JUDGMENT This appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioners against the judg­ment and order dated 28.09.2012 passed by the learned Writ Court in OWP No. 635/2010, whereby the writ petition has been dismissed with costs quanti­fied at Rs.20,000/ to be paid by the writ petitioners. 2. In the writ petition, the appel­lants challenged the orders dated 15.04.2008 and 09.05.2008 passed by respondent No. 1 (Financial Commis­sioner) in an appeal filed by the private respondents against mutation orders No. 722 to 741 dated 04.09.2006; No. 742 to 761 dated 16.12.2006; and mutation order No. 762 dated 02.06.2007 passed by Tehsildar concerned. The appellants in the aforesaid writ petition also chal­lenged conversion of the appeal by re­spondent No. 1 into a revision petition and the proceedings conducted by re­spondent No. 1, first in the appeal and after its conversion, in the revision petition. The appellants also sought a writ of mandamus/prohibition direct­ing the respondents not to cause any interference in their possession over the land covered by the aforesaid mu­tations and further, not to cause any kind of stoppage of irrigation water to these lands in any manner whatsoever. 3. It may be mentioned here that by the aforesaid order dated 15.04.2008, respondent No. 1 had directed that Deputy Commissioner - respondent No. 2, Kargil was to ensure that the position regarding use/sharing of wa­ter for irrigation as it benefits the lands of the private respondents was not to be allowed to their disadvantage till fur­ther orders not withstanding the en­tries recorded by the Patwari /Tehsildar, as alleged. By the subse­quent order dated 09.05.2008, respon­dent No. 1 had treated the appeal filed by the private respondents as a revi­sion petition and directed that the or­der passed on 15.04.2008 was to apply mutatis mutandis. 4. By the subse­quent order dated 09.05.2008, respon­dent No. 1 had treated the appeal filed by the private respondents as a revi­sion petition and directed that the or­der passed on 15.04.2008 was to apply mutatis mutandis. 4. Fundamentally, the challenge in the writ petition was founded on three grounds: first, that the mutations im­pugned in the appeal/revision petition before respondent No. 1 having been passed by the concerned Tehsildar un­der Ailan No. 10 of 1979 (Samvat) read with Ailan No. 38-C of 1989 (Samvat), no appeal or revision would lie before respondent No. 1; second, that the prin­cipal grievance of the private respon­dents in their appeal/revision before respondent No. 1 being about sharing of irrigation waters; no appeal or revi­sion would lie before respondent No. 1; third, consequently upon the above, respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to either entertain the appeal/revision or to conduct any proceedings thereon or to pass any orders thereon, muchless the orders actually passed by respon­dent No. 1. Specific averments in this regard were made in paragraph 4 of the writ petition. 5. When the aforesaid writ petition came up for consideration before the learned Writ Court, while issuing notice, the following order came to be passed in the accompany IA No. 1041/ 2010: "As the question of apportionment of water between the residents of differ­ent areas is concerned, it will be ap­propriate to direct the Canal Officer to consider the claim of the parties and take a decision thereon after afford­ing opportunity of hearing to the par­ties within a period of two weeks from the date copy of this order is served on him. The Canal Officer will con­sider and pass appropriate orders ir­respective of issuance of the orders by the Financial Commissioner, Revenue, J&K, and for facilitating the disposal of the matter by the Canal Officer or­ders dated 15th April, 2008 and 9" May, 2008 shall remain in abeyance till next date before the Bench." 6. Subsequently, the official respon­dents filed their objections/reply to the aforesaid writ petition wherein they simply relied on the order dated 03.08.2010 passed by the Canal Officer, a photocopy whereof was appended with the objections. Subsequently, the official respon­dents filed their objections/reply to the aforesaid writ petition wherein they simply relied on the order dated 03.08.2010 passed by the Canal Officer, a photocopy whereof was appended with the objections. In the said order, the Canal Officer stated that as the Khul (water course) had been constructed and maintained by the Zamindars themselves, therefore, as per the defi­nition of J&K Irrigation Act, 1978, it does not fall under the control and ju­risdiction of the Canal Officer. He, therefore, recommended that the Zamindari Khul may be allowed to be restored by the beneficiaries at their own expenses. The Canal Officer in the said order made it clear that "the rec­ommendation is purely made in the interest of saving the standing crops and fruit trees under the command of the said Khul. However, the status quo of the land may be maintained till the outcome of the various petitions in dif­ferent court of the State.". 