JUDGMENT : Bela M. Trivedi, J. The appellant-plaintiff has preferred the appeal under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code challenging the judgment & decree dated 26.07.1982 passed by the Additional District Judge, Jaipur City, Court No.7 (hereinafter referred to as "the trial court") in Civil Suit No.86/76 [64/80], so far as the findings recorded by the trial court relating to the issue Nos.1, 2 & 4 are concerned. The respondents-defendants have filed their cross-objections under Order 41 Rule 22 of Civil Procedure Code in the appeal challenging the said decree, so far as the findings relating to the issue Nos.3, 5 & 7 are concerned. 2. The appellant-plaintiff had filed the suit against the respondents-defendants seeking partition and her ?th share in the immovable properties belonging to the HUF including the house bearing No.1182 situated at Natanion Ki Gali, Chora Rasta, Jaipur, and sought permanent injunction in respect of the movable properties described in the Schedules K & Kh annexed to the plaint. It was alleged in the plaint interalia that Late Shri Niranjan Singh, husband of the appellant-plaintiff, was the eldest son of the defendant No.1 Sardar Nanak Singh. The said Niranjan Singh expired on 18.02.1976 at Jaipur. According to the plaintiff, before the partition i.e. 1947, the whole family of the defendants including Shri Niranjan Singh were staying at Multan (Pakistan), where they had some properties belonging to the HUF (Hindu Undivided Family) of which the defendant No.1 was the karta. After the partition, the whole family came to India leaving their properties in Pakistan, for which the defendant No.1 was given the compensation to the tune of about Rs. 35,000/- under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act 1950. The defendant No.1 thereafter purchased the residential house bearing No.1182 at the Natanion Ki Gali, Jaipur and other properties from the said amount of compensation received by him as the karta of HUF. It was further case of the plaintiff that initially the said house No.1182 was occupied by the tenants, and therefore the family of defendant No.1 was staying in a rented premises, and after sometime part of the said house having been vacated, the plaintiff and her husband Niranjan Singh had started staying over there. Thereafter, the remaining part having been vacated by the tenants, the defendants had also come to stay in the said house. Thereafter, the remaining part having been vacated by the tenants, the defendants had also come to stay in the said house. It was also case of the plaintiff that during the said period, her husband Niranjan Singh was working in the Sachivalaya, Jaipur and had his own independent income. On the death of her husband Niranjan Singh on 18.02.1976, the defendants started misbehaving with the plaintiff and tried to take possession of the movable properties purchased by the plaintiff and her husband from their own income. The defendant No.1 also refused to part with the amount of insurance policy, in which he was mentioned as nominee. According to the plaintiff, the said house bearing No.1182 and other immovable properties having been purchased from the nucleus of the HUF, the plaintiff had ?th share in the said properties. Hence the said suit, claiming her share in the immovable properties, and seeking the permanent injunction in respect of the movable properties was filed. 3. The respondents-defendants had resisted the said suit by filing the written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint, and contending interalia that the defendant No.1 had received only Rs. 650/- by way of compensation from the ancestral properties at Pakistan, and that the house bearing No.1182 was purchased by the defendant No.1 not from the said funds of HUF but from his own income, and therefore the said property was the self acquired property of the defendant No.1. The defendants had also denied the allegations levelled against them with regard to the movable properties and the insurance policies as alleged in the plaint. The defendants had also denied the allegations levelled against them with regard to the movable properties and the insurance policies as alleged in the plaint. The trial court from the pleadings of the parties framed following seven issues:- ^^D;k fookfnr edku la;qDr ifjokj dh jkf'k ls izfroknh uaŒ 1 us [kjhnk og bl dkj.k la;qDr ifjokj dh lEifr gSA 2- D;k fooknxzLr edku ds vykok vkSj Hkh la;qDr ifjokj dh vpy laifRr gS] ;fn gka rks og D;k gSA 3- D;k ifjf'k"V d esa vafdr py laifRr okfnuh us ifr dh gS] ;fn gka rks bldk nkos ij D;k vlj gSA 4- D;k okfnuh jktdh; chek ikfylh uaŒ 59489 e`rd fujatu flag] ftlesa izfroknh la[;k&1 ukfeuh gS] esa Hkh fgLlk ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA 5- D;k thou chek fuxe dh ikfylh uaŒ 6914437 ,oa 6921924 ftuesa okfnuh uksfeuh gS] esa izfroknhx.k Hkh fgLlk ikus dk vf/kdkjh vf/kdkjh gS] ;fn gka rks muesa ls dkSuA 6- vuqrks"kA 7- D;k e`rd fujatu flag dk 4]000@& :i;s lsdzsVsfj,V ,Eiykbt dks & vkWijsfVo lkslkbVh esa Fkk] ft;s okfnuh us fudky fy;k gS] ;fn gka rks D;k izHkko gSA** 4. The trial court after appreciating the evidence on record and considering the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, partly decreed the suit as per the impugned judgment and decree, whereby the trial court decided the issue Nos.1, 2 & 4 against and issue Nos.3, 5 & 7 in favour of the appellant-plaintiff. Being aggrieved of the same, the appellant and respondents have filed the appeal and cross-objections respectively. