) JCR 102 (Jhr.) [ : 2003(3) JLJR 216 ] that before resorting to Rule 97 of the Bihar Service Code, a show-cause notice must be issued to him. I am also of the view that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner that during the period of suspension he would not be entitled for anything more than the subsistence allowance, could not have been passed without issuing a separate show-cause notice to the petitioner. 17. In the case of "Manzoor Ahmed Mazumdar VS. State of Meghalaya and Others", reported in (1997)11 SCC 374 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting Rule 54(3) of the Fundamental Rules which is pari materia to Rule 97 of the Bihar Service Code, has held that even though there is no express requirement in Fundamental Rule 54(3) for giving an opportunity to the employee before passing an order, providing such an opportunity is implicit in the exercise of power which has been conferred by the said provision. It was held that it was necessary for the authority to afford an opportunity to the employee before passing the order regarding pay and allowances payable to the employee in respect of the period of suspension. 18. In the case of "M. Gopalkrishna Naidu vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh", reported in AIR 1968 SC 240 , the Honoble Supreme Court while examining Fundamental Rule 54, has held as under:- "6. It is true that the order under F.R. 54 is in a sense a consequential order in that it would be passed after an order of reinstatement is made. But the fact that it is a consequential order does not determine the question whether the government servant has to be given an opportunity to show cause or not. It is also true that in a case where reinstatement is ordered after a departmental inquiry the government servant would ordinarily have had an opportunity to show cause. But the fact that it is a consequential order does not determine the question whether the government servant has to be given an opportunity to show cause or not. It is also true that in a case where reinstatement is ordered after a departmental inquiry the government servant would ordinarily have had an opportunity to show cause. In such a case, the authority no doubt would have before him the entire record including the explanation given by the government servant from which all the/acts and circumstances of the case would be before the authority and from which he can form the opinion as to whether he has been fully exonerated or not and in case of suspension whether such suspension was wholly unjustified or not. In such a case the order passed under a rule such as the present Fundamental Rule might be said to be a consequential order following a departmental inquiry. But there are three classes of cases as laid down by the proviso in Art. 311 where a departmental inquiry would not be held viz., (a) where a person is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry, and (c) where the President or the Governor as the case may be is satisfied that in the interest of security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. Since there would be no inquiry in these classes of cases the authority would not have before him any explanation by the government servant. The authority in such cases would have to consider and pass the order merely on such facts which might be placed before him by the department concerned. The order in such a case would be ex parte without the authority having the other side of the picture. In such cases the order that such authority would pass would not be a consequential order as where a departmental inquiry has been held. Therefore, an order passed under Fundamental Rule 54 is not always a consequential order nor is such order a continuation of the departmental proceeding taken against the employee. 7. In such cases the order that such authority would pass would not be a consequential order as where a departmental inquiry has been held. Therefore, an order passed under Fundamental Rule 54 is not always a consequential order nor is such order a continuation of the departmental proceeding taken against the employee. 7. It is true as Mr. Sen pointed out that F.R. 54 does not in express terms lay down that the authority shall give to the employee concerned the opportunity to show cause before he passes the order. Even so, the question is whether the rule casts such a duty on the authority by implication. The order as to whether a given case falls under Cl. 2 or Cl. 5 of the Fundamental Rule must depend on the examination by the authority of all the facts and circumstances of the case and his forming the opinion therefrom of two factual findings; whether the employee was fully exonerated and in case of suspension whether it was wholly unjustified. Besides, an order passed under this rule would obviously affect the government servant adversely if it is one made under Cls. 3 and 5. Consideration under this rule depending as it does on facts and circumstances in their entirety, passing an order on the basis of factual finding arrived at from such facts and circumstances and such an order resulting in pecuniary loss to the government servant must be held to be an objective rather than a subjective function. The very nature of the function implies the duty to act judicially. In such a case if an opportunity to show cause against the action, proposed is not afforded, as admittedly it was not done in the present case, the order is liable to be struck down as invalid on the ground that it is one in breach of the principles of natural justice." 19. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this writ petition deserves to be allowed and hence, orders dated 25.9.2000, 8.1.2001 and 25.7.2001 are hereby quashed.