JUDGMENT BELA M. TRIVEDI, J. 1. All the three petitions involving similar issues were heard together and are being decided finally at the admission stage with the consent of the learned counsels for the parties, by this common order. The petition being SBCWP No. 10833 of 2014 filed by the petitioners Rajasthan Cricket Association and others was heard as a lead case and the paper books have also been prepared and submitted in the said petition accordingly. The facts of the said petition therefore are taken for consideration for the sake of convenience. The petitioners had sought amendment in the said petition after filing of the replies by the respondents and as per the amended petition, following prayers have been sought in the said petition:- “It is, therefore, humbly prayed that Your Lordships may be pleased to allow this writ petition and by issue an appropriate writ order or direction - (i) direct the respondent no.1 to 3 to provide adequate security and protection to the office bearers and other executive committee members of petitioner no. 1 association so that they can take charge of the office of the association and day to day activities of the petitioner no. 1 association do not suffer. (ii) direct the respondent no. 1,2 and 3 to restore the possession of RCA office situated in SMS Stadium, Jaipur to the office bearers of the petitioner no.1 association. (iii) direct that an enquiry may be initiated against respondent no.3 the then SHO Police Station Jyoti Nagar Jaipur for aiding and abetting the breaking of the office gates and allowing wrongful possession of the office of the petitioner no. 1 to respondent no.4 to 6 and various other unauthorized persons and anti social elements. (iv) direct that no interference shall be caused by respondent no.3 to 6 in the working of the office bearers of the petitioner no.1 association elected on 6.5.2014 and management of association by them. (iv-a) declare the purported requisition dated 24.7.2014 (Annexure-9), requisition dated 13.9.2014 (Annexure-10), purported notice dated 6.10.2014 (Annexure-12) and purported minutes of meeting dated 11.10.2014 (Annexure-11) to be illegal, bad in the eyes of law, void and nonest and set aside the same. (v) Any other order which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the present case may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioners.” 2. (v) Any other order which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the present case may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioners.” 2. CASE OF THE PETITIONERS 2(i) As per the case of the petitioners, the petitioner No.1 is a State Level Association registered under the Rajasthan Sports Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The petitioner No.2 is the President of the petitioner No.1 Association and also the President of Nagaur District Cricket Association. The petitioner No.2 has filed the petition through his constituted attorney Mr. Mehmood M. Abdi, who is also the petitioner No.5 herein. The petitioner No.3 is the Honorary Secretary of the petitioner NO.1 Association and also the Secretary of Dholpur District Cricket Association. The petitioner No.4 is the Honorary Treasurer of the petitioner NO.1 Association and also the Secretary of Alwar District Cricket Association. The petitioner No.5 is the Dy. President of the petitioner No.1 Association and also the President of Shriganganagar District Cricket Association. The petitioner No.6 is the Vice President of the petitioner NO.1 Association and also the Secretary of Bikaner District Cricket Association. The petitioner No.7 is the Vice President of the petitioner No.1 Association and also the Secretary of Jhunjhunu District Cricket Association. The petitioner No.8 is the Vice President of the petitioner No.1 Association and also the Secretary of the Churu District Cricket Association. The petitioner No.9 is the Joint Secretary of the petitioner No.1 Association and also the Secretary of the Banswara District Cricket Association. The petitioner No.10 is the Joint Secretary of the petitioner No.1 Association and also the Secretary of Shriganganagar District Cricket Association. The petitioner No.11 is the Organising Secretary of the petitioner No.1 Association and also the Secretary of the Bharatpur District Cricket Association and the petitioner No.12 is the Organising Secretary of the petitioner No.1 Association and also the President of Jalore District Cricket Association. 2(ii). The respondent No.1 is the State of Rajasthan and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are the Commissioner of Police, Jaipur, and the SHO, Police Station Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur respectively. 2(ii). The respondent No.1 is the State of Rajasthan and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are the Commissioner of Police, Jaipur, and the SHO, Police Station Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur respectively. According to the petitioners, the respondent No.4 was the elected Vice President of petitioner No.1 Association and also the Secretary of Kota District Cricket Association, and the respondent No.5 was the elected Joint Secretary of petitioner No.1 Association and also the Secretary of Chittorgarh District Cricket Association, and the respondent No.6 was the Secretary of Jaipur District Cricket Association, however now the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 have been suspended and placed under inquiry by the petitioner No.1. 2(iii) It is further case of the petitioners that pursuant to the order dated 20.11.13 passed by the Apex Court in SLP No. 36140 of 2012, the elections of the Executive Committee of the RCA took place on 19.12.13 under the supervision of Hon'ble Mr. Jutice N.M. Kasliwal (Retd.) and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.P. Pathak (Retd.), appointed as the Principal Observer and the Observer respectively by the Apex Court. As per the result declared on 6.5.14 a certificate of election was given to the 21 members of the new executive body, whereby the petitioner Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were elected as the office bearers and petitioner Nos. 5 to 12 as the other members. The respondent Nos. 4 and 5 were also elected as the office bearers amongst others. The said certificate of election dated 6.5.14 is produced by the petitioners as Annex.2. 2(iv). It has been alleged by the petitioners that on 11.10.14 a mob of about 100 persons led by the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6, forcibly entered the office of RCA situated at S.M.S. Stadium, Jaipur at around 7.00 P.M., and the said mob broke down the electronic security controlled glass doors which, controlled the access to the first floor offices of the office bearers. The petitioner No. 9 and 10 therefore gave information to the Police Station, Jyoti Nagar. As per the further case of the petitioners, though the respondent No.3 SHO, Police Station, Jyoti Nagar alongwith other police personnel had come to the site, and in whose presence the breaking of glass doors etc took place, he did not take any action against any miscreants and allowed acts of vandalism to continue. As per the further case of the petitioners, though the respondent No.3 SHO, Police Station, Jyoti Nagar alongwith other police personnel had come to the site, and in whose presence the breaking of glass doors etc took place, he did not take any action against any miscreants and allowed acts of vandalism to continue. According to the petitioners, the said SHO also took the main key of the first floor offices from the petitioner No. 10, assuring him that the said key would be handed over to the Honorary Secretary of the Association. Since the petitioner No.3, the Secretary of the Association had to go to Dholpur on that day, he left at around 3.00 P.M., and when he returned on the next day i.e. on 12.10.14 he went to the Jyoti Nagar Police Station alongwith the petitioner Nos. 9, 10 and 11 to take the keys of the office., however at that time the respondent No. 4 alongwith his supporters had already reached the Police Station and the respondent No.3 instead of handing over the keys to the petitioner No.3, handed over the same to the respondent No.4. Thus, according to the petitioners, the respondent No.3 had facilitated the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 to occupy the office of RAC forcibly, who subsequently destroyed and removed the record and articles kept in the said office. According to the petitioners, they had by separate communications dated 14.10.14 brought to the notice of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 about the said incident and requested to take action on urgent basis, however no action was taken against the respondent No.3 or respondent Nos. 4 to 6. 2(v). It is further case of the petitioners that the respondent No.4 had claimed that he had brought No Confidence Motion against the elected President Lalit Modi, i.e. the petitioner No.2, the Secretary Somendra Tiwari i.e. the petitioner No.3, the Treasurer Pawan Goyal i.e. the petitioner No.4 and the Dy. President Mehmood Abdi i.e. the petitioner No.5, in a meeting held on 11.10.14, and it was resolved in the said meeting to remove the said four petitioners as the office bearers and to appoint the respondent No.4 Amin Pathan as the Officiating President, the respondent No.5 Shakti Singh Rathore as the Officiating Secretary and the respondent No.6 Mohammed Iqbal as the Officiating Treasurer. The copy of minutes of the said meeting alongwith the resolutions is produced as Annex.11 to the petition. According to the petitioners, there was no extraordinary General Meeting ever convened and held as per the provisions of the Byelaws nor any requisition or notice of such meeting was ever given, and the said respondents had fabricated the documents signed by unauthorised and fictitious persons. Hence, the petition was filed. 3. CASE OF THE RESPONDENTS: 3(i). The petition has been resisted by the respondents by filing separate replies. In the reply filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3, the allegations against the respondent No.3 Shri Vivek Singh, SHO, Police Station Jyoti Nagar have been denied by them and they have further contended that no key of RCA office was taken by the respondent No.3 and that the said Officer was present on and during the day of incident at the site only with a view to maintain law and order situation. These respondents have produced on record the case diary dated 11.10.14 and 12.10.14 maintained by the respondent No.3 SHO as Annexure-R/1. 