7. The private respondents herein in their objections maintained a con­spicuous silence about the aforesaid fundamental grounds of challenge taken by the appellants in their writ petition. 8. The learned Writ Court, relying on the Apex Court judgment in Karuna Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2012 AIR SCW 2621, dismissed the writ pe­tition on the ground that since the ap­pellants had availed of the alternate remedy of contesting the appeal/revi­sion before the Financial Commis­sioner, they were estopped from filing the writ petition. While doing so, the learned Writ Court has directed the Financial Commissioner to determine the issues after hearing learned coun­sel for the parties with liberty to the appellants to raise all issues before the said revenue authority. The appellants were also burdened with costs of Rs.20,000.00. This appeal has been filed against the aforesaid judgment and or­der of the learned Writ Court. 9. We have heard the learned coun­sel for the parties and considered the matter. 10. There is no dispute that the land covered by the mutation orders in question is Nautor land. Nautor and Waste Land has been exhaustively dealt with by Mr. This appeal has been filed against the aforesaid judgment and or­der of the learned Writ Court. 9. We have heard the learned coun­sel for the parties and considered the matter. 10. There is no dispute that the land covered by the mutation orders in question is Nautor land. Nautor and Waste Land has been exhaustively dealt with by Mr. Justice H. Imtiyaz Hussain, under Chapter - 9 starting from page 161, in his Revenue Manual, Land Laws in Jammu & Kashmir, Vol.2, wherein it is mentioned that 'Nautor' is uncultivated land made cultivable for the first time by breaking the land and it means the right to utilize with com­petent sanctions the land owned by the Government outside towns, the re­served and demarked protected forests. By State Council Resolution No. 22 dated 25.08.1924 it was ordered that all those who were recorded as in possession of 'Nautor Najaiz' be recorded as tenants-at-will under the State. However, in the case of Ladakh and Kargil Districts, by Revenue Department Notification No. 10 dated 22nd Har, 1979 (Samvat era), there was a limit of 20 Kanals Nautor imposed, meaning thereby that a per­son could not break up and bring into cultivation more than 20 Kanals of Nautor land, but this restriction was subsequently removed vide Revenue Department Ailan No. 21 of 1936 sub­ject to the following conditions: (i) That the rights of others are not adversely affected; (ii) That the condition per provision (i) is decided by a Revenue Officer not below the rank of Tehsildar at the time of attestation of mutation; and decision of such Revenue Of­ficer shall be appeal-able. At page 169 of the aforesaid Rev­enue Manual, it is further mentioned as under: "Rules in case of Nautor in frontier districts: In the year 1936 the following rules were sanctioned vide Council Order No. 21-C regarding relaxation of waste land rules in case of Nautor in frontier districts,- 1. That the frontier districts of Ladakh & Gilgit be exempted from the operations of the Waste Land Rules which are applicable to the Jammu and Kashmir Provinces; 2. That the frontier districts of Ladakh & Gilgit be exempted from the operations of the Waste Land Rules which are applicable to the Jammu and Kashmir Provinces; 2. That all land brought under culti­vation as Nautor upto the end of Assuj 1990 (Svt.) in these Districts be entered, after necessary en­quiry in the proprietary right of those who brought it under culti­vation and that such land be treated in accordance with Rev­enue Department Ailan No. 38 dated dated 31st Har 1000 (sic for 1989 Svt); 3. That if land is brought under cul­tivation as Nautor after the first Katik 1990, it will, after it has been brought under cultivation, be entered in a mutation register and occupancy right in it will be granted by an attesting officer not below the rank of a Tehsildar (whose order will be appealable in the usual course) by order re­corded on the mutation sheet in favour of the person bringing the land under cultivation as Nautor provided that the rights of other persons are not adversely af­fected by such entry; and 4. That no Malikana be charged from such occupancy tenants." From a bare perusal of the afore­said, it becomes clear that the muta­tion order passed by a Revenue Officer not below the rank of Tehsildar in re­spect of Nautor land in terms of the Allans and Revenue Notifications is appealable in usual course. Now the question is what is the usual course of appeal? 11. A provision for appeal is made in Section 11 of the Jammu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act, 1996 Svt. (1939 AD) (for short Land Revenue Act). It reads as under: "[11. Now the question is what is the usual course of appeal? 