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel Mr. S. Kasliwal with Mr. R.N. Vijay for the appellant that the trial court had thoroughly mis-appreciated the evidence on record so far as the immovable properties, more particularly the house bearing No.1182 at Jaipur, were concerned. Taking the Court to the evidence of the respondent No.1, he submitted that the respondent No.1 himself had admitted that the properties at Pakistan were ancestral properties and he had received the compensation in respect of the said properties, and that the said amount of compensation was also used for the purchase of the property bearing No.1182 at Jaipur. Taking the Court to the evidence of the respondent No.1, he submitted that the respondent No.1 himself had admitted that the properties at Pakistan were ancestral properties and he had received the compensation in respect of the said properties, and that the said amount of compensation was also used for the purchase of the property bearing No.1182 at Jaipur. Placing heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in case of V.D. Dhanwatey versus The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1968 SC 683 , and on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in case of Mangal Singh Versus Harkesh & Ors., AIR 1958 All. 42 , he submitted that the property acquired by any person with the assistance of the joint family funds, assumes the character of joint family property and could not be said to be his self acquired property. He further submitted that the trial court had erred in treating the property bearing No.1182 purchased by the respondent No.1 from the nucleus of HUF as his self acquired property. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Smt. Sarbati Devi & Anr. Versus Usha Devi, AIR 1984 SC 346 and also in case of Ram Chander Talwar & Anr. Versus Devender Kumar Talwar & Ors., (2010) (10) SCC 671, Mr. Kasliwal submitted that nomination in the insurance policy would confer right on the nominee to receive the amount of policy, and the said amount would devolve on the heirs of the deceased according to the law of succession, and therefore the trial court had rightly held that the appellant-plaintiff was entitled to receive the amounts of the insurance policies. 6. Learned counsel Mr. Amit Gupta with Mr. Bihari lal Agarwal for the respondents, however, supporting the findings of the trial court as regards the immovable property bearing No.1182, submitted that the said property was purchased by respondent No.1 from his own income and the plaintiff had miserably failed to prove by leading cogent evidence that the said property was purchased from the nucleus of the HUF. Relying on the order of Claims Officer at Exhibit-11, Mr. Relying on the order of Claims Officer at Exhibit-11, Mr. Gupta submitted that out of the two properties mentioned in the said order, only one property i.e. property No.100 situated at Lahore City was considered as the ancestral property and that the property No.99 was considered as the joint property, by the competent authority, while awarding the compensation. According to him, the compensation received by the respondent No.1 was too meager to purchase the house No.1182 at Jaipur, and that in absence of any evidence produced by the plaintiff to prove that the said amount was used for the purchase of the house at Jaipur, it could not be said that the trial court had erred in treating the said house at Jaipur as the self acquired property of the respondent No.1. Mr. Gupta placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in case of D.S. Lakshmaiah & Anr. Versus L. Balasubramanyam & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 3800 , in support of his submission that no presumption could be raised of a property being joint family property only on account of the existence of a joint hindu family. Mr. Gutpa further submitted that the trial court had erred in deciding the issues with regard to the movable properties of Late Shri Niranjan Singh in favour of the appellant-plaintiff, in as much as the respondents would also have their share in the same and also in the amount of insurance policies received by the appellant after the death of her husband, as per the law of succession. 