3(ii) The respondent No.4 has filed the reply raising preliminary objections as to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that there being specific provision contained under Section 16 of the said Act for referring the dispute touching the Constitution and Management Committee, to the arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the judicial intervention was totally barred under Section 5 of the said Arbitration Act. It has also been contended that the petitioners with a view to circumvent the said provision of arbitration had concocted the story for the purpose of filing the writ petition which is wholly misconceived and the petition was filed abusing the process of court. As regards the alleged incident of 11.10.14, it has been contended that on the date of declaration of the result of election on 6.5.14, the Apex Body of the Game of Cricket i.e. the Board for Control of Cricket in India had suspended the membership of the RCA, as Mr. Lalit Modi was declared as the elected President of RCA. Mr. Lalit Modi having been found guilty of serious misconduct and indiscipline, the BCCI vide the resolution dated 25.9.13 had already expelled him from the BCCI. According to the respondent NO.4, the said President Mr. Lalit Modi was declared as the elected President of RCA. Mr. Lalit Modi having been found guilty of serious misconduct and indiscipline, the BCCI vide the resolution dated 25.9.13 had already expelled him from the BCCI. According to the respondent NO.4, the said President Mr. Lalit Modi was staying in London for the last few years and had failed to discharge his duties towards the game of cricket and the Dy. President Mr. Mehmood Abdi, who was the resident of Mumbai and the Secretary Somendra Tiwari and the Treasurer Pawan Goyal were managing the affairs of RCA in an arbitrary manner and, therefore large majority of the members of RCA were not satisfied with the functioning of RCA. The majority of members therefore submitted requisition to the Secretary RCA on 24.7.14 for convening a general body meeting but the Secretary ignored the said requisition and therefore another requisition was given on 13.9.14 showing 'No Confidence' against all the members responsible, however no heed was paid to the said requisitions by the Secretary. The respondent No.4 has produced the copies of the said requisitions as Annex.R-4/3 and R-4/4 respectively. According to this respondent under the peculiar circumstances, on 11.10.14, 22 members out of 33 members, which was equal to 2/3rd of total voting members had assembled, in response to an intimation given by the Joint Secretary, Mr. Shakti Singh the respondent No.5 herein, and convened an extraordinary general meeting, and had passed special resolution of 'No Confidence Motion' unanimously to remove all the four office bearers i.e. the President Lalit Modi, Dy. President Mr. Mehmood Abdi, the Secretary Mr. Somendra Tiwari and the Treasurer Mr. Pawan Goyal. It has also been contended that the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 and other persons who were the office bearers of 22 District Associations had come to Jaipur for the extraordinary general meeting on 11.10.14 and had unanimously approved the resolution in question. The copies of the affidavits of the said members have been produced collectively as Annex.R-4/6. According to the respondent No.4, the said members had legal right to visit the RCA office and that the story of mob of 100 persons having come to the RCA office and broke down the doors etc. was absolutely a concocted story. The copies of the affidavits of the said members have been produced collectively as Annex.R-4/6. According to the respondent No.4, the said members had legal right to visit the RCA office and that the story of mob of 100 persons having come to the RCA office and broke down the doors etc. was absolutely a concocted story. It has been further contended that the petitioners had not filed any complaint against anybody and instead of taking action in accordance with law, the petition was filed with ulterior motives. Denying the allegations about the handing over the key of the RCA office by the SHO, it is contended that the SHO, Police Station, Jyoti Nagar was called by the petitioners themselves after the charge of officiating office bearers was assumed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 in usual peaceful manner and the respondent No.3 SHO had gone back after doing his duty. It is submitted that the special resolution was passed unanimously by 22 voting members out of total 33 members, which was the quorum required under Article 19-A of the Byelaws of the RCA, and therefore taking over the charge was merely a formality which was done in a peaceful manner. 3(iii). The respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have also filed separate replies supporting the contentions raised in the reply filed by the respondent No.4 and further contending interalia that the 21 days emergent in nature. However, the notices were sent by hand and the members were also communicated through telephonic message. According to these respondents the petitioners were also sought to be given notice, however they refused to accept the same and refused to participate in the meeting. According to them nothing illegal or unlawful had happened in the RCA office on 11.10.14 and the petitioners had concocted the documents as well as the story with a view to abuse the process of law by filing the present petition. It has also been denied that on 13.10.14, 19 district cricket association had held a meeting and they had reposed confidence in the executive committee. According to them, the petitioners had shown fictitious members, who were not held to be the valid members by the concerned District Court and also by the Principal Observer Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.M. Kasliwal before holding the election on 19.12.13. According to them, the petitioners had shown fictitious members, who were not held to be the valid members by the concerned District Court and also by the Principal Observer Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.M. Kasliwal before holding the election on 19.12.13. The respondents have also filed additional replies after the amendment of the petition by the petitioners. 4. The petitioners have filed the rejoinder to the reply to the writ petition filed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 6, reiterating the allegations made in the petition and further contending interalia that the meeting dated 11.10.14 was not convened as per the Byelaws, as the concerned respondents had not sent the notices to the office bearers, executive members and the affiliated organisations as contemplated in Article 13(f) of the Byelaws. It is also contended that the members purporting to represent the districts shown in the said meeting, actually did not represent the respective district cricket associations and hence neither the quorum nor the 3/4th majority was present to carry out the No Confidence Motion. The respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have also filed their sur-rejoinder to the rejoinder filed by the petitioners. 5. The court at the first instance while issuing the notice to the respondents vide order dated 17.10.14 had directed the Chairman, Rajasthan State Sports Council to manage the affairs of RCA, by way of an interim measure and the said arrangement is continued till this date. The Rajasthan State Sports Council, who is party-respondent No.2 in the petition being No. 10877 of 2014 filed by Alwar District Cricket Association and others, has filed the reply in the said petition contending interalia that pursuant to the said order passed by the court, the Chairman of the said council has taken over the charge of the office of RCA. 6. The respective counsels for the petitioners and for the respondents have made their elaborate submissions and have relied upon number of judgments of the Apex Court, of this Court and other High Courts in support of their respective submissions, which shall be dealt with hereinafter at the appropriate stages. However, before adverting to their respective submissions, it would be appropriate to reproduce certain relevant provisions of the said Act and of the Constitution of RCA. 7. PROVISIONS OF LAW 7(i). However, before adverting to their respective submissions, it would be appropriate to reproduce certain relevant provisions of the said Act and of the Constitution of RCA. 7. PROVISIONS OF LAW 7(i). So far as the said Act is concerned, as per its long title, the said Act has been enacted to provide for registration, recognition and regulation of Sports Associations and to facilitate and regulate the activities and affairs of the Sports Associations in the State of Rajasthan and also to provide for recognition and regularisation of the right to represent the State of Rajasthan and the various Revenue Districts in the State. Section 2 of the said Act pertains to definitions. As per Section 2(i) “Executive Body” means a group of duly elected persons who manage and control the affairs of a Sports Association, by whatever name such body may be called. As per Section 2(j) “Extraordinary General Meeting” means a special meeting of the General Body of a Sports Association other than an Annual General Meeting. Section 2(k)defines “General Body” as the body of all voting and nonvoting members of a Sports Association. As per Section 2(n) “Office Bearer” means any person who holds the post of the President, Secretary or Treasurer in the Executive Body of a Sports Association. As per Section 2(t) “Special Resolution” means a resolution passed by two third majority of members present and voting in a General Body meeting, the minutes of which meeting are recorded and signed by the Office Bearers and attested by the Observer, if any, presence of at least half of the total number of voters shall constitute a quorum for this purpose. Section 7 of the said Act requires the Sports Association to frame its Constitution, which should consist of (a) Part 'A'- Memorandum containing its aims and objectives and area of operation; and (b) Part 'B'- Byelaws. Section 8 pertains to the Byelaws, and the relevant part thereof reads as under:- “8. Byelaws--(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every Sports Association which seeks registration under this Act shall make amongst other things, the following provisions in its Byelaws:- (a) Executive Body of the Sports Association shall be elected in a democratic manner in periodical elections. (b) Elections of the Executive Body shall be held at least once in every four years. (b) Elections of the Executive Body shall be held at least once in every four years. (c) District Level Associations shall make provisions to abide by those decisions or directions of the concerned State Level Sports Association, which are in consonance with the provisions of this Act. (d) Provisions to encourage the Sports and Sports persons of every section of society without any discrimination.” 7(ii). As per Section 11, the composition of executive body of a Sports Association should be a minimum of five and a maximum of twenty one members including the Office Bearers. Section 16 pertains to Conciliation and Arbitration, which reads as under:- “16. Conciliation and Arbitration-(1) If any dispute arises touching the constitution, management activity, election or claim to affiliation of any Sports Association, the same shall be resolved through conciliation and arbitration. (2) The arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Central Act No. 26 of 1996), as amended from time to time, shall apply to the conciliation and arbitration proceedings referred under sub-sec.(1).” 7(iii). So far as the Constitution of RCA is concerned, the same has been produced by the petitioners at Annex.3 to the petition, which includes Part-'A'-Memorandum and Part-'B'-Byelaws. Relevant part of Article 10 which deals with Executive Committee, is reproduced as under:- “Art. 10. Executive Committee. (a) The Executive Committee shall consist of President-One Post, Deputy President-One Post, Vice Presidents-Six Posts, Hon. Secretary-One Post, Hon. Treasurer-One Post, Hon. Jt. Secretary-Four Posts, Hon. Organizing Secretary-Four Posts, Executive Member-Three Posts. (b) The tenure of the Executive Committee/office bearer shall be four years. However, General Body by special resolution shall have right to suspend and recall any member of the executive committee/office bearer after holding an enquiry through a committee appointed by the elected President, who shall direct enquiry to be conducted by such constituted Committee after framing definite charges against such members of the executive committee/office bearer proposed to be recalled.” 7(iv). Article 13 of the Byelaws pertains to the Meetings of General Body, the relevant part thereof is reproduced as under :- “13(a)........ (b) Special Meetings. An extra ordinary General Meeting of General Body can be convened by the Hony. Secretary whenever he thinks fit for within 30 days of receipt of requisition by minimum five affiliated Organizations specifying the business for which the Meeting is to be convened. No other business shall be transacted at such a Meeting. (b) Special Meetings. An extra ordinary General Meeting of General Body can be convened by the Hony. Secretary whenever he thinks fit for within 30 days of receipt of requisition by minimum five affiliated Organizations specifying the business for which the Meeting is to be convened. No other business shall be transacted at such a Meeting. (c) No business other than the formal adjournment of the Meeting shall be transacted at any meeting unless a quorum be present. No quorum will be necessary for an adjourned meeting. (d) ...... (e) ..... (f) Notice: Notice of every Meeting shall be sent under Registered Post/approved Courier Service to the Office Bearers, Executive Member and the affiliated Organisation 21 days prior to the date fixed for such meeting. Such notice shall specify the date, time and place of such meeting and the nature of business to be transacted and in case of AGM, shall be accompanied by report of the Hony. Secretary, audited statements of accounts for the past years, provided always that the accidental omission to give any such notice or documents to any person entitled thereto or its non receipt by him shall not invalidate the proceedings at any meeting. Any dispute regarding the date of the notice sent would be settled by a reference to the Dispatch Register of RCA.” 7(v). Article 19-A of the Byelaws which pertains to No Confidence Motion reads as under:- “The General Body in its meeting by a resolution if passed a no-confidence-motion against any of the office bearers or Executive Member such office bearer or Executive member shall cease to hold office in association immediately after such resolution is passed. However such resolution should be passed by 3/4th majority of voting members present and voting in General Body meeting the minutes of which meeting are recorded and signed by the office bearers and attested by the Observer, if any, present. At least 2/3rd of the total number of voters shall constitute a quorum for this purpose.” 8. RE: MAINTAINABILITY OF PETITION: 8(i). In the light of the aforesaid provisions of the said Act and of the Byelaws, framed by the RCA under the said Act, let us appreciate the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties. In the instant case, the learned senior counsels Mr. A.K. Sharma for the respondent No.4 and Mr. R.N. Mathur for the respondent Nos. In the light of the aforesaid provisions of the said Act and of the Byelaws, framed by the RCA under the said Act, let us appreciate the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties. In the instant case, the learned senior counsels Mr. A.K. Sharma for the respondent No.4 and Mr. R.N. Mathur for the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 pressing into service the provisions contained in Section 16 of the said Act, had raised preliminary objection by submitting that in view of the said statutory provisions in the Act itself, the present petition pertaining to the dispute touching the Constitution and management activity is not maintainable. According to them the petitioners in order to circumvent the said provision had concocted the story of the incident of 11.10.14 making the false allegations against the respondents and had attempted to commit fraud by producing fabricated documents. They also submitted that the petitions filed by the petitioners were not only misconceived, but involved disputed questions of facts, which could not be entertained while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Relying upon the decision of this court in case of Suratram vs. The Addl. D.D.O., Ajmer & Others, AIR 1979 Raj. 186 , Mr. Mathur for the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 submitted that unless substantial failure of justice or substantial injury is shown the writ petitions under Article 226 should not be entertained even if the impugned order is patently without jurisdiction or against law. According to him, if the elected members had lost the confidence of majority of members of the Association, they should not come forward to seek protection under the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8(ii). However, the learned counsel Mr. S.S. Hora for the petitioners submitted that the alternative remedy on the ground of arbitration clause is not an absolute bar to the invocation of writ jurisdiction and that it is for the High Court to satisfy itself whether the case warrants an exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or not. S.S. Hora for the petitioners submitted that the alternative remedy on the ground of arbitration clause is not an absolute bar to the invocation of writ jurisdiction and that it is for the High Court to satisfy itself whether the case warrants an exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or not. He also submitted that the present petition has also been filed against the State Government and the Police Commissioner and the concerned SHO, who had failed to discharge their duties, and the provision of arbitration contained in the said Act could not be made applicable to them, they being not the members of the RCA. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. Jayesh H. Pandya & Another, AIR 2003 SC 2252 , he has submitted that if the subject matter involves arbitration as well as other disputes, bifurcation of cause of action or bifurcation of the parties in the petition filed against several respondents cannot be allowed. He has also relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in case of ABL International Ltd. & Another vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. & Others, 2004 (3) SCC 553 , in case of Sayed Maqbool Ali vs. State of U.P. & Another 2011 (15) SCC 383 and in case of Union of India & Others vs. Tantia Construction Private Ltd. 2011 (5) SCC, 697 in support of his submissions that the powers of High Court under Article 226 cannot be fettered by any alternative remedy. 8(iii). Now, so far as the existence of alternative remedy is concerned, though it is true that as per Section 16 of the said Act, any dispute, touching the Constitution and management activity of any Sports Association, is required to be resolved through conciliation and arbitration as per the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, it is required to be noted that in the instant case, the petitioners have also sought reliefs against the State and its machineries alongwith the reliefs against the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 who are the members of the RCA. Therefore as rightly submitted by Mr. Hora for the petitioners, the disputes involved in the petition could not be said to be the dispute touching the Constitution and management activity of the RCA alone. 4, 5 and 6 who are the members of the RCA. Therefore as rightly submitted by Mr. Hora for the petitioners, the disputes involved in the petition could not be said to be the dispute touching the Constitution and management activity of the RCA alone. It is also true that there are certain disputed questions of facts involved in the petition, which this court exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution could not decide, however as per the settled legal position, mere existence of disputed questions of facts ipso facto would not prevent the writ court from entertaining the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court in catena of decisions has held that though a writ petition involving serious disputed questions of facts, should not normally be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, however merely because a question of fact is raised by the respondents, the High Court would not be justified in requiring the party to seek relief by somewhat lengthy, dilatory and expensive process by a civil suit or other alternative remedy. That apart, since the petitions have been heard at length finally at the admission stage, with the consent of the learned counsels for the parties, who have addressed the court on all the issues involved, the existence of alternative remedy of arbitration or the civil suit loses its significance. 9. RE: PRAYERS FOR POLICE PROTECTION, RESTORATION OF POSSESSION AND INQUIRY AGAINST THE RESPONDENT NO.3: As regards the relief for providing adequate security and protection to the office bearers, it was sought to be submitted by the learned counsel Mr. Hora for the petitioners that the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 having forcibly entered the office of the RCA with the help of mob of 100 persons which included some anti-social elements, it has become difficult for the petitioners, who are the elected members and office bearers of the RCA to carry out the day-to-day activities of the association. He also submitted that the respondent Nos. 3, who was the concerned SHO of Police Station, Jyoti Nagar had also helped the respondent Nos. He also submitted that the respondent Nos. 3, who was the concerned SHO of Police Station, Jyoti Nagar had also helped the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 and other persons to enter the said office and it was the respondent No.3 who had taken the main key of the first floor of the office of the RCA from the petitioner No.10 on 11.10.14 and had handed over the same to the respondent No.4, on 12.10.14. According to the learned counsel Mr. Hora, the said action of the respondent No.3 virtually amounted to dispossessing the petitioners from the office premises of the RCA and such an action was not only arbitrary and illegal but was also a misuse of his power and position as an SHO. Mr. Hora further submitted that though the FIR was sought to be lodged by the petitioners against the concerned respondents and other persons for the alleged incident, the respondent No.3 did not register the FIR and therefore the petitioners were required to write letters to the Commissioner of Police and the Chief Secretary on 14.10.14, which are on record at Annex.7 and 8. He therefore submitted that under the circumstances, this is a fit case not only to restore the possession of the office of RCA to the petitioners but to provide adequate protection to the office bearers and other executive members, and also to direct the respondent No.2 to initiate the enquiry against the respondent No.3 who had failed to discharge his duties and had aided and abetted the offences committed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 6. 10. Per contra, it has been submitted by the learned senior counsel Mr. A.K. Sharma for the respondent No.4 that no such incident as alleged by the petitioners had taken place on 11.10.14 and the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 being the office bearers and other members of RCA had legally and peacefully gone to the office of RCA for taking the charge. According to him, it was the petitioner No. 10 who had called the police, and the SHO having found that there was peaceful taking over of charge of the office of RCA by the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 and other members, he had left the site without taking any further action. According to him, it was the petitioner No. 10 who had called the police, and the SHO having found that there was peaceful taking over of charge of the office of RCA by the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 and other members, he had left the site without taking any further action. Relying upon the decision of P.R. Murlidharan & Others vs. Swami Dharmanananda Theertha Padar & Others, 2006 (4) SCC 501 , he submitted that no such police protection as sought by the petitioners could be granted for discharging the official functions, more particularly in the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Relying upon decision of the Apex Court in case of Sakiri Vasu vs. State of U.P. & Others, (2008) 2 SCC 409 , he submitted that the High Court should not entertain the writ petition when the remedies under the Cr. P.C. are provided in the matter of non-registration of FIR or improper investigation. 