Hon'ble KOTHARI, J.—The petitioner-tenant Chetan Das S/o Nekumal Sindhi, aged 74 years, occupying the suit premises situated behind Anand Cinema, Beriyo Ka Moalla, Jodhpur has filed the present writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the respondent landlord Smt. Anusuya Tak W/o Kishan Tak, resident of Jaloriya Ka Bas, Jodhpur being aggrieved by the concurrent eviction decree and judgment of Appellate Rent Tribunal and Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur in respect of the residential house situated at aforesaid address Behind Anand Cinema, Jodhpur which was initially let out to the defendant-tenant-the present petitioner vide rent note dtd. 28.5.1965 w.e.f. 1.6.1965. 2. By the consent of learned counsels for the parties, the matter was finally heard at the admission stage itself and lengthy arguments and written submissions have been filed though the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. vs. Rajendra Shankar Pateil reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6387 strongly deprecating the practice of entertaining such writ petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India over the dispute between landlord and tenant, where the only respondent is the landlord or tenant and held that such writ petitions are not even maintainable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case has held as under: "49. So the same expression namely to keep the Courts and Tribunals subordinate to the High Court `within the bounds of their authority' used in Manmatha Nath Biswas (AIR 1933 Cal. 132) (supra), to indicate the ambit of High Court's power of superintendence has been repeated over again the again by this Court in its Constitution Bench decisions. 50. Same principles have been followed by this Court in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala @ Bharucha (deceased) through LRs. and others vs. Phiroz N. Bhatena and others etc., reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141 : ( AIR 1991 SC 1494 : 1991 AIR SCW 1441), wherein it has been held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior Court or Tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Court or Tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that except to this "limited extent" the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of facts. 51. In coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its previous decision rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 : ( AIR 1987 SC 117 ). The decision i. Chandavarkar (supra) is based on the principle of the Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh ( AIR 1954 SC 215 ) (supra) and Nagendra Nath ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) (supra) discussed above." 3. The Rent Tribunal while allowing the Rent Eviction Petition No. 222/2005- Smt. Anusuya Tak vs. Chetan Das passed a detailed judgment and eviction decree by the impugned judgment running into 18 pages on 6.2.2010 and the eviction decree was granted on the ground of alternative accommodation purchased by the tenant's wife at Mahamandir, Jodhpur. 4. The defendant-tenant Chetan Das challenged the said eviction decree before the Appellate Rent Tribunal by way of Rent Appeal No. 18/2010- Chetan Das vs. Smt. Anusuya Tak and the landlord Smt. Anusuiya Tak also preferred cross appeal No. 31/2010 on those grounds which were decided against the landlord by the Rent Tribunal, though the eviction decree was granted in her favour and thus, both these connected appeals namely, Rent Appeal No. 18/2010 - Chetan Das vs. Smt. Anusuiya Tak and Rent Appeal No. 31/2010- Smt. Anusuiya Tak vs. Chetan Das came to be decided by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal by the judgment and decree dtd 19.7.2012. While the defendant's Appeal No. 18/2010 came to be dismissed, the Rent Appeal No. 31/2010 filed by the landlord Smt. Anusuiya Tak was allowed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal and the issues No. 1 to 4 which were decided against the landlord, were decided in favour of the landlord and eviction decree was granted under Section 9(e),(f), (j) and (k) and Section 10(1)(c) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001. The said judgment of the Appellate Rent Tribunal runs into 30 pages discussing the entire case laws and the various contentions raised by the parties. 5. Being aggrieved by the said decisions of Tribunals below, the defendant-tenant Chetan Das has preferred this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which was filed on 15.9.2010 and contested by Mr. 5. Being aggrieved by the said decisions of Tribunals below, the defendant-tenant Chetan Das has preferred this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which was filed on 15.9.2010 and contested by Mr. O.P. Mehta, learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner. 6. The contentions raised by Mr. O.P. Mehta in the oral arguments as well as written submissions filed before this Court can be summarized as under: (i) The respondent-landlord filed the petition before the Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur on 25th May, 2005, seeking eviction of present petitioner from suit premises, situated at Beriyon Ka Mohalla, behind Anand Cinema, outside Sojati Gate, Jodhpur; which was let out to Chetan Das Sindhi (present petitioner) vide rent note dated 28th May, 1965 with effect from 1st June, 1965. (ii) The landlord's contention was that she purchased this rented house in question from Udaiveer Singh vide registered sale-deed dtd. 14.11.1977. She filed a suit under the Act of 1950. It was stated that as the Act of 1950 stood repealed, therefore, she did not press the suit as she is old lady and she will seek relief under the new Rent Control Act of 2001 and therefore, she filed the present petition before the Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur on the grounds enumerated under Secs. 9(d), (e), (i) and (k) as also under Section 10(1) (c) of the Act of 2001. Learned Rent Tribunal vide judgment dtd. 6th February, 2010 granted decree for eviction on the basis of grounds envisaged under Section 9(i) and Section 10(1)(c) of the Act while refused the eviction decree on the rest of the grounds on merits, as well as on reaching the conclusion that the petition is barred by provisions of Order 23 Rule 1(4) C.P.C. (iii) The present petition- tenant preferred an appeal against the order of eviction