ORDER : 1. Invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (henceforth 'the Act, 1996') M/s South Eastern Coalfields Limited (SECL) has tiled the instant appeal questioning the order dated 13-12-2010, whereby and whereunder learned District Judge, in exercise of her jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, has set aside the award dated 1-12-2005 and thereby remanded the matter to the Arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute and pass an award on merits in accordance with law. 2. Facts of the case, in brief, arc as under :- (2.1) The arbitral dispute arose between the parties with relation to construction of a multi-speciality hospital, namely, Apollo Hospitals at Bilaspur between the parties leading to appointment of Sole Arbitrator Mr. S.P. Mathur, respondent No.2 herein to adjudicate the dispute between M/s B.S. Agrawal, respondent No.1 herein and M/s South Eastern Coalfields Limited, appellant herein in relation to the work awarded to the respondent No. 1 by work order dated 18-1-1994 and agreement dated 2-3-1994. (2.2) Respondent No.1 herein made a claim before the Sole Arbitrator as under : 1. Compensation for work done during the extended period. Value of Work increased from Rs.7.91 crore to Rs.10.45 crore. There was thus abnormal (more than 32%) deviation in work quantities. Although escalations were paid but they did not cover all costs and all items. Value of work done in original period (upto July 1996) Rs. 7.54 crore and in extended period (from July 1996 to August 1997) was Rs.2.77 crore. 10% of extended period value, that is, about Rs.27.7 lakhs are claimed as compensation. 2. 10% of contract value was provided as overheads for 30 months which works out to about Rs.2.64 lakhs per month. Thus about Rs.34.3 lakhs are claimed for overheads during 13 months of extended period. 3. SECL, in spite of protest by BSA, deducted a sum of about Rs.8.8 lakhs towards electricity charges in the final bill which is claimed now. 4. Contract provided a formula for payment of escalation on account of cement SECL, however, paid less. Balance of about Rs.82.2 lakhs are, therefore, claimed. 5. Payment for extra items and extra quantities was delayed. A sum of about Rs.20.2 lakhs is claimed as compensation, taking 18% interest on the concerned amount for the period between when it should have been paid and when it was actually paid. 6. Balance of about Rs.82.2 lakhs are, therefore, claimed. 5. Payment for extra items and extra quantities was delayed. A sum of about Rs.20.2 lakhs is claimed as compensation, taking 18% interest on the concerned amount for the period between when it should have been paid and when it was actually paid. 6. 50% security money (in the form of Bank Guarantee) should have been released by SECL after completion of work on 31-8-1997 and balance after six months on 28-2-1998. Against the same a sum of about Rs.1.42 lakhs is claimed as extra expenditure incurred towards bank commission charges. 7. Work finished on 31-8-1997 but building was not taken over and security personnel had to be deployed. A sum of about Rs.10 Lakhs is claimed. (No date upto which security personnel were deployed was given but this indicated as Dec.99 in letter to SECL). (2.3) The claim was made stating inter alia that though the work was completed on 31-8-1997 and payment of final bill was made on 15-10-2001 and claimed the aforesaid amount along with 18% interest and cost. Upon being noticed by the Sole Arbitrator, the appellant/SECL filed its statement of claim stating inter alia that respondent No.1 is not entitled for claim as claimed and specifically pleaded that the claims are time-barred as the work has been completed on 31-8-1997 and the claims have been preferred in January, 2002, therefore, they are barred by limitation and the final bill has already been paid to respondent No.1 and no dues certificate has already been issued in favour of the appellant/SECL and, therefore, respondent No.1 is not entitled for any claim and as such it deserves to be dismissed for the reasons firstly, as barred by limitation and even it is held otherwise, on merits on the ground of satisfaction recorded by respondent No.1 herein. (2.4) The Sole Arbitrator, by his award dated 1-12-2005, dismissed the claims finding inter alia that all the claims except claim No. 7 are barred by limitation in view of article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Secondly, the final bill has been paid in full and final satisfaction of the claimant and no dues certificate has also been issued by the claimant in favour of the appellant/ SECL and, therefore, the claims have no merit. Secondly, the final bill has been paid in full and final satisfaction of the claimant and no dues certificate has also been issued by the claimant in favour of the appellant/ SECL and, therefore, the claims have no merit. (2.5) Respondent No.1, feeling dissatisfied with the award passed by the Sole Arbitrator, filed an application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 to set aside the award on the ground that the finding of the Sole Arbitrator dismissing the claims of the claimant, as barred by limitation as well as on merits, is contrary to the facts and law available on the record and as such the award deserves to be set aside. (2.6) The learned District Judge, by his impugned order, held that the claims made by the claimant before the Sole Arbitrator are within the period of limitation and the issuance of no claim/dues certificate cannot be said that a certificate has been issued in full and final satisfaction of his claim and thereby remanded the matter to the Sole Arbitrator for hearing and disposal of their claims on merits in accordance with law. (2.7) Questioning the order of the District Judge setting aside the award in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, instant appeal has been filed by the appellant/SECL. 3. Dr. N.K. Shukla, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant/SECL would submit that the learned District Judge has committed illegality in holding that the claims as made by respondent No.1 were not time-barred. He would further submit that grant of no dues/claim certificate by respondent No. 1 would disentitle the claimant to make any such claim as made before the Sole Arbitrator and finding on this issue by the learned District Judge is contrary to law. 4. Shri Rajesh Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 would, however, submit that the learned District Judge is absolutely justified in holding the claims made by respondent No.1 within the period of limitation. He would further submit that the alleged issuance of no claim certificate respondent No.1 would not disentitle to make further claim before the Sole Arbitrator and as such the learned District Judge has rightly set aside the award and remanded the matter to the Sole Arbitrator for heating and disposal of the claims on merits in accordance with law. 5. He would further submit that the alleged issuance of no claim certificate respondent No.1 would not disentitle to make further claim before the Sole Arbitrator and as such the learned District Judge has rightly set aside the award and remanded the matter to the Sole Arbitrator for heating and disposal of the claims on merits in accordance with law. 5. I have heard and considered the rival submissions made by the parties and have perused the record with utmost circumspection. 