11. A provision for appeal is made in Section 11 of the Jammu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act, 1996 Svt. (1939 AD) (for short Land Revenue Act). It reads as under: "[11. Appeals Save as otherwise provided by this Act, an appeal shall lie from an original or appellate order of a Rev­enue officer as follows, namely: - (a) to the Collector when the order is made by an Assistant Collector of ei­ther class; (b) to the [Divisional Commissioner] when the order is made by a Col­lector; (c) to the Financial Commissioner when the order is made by a [Divi­sional Commissioner]: Provided that, - (1) where an original order is con­firmed on first appeal, no further ap­peal shall lie except on the grounds mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19 77; (2) where any such order is modified or reversed on appeal by the Collec­tor, the order made by the Divisional Commissioner on further appeal, if any, to him shall be final; (3) the Government may especially empower an Assistant Collector of the first class to hear appeals against the orders of an Assistant Collector of the second Class." It is manifest from the aforesaid provision of law that an original order made by a Revenue Officer of the rank of Assistant Collector of either class is appealable before the Collector. Section 6 of the Land Revenue Act mentions the classes of Revenue Officers. Sub-Section (2) of Section 6 states that the Deputy Commissioner of a district was to be the Collector thereof and an As­sistant Commissioner and a Tehsildar has to be an Assistant Collector of the first class and a Naib Tehsildar an As­sistant Collector of the second class. Admittedly, the mutation orders in the instant case had been passed by Tehsildar, i.e., Assistant Commis­sioner of the first class. The Statute, namely, Section 11 (a), prescribes that an appeal against the order made by an Assistant Collector shall lie to the Col­lector. The word used is 'shall', mean­ing thereby that it cannot lie before any other Revenue Officer. Admittedly, the mutation orders in the instant case had been passed by Tehsildar, i.e., Assistant Commis­sioner of the first class. The Statute, namely, Section 11 (a), prescribes that an appeal against the order made by an Assistant Collector shall lie to the Col­lector. The word used is 'shall', mean­ing thereby that it cannot lie before any other Revenue Officer. By the scheme of the aforesaid provision of law, it be­comes manifest that it could be filed before the Financial Commissioner only if the original order or the appel­late order had been passed by the Divi­sional Commissioner. In that view of the matter, the Financial Commis­sioner (Revenue) had no jurisdiction to entertain any appeal against the mu­tation orders passed by the Assistant .Collector concerned. 12. Mr. Qayoom, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that under the garb of challenging the mutation orders in question, the private respon­dents in their appeal (later treated a revision by the Financial Commis­sioner) had actually raised a dispute regarding the Abpashi Khul Nalla Shurchey. Mr. Qayoom, drawing the attention of this Court to the pleadings of the private respondents made in the aforesaid appeal/revision petition as also to the objections filed in response to the writ petition, submitted that the respondents actually seek a decision on their exclusive right to use the wa­ters of the aforesaid Nalla. He further submitted that all disputes concerning the use or distribution of water were governed by the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Irrigation Act, 1978, now repealed and governed by the provisions of Jammu and Kashmir Wa­ter Resources (Regulation and Manage­ment) Act, 2010. According to the learned counsel, there is no provision in either of these two Acts providing for any appeal or revision before the Finan­cial Commissioner; therefore, it was not competent for the Financial Com­missioner either to pass any order on the use or sharing of water, as he ac­tually did vide order dated 15.04.2008, or to treat the appeal in relation to the said dispute as revision and apply or­der dated 15.04.2008 mutatis mutan­dis to the revision petition. 13. Mr. R. A. Jan, learned senior counsel for the private respondents, on the other hand, vehemently argued about the powers of the Financial Com­missioner to revise orders passed by the subordinate Revenue Officers. We will deal with those arguments later. 13. Mr. R. A. Jan, learned senior counsel for the private respondents, on the other hand, vehemently argued about the powers of the Financial Com­missioner to revise orders passed by the subordinate Revenue Officers. We will deal with those arguments later. For the present, we will examine as to what was the issue raised before the Financial Commissioner and whether he was competent to deal with such issue. 