dated 6.2.2010 challenging the grounds on which the decree of eviction was awarded by the learned Rent Tribunal. The respondent-landlord also filed an appeal, alleging the decree passed by the Rent Tribunal on those grounds which were disallowed. (iv) Learned Appellate Rent Tribunal allowed the appeal of the respondent-landlord while dismissed the appeal of the present petitioner-tenant vide judgment dated 19.7.2012 and granted the eviction decree. (v) The present petitioner-tenant filed the aforesaid two writ petitions before this Hon'ble Court against the order dtd. 19.7.2012. (iv) Learned Appellate Rent Tribunal allowed the appeal of the respondent-landlord while dismissed the appeal of the present petitioner-tenant vide judgment dated 19.7.2012 and granted the eviction decree. (v) The present petitioner-tenant filed the aforesaid two writ petitions before this Hon'ble Court against the order dtd. 19.7.2012. (vi) Both the learned Tribunals below have wrongly ordered eviction of the tenant on the ground of acquiring an alternative suitable accommodation by tenant-petitioner as well as on the grounds enumerated under Section 10 of the Act of 2001 which provides for the recovery of immediate possession of the rented premises in question in the case of an old and senior citizen being the landlord. (vii) Both these grounds, on which eviction has been granted by both the learned Tribunals are contrary to the material on the record, hence the same are perverse. The petition filed by the respondent-petitioner before the Rent Tribunal was even not maintainable, even then the eviction has been ordered erroneously. (viii) So far as acquiring of alternative suitable accommodation by present petitioner, as a ground for eviction is concerned, the same is barred by limitation and hence, both the learned Tribunals had no jurisdiction to pass the eviction decree with regard to grounds envisaged under Section 9(i) as also Section 10 of the Act of 2001. (ix) With regard to Section 9(i), the respondent-landlord averred in the rent petition to this effect that present petitioner, through his wife Sundari Devi has purchased a house on 16th June, 1988 situated outside Third Pol, Mahamandir, Shiv Shakti Nagar, Jodhpur and the petitioner Chetan Das is residing in that purchased house with his family and therefore, now the petitioner, tenant does not require the suit premises. (x) This contention was categorically denied by the present petitioner in the reply and it was specifically averred that the two brothers of the present petitioner-Chatan Das and Ram Chandra resided with him right from the beginning and gradually, the family expanded. The petitioner has 6 sons and one daughter. Daughter is married and one of the sons has expired and all the sons are married so they all are residing with their wives and children with him and as such, petitioner also has 9 grandsons and 8 grand-daughters, out of them 2 have been married. The petitioner has 6 sons and one daughter. Daughter is married and one of the sons has expired and all the sons are married so they all are residing with their wives and children with him and as such, petitioner also has 9 grandsons and 8 grand-daughters, out of them 2 have been married. His married daughter as well as married grand daughters used to visit the family of the petitioner but in view of expanded family, it was not possible for all of them to reside in rented premises in question and therefore, one house was purchased by the petitioner, where some members of the family reside in the rented premises in question and they used to visit other family members residing in that purchased house as also other members of his family also resides in the disputed premises. (xii) The petitioner's son Kailash, who had expired was residing in Mahamandir house and other sons Ramesh, Kamlesh and Prakash are also residing there with their families, out of them Ramesh and Kamlesh are deaf and dumb by birth. (xiii) Ramesh lives with his wife and 2 children, Kailash has 3 sons and 2 daughters and Prakash is also having one son. They all are residing in the house purchased by petitioner's wife at Mahamandir. (xiv) In this way, the rented premises in question is being used for residence of the petitioner and his wife along with both his brothers, who are residing with him right from inception and they are also family members of the petitioner. (xv) In this way, the petitioner explained that acquisition of another house, though of his wife, was absolutely reasonable, being necessitated because of expansion of family. (xvi) The respondent landlord filed rejoinder to the reply but all the material facts, which were pleaded about family members, were not disputed. It was only stated that in the voters' list, name of petitioner and his wife appears at Mahamandir address. Though Ration Card pertaining to address of the disputed rented house was submitted by the petitioner. 7. Mr. (xvi) The respondent landlord filed rejoinder to the reply but all the material facts, which were pleaded about family members, were not disputed. It was only stated that in the voters' list, name of petitioner and his wife appears at Mahamandir address. Though Ration Card pertaining to address of the disputed rented house was submitted by the petitioner. 7. Mr. O.P. Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant relied upon the following case laws: (i) AIR 1988 SC 1796 - Birad Mal Singhvi vs. Anand Purohit (ii) AIR 2004 SC 230 -Sushil Kumar vs. Rakesh Kumar (iii) AIR 2005 SC 2731 -Pratap Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (iv) AIR 2005 SC 2755 - Gurpal Singh vs. State of Punjab. (v) AIR 2006 SC 2157 - Ravinder Singh Gorkhi vs. State of U.P. (vi) AIR 2008 SC 1696 - Jyoti Prakash Rai vs. State of Bihar. (vii) AIR 2008 SC 632 - Desh Raj vs. Bodh Raj (viii) AIR 2009 SC 314 - Babloo Pasi vs. State of Jharkhand. (ix) AIR 1991 SC 2219 - State of Punjab vs. Gurdev Singh (x) AIR 1987 SC 1823 - Smt. Shakuntala S. Tiwari vs. Hem Chand M. Singhania (xi) Gannmani Anusuya and Ors. vs. Parvatini Amarendra- AIR 2007 SC 2380 8. In the case of State of Punjab vs. Gurdev Singh reported in AIR 1991 SC 2219, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "The Court's function on the presentation of plaint is simply to examine whether, on the assumed facts, the plaintiff is within time. The Court has to find out when the "right to sue" accrued to the plaintiff. If a