ORDER This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 03.07.2001 and 11.07.2001 respectively passed by the learned Civil Judge, senior Division, Court No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala in Title (P) Suit No. 112 of 1998, whereby and whereunder the learned Civil Judge al­lowed the suit for partition filed by Monoranjan Roy, the predecessor in interest of the respondent Nos. 1(i) to (iv) entitling him to get 1/7th share of the ‘C’ Schedule land and 1/8th share of the rest properties as described in the Schedules A, B, D and E. 2. Heard Mr. B. Das, learned senior Coun­sel, assisted by Mr. D. Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. D. Chakraborty, learned senior coun­sel, assisted by Mr. H. Laskar, learned coun­sel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1(ii) to (iv). Also heard Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1(i). None appears on behalf of the re­spondent Nos. 2 to 4. 3. The brief history of the litigation may help this Court in understanding the facts and controversies, which is as follows:-- The plaintiff, i.e. the original respondent No. 1, predecessor in interest of respondent Nos. 1(i) to (iv) (hereinafter referred as ‘plain­tiff’), filed the suit against the defendants, who are the appellants herein. The appellant Nos. 1 and 2 are the sons of late Srish Chandra Roy, who were the defendant Nos. 2 and 4 respectively in the original suit and the appellant No. 3 is the daughter of said late Srish Chandra Roy, who was the defendant No. 6 in the suit. The appellant No. 4, daugh­ter-in-law of said late Srish Chandra Roy was the defendant No. 7 and the appellant Nos. 5 and 6, the grandsons of said late Srish Chandra Roy, were the defendant Nos. 8 and 9 in the suit (hereinafter referred as defen­dants). 4. The case of the plaintiff, predecessor in interest of respondent Nos. 1(i) to (iv), be­fore the learned Civil Judge was that the suit land measuring 2 Kanis 11 gandas 1 kara 2 krantas 12 dhurs is inherited by him and his brothers and sisters ‘and relative defendants. The respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are also the sons of said late Srish Chandra Roy and were defendant Nos. 1, 3 and 5 in the suit. The respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are also the sons of said late Srish Chandra Roy and were defendant Nos. 1, 3 and 5 in the suit. The suit land was originally belonged to late Srish Chandra Roy, the father of the plaintiff, some of the defendant Nos. 1 to 6, father-in-law of defendant No. 7 and grandfather of defendant Nos. 8 and 9. The original owner, the prede­cessor in interest of the plaintiff and defen­dants died on 11.12.1994 leaving the prop­erties, i.e. suit land. Another successor, the mother of the plaintiff, also died and the prop­erties were inherited by the plaintiff as well as the defendants. Admittedly, the father of the plaintiff gifted land measuring 0.500 acres appertaining to Khatian No. 2748 to the plaintiff and his six brothers, i.e. defen­dant Nos. 1 to 5 and the predecessor of the defendant Nos. 7, 8 and 9, late Satya Ranjan Roy, by a registered deed of gift. As such the predecessor in interest of the respondent Nos. 1(i) to (iv), i.e. plaintiff, was the owner of 1/7th of ‘C’ Schedule land and each of the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 was the owner of 1/7th share and the defendant Nos. 7, 8 and 9 are jointly entitled to get 1/7th share of the suit property in the ‘C’ Schedule land and the defendant No. 6 has No. share in the ‘C’ Sched­ule land. The plaintiff and the defendants are in joint possession in the suit land since the death of the parents and defendant No. 6, sis­ter of the plaintiff, after marriage is living separately. The plaintiff being one of the shareholders of the property of his father, late Srish Ch. Roy, gave a proposal to the defen­dants for partition of the suit land and ac­cordingly, a family meeting was held, but the defendant Nos. 2 and 4, who are the appel­lant Nos. 1 and 2 respectively in the present appeal, refused to partition of the land. It is also stated by the plaintiff in his plaint that the valuable portion of the property is occu­pied by the defendant Nos. 2 and 4. Father of the plaintiff carrying business on the ‘Sriguru Stores’ and on his death right, title and interest of the father of the plaintiff de­volved upon the plaintiff and the defendants by inheritance and the defendant Nos. 2 and 4 are looking after the business. 