14. Perusal of the appeal, later treated as Revision, filed before the Financial Commissioner reveals that the case set up by the private respon­dents was that they (villagers of Surchay and Salmon) have been using the water of canal Nalla Surchay since decades both for irrigation purposes as well as domestic use. The appellant-villagers have migrated from various places, including Tibet etc. and settled down in Salmon which falls more than a kilometer away from village fields of Surchay. Their fields used to be irrigated from a separate Abpashi Nalla/ source called Cholichan Tongoos Nalla. Since 1990, the appellants started in­terfering and causing illegal and un­warranted interruption in their peace­ful usage of water resource of Abpashi canal. In paragraph 6 of the appeal/re­vision, the private respondents specifi­cally stated as under: "The case pertaining to the same sub­ject matter is still pending before the competent court of Canal Officer, Kargil due to the non-cooperation and delay tactics adopted by the respon­dent party in the said case." 15. In paragraph 8 of the appeal/ revision, the private respondents have clearly stated that they are aggrieved of the mutation of Abpashi "Irrigation Canal" and Shamilat lands/State lands detrimental and adverse to the well es­tablished and secured rights of the ap­pellants. Paragraphs 8(c), 8(f), 8(g), 8(h) and the prayer clauses (ii) and (iii) of the appeal/revision specifically pertain to and highlight the grievance of the private respondents and their claim of exclusive right to use waters of Nalla Surchay for irrigation and domestic purposes. At the top of it, the impugned order dated 15.04.2008 passed by the Financial Commissioner pertains to the use/sharing of water for irrigation purposes, whereby he has directed the Deputy Commissioner to ensure that the position of usage/sharing of water for irrigation is not allowed to the dis­advantage of the private respondents herein, notwithstanding the entries recorded by Patwari/Tehsildar. 16. At the top of it, the impugned order dated 15.04.2008 passed by the Financial Commissioner pertains to the use/sharing of water for irrigation purposes, whereby he has directed the Deputy Commissioner to ensure that the position of usage/sharing of water for irrigation is not allowed to the dis­advantage of the private respondents herein, notwithstanding the entries recorded by Patwari/Tehsildar. 16. It thus becomes axiomatic that the private respondents in their afore­said appeal/revision have challenged the mutation orders because of such mutation orders the waters of Surchay Nalla are being shared by the appel­lants for agricultural purpose which, according to the private respondents, has affected their exclusive rights to the usage of waters of Surchay Nalla. The real question that underlies these pleadings is whether the Financial Commissioner has the power to enter upon such dispute, either by entertain­ing an appeal or a revision, as relates to usage or sharing of water under the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Irrigation Act, 1978 (as it was govern­ing the field at the relevant time) or the subsequent Act passed enacted in 2010? 17. Settlement of Disputes concern­ing use or distribution of water is gov­erned by the provision of Section 72 under Chapter XI of the Jammu and Kashmir Irrigation Act, 1978. It reads as under: "72. Power of Canal Officer to or­der use or distribution of water; (1) The Zilladar may, if he considers necessary, pass an order as to the use or distribution of water from a dam, storage tank or water course or field channel amongst persons in any land or a group of lands or in any holding or group of holdings in such land or lands; Provided that no such order shall be passed by the Zilladar with­out making any inquiry into the matter and without giving notice to all the persons interested that on a day to be named in such no­tice, he shall proceed to inquire into the said matter. (2) Whenever a difference arises be­tween two or more persons in re­gard to their mutual rights or li­abilities in respect of the use or maintenance of a dam, storage tank or water course or field chan­nel or field drain, any such per­son may apply in writing to the Zilladar stating the matter in dis­pute. (2) Whenever a difference arises be­tween two or more persons in re­gard to their mutual rights or li­abilities in respect of the use or maintenance of a dam, storage tank or water course or field chan­nel or field drain, any such per­son may apply in writing to the Zilladar stating the matter in dis­pute. (3) On receipt of an application un­der Sub-section (2), the Zilladar shall give notice to the other per­sons interested, and on a day to be named in such notice, he shall proceed to enquire into such mat­ter and after the enquiry, he shall try to bring about a compromise between the parties. (4) On the failure of the Zilladar to bring about a compromise, he shall pass an interim order as regards the use or maintenance, of a storage tank or water course or field channel or field drain pending the disposal of the dis­pute and he shall forward the dis­pute to the Canal Officer alongwith his findings and the Canal Officer shall pass an order thereon after giving a hearing