7. On due consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties before the trial court, in the light of the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, following points arise for determination before this Court:- (1) whether the appellant-plaintiff had proved that the house bearing No.1182, at Jaipur was purchased by the respondent No.1 with the aid and assistance of the nucleus of the HUF, and therefore she had her share in the same as claimed by her ? (2) Whether the respondent No.1 had proved that the said house at Jaipur was his self acquired property and not the HUF property ? (3) Whether the appellant-plaintiff was entitled to the injunction in respect of the movable properties left by her deceased husband Niranjan Singh ? 8. (2) Whether the respondent No.1 had proved that the said house at Jaipur was his self acquired property and not the HUF property ? (3) Whether the appellant-plaintiff was entitled to the injunction in respect of the movable properties left by her deceased husband Niranjan Singh ? 8. Before adverting to the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, it would be beneficial to refer to certain observations made by the Apex Court in various decisions on the law of presumptions as to when the properties should be treated as the properties of joint hindu family, and on whom the burden lies. 9. The law in this regard was laid down by the Privy Council in case of Appalaswami v. Surnarayanmurti, AIR 1947 PC 189 , in which it was stated as under:- "The Hindu law upon this aspect of the case is well settled. Proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that property held by any member of the family is joint, and the burden rests upon anyone asserting that any item of property was joint to establish the fact. But where it is established that the family possessed some joint property which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property." 10. The Apex Court, in the case of V.D. Dhanwatey versus The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh (supra) held as under:- "4. The general doctrine of Hindu Law is that property acquired by a karta or a coparcener with the aid or assistance of joint family assets is impressed with the character of joint family property. To put it differently, it is an essential feature of self-acquired property that it should have been acquired without assistance or aid of the joint family property. The test of self-acquisition by the karta or coparcener is that it should be without detriment to the ancestral estate. It is therefore clear that before an acquisition can be claimed to be a separate property, it must be shown that it was made without any aid or assistance from the ancestral or joint family property." 11. The test of self-acquisition by the karta or coparcener is that it should be without detriment to the ancestral estate. It is therefore clear that before an acquisition can be claimed to be a separate property, it must be shown that it was made without any aid or assistance from the ancestral or joint family property." 11. Again in case of Mudigowda Gowdappa Sankh v. Ramchandra Revgowda Sankh, AIR 1969 SC 1076 , the Apex Court reiterated in para 6 as under:- " ....of course, there is no presumption that a Hindu family merely because it is joint, possesses any joint property. The burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property in the first instance is upon the person who claims it as coparcenary property. But if the possession of a nucleus of the joint family property is either admitted or proved, any acquisition made by a member of the joint family is presumed to be joint family property. This is, however, subject to the limitation that the joint family property must be such as with its aid the property in question could have been acquired. It is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, that the onus shifts on to the person who claims the property as self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the family estate." 12. The Apex Court, in case of D.S. Lakshmaiah & Anr. Versus L. Balasubramanyam & Anr., (supra), after considering various earlier decisions observed as under:- "18. The legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available." 