2 and 4. Father of the plaintiff carrying business on the ‘Sriguru Stores’ and on his death right, title and interest of the father of the plaintiff de­volved upon the plaintiff and the defendants by inheritance and the defendant Nos. 2 and 4 are looking after the business. The cause of action arose on 17.10.1998 when the plaintiff was refused by the defendant Nos. 2 and 4 for partition of his share by way of family settlement. Thus, the plaintiff filed the suit for aforesaid partition of ‘C’ Schedule land for getting 1/7th share and 1/8th share of the land as described in the Schedules A, B, D and E. 5. The defendants appeared and submit­ted their written statement denying the claim of the plaintiff, i.e. predecessor in interest of respondent Nos. 1(i) to (iv). The case of the defendants, in short, before the learned Civil Judge was that since 1962 the plaintiff used to look after the business standing in the name of their father, but the plaintiff usurped the profit from the aforesaid business. He also maintained false account and separated him­self from the business and started a new busi­ness in the year 1963. The plaintiff also used to do contract business, but contributed noth­ing to the family and as he had independent earning, father of the plaintiff and some of the defendants asked him for some contribu­tion to the family, but he did not do the same. The plaintiff also did not have any connec­tion with his family from 1962 till the death of his father in 1994. It is also stated by the defendants that a gift deed was executed by late Srish Chandra Roy in 1972 and the plain­tiff after execution of the gift deed procured money from his father on the undertaking that he would not ask for any part of the landed property. As such, the plaintiff is not entitled to get any part of the suit property by way of partition. After the death of the father of the plaintiff and defendants, a partnership deed was executed in 1993 to run the business and the plaintiff has no right to that business as he is running a separate business and thus, the plaintiff’s prayer for partition is liable to be dismissed. The defendant Nos. After the death of the father of the plaintiff and defendants, a partnership deed was executed in 1993 to run the business and the plaintiff has no right to that business as he is running a separate business and thus, the plaintiff’s prayer for partition is liable to be dismissed. The defendant Nos. 3 and 5 filed separate written statement and also claimed partition of the suit property metes and bound for separate possession with co-sharers. 6. The learned trial Court considering the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues:-- “1. Is the suit maintainable in its present form and nature? 2. Has the plaintiff cause of action for the suit ? 3. Is the plaintiff entitled to get decree of partition as prayed for? 4. To what relief or reliefs the plaintiff is entitled?” 7. Both the plaintiff and defendants ad­duced their oral evidence as well as documentary evidence. The plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and also produced some documents and the defendants did not pro­duce any document, only cross-examined the plaintiff and also adduced three witnesses in support of their case. Out of them, DW1 and DW2 are the defendant Nos. 1 and 4 respec­tively and DW3 is a neighbour. The plaintiff side produced Khatian Nos. 16004 and 3028 in the name of Kiran Bala Roy, Khatian Nos. 2748 and 4847 in the name of his father late Srish Chandra Roy. All these khatians are exhibited as Ext.1 series. Ext.2 series is the gift deed by which his father late Srish Chandra Roy gifted his property to his sons including the plaintiff. The total suit land 1 Kani 5 gandas 2 krantas and 10 dhurs under Khatian No. 2748 is in the ‘C’ Schedule of the plaint. 8. The learned trial Court considering the oral evidence of the parties as well as the documentary evidence, particularly the gift deed and the Khatians produced by the plain­tiff, decreed the suit by the impugned judg­ment and decree as stated supra. 8. The learned trial Court considering the oral evidence of the parties as well as the documentary evidence, particularly the gift deed and the Khatians produced by the plain­tiff, decreed the suit by the impugned judg­ment and decree as stated supra. Being dis­satisfied with the said judgment and decree, the defendant-appellants preferred the instant appeal on the ground mainly that in normal course a son is entitled to the property of his father by law of inheritance, but when it is evident that the son separated himself from the family of the father and took away huge money from the income of the family sur­reptitiously in order to deprive the other le­gal heirs, like the defendant-appellants, the plaintiff is not entitled to get any decree of partition relating to the suit property, moreso, when the father gifted some landed property to the plaintiff and the plaintiff has been do­ing business separately and also living in a separate mess for a long time. 9. Mr. Das, learned senior counsel, while urging for setting the judgment and decree impugned herein, would contend that when a son has some right to the property of the father as per law of inheritance, he has also some duty to the family and unless he has discharged the duty cast upon him, he can­not claim the ancestral property. He further submits that the Schedule ‘C’ land at Mouja Agartala, Sheet No. 9, appertaining to Khatian No. 2748, comprised in C.S. Plot Nos. 7295 and 7299, measuring 0.500 acres, corre­sponding to 1 kani 5 gandas 2 krantas 10 dhurs is the viti land and the same was gifted by the predecessor in interest of the plaintiff and the defendants by way of gift deed and subsequent to execution of the gift deed the plaintiff had withdrawn his claim over the ‘C’ Schedule land. Thus, the said land cannot be partitioned. Regarding the other part of the suit land, i.e. Schedules A, B, D and E lands, he contended that the learned trial Court failed to consider the law of inherit­ance and committed injustice to the appel­lants, who were defendants in the suit. He finally contended that the plaintiff started his separate business and also was living sepa­rately before the death of his parents. Thus, he is not entitled to any share from the joint family property, i.e. suit land, by way of par­tition. 