JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Through this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 1.11.2012 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (in short D.D.C.) in Restoration Application No. 64/2012-13 in Revision No. 1807 by which the Deputy Director of Consolidation has rejected the petitioners’ application as barred by time as day to day delay was not explained in the application for condonation of delay. While assailing this order, Sri Ram Prakash Rai, leaned counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in rejecting the petitioners’ restoration application on the ground that day to day delay was not explained. In his submissions, there was plausible explanation given in the restoration application but that has been misinterpreted by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, In his further submissions, that while considering the application for condonation of delay, in view of settled legal position a sympathetic view ought to have been taken by the learned D.D.C. 2. Sri Bheem Singh, learned counsel, who appears for respondent Nos. 1 to 3, considering the legal position in this regard has very fairly submitted that the writ petition may be finally disposed of on its own merit, without calling for counter-affidavit. Therefore, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition is taken up for final disposal. 3. The facts giving rise to this case are that it appears against an order dated 27.8.1980 passed in Appeal No. 249 under Section 11 (1) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), revision was filed, by the father of the petitioners which was numbered as Revision No. 1807, before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The aforesaid revision was dismissed for want of prosecution on 10.9.1984. For recall of the aforesaid order, a restoration application was filed on 29th September, 1984 which was allowed on 1st February, 1985 and thereafter number of dates were fixed but no final decision was rendered and ultimately the revision was again dismissed for want of prosecution on 12.9.1995. From the perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the papers available on the records of the writ petition, it transpires that no application was filed for recall of the order dated 12.9.1995 prior to the year 2006. From the perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the papers available on the records of the writ petition, it transpires that no application was filed for recall of the order dated 12.9.1995 prior to the year 2006. However, it appears an application was filed on 11.9.1995 for recall of the order dated 18.8.1995 with the explanation that the counsel for the petitioner as well as the Court’s preshkar have told that the case was dismissed on 18.8.1995 and the petitioners without ascertaining from the record as to whether case was dismissed for default on 18.8.1995 believing on the version of them, have filed a restoration application. It again appears that without disposal of the restoration application for recall of the order dated 18.8.1995, the revision was dismissed in default on 8.4.2003. It is stated that in the year 2003, the petitioner’s sister had fallen ill and she expressed her last will to get her treatment at Varanasi, the petitioner No. 1, for the treatment of her sister, has gone to Varanasi, ultimately, his sister died and it appears in the meantime, the case was dismissed. When the petitioner came to know about the dismissal order, he has engaged another counsel and on 30.5.2006 and another restoration application was filed for recall of the order dated 12.9.1995 as well as the order dated 8.4.2003. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has observed in his judgment that order dated 18.8.1995 is not available on the record and there was no restoration application prior to 30.5.2006 for recall of the order dated 12.9.1995. I am surprised to note that when the revision itself was dismissed for want of prosecution on 12.9.1995 and there was no order for dismissing the revision in default on 18.8.1995 how the revision was again dismissed for want of prosecution on 8.4.2003. Both the order dated 12.9.1995 and 8.4.2003 recite that the revision is dismissed in default. What has been noted by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is that the petitioner has not explained the delay properly and filed restoration application for recall of the order dated 12.9.1995 after a long delay. He took the view that delay has not satisfactorily been explained. 4. The law relating to condonation of delay has been considered time and again. The Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. He took the view that delay has not satisfactorily been explained. 4. The law relating to condonation of delay has been considered time and again. The Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, JT 1987 (1) SC 537 : 1987 (2) SCR 387 , has given following guidelines while dealing with the delay condonation application : 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. ‘Every day’s delay must be explained’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” 5. As would appear, for condonation of delay, the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken the view that the purpose of establishment of the Court is to impart substantial justice to the parties and not to legalize injustice on technicalities. It has also been held by the Supreme Court that day to day explanation means plausible explanation. 6. The Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Singh and others, JT 2000 (5) 389, after considering various cases of the Apex Court on condonation of delay application has held : Para 12................ It has also been held by the Supreme Court that day to day explanation means plausible explanation. 6. The Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Singh and others, JT 2000 (5) 389, after considering various cases of the Apex Court on condonation of delay application has held : Para 12................ “ The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented process approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient case for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of pragmatic approach in justice -oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause”. Para 13................. “ It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter,acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court”. 7. This view has further been affirmed by the Apex Court in the case of Gangadeep Pratisthan Private Ltd. and others v. Messrs. Mechano and others, AIR 2005 SC 1958 . 8. Thereafter in numerous cases, the Apex Court took the view that while considering the matter of condonation of delay, the merit of the case has to be seen. 7. This view has further been affirmed by the Apex Court in the case of Gangadeep Pratisthan Private Ltd. and others v. Messrs. Mechano and others, AIR 2005 SC 1958 . 8. Thereafter in numerous cases, the Apex Court took the view that while considering the matter of condonation of delay, the merit of the case has to be seen. It has also been held that the purpose of fixing limitation to approach the Court is not to take away the right of appeal but certainly if some inconvenience have been caused to the otherside, the Court can compensate the otherside by imposing the cost instead of throwing the matter on limitation. The Apex Court in the case of Jeet Narain and another v. Govind Prasad and others, 2010 (3) ADJ SC 470, has condoned the delay of 26 years looking into the merit of the case. 9. Here in this case, as would appear from the facts of this case, the petitioners have through out been negligent. On first occasion, the case was dismissed in 1984 which was restored in 1985. Thereafter it was again dismissed in default in September, 1995 and without ascertaining the facts as to when the case dismissed for default, a restoration application was filed for recall of the order which was not even in existence and again it has been allowed to be dismissed in April, 2003. There are more than one petitioners and even if one of the petitioner had gone for treatment of his sister, the remaining petitioners ought to have taken care of the litigation but instead of doing so, they have been through out negligent. The existing facts goes against the petitioners. 10. However since the case has never seen the light of the day on merit and the same has been dismissed in default, therefore the Court would prefer to direct the revisional Court to decide the matter on merit after condoning the delay. However, the inconvenience caused to the otherside is being compensated by imposing the cost of Rs. 1,000/- on each of the petitioners. 11. In view of the foregoing discussions, the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby quashed. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The petitioners are directed to deposit Rs. 12,000/- cost along with certified copy of the order of this Court before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 1,000/- on each of the petitioners. 11. In view of the foregoing discussions, the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby quashed. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The petitioners are directed to deposit Rs. 12,000/- cost along with certified copy of the order of this Court before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The cost, so deposited, be paid to the respondents equally. In case, such cost is deposited within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order of this Court, the Deputy Director of Consolidation is directed to decide the revision itself expeditiously but not later than six months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order of this Court. ——————