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2013 DIGILAW 355 (GUJ)

Gujarat Energy Transmission Corp. Ltd. v. Labour Court Anand

2013-07-01

PARESH UPADHYAY

body2013
ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Premal R. Joshi, learned advocate for the petitioner - employer and Mr. Prabhakar Upadhyay, learned advocate for contesting respondent - workman. 2. Challenge in this petition is made to the interim order passed by the Labour Court, Anand in an application being Complaint (LCA) No. 1 of 2013 in pending Reference (LCAD) No. 1 of 2012 preferring by the respondent workman under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereby the parties to the application, including the present petitioner, are directed to maintain status quo qua service conditions of the respondent 13 workmen, the details of which are shown in the schedule to the order of the appropriate Government dated 21.01.2012 making Reference. 3. Mr. Joshi, learned advocate for the petitioner, has contended that the concerned workmen are the employees of the contractor and therefore, the effect of statusquo granted by the Tribunal is that though the petitioner company intends to discontinue the contract of Sidhdhi Labour and Security Services, the petitioner company has not been able to do. It is also contended that there is no material on record that the said contract was to be discontinued the services of the workmen and therefore, the action of the workmen of moving the Labour Court by filing the complaint, was on an apprehension without any basis and the same was premature. Learned advocate for the petitioner has further contended that the finding of the Labour Court that if the protection is not granted, there would be irreparable loss to the workmen, is also not well founded since if discontinuation of the service of the workmen if ultimately found to be illegal, Court can also grant appropriate compensation. Mr. Joshi, learned advocate for the petitioner, has relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Nadiad Municipality v. Ghanshyam R. Barot & Ors., 1998(3) GLR 2675 , to contend that the provisions of Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 can be invoked only if there is a contravention of Section 33. It is contended that when there is no contravention, the complaint would not lie. It is contended that when there is no contravention, the complaint would not lie. Reliance is also placed on the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of (M/s) Anup Engineering Ltd. v. Shreenarayan Kanaiyalal, 1995(1) GLH 345 , to contend that during pendency of Reference, interim relief should not be granted, which may amount to allowing petition itself. Reliance is also placed on the decision of Kerala High Court in the case of The Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd. v. M. Parameshwara Menon, 1980(40) FLR 431, to contend that the jurisdiction of Labour Court would be attracted under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act only if there is contravention of Section 33 established. 4. Mr. Joshi, learned advocate for the petitioner, has, therefore, submitted that the apprehension of the workmen was premature, coupled with the fact that they were the employees of contract and therefore, no statusquo should have been granted by the Labour Court qua service conditions of the workmen and the order impugned in this petition dated 13.03.2013 be interfered with by this Court. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Prabhakar Upadhyay, learned advocate for contesting respondent - workmen, has drawn attention to the fact that the workmen have been in the employment of the petitioner company for about 13 to 18 years and only one or two workmen are working since 3 to 5 years. It is also pointed that the contracts have changed over years but the Association of the workmen with the petitioner company has remained as it is in all these 15 to 20 years. It is contended by Mr. Upadhyay that thus, the petitioner company has entered into paper arrangement with different contractors and precisely for that reason, the Reference is made, which is pending before the Labour Court and during pendency of the Reference, if the services of the workmen are discontinued, the very Reference would become in-fructuous and therefore, the interim protection granted by the Labour Court be not interfered with. Mr. Upadhyay further contended that even the petitioner company has, after the impugned order having been passed by the Labour Court on 13.03.2013, filed reply to the application of the workmen, which is pending for final adjudication and on this count also, this Court may not interfere with. 6. Mr. Upadhyay further contended that even the petitioner company has, after the impugned order having been passed by the Labour Court on 13.03.2013, filed reply to the application of the workmen, which is pending for final adjudication and on this count also, this Court may not interfere with. 6. Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, what is undisputed is that the workmen are in the employment of petitioner company for 15 to 18 years, the details of which are given in the schedule to the Reference. Mr. Joshi, learned advocate for the petitioner company, has not been able to dispute that though contractors have changed from time to time, the engagement of the workmen has remained as it is with the petitioner company. Reference can also be made to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the application dated 13.03.2013 given on behalf of the workmen to the Labour Court, which also makes this fact clear. In this factual background that the workers have remained in employment of the petitioner company for 15 to 18 years and over all these years, only contracts have changed but the Association of the workmen has remained as it is with the petitioner company, prima facie, there is substantial force in the arguments of the learned advocate for the respondent workmen through contract is merely a paper arrangement. Under these circumstances, when Labour Court has thought it proper to grant protection under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, I see no infirmity in the impugned order and does not call for any interference by this Court. 7. So far reliance placed on the above referred decisions by learned advocate for the petitioner is concerned, there were any dispute with regard to the proposition of law annunciated in those decisions. 8. So far the decisions in the case of Nadiad Municipality (supra) as well as of Kerala High Court are concerned, there can not be any dispute that invocation of jurisdiction under Section 33A would presuppose existence of relationship under Section 33A. In this case, it can not be said that Section 33A would not come into play at all. 9. So far the contention that the workers have approached the Labour Court at a premature stage, the same also needs to be rejected. In this case, it can not be said that Section 33A would not come into play at all. 9. So far the contention that the workers have approached the Labour Court at a premature stage, the same also needs to be rejected. Since on one hand, the petitioner company is trying to blow hot and cool ......, on the other hand, it is contended that they are contractor's workmen and the petitioner company has nothing to do with it. The petitioner company has not been able to discontinue the contract with Sidhdhi Labour and Security Services, though this Court, at this stage, need not pronounce it finally, prima facie, the facts suggests that only contractors have changed and the Association of workmen with the petitioner company has remained as it is and therefore, had the protection not been granted and the Reference has become in-fructuous. 10. The reliance on the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of Anup Engineering Ltd. (supra) is concerned, the same will not have any applicability in the facts of this case since it was a case of termination of services without holding a domestic enquiry and the termination after inquiry is the subject matter of the Labour Court, during pendency of the petition, the dismissal order could not have been restrained from being implemented as interim relief. This is not the case here. The terms of Reference is qua the workmen should be treated to be the workmen of the petitioner company on the face of change of names of contractors from time to time. The present facts if kept in view, the view taken by this Court in the case of Delhi Public School, Special Civil Application No. 3347 of 2013, will have full force. 11. Considering the totality of the facts, in my view, the Labour Court has not committed any error in granting protection to the workmen. The petition does not have any force, the same needs to be rejected. For the reasons recorded above, the petition is rejected. Notice is discharged. No order as to costs.