10. Mr. He finally contended that the plaintiff started his separate business and also was living sepa­rately before the death of his parents. Thus, he is not entitled to any share from the joint family property, i.e. suit land, by way of par­tition. 10. Mr. Das further submits that the plain­tiff has no right to the A, B, D and E Schedule land as the plaintiff-donee has separated himself from the joint family and started his own business and also obtained his claim relating to ‘C’ Schedule land while the par­ents were alive. Thus, the plaintiff is not en­titled to any of the suit land as per the law of inheritance. 11. Per contra, Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel submits that the father of the plaintiff admittedly gifted the ‘C’ Schedule land by way of registered gift deed dated 28.12.1972 to the plaintiff as well as to his six brothers, even knowing that the plaintiff started a separate business in 1962 and was living in separate mess and homestead since 1972, while the father died in 1994 and mother died in 1993. He further submits that the plaintiff’s father never intended to de­prive him from the ancestral property till his death. Had he considered to deprive the plaintiff, he would have gone for a separate Will or revocation of the gift deed following the necessary procedure of law, but that was not done. He finally contended that the gift is one of the modes of transfer of property and once the property is transferred in favour of a person in a lawful manner, the same can­not be questioned by the other beneficiaries of the gift deed. Here in this case, the defen­dants when admitted the gift deed executed by one to the parents, i.e. father, they have no right to question regarding the said prop­erty in the Schedule ‘C’ as 1/7th share of that property is the property of the plaintiff and the respondent Nos. 1(i) to (iv) being the le­gal heirs are also entitled to the benefit of the shares of their father. 12. Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for one of the legal heirs of the plaintiff, i.e., respondent No. 1(i), adopted the submission of Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel. 13. 1(i) to (iv) being the le­gal heirs are also entitled to the benefit of the shares of their father. 12. Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for one of the legal heirs of the plaintiff, i.e., respondent No. 1(i), adopted the submission of Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel. 13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the impugned judgment and decree, it appears that admit­tedly the suit lands as described in Sched­ules A, B, D and E of the plaint are not par­titioned and jointly owned by both the plain­tiff and defendants. Though the case of the defendants-appellants before the learned trial Court was that the plaintiff did not possess the land and he was out of possession of the land in question since 1972, but did not deny the gift deed as well as the documents like the Khatians produced by the plaintiff in sup­port of his share of property to be partitioned. Defendant Nos. 1 and 4 examined them as DW1 and DW2 respectively and stated that the plaintiff agreed to abandon the claim over the joint property. DW3 in his evidence also stated that the plaintiff was running separate business since 1968. It further appears that the defendant Nos. 1, 3 and 5 and other broth­ers also supported the claim as sought for by the plaintiff and in their written statement they have contended that valuable question (portion) of the suit property has been occu­pied by the defendant Nos. 2 and 4, i.e., the appellant Nos. 1 and 2. 14. There is no doubt that always a parti-ti0n is not actually a transfer of property but would only signify the surrender of a por­tion of a joint right in exchange for a similar right from the other co-sharer or co-sharers. But in the instant case, admittedly by way of gift deed the father of the plaintiff had transferred his property with ‘C’ Schedule to his sons so that in future they may not fight with each other, which can in other way be deemed to be his Will for partition. Thus, the same attracted the provision of Sections 5, 122 read with Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. Regarding the other Schedule of land, this Court may accept the contention of Mr. Das as the same was not transferred by the parents of the plaintiff to their respective sons. 15. Thus, the same attracted the provision of Sections 5, 122 read with Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. Regarding the other Schedule of land, this Court may accept the contention of Mr. Das as the same was not transferred by the parents