13. The legal position, which could be deduced from the abovestated decisions is that irrespective of the extent of contribution of the acquiring member himself of his own fund, if he takes the aid of any portion of joint or ancestral property in acquiring the property, the property so acquired assumes the character of joint family property. It is an essential feature of self-acquired property that it should have been acquired without the assistance and aid of the joint family property. Of course, there could not be any presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of the existence of a joint hindu family, but the party who asserts that the property is a joint family property has to prove that there was an adequate nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired and once that is proved, there would be presumption of property being joint, and the onus then would shift on the person, who claims it to be self- acquired property, to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of the joint family nucleus that was available. 14. In the light of the above stated legal position, let us appreciate the evidence adduced by the parties before the trial court. The appellant-plaintiff had examined herself as PW-1, in which she had stated that the house at Natanion Ki Gali, Jaipur, was the property of joint hindu family as the same was purchased from the amount of compensation received by her father-in-law Shri Nanak Singh towards the joint family properties at Lahore, when the partition took place and when family members came to India. She had produced the certificate of payment of compensation issued by the Ministry of Rehabilitation at Exhibit-2, to show that her father-in-law had received about Rs.35,000/- as the compensation for the properties at Lahore. She had also produced the other documents at Exhibit-11 and Exhibit-12 to show that the properties at Lahore and Multan were joint family properties. In the light of her oral as well as the documentary evidence, if the evidence of respondent No.1 Nanak Singh is appreciated, then it clearly transpires that after having stated that the disputed house at Jaipur was purchased by him for Rs. In the light of her oral as well as the documentary evidence, if the evidence of respondent No.1 Nanak Singh is appreciated, then it clearly transpires that after having stated that the disputed house at Jaipur was purchased by him for Rs. 13,500/-, he also had admitted that the houses at Lahore and Multan were joint Hindu family properties, and that he had received the total compensation to the tune of Rs. 36,000/- for the said properties, and that he had got his share from the said amount. He had clearly admitted that he had purchased the house at Jaipur after adjusting the funds which he had received by way of compensation from the houses at Lahore and Multan. Of course, he had tried to say that the two houses at Lahore were ancestral properties and one house at Multan was jointly purchased by him and his brother, however had not stated that the house at Jaipur was purchased by him exclusively from his own funds and not with the aid of the nucleus of the joint family. He stated that Exhibit-8, 9 & 10 were the documents pertaining to the ancestral properties and that the amount of compensation received was used for the purchase of the disputed house. His brother Shri Hira Singh was also examined as DW-3 in the suit and he had also admitted that the properties at Lahore were joint family properties and the house at Multan was purchased by him and his brother jointly, and that they had got the compensation for the said properties. Though, he had stated that they had received the compensation to the tune of Rs. 12225/- for the three houses, he also stated that the amount of compensation was adjusted to purchase the house at Natanion Ki Gali, Jaipur, which was purchased for Rs. 13,000/-. He has also stated that Niranjan Singh used to give some amount from his own income to his brother Nanak Singh. 15. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to refer to the order dated 06.08.1952 passed by the Claims Officer in respect of the index No.P/LH4/24052(d) produced at Exhibit-11. 13,000/-. He has also stated that Niranjan Singh used to give some amount from his own income to his brother Nanak Singh. 15. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to refer to the order dated 06.08.1952 passed by the Claims Officer in respect of the index No.P/LH4/24052(d) produced at Exhibit-11. In the said order it has been stated that the said claim was lodged by Shri Nanak Singh as 'karta' of the family consisting of himself and his brother Shri Hira Singh, in respect of the properties bearing Municipal No.100 & 99 situated in gali Sunarian wali, Lahore City, and that the claimants claimed ½ share in both the properties. In the said order, the Claims Officer had assessed the value of the property bearing No.100 at Rs. 5820/- and the property No.99 at Rs. 5400/- and further held that the said Nanak Singh as the 'karta' of the family and his brother Hira Singh would be entitled to their ½ share each i.e. Rs. 2910/- & 2700/- respectively. As per the order dated 11.10.1951 (Exhibit-12) passed by the Claims Officer Multan in respect of the index No.P/M.L.8/6195/C, the value of the property bearing House No.570 