to the parties. (5) The Divisional Canal Officer, within whose jurisdiction the dam, storage tank or water course or field channel or field drain is situated, may, on his own motion or on an application made in this behalf by an aggrieved person, revise an order passed by a Ca­nal Officer under sub-section (4); Provided, that no such application shall lie unless it is made within a period of thirty days from the date of such order. (6) No order passed under this sec­tion shall be liable to be called in question in any civil court." Section 2(dd) defines "Zilladar" as meaning an officer exercising control over a canal in respect of proper distri­bution and regulation of water and is responsible for the assessment of ca­nal revenue. (6) No order passed under this sec­tion shall be liable to be called in question in any civil court." Section 2(dd) defines "Zilladar" as meaning an officer exercising control over a canal in respect of proper distri­bution and regulation of water and is responsible for the assessment of ca­nal revenue. Canal Officer, in terms of Section 2(c), means an officer exercis­ing control over a sub-division of an ir­rigation work or portion of an irrigation work; "water course", in terms of Sec­tion 2(z) is defined to mean the length of a channel between an outlet and a field channel, built at the cost of the Government and maintained by the owners or occupiers to carry water from an outlet to any block of land or as may be prescribed; "field channel" in terms of Section 2(i) is defined to mean a channel constructed by owners or oc­cupiers or beneficiaries or constructed by the Government on their behalf and at their cost to serve the various fields within a block and include existing water courses constructed or main­tained by the owners or, occupiers or beneficiaries; and "beneficiary" under Section 2 (a) is defined to mean a per­son or persons who derive benefit from an irrigation work whether directly or indirectly. 18. The aforesaid provision of Sec­tion 72 of the Act prescribed the Zilladar as the authority competent to order use or distribution of water, whether from a dam, storage tank or water course or field channel. In the case of difference between two or more persons in regard to their mutual rights or liabilities in respect of the use or maintenance of water course or field channel or field drain etc, such person could apply to the Zilladar stating the matter in dis­pute, whereupon, after issuing notice to other persons interested, it is en­joined upon the Zilladar to try to bring about a compromise between the par­ties. However, on his failure to bring about a compromise, the Zilladar is re­quired to pass an interim order as re­gards the use or maintenance of such water course, field channel or field drain pending disposal of the dispute, and forward the dispute to the Canal Officer alongwith his findings. Sub-Sec­tion (4) of Section 72 further provided that the Canal Officer would then pass an order thereon after giving a hear­ing to the parties. Sub-Sec­tion (4) of Section 72 further provided that the Canal Officer would then pass an order thereon after giving a hear­ing to the parties. Sub - Section 5 of Sec­tion 72 gives power to the Divisional Canal Officer, within whose jurisdic­tion the dam, storage, tank, water course, field channel or field drain is situated, to revise an order, either on his own motion or on an application made in that behalf by an aggrieved person, passed by the Canal Officer under Sub - Section (4) of Section 72. It is thus clear that it is the Divisional Canal Officer who, under the aforesaid provision of law, has been vested with revisional powers. There is no provi­sion contained in the Act empowering the Financial Commissioner to enter upon any such dispute as envisaged by Section 72 of the aforesaid Act. 19. The Jammu and Kashmir Irri­gation Act, 1978 was repealed by the Jammu and Kashmir Water Resources (Regulation and Management) Act, 2010. Admittedly, there is no provision contained in the said Act which would empower the respondent No. 1-Finan­cial Commissioner to enter upon such a dispute either in an appeal or a revi­sion petition, suo moto or otherwise. 20. It is thus established that the Financial Commissioner does not have any power to enter upon a dispute in­volving usage or sharing of water for irrigation purposes or to revise any or­der passed either by the Canal Officer or the Divisional Canal Officer. Resultantly, it was not within the com­petence of the Financial Commis­sioner to entertain an appeal or to treat it as revision petition, insofar as the dispute sought to be raised therein re­lated to the usage or sharing of water by the parties hereto. On the same corollary, it was not within the compe­tence of the Financial Commissioner to pass an order of the nature he has actually passed on 15.04.2008, which he has subsequently applied and adopted mutatis mutandis vide order dated 09.05.2008 in the revision peti­tion, since the subject fell beyond the purview of revisional powers of the Fi­nancial. 