suit is not covered by any of the specific articles prescribing & period of limitation, it must fall within the residuary article. The purpose of the residuary article is to provide for cases which could not be covered by any other provision in the Limitation Act. The residuary article is applicable to every variety of suits not otherwise provided for. Article 113 (corresponding to Article 120 of the Act 1908) is a residuary article for cases not covered by any other provisions in the Act. It prescribes a period of three years when the right to sue accrues. Under Article 120 it was six years which has been reduced to three years under Article 113. Article 113 (corresponding to Article 120 of the Act 1908) is a residuary article for cases not covered by any other provisions in the Act. It prescribes a period of three years when the right to sue accrues. Under Article 120 it was six years which has been reduced to three years under Article 113. According to the third column in Article 113, time commences to run when the right to sue accrues. The words "right to sue" ordinarily mean the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings Generally, the right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises, that is, the right to prosecute to obtain relief by legal means. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. 9. In the case of Smt. Shakuntala S. Tiwari vs. Hem Chand M. Singhania reported in AIR 1987 SC 1823 on the issue of limitation has held as under: "In the instant case the suit was filed because the tenancy was determined by the combined effect of the operation of Ss. 12 and 13, Rent Act. Thus at thee most it would be within Art. 66, Limitation Act, if it was held that forfeiture has been incurred by the tenant in view of the breach of the conditions mentioned in S. 13, Rent Act and on lifting of the embargo against eviction of tenant in terms of S. 12 of the Act. That being so, either of the two, Art. 66 or Art. 67 would be applicable to the facts of the case; there is no scope of the application of Art. 113, Limitation Act, in any view of the matter." 10. In the case of Gannani Anusuya and Ors. vs. Parvatini Amarendra reported in AIR 2007 SC 2380 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "27. In terms of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is for the court to determine the question as to whether the suit is barred by limitation or not irrespective of the fact that as to whether such a plea has been raised by the parties. Such a jurisdictional fact need not, thus, be pleaded." 11. In the case of Kamlesh Babu and Ors. vs. Lajpat Rai Sharma and Ors. Such a jurisdictional fact need not, thus, be pleaded." 11. In the case of Kamlesh Babu and Ors. vs. Lajpat Rai Sharma and Ors. reported in AIR 2008 SC (Supp.) 1931, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: 21. It is no doubt true, as was pointed out by this Court in the case of Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. (supra) and also in Narna Rama Murthy's case (supra), that if the plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact, the same cannot be raised at the appellate stage. We have no problem with the said proposition of law. What we are concerned with is whether the said proposition is applicable to the facts of this case. In this case the plea of limitation had been raised in the written statement and though no specific issue was framed in respect thereof, a decision was given thereupon by the learned Trial Court. Apart from Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, even Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure casts a mandate upon the court to reject a plaint where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law, in this case by the law of limitation. Further, as far back as in 1943, the Privy Council in the case of Lachhmi Sewak Sahu vs. Ram Rup Sahu and Ors. (AIR 194 Privy Council 24) held that a point of limitation is prima facie admissible even in the court of last resort, although it had not been taken in the lower courts. 12. On the other hand, Mr. Arun Kumar Kalla, learned counsel appearing for the respondent landlord vehemently opposed the various contentions on behalf of the petitioner-defendant-tenant and he submitted that firstly the present writ petition is not even maintainable in view of Supreme Court decision in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra). and the same deserves to be dismissed at the threshold as the concurrent findings of facts are binding on this Court and cannot be disturbed in the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the sole respondent being landlord Smt. Anusuiya Tak being senior citizen, the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed without going into the merits of contentions of the defendant-tenant. 13. In the alternative, on merits also, the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord Mr. 13. In the alternative, on merits also, the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord Mr. A.K. Kalla submitted that the respondent-landlord was a senior citizen as per the School Leaving Certificate of 10th Class from Board of Secondary Education and therefore, entitled to get immediate possession of suit premises under Section 10 of the new Rent Control Act, 2001 and the findings of facts in this regard cannot be disputed by the petitioner-tenant. He further submitted that upon purchase of the alternative residential accommodation by the tenant's wife at Mahamandir, the defendant-tenant-Chetan Das and his wife along with his sons family have shifted to said alternative accommodation at Mahamandir, Jodhpur, whereas only his two brothers' family continues to occupy the suit premises situated behind Anand Cinema, Jodhpur and this also amounts to parting with possession by the defendant-tenant in favour of his brothers giving rise to the said ground of eviction and also amounting to subletting but since the proof of rent paid by the brothers to the original tenant Chetan Das was not there, the eviction decree granted on the other ground of alternative suitable accommodation becoming available to the petitioner-tenant deserved to be upheld and no interference in the same is called for. He further submitted that the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the defendant-tenant about the suit being barred by limitation under the new Act and also that the