situated in Multan City, was assessed at Rs. 25,980/-. Now as per the certificate of the payment of compensation issued by the Ministry of Rehabilitation (Exhibit-2), the respondent No.1 Nanak Singh had received the compensation to the tune of Rs. 35760/- in respect of his three claims, including the two claims mentioned hereinabove for the properties at Lahore and Multan. Thus, there remains no shadow of doubt that the properties at Lahore and Multan were the properties of the joint hindu family, of which the respondent No.1 was the 'karta', and that he had received the compensation of Rs. 35760/- under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act 1950, after the whole family came to India, leaving their properties at Pakistan. Thus, there remains no shadow of doubt that the properties at Lahore and Multan were the properties of the joint hindu family, of which the respondent No.1 was the 'karta', and that he had received the compensation of Rs. 35760/- under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act 1950, after the whole family came to India, leaving their properties at Pakistan. It may be true that the respondent No.1 had received the said amount as the 'karta' of HUF, and that he and his brother Hira Singh would have ½ share in the same, however from the said evidence of the DW-1 Nanak Singh and of his brother DW-3 Hira Singh, the version of the plaintiff gets fortified to the extent that there were properties of joint Hindu family, and there was nucleus of the said HUF and that part of said nucleus was used for the purchase of the disputed house at Jaipur. 16. Now, since it was proved by the appellant and also admitted by the respondent No.1 that there was an HUF and there were properties of HUF, and that the amount of compensation was also received for the said properties, a presumption could be raised in favour of the appellant that the disputed house at Jaipur was purchased from the nucleus of the HUF. In that case, as per the settled legal position stated above, the onus then had shifted on the respondent No.1 to prove that he had purchased the property at Jaipur, exclusively from his own funds and not with the aid and assistance of the funds of HUF. However, the respondent No.1 had miserably failed to discharge this onus. Not only that he had not stated in his evidence that it was purchased exclusively from his own income, he had categorically admitted that compensation received from the properties at Pakistan was adjusted and used for purchasing the disputed house at Jaipur. His brother Hira Singh had also admitted the said position. Hence, the said house at Jaipur had assumed the character and status of the joint Hindu family property. 17. Though it was sought to be submitted by the learned counsel Mr. His brother Hira Singh had also admitted the said position. Hence, the said house at Jaipur had assumed the character and status of the joint Hindu family property. 17. Though it was sought to be submitted by the learned counsel Mr. Amit Gupta for the respondent that the said amount of compensation received by the respondent No.1 towards his share, was not sufficient to purchase the house at Jaipur, and therefore the said house could not be said to be the property of HUF, the said submission could not be accepted. As per the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court, the property purchased with the aid and assistance of the nucleus of HUF would also assume the character of the property of HUF. The appellant-plaintiff having discharged her burden to prove that there existed joint hindu family which had its nucleus, and that the property at Natanion Ki Gali, Jaipur was purchased with the aid and assistance of the said nucleus of HUF, the onus had shifted on the respondent No.1 to prove that the said property was his self-acquired property, which onus he had failed to discharge. There is nothing on record to suggest that the said property was purchased by the respondent No.1 exclusively from his own income and without the aid and assistance of the nucleus of HUF. In that view of the matter, the Court has no hesitation in holding that the trial court had committed a fallacy in holding that the property at Natanion Ki Gali, Jaipur was not the property of HUF but was the self-acquired property of the respondent No.1. It is therefore held that the said property at Jaipur is the property of HUF and that the appellant would have her share in the said property as claimed by her. Though the appellant-plaintiff had claimed her share in the other immovable properties of the respondent No.1 like agricultural land at Udaipur Vati, there is no specific pleading in her plaint nor any cogent evidence was adduced by her with regard to the other immovable properties to prove that the said properties were also HUF properties. Under the circumstances, her share is recognised only with regard to the house property at Natanion Ki Gali, Jaipur. 