21. On the same corollary, it was not within the compe­tence of the Financial Commissioner to pass an order of the nature he has actually passed on 15.04.2008, which he has subsequently applied and adopted mutatis mutandis vide order dated 09.05.2008 in the revision peti­tion, since the subject fell beyond the purview of revisional powers of the Fi­nancial. 21. In this behalf, we may further observe that in terms of Revenue de­partment notification No. 10 dated 22nd Har, 1979 read with Revenue Ailan No. 21 of 1936, the Tehsildar was compe­tent to attest mutations subject to the condition that the rights of others were not adversely affected and this condi­tion, that the rights of others were not adversely affected, had to be decided by the Tehsildar at the time of attestation itself. In other words, at the time of at­testing the mutation, the Tehsildar has only the power to take a decision whether rights of others would be ad­versely affected or not. If he was con­vinced that rights of others would not be affected, he was competent to attest the mutation. In no case, a power was conferred on the Tehsildar to enter upon the dispute about use or sharing of water and proceed to decide the same at the time of attesting the mutation. In other words, dispute if raised by any party that the contemplated attestation would affect the water rights of others, it was not competent for the Tehsildar to enter upon and decide the said dis­pute. As a sequel thereto, the Finan­cial Commissioner cannot assume to itself a power which was not conferred even on the Tehsildar for attesting the mutations. Usage of Water and its shar­ing could, at best, be a ground to decide the validity of mutation, but would not constitute the dispute itself before the Financial Commissioner, nor can he take cognizance of any such dispute. In the instant case, the private respon­dents in their appeal/revision had made specific pleas as well as prayer in relation thereto. Not only the private respondents in their appeal/revision had made such pleas, the Financial Commissioner, too, has issued interim directions concerning the dispute re­garding usage and sharing of water, which was beyond his jurisdiction. 22. In the instant case, the private respon­dents in their appeal/revision had made specific pleas as well as prayer in relation thereto. Not only the private respondents in their appeal/revision had made such pleas, the Financial Commissioner, too, has issued interim directions concerning the dispute re­garding usage and sharing of water, which was beyond his jurisdiction. 22. Now, the next question that falls for consideration is whether, in the presence of the water dispute raised by the private respondents, it was compe­tent for the Financial Commissioner to convert the appeal filed against the mutation orders into revision petition. We have already returned a finding that the appeal against the mutation orders was not competent before the Financial Commissioner. 23. Mr. Qayoom, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that Council Order No. 21-C of 1936 was a special provision which conferred powers on the Tehsildar to attest mutations of Nautor lands and, therefore, the orders passed pursuant to the said Council Order are not revisable by the Finan­cial Commissioner in terms of the pro­vision of Section 15 of the Land Rev­enue Act. He submitted that the revisional powers of the Financial Com­missioner are available to him only regarding the orders passed by the Rev­enue Officers under his control with reference to the provisions of the Land Revenue Act, not in reference to the special provisions of law contained in the Council Order in question. It is his further submission that the Tehsildar, while attesting the mutations in ques­tion in favour of the appellants has sat­isfied the conditions laid down in Coun­cil order. Mr. Qayoom also submitted that since the appeal filed by the re­spondents before the Financial Com­missioner was not maintainable, it was not competent for the Financial Com­missioner to treat the said incompe­tent appeal as revision. 24. Mr. R. A. Jan, Sr. Advocate, on the other hand, apart from questioning the maintainability of the writ pe­tition filed by the appellants, submit­ted that Section 15 of the Act confers unfettered powers on the Financial Commissioner to call for the records of any case, at any time, whether dis­posed of by or pending before, any Rev­enue Officer under his control and pass such orders as he thinks fit. He fur­ther submitted that the power so con­ferred on the Financial Commissioner is very wide in its terms and it cannot be construed as being subject to any limitations such as filing of an appeal. He fur­ther submitted that the power so con­ferred on the Financial Commissioner is very wide in its terms and it cannot be construed as being subject to any limitations such as filing of an appeal. The learned senior counsel further submitted that even if the appeal be­fore the Financial Commissioner was not competent, it would not detract from the statutory authority the powers oth­erwise conferred on him by Section 15 of the Act. Learned counsel in support has cited a judgment of the Supreme Court in Indira Sohanlal v Custodian of E.P., AIR 1956 SC 77 and a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Baboo Ram v Financial Commissioner, de­cided on 09.12.1970, reported as 2010 (7) JKJ617. 