of the plaintiff to their respective sons. 15. The contention of Mr. Das that the plaintiff has no right to the A, B, D and E Schedules land since the plaintiff-donee has separated himself from the joint family and started his own business in the lifetime of his father cannot be a ground for depriving the plaintiff from the ancestral property as the parents did not deprive him of the said property in their lifetime. If the contention of Mr. Das is to be accepted, then the law of succession relating to movable property has to be rewritten, which is not the function of the Court as the Court is to act in accordance with law. 16. Gift is nothing but transfer of certain existing movable and immovable property made voluntarily without any consideration by one person to another and accepted by the person in whose favour it was transferred. In the instant case, the defendant-appellants in their written statement nowhere stated that the plaintiff did not accept the gift during the lifetime of his father. Gift may be made ab­solutely or conditionally. When it is made conditionally, the property can be recovered back even by the donor. But in the instant case, on perusal of the gift deed it appears that the said is not a conditional deed. As the gift deed is not a conditional one even if the donor father also was not in a position to re­cover back the gifted property far too revo­cation of the gift deed. Sometime a gift deed relating to transfer of the family property by the father of the sons can be considered as a whole also so that after the death of the father the legal heir sons may not fight each other. Unfortunately, in the instant case though the father gifted the land to his sons, but some of the sons like the defendant-ap­pellants being not happy with the gift deed tried to deny the share of the plaintiff even he approached for amicable settlement and ultimately he was forced to go to the Court of law for partition of his ancestral property. 17. 17. Viewing the gift deed it appears that the same is executed by the father in favour of all his sons to fulfil his desire for the pur­pose of partition among themselves relating to ‘C’ Schedule land, though the word ‘par­tition’ is not there. Nomenclature of the docu­ment sometimes may conceal the real trans­action. Nomenclature may be with or with­out any motive or under a wrong understand­ing of the parties or law applicable to them. A Court has to see the real purpose of the documents. 18. It is also admitted position that the father of the plaintiff did not gift any prop­erty of the Khatian No. 2748 to his daughter, defendant No. 6. Thus, very rightly the trial Court held that the defendant No. 6 is not entitled to any share of the ‘C’ Schedule land and defendant Nos. 7, 8 and 9 being the le­gal heirs of another deceased son of late Srish Chandra Roy are entitled jointly 1/7th share of the ‘C’ Schedule land. In absence of any document to support the contention of the defendant-appellants that the plaintiff mis­appropriated the property in specific amount and abandoned his claim to the paternal prop­erty, the learned Civil Judge as trial Court rightly did not accept the contention of the defendant-appellants on that aspect. Moreso, admittedly when the gift deed Ext.2 was ex­ecuted by the father of the plaintiff about 30 years back and in his lifetime neither the said gift deed was revoked nor any question was raised. It can be said that the right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the gifted property relating to his share within the ‘C’ Schedule land is fully established and Khatian Nos. 16004 and 3028 (Ext.1 series) and Khatian Nos. 4847 and 4848 (Ext.1 se­ries) admittedly being the property owned by the parents of the plaintiff, late Srish Chandra Roy and plaintiff being their legal heirs, cannot be deprived of his share from the property of joint family as per law of in­heritance and/or succession. 19. In view of the above facts and circum­stances, there is no doubt in the mind of this Court that the father of the plaintiff wanted that the ‘C’ Schedule land should go to all his sons equally, the said land being a spe­cial category of land than the land of Sched­ules A, B, D and E and other properties be­ing ancestral properties. The defendant-ap­pellants and plaintiff are entitled to get the equal share and the learned trial Court only gave his seal on that shares by way of allow­ing the partition. Thus, it cannot be said that the learned trial Court failed to consider the evidence on record or committed any error by way of passing the impugned judgment and decree allowing the partition as sought for by the plaintiff and supported by the de­fendant Nos. 1, 3 and 5 and other brothers of the plaintiff. Unless any perversity or any wrong interpretation of law is there in the judgment of the learned trial Court, an ap­pellate court normally should not interfere with the said judgment and decree. 20. In view of the above, the impugned judgment and decree do not warrant any in­terference by this Court. 21. In the result, the appeal is dismissed being devoid of merit. No order as to costs. Send down the lower court records. Appeal dismissed.