respondent-landlord was not entitled to recover the immediate possession under Section 10 of the Act, are also misconceived as on the basis of evidence, oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the respondent landlord, it was beyond the pale of doubt that the respondent landlord Smt. Anusuya Tak, aged 74 years was a senior citizen at the time of filing the present eviction petition in the year 2005 and was, therefore, entitled to the immediate possession of the suit premises and it is wrong to contend that the conditions of Section 10 of the Act were not satisfied in the present case. 14. Mr. 14. Mr. Arun Kumar Kalla also urged that the only condition prescribed under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act is that thee landlord has become a senior citizen and files the eviction petition after expiry of 3 years from the date of letting out of premises and Sub-Section (2) only requires that where the landlord has let out more than one premises, such petition for immediate possession shall be maintainable in respect of only one of rented premises to be chosen by the landlord and subject to the condition that the landlord is not residing in his own premises in the same municipal area. He submitted that all these stipulations or conditions in Section 10 of the Act were undisputedly satisfied by the landlord before the Appellate Rent Tribunal and consequently, the eviction decree under Section 10 of the Act read with Section 9(1)(e),(f), and (k) of the Act granted by the Appellate Rent Tribunal also deserves to be upheld as admittedly the defendant-tenant had acquired an alternative suitable accommodation upon purchase of house at Mahamandir in the name his wife, which was not only suitable and adequate for his requirement, but the fact was proved before the Tribunal below that the defendant-tenant along with his wife and sons had shifted to that newly acquired premises and disputed suit premises were left in the possession of his brothers which were not the tenants of landlord ever since beginning. 15. Mr. Arun Kumar Kalla has also relied upon the following case-laws. 16. In the case of Smt. Shakuntala S. Tiwari vs. Hem Chand M. Singhania reported in AIR 1987 SC 1823 on the issue of limitation has held as under: "Article 67 of the Limitation Act which has been set out hereinbefore indicates that time begins to run only when the tenancy is determined. It comprehends suit by a landlord and deals with right to recover possession from the tenant. Therefore, it deals with landlord and tenant. We are therefore unable to accept the argument of the respondent that limitation was inapplicable to ejectment." 17. In the case of M/s. Kamakshi Builders vs. M/s. Ambedkar Educational Society and Ors. reported in AIR 2007 SC 2191 has held as under: "30. Reliance placed by Mr. Parasaran on Article 67 of the Limitation Act is also not apposite. It is a special provision. In the case of M/s. Kamakshi Builders vs. M/s. Ambedkar Educational Society and Ors. reported in AIR 2007 SC 2191 has held as under: "30. Reliance placed by Mr. Parasaran on Article 67 of the Limitation Act is also not apposite. It is a special provision. It would apply in a case where a tenant has ceased to be tenant in terms of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Rent and Eviction Control) Act. A tenant continues to be a tenant despite termination of tenancy. Article 67 would not be attracted in a case where a tenant remains a statutory tenant. In a case of this nature, Article 65 would apply." 18. In the case of Rajendra Kumar Agarwal and Ors. vs. Eleventh Additional District Judge, Agra reported in AIR 2007 (NOC) 140 (All.) "The restrictions for evicting a tenant were therefore provided under the Act. Since the provisions of the State Rent Act were applicable to the property in issue the tenancy stood protected therein and would not come to an end only by virtue of the terms of the lease deed or by a notice under the Transfer of Property Act. The petitioners being statutory tenants cannot therefore claim benefit of the bar of Article 67 of the Indian Limitation Act." 19. In the case of Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by LRs. vs. Bishun Narain Inter College reported in AIR 1987 SC 1242 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issue of determination of age of senior citizen has held as under: "Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead, the court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal." 20. In the case of Shyam Lal @ Kuldeep vs. Sanjeev Kumar and Ors. In the case of Shyam Lal @ Kuldeep vs. Sanjeev Kumar and Ors. reported in 2009(3) CCC 138 (SC) = 2010(1) RLW 779 (SC) has held as under: "The findings of the learned District Judge holding Ex.P.2 to be a public document and admitting the same without formal proof cannot be questioned by the defendants in the present appeal since no objection was raised by them when such document was tendered and received in evidence. It has been held in Dasondha Singh and others vs. Zalam Singh and others (1998 (1) PLR 735) that an objection as to the admissibility and mode of proof of a document must be taken at the trial before it is received in evidence and marked as an exhibit. Even otherwise such a document falls within the ambit of Section 74, Evidence Act, and is admissible per se without formal proof." 21. In the case of Narender vs. Pradeep Kumar reported in 2005 CJ (Rent Control) 115 on the point of availability of alternative accommodation by way of purchase by the tenant's wife has held as under: "We fail to understand how can learned Single judge exercises extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 for the benefit of a person who himself has not pursued his application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was dismissed. The Rent Control Tribunal both on facts and law has found that the view taken by the Additional Rent Controller is correct as the wife of the tenant-respondent has purchased a flat and they have alternative accommodation. We do not see any ground for giving this latitude to the respondent." 22. In the case of Kannachankandi Chandan vs. Peetikakandy Achuthan reported in 2012 AIR SCW 3543, the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issue of availability of alternative accommodation has held as under: "12. In our considered view, the High Court has erred in reversing the findings of the Rent Control Appellate Authority by not allowing the eviction, especially when the tenant (1st respondent herein) had acquired another building in the same locality which is suitable for his business. The impugned judgment is, therefore, erroneous and unsustainable and the same is set aside." 