25. We have already quoted hereinabove as to what was provided by Rev­enue Department Notification No. 10 dated 22nd Har, 1979 and vide Revenue Department Ailan No. 21 of 1936. We do not have the benefit of original Rev­enue Department Notification No. 10 of 22nd Har, 1979. However, one of the documents produced before us seems to be page No. 3780 of some book con­cerning Notifications, Circulars, Or­ders, etc. It is extracted below: "Land Revenue Act, Svt, 1996 - Re­laxation of Waste Land Rules in case ofNautor in frontier Districts. Council Order No. 21-C of 1936. - The following rules are hereby sanc­tioned. " The Rules sanctioned by the afore­said Council order have already been quoted by us hereinabove. A perusal of the above extracted portion of the docu­ment demonstrates that the Council order in question was issued under the Land Revenue Act, Svt., 1996. We have, therefore, reason to believe that other Council orders, too, had been issued under the same Act, not in isolation thereof. That being so, Mr. Qayoom is not correct in saying that the Council orders constituted any special provision to be treated in isolation of the provi­sions of the Land Revenue Act. 26. Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act speaks of cases pending before or disposed of by any Revenue officer un­der his control. It is not the case of the appellants that the Tehsildar, who at­tested the mutations in question, falls outside the control of the Financial Commissioner. There is another important factor in the matter. The Coun­cil orders only speak of passing of mu­tation orders. Such mutation orders cannot be passed in isolation of the pro­visions of the Land Revenue Act. It is not the case of the appellants that the Tehsildar, who at­tested the mutations in question, falls outside the control of the Financial Commissioner. There is another important factor in the matter. The Coun­cil orders only speak of passing of mu­tation orders. Such mutation orders cannot be passed in isolation of the pro­visions of the Land Revenue Act. In fact, the procedures to be adopted and the records to be maintained for effec­tuating such mutations is prescribed by the provisions contained in the Land Revenue Act. Section 15 of the Act gives power to the Financial Commis­sion to call for the records of "any case pending before or disposed of by any Revenue Officer under his control". It is not the case of the appellants herein that mutations attested by the Tehsildar concerned did not constitute a "case" within the meaning of Section 15 of the Act or that the Revenue Of­ficer concerned did not fall within the control of the Financial Commissioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that mu­tations ordered by the Tehsildar pur­suant to the Council orders in question did not constitute a "case pending be­fore or disposed of by any Revenue Of­ficer" under the control of the Finan­cial Commissioner. 27. In view of the above, we hold that the mutation orders attested un­der the relevant Council orders did not fall outside the scope and ambit of the provisions of the Land Revenue Act. Consequently it would fall within the revisional powers of the Financial Com­missioner under Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act. As a fall out thereof, it is also held that it was within the compe­tence of the Financial Commissioner to treat the appeal as revision against such mutation orders. 28. However, as we have already held that the Financial Commissioner does not have any powers vis-a-vis the dispute over usage of water or its shar­ing, the Financial Commissioner can­not enter upon such dispute under the garb of exercising revisional jurisdic­tion against the mutation orders and proceed to pass any orders in relation thereto. He has to confine revisional jurisdiction only to the extent of attes­tation of the mutations in question and in isolation of the water sharing dis­pute sought to be raised in the revi­sion. He has to confine revisional jurisdiction only to the extent of attes­tation of the mutations in question and in isolation of the water sharing dis­pute sought to be raised in the revi­sion. However, it is reiterated that the adverse affect of such mutations on the rights of others, for example usage of water, may constitute a ground to seek examination of the mutation orders in exercise of revisional powers. 29. It was next submitted by Mr. R. A. Jan, learned senior counsel, that the writ petition was not maintainable pending revision before the Financial Commissioner, particularly in view of the fact that the appellants had filed objections to the application as also a review petition which is still pending before the Financial Commissioner. 