11. As regards the submissions made by the learned counsels on providing the police protection, it may be stated that such remedy would fall within the purview of private law remedy. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel Mr. A.K. Sharma for the respondents, writ of mandamus directing protection in respect of the office or property or status which is in dispute, and in respect of which rights are still to be adjudicated upon, could not be issued, unless the possession of the property or the office, in respect of which protection is sought, has been established by the persons seeking such protection. In the instant case, even as per the case of the petitioners, the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 had forcibly entered the office of the RCA and had taken the possession of the office of RCA. Hence, unless the petitioners' possession or the right of the petitioners to possess the office of RCA is established, no such protection as prayed for could be granted. 4 to 6 had forcibly entered the office of the RCA and had taken the possession of the office of RCA. Hence, unless the petitioners' possession or the right of the petitioners to possess the office of RCA is established, no such protection as prayed for could be granted. As held by the Apex Court in case of P.R. Murlidharan vs. Swami Dharmananda (supra), it is one thing to say that in a given case a person may be held to be entitled to police protection, having regard to threat perception but it is another thing to say that he is entitled thereto for holding an office and discharging certain functions when his right to do so is open to question. In that view of the matter, it is difficult to grant the prayer for providing police protection to the petitioners for taking over the charge of the office of RCA. 12. The law is also well settled by the Apex Court with regard to the procedure to be followed by the person aggrieved, when his FIR is not registered or the investigation is not being carried out by the concerned police officer legally and in fair manner. In case of Sakiri Vasu vs. State of U.P. (supra), it has been held by the Apex Court in para 26 as under:- “26. If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police station his first remedy is to approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154 (3) Cr. PC or other police officer referred to in Section 36CrPC. If despite approaching the Superintendent of Police or the officer referred to in Section 36 his grievance still persists, then he can approach a Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr PC instead of rushing to the High Court by way of a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr PC. Moreover, he has a further remedy of filing a criminal complaint under Section 200CrPC. Whey then should writ petition or Section 482 petitions be entertained when there are so many alternative remedies?” 13. In the instant case , apart from the fact that there is nothing on the record except bare allegations made by the learned counsels for the petitioners that the petitioner had sought to lodge the complaint against the respondent Nos. Whey then should writ petition or Section 482 petitions be entertained when there are so many alternative remedies?” 13. In the instant case , apart from the fact that there is nothing on the record except bare allegations made by the learned counsels for the petitioners that the petitioner had sought to lodge the complaint against the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 and others for the alleged incident of breaking down the electronic doors of RCA office with unauthorised persons on 11.10.14 with the help of respondent No.3 SHO, the learned counsels for the petitioners have also failed to explain as to why the procedure as laid down under the Cr. P.C. more particularly approaching the concerned court for filing complaint was not resorted to. Though Mr. Hora had placed heavy reliance on the report contained in the case diary produced by the respondent No.3 alongwith his reply, to submit that even as per the said report, the respondent No.3 had gone to the office of RCA on 11.10.14 and had come back after following the instructions of the high officers and after settling the law and order situation. According to Mr. Hora, the said case diary speaks volume and supports the allegations made by the petitioners that a riotous situation had taken place at the office of RCA, and that the SHO had acted on the instructions received by him from his higher officers. Though there is some substance in the said submission made by Mr. Hora, it is difficult to accept all allegations made by the petitioners against the respondent No.3 as the gospel truth and direct the respondent No.2 to initiate enquiry against him as sought to be prayed in the petition. As stated earlier, it was open for the petitioners to follow legal recourse as provided under the Cr. P.C. which they had failed to do so. Therefore, the prayer for initiating action against the respondent No.3 SHO also could not be granted in this petition. RE: IMPUGNED PROCEEDINGS AND RESOLUTIONS: The main thrust of the petitions is the challenge to the proceedings and the resolutions passed by the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 and other members in the alleged extraordinary general body meeting held at Hotel Indiana, Tonk Road, Jaipur on 11.10.14, passing the no confidence motion against the petitioner Nos. RE: IMPUGNED PROCEEDINGS AND RESOLUTIONS: The main thrust of the petitions is the challenge to the proceedings and the resolutions passed by the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 and other members in the alleged extraordinary general body meeting held at Hotel Indiana, Tonk Road, Jaipur on 11.10.14, passing the no confidence motion against the petitioner Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 and removing them from the post of President, Secretary, Treasurer and Dy. President respectively, and further resolving and approving the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 as the officiating President, Secretary and Treasurer of the RCA. 15. It has been vehemently submitted by the learned counsel Mr. S.S. Hora for the petitioners that the petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 having been validly elected as the office bearers of the association in the election held under the supervision of the observers appointed by the Supreme Court, they could not have been removed under the guise of no confidence motion allegedly passed in the extraordinary general body meeting, held by the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 and others dehors the provisions contained in the said Act and the Byelaws of the RCA. Pressing into the service various provisions of the Act and the Byelaws, Mr. Hora submitted that there was no requisition submitted nor any notice given to the members of the RCA as contemplated in Article 13(f) of the Byelaws, and that the concerned petitioners were sought to be removed as the office bearers by the concerned respondents and other so-called members of the executive committee in a clandestine manner, fabricating the documents of the requisitions and notices. He further submitted that admittedly the notices of 21 days as required under Article 13(f) were not given to the office bearers and the members of the executive committee, and that the so-called notices were also not given by the registered post or through approved couriers as required under the said Article. 16. Relying upon the provisions contained in Section 8(1)(b) of the said Act and Article 10(b) of the Byelaws, Mr. 16. Relying upon the provisions contained in Section 8(1)(b) of the said Act and Article 10(b) of the Byelaws, Mr. Hora submitted that the tenure of the office bearers was for four years, and even if a no confidence motion was to be passed against any of the office bearers, the quorum of atleast two third of the total number of voters, and three fourth majority of the voting members present was required as per Article 19-A of the Byelaws. According to him apart from the fact that many members allegedly present in the meeting held by the concerned respondents on 11.10.14 were not the valid members of the association and, therefore, the quorum was not duly constituted, the resolution could not be said to have been passed by the majority inasmuch as if proper notices were given to all the 33 members, they all would have remained present in the said meeting and in that case three fourth of the majority of voting members present would have been 25 and not 22. According to him non-service of notices as contemplated in the Byelaws had vitiated and invalidated the entire proceedings conducted by the concerned respondents on 11.10.14. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta & Another vs. Ruby General Hospitals Ltd. & Others, 2006 (7) SCC 613 and in case of Dankha Devi Agrawal vs. Delhi Properties Pvt. Ltd & Others, 2006 (7) SCC 382 , he submitted that in similar circumstances where the proper notices were not given to the shareholders, the Apex Court had held such proceedings as invalid. He has also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Sayed Maqbool Ali vs. State of U.P. (supra) and Ravi Yashwant Bhoir vs. District Collector, Raigarh, 2012 (4) SCC 407 to submit that even if it is assumed that the elected official did not have an absolute or vested right to hold the post, he could not be removed without strictly adhering to the provisions provided in the Statute for his removal. 17. The learned senior counsel Mr. Sudhir Gupta appearing for the petitioners in the petition being No.10878/14 filed on behalf of Shriganganagar District Cricket Association, supporting the submissions made by the learned counsel Mr. 17. The learned senior counsel Mr. Sudhir Gupta appearing for the petitioners in the petition being No.10878/14 filed on behalf of Shriganganagar District Cricket Association, supporting the submissions made by the learned counsel Mr. Hora, further submitted that as per Article 13(b) of the Byelaws, the extraordinary general body meeting could be convened by the Hony. Secretary on the receipt of the requisition by minimum five members, specifying the business for which the meeting is to be convened and no business other than the business mentioned in the requisition could be transacted at such meeting. According to him, the documents of the requisition and the notices were concocted by the concerned respondents subsequently, however, even if they are believed to be genuine documents then also the agenda set out in the said requisitions and the notices did not match the resolution passed in the so-called extraordinary general body meeting held on 11.10.14. Relying upon the decision of Apex Court in case of Parbeen Ram Phukan vs. State of Assam, 2014 (14) Scale 369, he submitted that there is a distinction between non service of notice and a notice though served but with some kind of procedural irregularity in servicing, and that in case of the formal category of cases, all consequential actions if taken would be rendered bad in law once the fact of non-service is proved, whereas in case of later category of cases, the consequential action if taken could be sustained. According to him admittedly the notices of the no confidence motion were not served upon all the members of the executive committee, and therefore the impugned resolution passed by the respondents and other members was invalid and nonest in the eye of law. 18. The learned senior counsel Mr. K.K. Sharma for the petitioners in the petition being No. 10878 of 2014 filed by Alwar District Cricket Association also adopted the submissions made by the learned counsel Mr. Hora and Mr. Sudhir Gupta and further submitted that the said Act did not provide for the removal of the elected body, and that the tenure of the executive committee being of four years, the removal of the concerned petitioners as the office bearers was not only dehors the Act but was in violation of the settled concept of democracy. Mr. Sudhir Gupta and further submitted that the said Act did not provide for the removal of the elected body, and that the tenure of the executive committee being of four years, the removal of the concerned petitioners as the office bearers was not only dehors the Act but was in violation of the settled concept of democracy. Mr. Sharma has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Mohan Lal Tripathi vs. District Magistrate Raebareli, 1992 (4) SCC 80 to submit that the right of elected body to govern is a special right created by the Statute and therefore right to remove the elected body also must stem out of the Statute only. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Meera Sahni vs. Lt. Governor Delhi & Others, 2008 (9) SCC 177 and in case of Babu Vergheese and Others vs. Bar Council of Kerala & Others, 1999 (3) SCC 422 , he submitted that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any Statute, the act must be done in that manner only and not in any other manner. According to him though the Statute did not provide for removal of office bearers, even if it is assumed that they could be removed by moving no confidence motion against them under Article 19-A of the Byelaws, then also the prescribed procedure and the conditions laid down therein were required to be strictly followed and complied with, and in the instant case, the said procedure having not been followed, the entire proceedings conducted by the concerned respondents on 11.10.14 had vitiated. 19. However, the learned senior counsel Mr. A.K. Sharma for the respondent No.4 submitted that the petitioners of the other two petitions had filed the petitions by way of proxy litigation without any cause of action and they had no independent right to challenge the resolutions in question. 19. However, the learned senior counsel Mr. A.K. Sharma for the respondent No.4 submitted that the petitioners of the other two petitions had filed the petitions by way of proxy litigation without any cause of action and they had no independent right to challenge the resolutions in question. As regards the proceedings conducted on 11.10.14, he submitted that the respondent No.4 was the elected Vice President, respondent No.5 was the elected Joint Secretary and the respondent No. 6 was the office bearer of the Jaipur Cricket Association, and that they having received many complaints against the concerned petitioners regarding non-performance of their duties as the office bearers, and their acting against the interest of the RCA, the requisitions were given to the Secretary on 24.7.14 and 13.9.14as per Annex.R-4/3 and R-4/4 by five members, however the Secretary having failed to convene the meeting of the general body, the 22 members out of 33 members had gathered together and had passed the resolution on 11.10.14 against the petitioner Nos. 2 to 5, in view of Article 19-A of the Byelaws. According to him 22 members constituted quorum being two third of 33 members, and all the said 22 members having unanimously resolved to remove the concerned petitioners as the office bearers of the association, the requirement of three fourth majority was also duly complied with. Mr. A.K. Sharma has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Pratap Chandra Mehta vs. State Bar Council of M.P. & Others, 2011 (9) SCC 573 to submit that no confidence motion can be brought against the elected office bearers and that the democratic principles require that the person who attends the position of President or Secretary, as the case may be, could be removed by the same electorate or smaller body which elected them to their position by taking recourse to a no confidence motion in accordance with Rules. Pressing into service the provisions contained in Chapter VI of the said Act, submitted that the said provisions pertain to the disaffiliation, enquiry and disqualification of the concerned association and the said provisions did not provide for the removal of the office bearers on the ground of no confidence. Lastly he submitted that the Byelaws being not statutory in nature, its non-compliance, if any would not vitiate the proceedings. 20. The learned senior counsel Mr. Lastly he submitted that the Byelaws being not statutory in nature, its non-compliance, if any would not vitiate the proceedings. 20. The learned senior counsel Mr. R.N. Mathur for the respondent Nos.5 & 6 supplementing the submissions made by the learned senior counsel Mr. A.K. Sharma for the respondent No.4, further submitted that the concept of no confidence motion is not unknown to the principles of democracy, and the work culture of a democratic body inheres in it the right of its members to move a no confidence motion against their elected leader, which right is a concomitant of the right to elect the leader. No confidence motion can be passed by simple majority against the holder of the elected office, unless the Statute, Rules or Byelaws indicate a contrary intention or prohibit passing of a no confidence motion. Placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Bhanumati etc. etc. vs. State of U.P. 2010 (12) SCC 1 , he elaborately submitted invoking the constitutional doctrine of silence that merely because the said Act is silent on the motion of no confidence against the office bearers, it could not be said that no such motion could be passed against them even though majority of the members of the Association had lost the confidence in the said office bearers. According to Mr. Mathur, apart from the fact that there is a special provision contained in Article 19-A of the Byelaws with regard to the no confidence motion, even assuming that there was no such provision then also the office bearers, who had lost the confidence of majority of members, had no right to continue to hold the office, if no confidence motion was passed against them by the majority of the members. He further submitted that the motion of no confidence being different from the motion of censure, no notice for such motion was required to be given to the office bearers, who were sought to be removed from their respective offices, as also no opportunity of hearing was required to be given to them, nor the majority members were required to give any reasons for their removal. In this regard Mr. In this regard Mr. Mathur has placed heavy reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in case of Pratap Chandra Mehta vs. State Bar Council of M.P. 2011 (9) SCC 573 and in case of Babubhai Muljibhai Patel vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and Others, 1974 (2) SCC 706 . 21. Mr. Mathur, has also placed heavy reliance on the Full Bench decision of Gujarat High Court in case of Nandlal Bavanjibhai Posiya and Others vs. Director of Agriculture Marketing & Rural Finance, Gandhinagar and Another, AIR 2002 Gujrat 348, on the decision of Karnataka High Court in case of Vidyacharan Shukla vs. B.S. Adityan, ILR 1989 Karnataka 2784 and on the decisions of the Delhi High Court to emphasize about the implications of the no confidence motion in democratic institutions, and to submit that the enjoyment of confidence by the leader of the democratic body is very much essential in the decision making process, and also for the implementation of the decisions of the majority. He further submitted that in the instant case , majority of the members had lost confidence in the President as serious allegations of misconduct were levelled, against him, and he had also not come to India since last many years, and also in the Secretary, who was staying at Bombay, and in the Treasurer and the Deputy President, who were not taking any interest in the activities of the association, and therefore the majority of the members had passed the resolution to remove them which was absolutely justified in the democratic set up of the association. 22. Mr. Mathur has also relied upon the various provisions of the said Act and the Byelaws, to submit that the provision contained in Article 19-A of the Byelaws was an independent provision, which did not require any notice to be given to all the members of the association, as was required to be given for convening the meeting of general body or extraordinary general meeting. Mr. Mr. Mathur also relied upon catena of decisions of the Apex Court, more particularly in case of K. Narasimhah vs. H.C. Singri Gowda & Others, AIR 1966 SC 330 and in case of Shyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akki vs. The Gadagbetgeri Municipal Borough and Others, AIR 1955 SC 314 , to submit the requirement of giving notice for convening the extraordinary general meeting was directory or not mandatory, more particularly when majority of the members were present in the meeting, who had supported the no confidence motion against the concerned petitioners. Of course, it was also sought to be submitted by Mr. Mathur that in any case the requisitions were also given to the Secretary for convening the meeting, however since he failed to convene the meeting, the special meeting was called after issuing notices to the members, and also after sending telephonic messages to almost all the members. He conceded that the 21 days notice as contemplated in Article 13(1)(f) of the Byelaws was not given, however according to him the said procedure was not required to be followed in the meeting held for passing the resolution of no confidence motion against the concerned petitioners. He further submitted that the issuance of notice to the members was sufficient compliance of the Article 19-A and the fact of dispatch of such notices could be verified from the dispatch register maintained at the office of RCA. He further submitted that the rules of procedure are the handmaid for Justice and that a purposive interpretation of the provisions contained in the Act and the Byelaws are required to be made, to advance the cause of justice. The will of the majority is always a paramount consideration in the democratic set up and hence if there was substantive compliance of the procedure contained in Article 19-A while moving no confidence motion, the irregularity in the service of notice could not be said to be a material noncompliance, which would vitiate the entire proceedings of the meeting held on 11.10.2014. Mr. Mathur also submitted that such irregularity in the service of notice should not be viewed seriously, when it was impossible to serve the notices to the members like the petitioner No.2, the President, who is staying abroad and is not permitted to come to India, since many years. Mr. Mathur also submitted that such irregularity in the service of notice should not be viewed seriously, when it was impossible to serve the notices to the members like the petitioner No.2, the President, who is staying abroad and is not permitted to come to India, since many years. Pointing out the findings of the principal observer recorded in his report submitted to the Apex Court, he submitted that some of the petitioners were not the valid members of the association, and therefore had no right to file the petitions, and that the petition was also bad for nonjoinder of the necessary parties, the petitioners having not impleaded all the members, who had resolved to remove the concerned petitioners. He also submitted that the petitioners having not come with clean hands, having suppressed the material facts from the Court, and having fabricated documents are not entitled to the discretionary reliefs and their petitions deserve to be dismissed. 23. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties at length and having considered the voluminous documents on record, it appears that despite many disputed facts, there are certain undisputed facts also, which are material to decide the issues involved in the petitions. It is not disputed that pursuant to the order passed by the Supreme Court, the elections for the Executive Members of the Executive Committee of RCA had taken place on 19.12.2013, under the supervision of the Principal Observer, Justice N.M. Kasliwal and the Observer, Justice S.P. Pathak. It is also not disputed that the said principal observer and the observer had invited the objections, in respect of the list of voters published by them, and had decided the said objections as per the order dated 23.11.2013, which is part of the report at Annexure-R-4/1. The eligibility list of contesting candidates for the election of Executive Body of RCA, is also part of the said report which is not disputed. The said report having been submitted by the principal observer before the Apex Court, and the Apex Court having passed the order dated 30.04.2014, directing the Election Officer to declare the result on 06.05.2014, is also not disputed. It is also not disputed that accordingly the petitioner No.2 was declared elected as the President, the petitioner No.5 as the Deputy President, the petitioner No.3 as the Honorary Secretary and the petitioner No.4 as the Treasurer. It is also not disputed that accordingly the petitioner No.2 was declared elected as the President, the petitioner No.5 as the Deputy President, the petitioner No.3 as the Honorary Secretary and the petitioner No.4 as the Treasurer. It is also not disputed that in the said election, the respondent No.4 was declared elected as one of the Vice Presidents and the respondent No.5 as one of the Honorary Joint Secretaries. The certificate of the election dated 06.05.2014, produced at Annexure/2 to the petition is not disputed. The Constitution of the RCA comprising the Memorandum and the Byelaws, produced at Annexure-3 to the petition is also not disputed. The main controversy and the disputes appear to have arisen as the respondent No.5 allegedly convened the meeting on 11.10.2014 passing no confidence motion against the petitioner Nos.2 to 5, and in the said meeting 22 members allegedly passed the resolution to remove the said four petitioners from their respective offices as the office bearers. 24. In the aforesaid premises, two main questions fall for consideration before this Court. Firstly, whether in absence of any specific provisions contained in the main Act and the Rules framed thereunder, for removing the office bearers by no confidence motion, could such provisions be made in the Byelaws framed under the Act? The other question is, if Article 19-A of the Byelaws permitted such no confidence motion to be passed against the office bearers, could it be passed without following the due procedure prescribed under the said Byelaws, or in other words, whether the impugned resolution dated 11.10.14 passed to remove the office bearers i.e. the petitioner Nos.2 to 5 from their respective posts was valid without sending requisite notices to all the members? 25. Now, it cannot be gainsaid that every democratic process is based upon the freedom to elect and freedom to remove the members in accordance with law. It is also a basic tenet of the democracy that an elected body has the power to elect its office bearers, and that if the body is not vested with the power to appoint or remove its office bearers, the body will never be able to enforce the accountability or responsibility of its office bearers or control the action of its office bearers. It is also a settled proposition of law that the right to participate in election is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right, but a special right created by the Statute. The Apex Court in case of Mohanlal Tripathi vs. District Magistrace, Rae Bareilly & Others, AIR 1993 SC 2042 , while examining the validity of a no confidence motion passed by the Board against the President, who was directly elected by the electorate and was sought to be removed or recalled by the other elected members, which was a smaller and different body than the one that had elected him, rejected the argument that such a motion was violative of the democracy mandate, and held as under:- “2. Democracy is a concept, a political philosophy, an idea practised by many nations culturally advanced and politically mature by resorting to governance by representatives of the people elected directly or indirectly. But electing representatives to govern is neither a 'fundamental right' nor a 'common law right' but a special right created by the statues, or a 'political right' or 'privilege' and not a 'natural', 'absolute' or 'vested right'. 'Concepts familiar to common law and equity must remain strangers to Election Law unless statutorily embodied.' Right to remove an elected representative,too, must stem out of the statute as 'in the absence of a constitutional restriction it is within the power of a legislature to enact a law for the recall of officers'. Its existence or validity can be decided on the provision of the Act and not, as a matter of policy.” 26. The Apex Court in case of Pratap Chand Mehta vs. State Bar Council of M.P. And Others (supra), while dealing with the issue, whether the State Bar Council had the power to enact provisions for removal of the office bearers of the State Bar Council by 'no confidence motions', in absence of enabling provisions contained in the Principal Statute i.e. the Advocates Act, observed as under:- “45. In the instant case, the election process as contemplated under the relevant laws is that the members of a State Bar Council are elected by the electorate of advocates on the rolls of the State Bar Council from amongst the electorate itself. In the instant case, the election process as contemplated under the relevant laws is that the members of a State Bar Council are elected by the electorate of advocates on the rolls of the State Bar Council from amongst the electorate itself. The elected members then elect a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and the Treasurer of the State Bar Council as well as constitute various committees for carrying out different purposes under the provisions of the Advocates Act. In other words, the body which elects the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of a State Bar Council always consists of members elected to that Council. The democratic principles would require that a person who attains the position of a Chairman or Vice-Chairman, as the case may be, could be removed by the same electorate or smaller body which elected them to that position by taking recourse to a `no confidence motion' and in accordance with the Rules. The body that elects a person to such a position would and ought to have the right to oust him/her from that post, in the event the majority members of the body do not support the said person at that time. Even if, for the sake of argument, it is taken that this may not be generally true, the provisions of Rule 122-A of the M.P. Rules make it clear, beyond doubt, that a `no confidence motion' can be brought against the elected Chairman provided the conditions stated in the said Rules are satisfied.” 27. In case of Bhanumati etc. etc. Versus State of U.P. (supra), the Apex Court, was examining the constitutional validity of the U.P. Panchayat Laws (Amendment) Act, 2007. One of the Arguments raised was that there was no concept of no confidence motion in the detailed constitutional provisions under Part-IX of the Constitution and therefore incorporation of such provision in the State Amendment Act would militate against the principles of Panchayati Raj institutions. The Apex Court, invoking the well known constitutional doctrine, namely the constitutional doctrine of silence, observed as under:- “51. Many issues in our constitutional jurisprudence evolved out of this doctrine of silence. The basic structure doctrine vis-à-vis Article 368 of the Constitution emerged out of this concept of silence in the Constitution. The Apex Court, invoking the well known constitutional doctrine, namely the constitutional doctrine of silence, observed as under:- “51. Many issues in our constitutional jurisprudence evolved out of this doctrine of silence. The basic structure doctrine vis-à-vis Article 368 of the Constitution emerged out of this concept of silence in the Constitution. A Constitution which professes to be democratic and republican in character and which brings about a revolutionary change by the Seventy-third Constitutional Amendment by making detailed provision for democratic decentralisation and self-government on the principle of grass-root democracy cannot be interpreted to exclude the provision of no-confidence motion in respect of the office of the Chairperson of the panchayat just because of its silence on that aspect.” 28. The very question as to whether in absence of expressed provisions in respect of the no confidence motion against the Chairman/Vice Chairman of an Agricultural Produce Market Committee, under the Gujarat Agricultural Produced Market Act, 1963 and the Rules framed thereunder, such a motion could be validly passed or not, was considered by the Full Bench of Gujarat High Court in case of Nandlal Bavanjibhai Posiya and Others vs. Director of Agriculture Marketing & Rural Finance, Gandhinagar and Another, (supra). The said question was answered by the Full Bench in the affirmative, by concluding that if a holder of an office is elected by simple majority, by the body in requisite quorum, he could be removed or recalled by a simple majority, in absence of any provision prohibiting such a course or prescribing any particular procedure of moving the no confidence motion with a particular majority and passing the same by a particular majority. It was held in para 59 as under:- “59. As has been held by us above, democratic institution transacts its business on majority opinion of its members. This is an unwritten Rule, tradition and work culture of every elected body. It is only when there is a departure from this tradition or unwritten Rule that Rules of business, Byelaws or statutes governing the democratic institutions may provide for particular majority of 2/3rd or less for taking decisions. Decision making process of democratic institution requires formation of opinion for resolutions by majority of its members. Enjoyment of confidence by the leader of the democratic body is essential in decision making process and it is more necessary for implementation of the decisions of the majority.” 29. Decision making process of democratic institution requires formation of opinion for resolutions by majority of its members. Enjoyment of confidence by the leader of the democratic body is essential in decision making process and it is more necessary for implementation of the decisions of the majority.” 29. It was further held in paras 58 and 66 as under:- “58. These institutions must run on democratic principles. In democracy all persons heading public bodies can continue provided they enjoy the confidence of the persons who comprise such bodies. This is the essence of democratic republicanism. This explains why this provision of no-confidence motion was there in the Act of 1961 even prior to the Seventy-third Constitution Amendment and has been continued even thereafter. Similar provisions are there in different States in India.” “66. Democracy demands accountability and transparency in the activities of the Chairperson especially in view of the important functions entrusted with the Chairperson in the running of Panchayati Raj institutions. Such duties can be discharged by the Chairperson only if he/she enjoys the continuous confidence of the majority members in the panchayat. So any statutory provision to demonstrate that the Chairperson has lost the confidence of the majority is conducive to public interest and adds strength to such bodies of self-governance. Such a statutory provision cannot be called either unreasonable or ultra vires Part IX of the Constitution.” 