23. In our considered view, the High Court has erred in reversing the findings of the Rent Control Appellate Authority by not allowing the eviction, especially when the tenant (1st respondent herein) had acquired another building in the same locality which is suitable for his business. The impugned judgment is, therefore, erroneous and unsustainable and the same is set aside." 23. In the case of M/s. Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. vs. H.C. Sharma reported in AIR 1988 SC 145 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issue of sub letting has held as under: "In the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the opinion that it was necessary for the tenant to obtain the consent in writing to subletting the premises. The mere permission or acquiescence will not do. The consent must be to the writing. Indeed there was no implied permission also here. Our attention was drawn to the fact that the landlord had written letter to the tenant and the landlord objected to the sub-letting the moment he realised the situation." 24. In the case of Tarak Nath Sha vs. Bhutoria reported in AIR 2002 SC 2057 on the issue of subletting has held as under: "14. In view of the discussion held above, we find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court setting aside the orders of the appellate authority and upholding the orders of the trial court, refusing to draw any inference of implied consent on the basis of inaction or conduct of the landlord. The consent as envisaged under Section 11(4)(i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1965 would mean consent with some positive act which may lead to interference of conferring right on the tenant to sub-let the premises and mere inaction would not be sufficient to amount to implied consent on the part of the landlord." 25. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, impugned orders and the case laws cited at the Bar. 26. This Court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition filed by the defendant-tenant Chetan Das is misconceived and deserves to be dismissed. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, impugned orders and the case laws cited at the Bar. 26. This Court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition filed by the defendant-tenant Chetan Das is misconceived and deserves to be dismissed. The said writ petition is not only not maintainable in view of Supreme Court decision in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetti (supra) as the only respondent is a landlord a private party and no government authority, Institution or State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is involved in the present dispute. Merely describing the writ petition as writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India does not bring it within the ambit and scope of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Essentially the present writ petition remains a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is not maintainable as such in view of aforesaid Supreme Court decision in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetti (supra), which is binding on this Court. The writ petition, therefore, deserves to be summarily dismissed. 27. Apart from this, this Court is constrained to observed that the petitioner-tenant has unnecessarily invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court seeking to frustrate the very purpose of new Rent Control Act, 2001 enacted within the State to expedite such trials and with the newly inserted provisions for senior citizens to recover immediate possession of their property from the tenants in terms of Section10 of the Act. The evidence on record amply proves that respondent-landlord Anusuya Tak was a senior citizen being 66 years of age as per her School Leaving Certificate (Annex. 14) at the time of filing of petition in the year 2005 and she had proved that she had no alternative accommodation in her own name in the same municipal area and therefore, she was entitled to a decree of eviction under Section 10 of the Act and the Tribunal have, therefore, rightly granted the decree under the new provisions of law in Section 10 of the new Rent Control law and no perversity or error is found in the same. At the same time, even the grounds of alternative accommodation acquired by the wife of the petitioner-tenant way back in the year 1988 and fact of tenant with his wife and sons family having shifted to that alternative accommodation was proved by the petitioner landlord and therefore, the grounds under Section 9 (1)(e),(f) were also established by the landlord. Merely because the defendant-tenant claimed that his brothers used to live with him ever since 1965 when the original tenancy was created in his favour, if does not make his brothers also the tenants of the landlord, as there is no privity of contract of tenancy with the brothers of the original tenant Mr. Chetan Das. The defendant-tenant has miserably failed to establish that he continues to live in the disputed rented premises behind Anand Cinema even after 1988 when the alternative accommodation at Mahamandir was purchased by his wife. In his statement in cross-examination, he also admitted that he is living at Mahamandir accommodation. Even the voters' list for election purposes were produced by the landlord in evidence showing his residential address at Mahamandir, Jodhpur and not behind Anand Cinema, Jodhpur, which in the opinion of this Court conclusively proves that the defendant-tenant had shifted to the alternative accommodation at Mahamandir. Merely the increase in number of members of family which is a natural phenomenon, is no ground to avoid eviction particularly when such increase in number of members of family of his brothers is also included therein and it does not frustrate the said ground even if it is shown that the alternative accommodation was purchased to accommodate such increase in the number of family members and therefore, the defendant-tenant continues to need the tenanted premises. The increase in number of family members over a large period is a natural phenomenon and that does not wash out the grounds of eviction established by the landlord in accordance with the provisions of law. 28. This Court in the case of Sampat Raj and ors. vs. Mohan Lal reported in (2012) 3 DNJ 1658 = 2013(1) RLW 817 with regard to the eviction matter on the ground of alternative accommodation has held as under: 10. 