18. Under the circumstances, her share is recognised only with regard to the house property at Natanion Ki Gali, Jaipur. 18. So far as the amount of insurance policies is concerned, the appellant-plaintiff had claimed her ½ share in the amount of insurance policy bearing No.56486, and had also sought permanent injunction against the respondents-defendants from causing any obstruction in receiving the amount of other life insurance policies and gratuity etc. mentioned in the schedule-Kh, belonging to her deceased-husband Niranjan Singh, and also sought injunction with regard to the movable properties mentioned in Schedule-K annexed to the plaint. The learned counsels for the parties have fairly submitted that the law on the right of nominee vis-a-vis the heirs of the deceased is well settled. They have rightly relied upon the the decision of the Apex Court in case of Smt. Sarbati Devi & Anr. v. Smt. Usha Devi (supra) in which the Apex Court while overruling the judgments of Delhi High Court and reversing the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, held as under:- ".......A mere nomination made under Section 39 does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them...." 19. The ratio of the above mentioned decision was also followed by the Apex Court in case of Vishin N. Khanchandani v. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani, 2000(3) CCC 360 (S.C.) : 2000(2) ACJ 01 (S.C.) : (2000) 6 SCC, 724, wherein it has been held to the effect that any amount paid to the nominee after valid deductions becomes the estate of the deceased. Such an estate devolves upon all persons who are entitled to succession under law, custom or testament of the deceased holder. 20. In view of the above stated legal position, it is required to be held that even though the nominee was authorised to receive the payment of L.I.C. policy after the death of the insured, the heirs of the insured could claim their share as per the law succession governing them. 20. In view of the above stated legal position, it is required to be held that even though the nominee was authorised to receive the payment of L.I.C. policy after the death of the insured, the heirs of the insured could claim their share as per the law succession governing them. In the instant case, the appellant-plaintiff had made claim in respect of the three insurance policies and the amount of gratuity and arrears of salary, etc. mentioned in the Schedule-Kh. However, there is no clear evidence nor the learned counsels for the parties have any instructions as to whether the said amounts policies and gratuity, etc. have been paid to the appellant-plaintiff or not. It appears that the appellant-plaintiff also did not raise any dispute with regard to the non receipt of the amount of policies and other terminal benefits mentioned in Schedule-Kh, as observed by the trial court in the impugned judgment. As regards the injunction prayed for in respect of movable properties mentioned in Schedule-K, it is significant to note that the respondent No.1 in his evidence before the trial court had admitted that his son Niranjan Singh and his wife i.e. the appellant were staying separate after their marriage and both of them were working, and they had their own independent income. Learned counsel Mr. Amit Gupta for the respondent has not been able to point out any error in the said findings recorded by the trial court. Under the circumstances, the trial court has rightly granted the injunction as prayed for in respect of the movable properties mentioned in schedule-K. Thus, the Court does not find any substance in the cross-objections filed by the respondents as regards the issue Nos.3, 5 & 7, recorded by the trial court. 21. In the aforesaid premise, it is required to be concluded that the trial court has committed a fallacy in not treating the property at Natanion Ki Gali, Jaipur as the HUF property and in dismissing the prayer of the appellant-plaintiff for getting her share in the same. The appeal therefore deserves to be partly allowed by modifying the judgment and decree to the said extent. The appeal therefore deserves to be partly allowed by modifying the judgment and decree to the said extent. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court, therefore is modified so far as its finding on the issue No.1 is concerned and it is declared that the property bearing House No.1182 described in para 3 of the plaint is the property of HUF of respondent No.1 and that the appellant-plaintiff is entitled to get her share in the same as prayed for in the plaint. The remaining part of the decree is confirmed. The appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent and the cross-objections stand dismissed accordingly.