30. Taking a cue from the above authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court and other High Courts, there remains hardly any doubt that even though the principal legislation is silent, the provisions of no confidence motion could be made in the subordinate legislation, and that the body which elects the President and other office bearers, can remove them by taking recourse to the no confidence motion, in accordance with the Rules. In the instant case, though there is no such specific provision for removal of office bearers on the motion of no confidence, in the said Act and the Rules framed thereunder, such a provision does exist in the Constitution of the Association, framed under Section 7 of the said Act. The said Constitution comprises of the Memorandum and the Byelaws. Article 19-A of the said Byelaws specifically provides for moving of no confidence motion against the office bearers or the executive member, and for passing of resolution for their removal by 3/4th majority of voting members present. The said Constitution comprises of the Memorandum and the Byelaws. Article 19-A of the said Byelaws specifically provides for moving of no confidence motion against the office bearers or the executive member, and for passing of resolution for their removal by 3/4th majority of voting members present. The said Byelaws having been framed pursuant to Sections 7 and 8 of the said Act, they assume the character of statutory Byelaws. Though, it is true that the tenure of the elected members of the executive body has been fixed for 4 years, as per Section 8(1)(b) of the said Act, and Article 10 (b) of the Byelaws, there being specific provision contained in Article 19-A of the said Byelaws, such office bearers could be removed by passing resolution in the meeting of general body with specific number of voters present, as provided therein. At this juncture, it is also required to be noted that chapter VI of the said Act deals with the disaffiliation and disqualification of the Sports Associations and does not provide for the disqualification or removal of the office bearers of the executive body of the RCA. It is only the Byelaws, more particularly Article 19-A of the said Byelaws, which provides for the removal of the office bearers or the members of the executive committee, of course on the satisfaction of the conditions mentioned therein. In that view of the matter, the submission made by the learned counsels for the petitioners that in absence of any specific provision contained in the said Act or the Rules framed thereunder, the office bearers could not be removed by passing no confidence motion against them, cannot be accepted. 31. This takes the court to the next question as to whether the impugned resolution to remove the concerned petitioner Nos.2 to 5 from their respective post of the office bearers, passed in the meeting held by the concerned respondents and others on 11.10.2014, and to take over charge by the respondents Nos.4, 5 & 6 as officiating President, Treasurer and Deputy President respectively, was legal and valid. In this regard, it was vehemently sought to be submitted by the learned counsels for the petitioners that the said resolution on the basis of so called no confidence motion, was not only violative of the principles of natural justice, but was passed in utter violation of the provisions contained in the constitution of the RCA. According to them, the documents of requisition at Annexures/9 & 10, and the notice at Annexure/12 were fabricated documents, and even otherwise admittedly the said alleged notices were not given to all the members of the Association and were also not given in consonance with the Article 13(f) of the Byelaws. Now so far as the question of violation of principles of natural justice is concerned, it is required to be noted that as per the settled legal position contained in catena of decisions of the Apex Court, the motion of no confidence could not be compared with the motion of censure. In case of Babubhai Muljibhai Patel vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and Others (supra), the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the question, whether grounds for removal must necessarily be specified while passing a motion of no confidence, and the Apex Court laying down the difference between a motion of no confidence and a censure motion, observed as under:- “19. It does not, however, follow therefrom that the ground must also be specified when a motion of no confidence is actually passed against a President. It is pertinent in this context to observe that there is a difference between a motion of no confidence and a censure motion. While it is necessary in the case of a censure motion to set out the ground or charge on which it is based, a motion of no confidence need not set out a ground or charge. A vote of censure presupposes that the persons censured have been guilty of some impropriety or lapse by act or omission and it is because of that lapse or impropriety that they are being censured. It may, therefore, become necessary to specify the impropriety or lapse while moving a vote of censure. No such consideration arises when a motion of no confidence, is moved. Although a ground may be mentioned when passing a motion of no confidence, the existence of a ground is not a prerequisite of a motion of no confidence. It may, therefore, become necessary to specify the impropriety or lapse while moving a vote of censure. No such consideration arises when a motion of no confidence, is moved. Although a ground may be mentioned when passing a motion of no confidence, the existence of a ground is not a prerequisite of a motion of no confidence. There is no legal bar to the passing of a motion of no confidence against an authority in the absence of any charge of impropriety or lapse on the part of that authority. The essential connotation of a no-confidence motion is that the party against whom such motion is passed has ceased to enjoy the confidence of the requisite majority of members.” 32. In case of Pratap Chandra Mehta vs. State Bar Council of M.P. (supra) also the Supreme Court has observed that 'no confidence motion' cannot be equated in law to removal, relatable to a disciplinary action or as a censure. It is stricto senso not removal from office but a removal resulting from loss of confidence. It is relatable to no confidence and is not removal relatable to the conduct or improper behaviour of the elected person. 33. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, it is required to be held that the concerned petitioners were neither required to be informed by the concerned respondents about the reasons nor were required to be given any opportunity of hearing before passing the motion of no confidence against them. 34. However, the Court does find substance in the submissions made by the learned counsels for the petitioners, that the impugned proceedings conducted and resolutions passed on 11.10.14 by the concerned respondents and others by moving no confidence motion against the concerned petitions were in utter violation of the mandatory provisions contained in the Byelaws and therefore were bad and invalid. However, the Court does find substance in the submissions made by the learned counsels for the petitioners, that the impugned proceedings conducted and resolutions passed on 11.10.14 by the concerned respondents and others by moving no confidence motion against the concerned petitions were in utter violation of the mandatory provisions contained in the Byelaws and therefore were bad and invalid. Though, the genuineness of the requisitions dated 24.07.2014 and dated 13.09.2014, allegedly signed by the five members of the association, (Annexures/9 & 10) and the notice dated 06.10.2014 (Annex.12) allegedly issued by the respondent No.5 as the Joint Secretary, is seriously doubted by the petitioners, even if the said requisitions and the notices are believed to be genuine ones, and even if the entire case put forth by the respondent Nos.4, 5 & 6 are believed as true, then also the facts which emerge from the replies are that the said respondents had neither given the notice of 21 days prior to convening special meeting on 11.10.14, nor all the office bearers, executive members and the affiliated organizations were sent the notices for convening such meeting, by registered post/approved courier service, as required under Article 13(f) of the Byelaws framed under the Act. The affidavits of the members who were allegedly present in the said meeting, are also conveniently silent about their receiving any such notice for convening the said meeting. It was strongly urged by the learned senior counsel Mr. R.N. Mathur for the respondent Nos.5 & 6 that non compliance of the provision for the notice period, and non sending of the notice to all the members, was merely a technical defect, as such notice was not mandatory requirement and was merely a directory under the said Byelaws. The said submissions of Mr. Mathur could not be accepted, in view of the Article 19-A read with other provisions contained in the Byelaws and the Act. 35. As stated earlier, the said Byelaws being part of the Constitution of RCA framed under Section 7 of the said Act, had assumed the character of statutory Byelaws. Even as per Section 8 of the said Act, the said Byelaws were required to make provisions, amongst the other things, that the executive body of Sports Association shall be elected in a democratic manner and such elections of executive body shall be held once in every 4 years. Even as per Section 8 of the said Act, the said Byelaws were required to make provisions, amongst the other things, that the executive body of Sports Association shall be elected in a democratic manner and such elections of executive body shall be held once in every 4 years. The Byelaws also provided in Article-10 that the tenure of executive committee/office bearer shall be 4 years. Further, Article 13 of the said Byelaws makes provisions for meetings of general body, and as per clause (b) of the said Article-13, an extra-ordinary general meeting of general body can be convened by the Honorary Secretary whenever he thinks fit, within 30 days of the receipt of requisition by minimum five affiliated organizations specifying the business for which the meeting is to be convened. The clause(c) of the said Article 13 states that no business other than the formal adjournment of the meeting shall be transacted at any meeting unless a quorum is present. Clause (f) of the said Article further states that the notice of every meeting shall be sent under registered post/approved courier service to the office bearers, executive members and the affiliated organizations, 21 days prior to the date fixed for such meeting and that such notice would specify the date, time and place of such meeting, and the nature of business to be transacted. In the light of the said provisions in the Byelaws and in the Act, if Article 19-A of the said Byelaws is appreciated, it clearly transpires that the office bearer or the executive member against whom a no confidence motion is passed by a resolution, in the meeting of general body, shall cease to hold office in the Association immediately after such resolution is passed, however such resolution should be passed by 3/4th majority of voting members present. It