28. This Court in the case of Sampat Raj and ors. vs. Mohan Lal reported in (2012) 3 DNJ 1658 = 2013(1) RLW 817 with regard to the eviction matter on the ground of alternative accommodation has held as under: 10. Admittedly, there is no evidence on record, brought from the side of the defendant-tenant that their legal representatives, who are now contesting the present second appeal of the plaintiffs-landlord were ordinarily residing with the defendant-tenant, Mohan Lal, prior to his death on 23.9.1995 with him. The DW.1, Mohan Lal (tenant) himself averred in the statement recorded by the learned trial court that he was living separately from his family members in the suit premises. In the absence of any other evidence, this Court is bound to come to the conclusion that the legal representatives of defendant-Mohan Lal are not covered by the definition of "tenant" and did not inherit the rights of tenancy as envisaged under Section 3 (vii) of the Act of 1950 as they have failed to establish that they were ordinarily residing with defendant-tenant, Mohan Lal prior to his death on 23.9.1995. The substantial question of No. 3, therefore, is answered against the defendants-tenant (legal representatives of original defendant-tenant) and in favour of plaintiffs-appellants. 11. The substantial question No. 2, is as to whether the suitable residential accommodation was available to the defendant-tenant during his lifetime with the acquisition or purchase of alternative accommodation, a residential house, in the name of his wife, Smt. Sohini Devi, vide Exhibit-4, registered sale-deed on 6.3.1987 or not. This Court is again of the opinion that in the absense of wife-Smt. Sohini Devi, herself having been produced before the learned trial court, who could only be cross-examined by the plaintiffs to verify the truth in the statement of DW.1 Mohan Lal (tenant) himself that his relationship with his wife, Smt. Sohini Devi were strained and he was living separately from his wife in the suit premises for last 11-12 years, is the self-serving statement to avoid the ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(i) of the Act of 1950 of the defendant-tenant himself could not be believed. No other documentary evidence or oral evidence was led by the defendant-tenant to rebut the evidence led by the plaintiffs that the defendant himself has purchased one residential house with his own money vide seller Amrit Lal (PW2's statement), though in the name of his wife Smt. Sohini Devi and that such an alternative accommodation had thus become available to him, the learned trial court was justified in arriving at the conclusion that the tenant deserves to be evicted from the suit premises in view of such availability of alternative accommodation to him. The burden in this regard obviously shifted on the defendant himself to establish that alternative accommodation was not suitable to him for good reasons to be established by him. Neither any proceedings for matrimonial dispute between the two was adduced as an evidence nor any other neighbour or relative was produced before the court below to establish that the relationship between the two, were strained and the defendant-Mohan Lal himself was living separately from his family. On the other hand, in para 1 of the written statement, the defendant -Mohan Lal had clearly averred that he was living in the suit premises with his family for last 28 years. The said written statement was filed before the learned trial court on 27.7.1989 and the statements of the defendant-tenant. Mohan Lal were recorded by the learned trial court on 4.5.1993 after gap of 4 years, wherein the said defendant has stated that he was staying separately for last 12 years from his wife, and about 10 years back, his wife had purchased the house only her own funds. The contradictions in the written statement filed by the defendant-tenant and in his statements after four years, recorded by the court below is significant. Obviously, the person was not telling the truth before the Court. 12. Be that as it may, after the death of said person, this Court need not comment upon the false stand taken by him before the court below and suffice it to say that statement of said defendant-tenant, Mohan Lal that since he was living separately, the availability of alternative accommodation to him, was not there, is not a statement, which inspires any confidence; and consequently the learned trial court was justified in not believing the same and directing the eviction on the ground specified under Section 13(1)(i) of the Act of 1950, viz. availability, ownership being not relevant of alternative accommodation for residence of the defendant-tenant. The substantial question of No. 2 therefore, also deserves to be answered in favour of plaintiffs-appellants (landlord) and against the defendant-tenant. 29. In another case of Puran Indoria vs. Balashram Society-SBCSA No. 15/2006 decided on 6.9.2012 = 2013(1) RLW 601 has held as under: 19. The difference of the words in New Clause 9(i) with Section 13(1)(i) are that the word "suitable residence" has now been substituted by the word "suitable premises adequate for his requirement". The word "residence" has been omitted in the New Act and substituted by wider words "suitable premises" and "adequate for his requirement," which has obviously done away with the distinction between residential and non-residential accommodation under this Clause. Otherwise the language of the said two provisions is in pari materia. 20. The reason for amendment in New Clause 9(j) obviously was to avoid disputes on the question of fact as to whether the alternative accommodation of residence is suitable for the tenant or not and, therefore, it was to be presumed that if the tenant has built or acquired vacant possession or has been allotted suitable premises adequate for his requirement, he would be liable to be evicted from the suit premises in question. The overall purpose of Clause (i) of Section 13(1) of Old Act and Clause (j) of New Act is to provide a ground of eviction to the landlord, in case the tenant gets a suitable alternative accommodation on his own; whether built, acquired or allotted. 