30. Since the Financial Commis­sioner had sought to adjudicate upon a dispute not falling within his compe­tence, inasmuch as he had also passed orders dated 15.04.2008 and 09.05.2008 in relation thereto, the said action of the Financial Commissioner was with­out jurisdiction and, resultantly, void ab initio. Naturally, therefore, the appel­lants were within their rights to file the writ petition. Reference in this regard may be made to U. P. State v Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958.SC 1957, cited by Mr. Qayoom. In the aforesaid judgment, it has been held that: "if an inferior court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdic­tion or patently in excess of jurisdic­tion or manifestly conducts the pro­ceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural jus­tice and all accepted rules of proce­dure and which offends the superior court's sense of fair play, the supe­rior court may, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforemen­tioned". Learned counsel has also relied on another judgment of the Supreme Court in Kuntesh v. Management, AIR 1987 SC 2186 , wherein it has been held that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition, when an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction. Learned counsel has also relied on another judgment of the Supreme Court in Kuntesh v. Management, AIR 1987 SC 2186 , wherein it has been held that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition, when an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction. The High Court should not refuse to exer­cise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. In that view of the matter, we are con­vinced that the writ petition filed by the appellants herein was maintainable. 31. In the impugned judgment passed by the learned Writ Court, the Finan­cial Commissioner has been directed to determine the issues after hearing learned counsel for the parties. The appellants herein were given liberty to raise all issues before the Financial Commissioner projected in the writ petition. Reliance by the learned Single Judge, on the judgment in the case of Karuna Singh v State of NCT of Delhi, 2012 AIR SCW 2621 is not well merited because it is distinguishable on facts. In that case, the petitioner had filed Criminal MC No. 3668 of 2008 and, thereafter, filed a writ petition before the High Court of Delhi wherein she had assailed the order of the Mag­istrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) and the High Court had also stayed the costs imposed on the petitioner by the Magistrate. While the writ petition was still pending before the High Court and stay was granted in his favour, she had approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution without assailing any order passed by the High Court. The case is quite distinguish­able. In the present case, the petitioner has challenged not only the jurisdic­tion of the Financial Commissioner to entertain the revision petition, but also the orders passed by him. Since we have come to the conclusion that the Financial Commissioner does not have the jurisdiction to entertain any revi­sion against the dispute relating to usage/sharing of water for irrigation etc., the Financial Commissioner can­not be allowed to enter upon such a dis­pute and to decide any issue in rela­tion thereto. We are also of the consid­ered view that the appellants could not be saddle with costs for filing the writ petition. 32. For all what has been discussed above, the order of the Ld Single Judge is modified. We are also of the consid­ered view that the appellants could not be saddle with costs for filing the writ petition. 32. For all what has been discussed above, the order of the Ld Single Judge is modified. The writ petition (OWP No. 635/2010) filed by the appellants as well as this Letters Patent Appeal are allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. The orders dated 15.04.2008 and 09.05.2008 passed by the Financial Commissioner in the revision titled Zamindaran Shurchay and Salmoon v Mohammad Issaq & ors. are also quashed. We direct the Financial Com­missioner to decide the revision peti­tion within a period of two months from the date a copy of this order is served upon him, after hearing the parties. It is made clear that such decision shall be strictly restricted by him only in re­lation to the mutation orders impugned in the revision. The parties are left free to approach the competent author­ity under the applicable laws for deter­mination of their respective rights in, or as to apportionment of, waters of the Nalla Shurchey. 33. The judgment and order dated 28.09.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge is, accordingly, modified to the extent indicated above. The cost of Rs.20,000 is also deleted. 34. All connected CMPs shall abide the above decision. No order, however, as to costs.