further provides that at least 2/3rd total number of voters shall constitute a quorum for this purpose. The said article 19-A has been approved by the Registrar subject to the provisions contained in the said Act. It further provides that at least 2/3rd total number of voters shall constitute a quorum for this purpose. The said article 19-A has been approved by the Registrar subject to the provisions contained in the said Act. Hence, from the conjoint reading of the provisions contained in the said Act and its constitution and the Byelaws framed under the said Act, there remains no shadow of doubt that just as the election of members of executive body is to be held in democratic manner, the removal of the said elected members or the office bearers has to be done in a democratic manner only and that too after following the due procedure as contained in the Byelaws, and that they could not be removed in any arbitrary or clandestine manner. The very purpose of making special provision for the notice period and the manner of service of notice for convening special meeting of General Body, is to provide a right to the voting members to remain present in such special meeting and to vote on the specific agenda for which the meeting is called. As per the settled legal position stated hereinabove the body which elects the President and other office bearers of an institution can remove the elected office bearers taking recourse to no confidence motion, however in accordance with the Rules. The body which elected the office bearers, the same body or the smaller body would certainly have right to participate in the special meeting held for removal of such office bearers on the ground of they having lost the confidence of majority. For enabling the members of such body to remain present, proper notice as required under the Rules or Byelaws would therefore be a condition precedent for holding such meetings. 36. Admittedly in the instant case, the notice dated 06.10.2014 allegedly prepared by the respondent No.5 as the Joint Secretary was not sent to all the members of the Association. It was also not sent 21 days prior to the holding of the meeting on 11.10.2014, nor the same was sought to be sent by registered post or by approved courier service as contemplated in Article 13(f) of the Byelaws. It was also not sent 21 days prior to the holding of the meeting on 11.10.2014, nor the same was sought to be sent by registered post or by approved courier service as contemplated in Article 13(f) of the Byelaws. It has been stated in the reply filed by the respondent Nos.5 & 6 that the 21 days notice was not given as the circumstances were emergent in nature and that the notice was sent by hand to those Secretaries of the Districts who were present and others were communicated through telephonic message. Such a reply filed by the respondents clearly establishes that they had not bothered to comply with the provisions contained in the Act and the Byelaws, which were of mandatory in nature. As rightly submitted by the learned counsels for the petitioners, if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any Statute, the act must be done in that manner only or not at all. Their submission is also fortified by the decisions of the Apex Court, in the case of Babu Verghese vs. Bar Counsel of Kerala, 1999 (3) SCC 422 and in case of State of U.P. vs. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 . Non sending and non-service of notices as per the requirement of the Byelaws had rendered all consequential actions of the concerned respondents on no confidence motion, as bad in law, in view of the ratio of judgment laid down by the Apex Court in case of Parbeen Ram Phukan vs. State of Assam (supra). 37. Mr. Mathur had sought to rely upon the decision of Apex Court in case of Shyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akki vs. The Gadag-betgeri Municipal Borough and Others (supra) to submit that omissions in the manner of service of notice were merely irregularities which would not vitiate the proceedings unless it was shown that those irregularities had prejudicially affected the proceedings. The said decision is hardly of any help to Mr. Mathur. The said decision is hardly of any help to Mr. Mathur. In the said case, though the notice as required under the relevant provision of Section 35 (3) of the Municipal Boroughs Act was not given and served, all councillors of the concerned municipality were present on the adjourned date of meeting, when the impugned resolution was passed, and the Apex Court, while construing the said provision which stated that no resolution of a municipality shall be deemed to be invalid on account of irregularity in service of notice upon the councillor or member, had held that the said provision was directory and not mandatory. The other decision in case of K. Narasimhah vs. H.C. Singri Gowda & Others (supra), in which the Apex Court had held that the notice in question to be not mandatory, also does not help to Mr. Mathur. In the said case also apart from the fact that the councillors were duly served with the notice, 19 out of 20 councillors had attended the meeting, and the one councillor who was the President, had left the meeting after the meeting had started. Under the circumstances, the Apex Court had held that the said meeting did not prejudicially affect the proceedings, by the irregularity in the service of notice. However, in the instant case, neither the requirement of 21 days notice was complied with nor all the members were given the notice about the convening of the special meeting of the General Body to be held on 11.10.2014 for moving no confidence motion against the concerned petitioners. It is also pertinent to note that the said meeting under challenge was held at some private hotel and not even at the office of RCA. Such a non-compliance of the provisions of Byelaws prejudicially affecting the rights of the members who were not given the notice, to participate in the said proceedings, had rendered the entire proceedings of the meeting illegal and arbitrary. 38. Much reliance was placed by the learned senior counsel Mr. Mathur on the minutes of meeting allegedly signed by 23 members, to submit that the majority of the members were aware about the said meeting, and all the voting members present had approved the impugned resolution, and therefore the concerned petitioners had no right to continue to hold the offices of the office bearers. However, the Court is not impressed by the said submissions. However, the Court is not impressed by the said submissions. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel Mr. Hora for the petitioners, apart from the fact that some of the members out of the said 22/23 members present in the meeting under challenge, did not hold valid membership, as per the report of the principal observer Justice Kasliwal, and therefore it could not be said that the quorum of 2/3rd of the total number of voters was duly complied with, and even if all the 22/23 members are treated as the valid voters, then also the impugned resolution could not be said to have been passed by the majority of 3/4th voting members, inasmuch as if proper notices were given to all the 33 District Cricket Associations, who were members of the RCA, all the authorised representatives i.e. the President or the Secretary of the concerned District Cricket Association would have remained present, and in that case 3/4th majority of voting members present would have been 25 and not 22. Since the notices were not given to all the voting members and that too in the manner prescribed in the Byelaws, the proceedings conducted and the resolution passed in the said meeting dated 11.10.2014 could not be countenanced as valid and the same are required to be held as bad in law, having been conducted in an arbitrary and antidemocratic manner, and also in utter disregard of the mandatory provisions of the Act and the Byelaws. If such a course is permitted to follow, a small group of members showing fake members would keep on passing no confidence motions against the office bearers without following any due process of law, and keep on creating chaotic and anarchic situations in the RCA. In that view of the matter, it is held that the proceedings and the resolutions passed in the meeting held on 11.10.14 by the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 and other members having vitiated deserve to be quashed and set aside. 39. At this juncture, it is required to be noted that at present the Chairman, Rajasthan State Sports Council is in charge of the affairs of the RCA, by virtue of the ex-parte interim order dated 17.10.14. 4, 5 and 6 and other members having vitiated deserve to be quashed and set aside. 39. At this juncture, it is required to be noted that at present the Chairman, Rajasthan State Sports Council is in charge of the affairs of the RCA, by virtue of the ex-parte interim order dated 17.10.14. Since the meeting was sought to be held on 11.10.14 by the concerned respondents against the concerned petitioners on the ground that the said petitioners had lost the confidence of majority, the court thinks it fit and proper to permit the concerned respondents to move the no confidence motion against the petitioners afresh and in accordance with law, under the supervision and observation of the Chairman, Rajasthan State Sports Council, and to continue the interim order dated 17.10.14 for a period of four weeks in order to avoid further complications in the matter and in order to see that the affairs of the RCA are managed in smooth and legal manner. 40. In that view of the matter, the petition being SBCWP No. 10833 of 2014 is partly allowed with the following directions:- (i) The proceedings of the meeting held on 11.10.14 and the resolutions passed in the said meeting at Annex.11 are quashed and set aside. Rest of the reliefs claimed in the petition are rejected. (ii) The interim arrangement made vide the interim order dated 17.10.14 is continued upto 12th March, 2015 during which period, the concerned respondents shall be at liberty to move the no confidence motion against the concerned petitioners if they desire to do so, after following the due procedure as contained in the Constitution of the RCA, and the meeting on such motion of no confidence, shall be presided over and supervised by the Chairman, Rajasthan State Sports Council. (iii) The Chairman, Rajasthan State Sports Council shall maintain the record of such proceedings and meeting. (iv) If no such motion is passed against the concerned petitioners as per Article 19-A of the Constitution, within the prescribed time limit, the concerned petitioners shall be entitled to resume their respective posts of office bearers with effect from 13th March, 2015. (iii) The Chairman, Rajasthan State Sports Council shall maintain the record of such proceedings and meeting. (iv) If no such motion is passed against the concerned petitioners as per Article 19-A of the Constitution, within the prescribed time limit, the concerned petitioners shall be entitled to resume their respective posts of office bearers with effect from 13th March, 2015. (v) If the motion of no confidence is passed against the concerned petitioners as per the provisions contained in the Constitution of the RCA, the concerned petitioners shall cease to hold the office in the Association with immediate effect, and the Chairman, Rajasthan State Sports Council shall follow the due course of law as per the provisions contained in the said Act and the Constitution of RCA. 41. The petition being No. 10833 of 2014 stands partly allowed. The petitions being SBCWP Nos. 10877 of 2014 and 10878 of 2014 stand disposed of accordingly. A copy of this order be placed in the other two writ petitions. Copy of this order be sent to the Chairman, Rajasthan State Sports Council.