21. This clarification by amendment in new law can be employed even to interpret the provisions of old law. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pappu Sweets and Biscuits and another reported in (1998) 7 SCC 223 in para 13 held as under: "13. 21. This clarification by amendment in new law can be employed even to interpret the provisions of old law. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pappu Sweets and Biscuits and another reported in (1998) 7 SCC 223 in para 13 held as under: "13. The learned counsel for the appellant also drew our attention to a similar exemption notification for the subsequent period issued by the State of U.P. wherein the relevant item is worded thus: "Units making sweetmeats, namkin, reori, gazak (but excluding such confectionery manufacturing units as are registered under the Factories Act, 1948) and restaurants." The learned counsel submitted that subsequent legislation can be looked at in order to see what is the proper interpretation to be put upon the earlier legislation when the earlier legislation is found to be obscure or ambiguous or capable of more than one interpretation. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decisions of this Court in State of Bihar vs. S.K. Roy ( AIR 1966 SC 1995 ) and Yogender Nath Naskar vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1969) 1 SCC 555 . In Naskar's case (supra), this Court quoted with approval the following observations made in Cape Brandy Syndicate vs. I.R.C. (1921) 2 KB 403. "I think it is clearly established in Attorney General vs. Clarkson (1900) 1 QB 156 that subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous. I quite agree that subsequent legislation if it proceeded on an erroneous construction of previous legislation cannot alter that previous legislation; but if there be any ambiguity in the earlier legislation, then the subsequent legislation may fix the proper interpretation which is to be put upon the earlier Act." 35. In Section 13(1)(i) of the Rajasthan Act, no such distinction is to be found for making categorisation between the residential accommodations and non-residential accommodation of commercial accommodations for applying various grounds specified in Section 13(1) of the Rajasthan Act. No such distinction is made in the entire scheme of the Act and, therefore, such a distinction could not be read with the Clause (i) to read it in a restrictive manner, particularly when this Court finds that said Clause (i) is less than happily worded. No such distinction is made in the entire scheme of the Act and, therefore, such a distinction could not be read with the Clause (i) to read it in a restrictive manner, particularly when this Court finds that said Clause (i) is less than happily worded. Prior to the enactment of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001, the words "suitable residence" in Section 13(1)(i) of the Old Act of 1950 has also been deleted in the New Act of 2001 and the words "suitable premises adequate for his requirement" has been substituted in the New Act, but the ground for seeking eviction of tenant on the specified grounds of eviction to be established by the landlord continue to be same throughout since 1950 even after the enactment of 2001 Act and that is that the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant, if the tenant gets another suitable alternative accommodation; be it by building himself or acquired or be allotted through other agencies or persons. These three words "built, acquired or allotted are merely different modes of making available the alternative accommodation to the tenants and all the three words are not restricted by or pertain only to the end words of Clause (i) "suitable residence." 36. This Court is, therefore, of the clear and firm opinion that Section 31(1)(i) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act applies to all kinds of suit premises; be it residential or non-residential or commercial premises and the word "suitable residence" has to be read with the phrase after the word "or" employed in the said Clause (i) namely " been allotted a suitable residence." The Clause in its entirety read with phrase that "the tenant has able to build, acquire vacant possession of or has been allotted a suitable residence" does not create any invidious classification for two types of suit premises. If the phrase in the said clause 13(1)(i) after the "comma" is to be read as one phrase that would read like this "acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence." As already observed the language of Section 13(1)(i) is not happily worded and, which ambiguity has been sought to be remedied by provisions of Section 9(j) in the new Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 by deleting the words "residence" from Clause 9(j) and also deleting the "comma" which came after the word "built" in the old Section 13(1)(i) of the Act and substituting much wider terms like, "suitable premises adequate for his requirement" that makes the legislative intention clear that the Legislature did not want to create any difference or classification depending upon the user of the suit premises whether it is residential or commercial. Therefore, this amendment in law can also be used to uphold the interpretation of old provisions of Section 13(1)(i) of the Act, which has been taken in the present case by this Court. 37. In Precision Steel and Engineering Works and another vs. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal reported in 2003(2) SCC 236 , interpreting the words "premises let for residential purposes" and discussing the difference between the two categories of premises, namely, residential and non-residential, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the expression as used in Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 should be interpreted liberally and not technically or narrowly. The maximum "Ex abundanti cautela" was discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with the Explanation to Section 14(1)(e) has nothing to do with determining the main, principal or dominant purpose of letting and it is wrong to contend that the enactment of the Explanation is suggestive of the legislative intent that even incidental user for commercial or other purposes, if accompanied by the consent of the landlord would, take the premises out of the expression "premises let for residential purposes." The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted below for ready reference. "The expression "the premises let for residential purposes" should be construed liberally and not technically or narrowly; meaning thereby, where the premises are solely let for residential purposes they are undoubtedly covered by Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 but even when the premises are let out for composite or mixed purposes, if the predominant or main purpose of letting is for residential purposes, the same would be included with the expression "the premises let for residential purposes". An incidental, secondary or unauthorized user of the premises for purposes other than residence would not take the premises out of the meaning of the expression "the premises let for residential purposes." 38. Likewise, while interpreting Section 13(1)(i) of the Rent Control Act this Court is of the opinion that the objective of providing this as a ground of eviction of the legislature was not to restrict it only to the cases of residential accommodation but for both types of accommodation; residential and non-residential and the emphasis is on the availability of alternative accommodation and not on the word "residence" employed at the end of Section 13(1)(i) of the Act. As already aforesaid, this Clause is not happily worded and the word "premises" should be read in place of word "residence" as it existed in Section 13(1)(i) of the Act prior to the substitution of words "suitable premises adequate for his requirement" in the new Clause 9(j) in New Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001, which amendment was brought by the Legislation being conscious of this lacunae that the word "residence" could cause in the old law. 39. Since in the present case, from the facts above, it is clear that the tenant, who had the suit shop in question measuring 20x30 ft. 39. Since in the present case, from the facts above, it is clear that the tenant, who had the suit shop in question measuring 20x30 ft. situated at Udia Pole, Udaipur was using the same for commercial purposes only, by installing the lathe machines therein and was later on allotted a new plot at F-291, Madri Industrial Area, Udaipur, where he could easily shift his lathe machines also, since he was admittedly doing the fabrication works only at the industrial plot, in the considered opinion of this Court, the ground of eviction that an alternative accommodation became available to the tenant, stood established by the plaintiff landlord and the courts below were perfectly justified in decreeing the eviction suit on this ground in favour of the plaintiff-landlord and the substantial question of law framed above, therefore, deserves to be answered accordingly in favour of the plaintiff-landlord and against the defendant-tenant. The decree of eviction on this ground is, therefore, upheld and the defendant-tenant's appeal No. 15/2006 Puran Indoria vs. Balashram Society is dismissed, while the landlord- plaintiffs appeal No. 391/3007 - Balashram Society vs. Puran Indoria is being disposed of in the light of decision in tenant's appeal. No order as to costs." 30. The judgments relied upon by Mr. O.P. Mehta for tenant on the issue of limitation and alternative accommodation are not applicable in the facts of the present case. The time limit for filing application for eviction under 2001 Act is only directory, so also the other time limits for filing pleadings and deciding such application and therefore, the said application having now been decided on merits cannot be held to be time barred by any stretch of imagination. The limited scope under Article 227 of the Constitution of India a delineated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) does not permit any inference with the findings of facts on the basis of which eviction of tenant has been ordered and the present writ petition of the tenant deserves to be dismissed. 31. In view of above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ petition filed by the petitioner-tenant is not only not maintainable, but also deserves to be dismissed on merits as well. The same is accordingly dismissed with costs of Rs. 31. In view of above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ petition filed by the petitioner-tenant is not only not maintainable, but also deserves to be dismissed on merits as well. The same is accordingly dismissed with costs of Rs. 5000/- to be paid by the petitioner-tenant to the respondent-landlord within a period of three months. 32. The petitioner tenant and the concerned persons residing in the suit premises shall hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit property viz. house in question to the respondent-landlord within a period of six months from today i.e. on or before 31st July, 2013 and shall pay mesne profit @ Rs. 2,000/- per month commencing from February, 2013 and will further continue to pay the mesne profit each month by 15th day of the next succeeding month on in advance to the respondent also and in case there is any default in payment of mesne profit, the period of six months for eviction shall stand reduced and the judgment of eviction would become executable forthwith. The petitioner shall also clear all the arrears of rent and mesne profit and pay the same to the respondent within two months from today, otherwise the same will bear interest @ 9% per annum. The tenant shall also not sub-let, assign or part with the possession of the suit premises or any part thereof in favour of any one else and would not create any third party interest in the same during the aforesaid period and the same would be treated as void. The petitioner-tenant shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within one month from today and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. It is made clear that if the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit house is not handed over to the respondent-landlord within a period of six months from today or mesne profits are not paid as directed above, besides the expeditious execution of the decree in normal course, the respondent-landlord shall also be entitled to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. A copy of this judgment be sent to both the learned Rent Tribunals below and the concerned parties forthwith.