6. In view of factual and legal submissions made by the parties, following questions would arise for determination in this appeal: (1) Whether the Sole Arbitrator is justified in dismissing the claims made by respondent No.1 as barred by limitation and further the learned District Judge is justified in holding it to be within limitation? (2) Whether the finding of fact recorded by the Sole Arbitrator and reversed by the District Judge that issuance of no claim certificate would not debar respondent No. 1 to make further claims is just and proper? Answer to First Question : 7. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties, it would be relevant to notice the pertinent facts relating to the contract in question. Admittedly, and undisputedly, the work in question was completed by respondent No.1 on 31-8-1997 and final bill was signed on 30-3-2001 and was paid on 15-10-2001. The dispute was raised on 8-8-200 I and the final claim has been made on 24-1-2001 to the appellant/SECL. According to respondent No.1, since the final bill was signed on 30-3-2001 and the period of 3 years would apply from 30-3-2001, therefore, the claim made in January. 2002 cannot be said to be barred by limitation. Whereas, according to the appellant/SECL, Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply and since the work in question has been completed on 31-8-1997, therefore, the period of limitation would start running with effect from 31-8-1997 and claim made in January, 2002 is apparently and evidently barred by limitation. 8. The Sole Arbitrator relied upon Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and held that the claim ought to have been preferred within 3 years from 31-8-1997 and thereby dismissed the claims except claim No.7 as barred by limitation. 9. 8. The Sole Arbitrator relied upon Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and held that the claim ought to have been preferred within 3 years from 31-8-1997 and thereby dismissed the claims except claim No.7 as barred by limitation. 9. In appeal, the learned District Judge has recorded that though the final bill was prepared on 30-3-2001, it was actually paid on 15-10-2001 and thereafter on 8-8-2001, respondent No.1 made protest in respect of the final bill before the Chief Engineer, SECL. Thus, the period of 3 years would be reckoned with effect from 8-8-2001 and, therefore, the claims made by respondent No. 1 are within the period of limitation. 10. Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides as under: "18. For the price of work done by the Three When the plaintiff for the defendant at his years work is request where no time has been done." fixed for payment. 11. "Work and Labour" in legal nomenclature is a term of precise legal import. In England, it is the name of one of the common counts in actions of assumpsit being for work and labour done and materials furnished by the plaintiff for the defendant: Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edn. p. 1604. The Courts in India have, therefore, given a wider meaning to the words 'work done' in Article 18 and treated a works contract as coming within its purview. The starting point of limitation in each case must, however, depend on its own facts and circumstances. 12. In Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edn. Vol. 24 p. 218, the meaning of the expression 'work done' is given thus : "On a general contract for work to be done, the cause of action accrues when the work is done. A contract to do work may, however, contain a condition that the price should be paid out of .......... when a certain contingency has happened, and in such a case the cause of action does not arise until the .......... Contingency has happened." 13. In Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, 1969(3) SCC 607 the Supreme Court held as under : "11. ........ when a certain contingency has happened, and in such a case the cause of action does not arise until the .......... Contingency has happened." 13. In Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, 1969(3) SCC 607 the Supreme Court held as under : "11. ........ In our judgment, there is no right to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit, and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted : Bolo v. Kokan and others, 57 IA 325." 14. In Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi Vs. Delhi Development Authority, (1988)2 SCC 338 the Supreme Court, while considering applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, held as under: "It is also true that on completion of the work a right to get payment would normally arise but where the final bills as in this case have not been prepared as appears from the record and when the assertion of the claim was made on February 28, 1983 and there was non-payment, the cause of action arose from that date, that is to say, February 28, 1983. It is also true that a party cannot postpone the accrual of cause of action by writing reminders or sending reminders but where the bill had not been finally prepared, the claim made by a claimant is the accrual of the cause of action." 15. In National Aluminium Co. Ltd. and another Vs. G. C. Kanungo, AIR 2009 SC 2928 the Supreme Court held as under : "5. In other words, there was no finality in the matter and the matter was alive for consideration. If this date i.e. 26-5-1992 is taken into account, the claim made was within the period of three years. That being so, the claim as made was within the period of limitation and the stand of the appellant that the claim was barred by limitation is not tenable." 16. In the present case also, the work was completed on 31-8-1997, final bill was prepared on 30-3-2001 and actual payment was made on 15-10-2001. On 8-8-2001, respondent No.1 also represented to the Chief Engineer, SECL and nothing was heard from the appellant/SECL leading to the making of the claim on 24-1-2002 to the SECL. In the present case also, the work was completed on 31-8-1997, final bill was prepared on 30-3-2001 and actual payment was made on 15-10-2001. On 8-8-2001, respondent No.1 also represented to the Chief Engineer, SECL and nothing was heard from the appellant/SECL leading to the making of the claim on 24-1-2002 to the SECL. Thus, applying the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the claim made by respondent No.1 was beyond the period of limitation. 17. Apart from this, it is well settled that the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and the same cannot be decided without proper pleadings and without taking evidence thereon. 18. In Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. Vs. Hanuman Seva Trust and others, (2006) 5 SCC 658 the Supreme Court held that the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact, as under: "8. After hearing counsel for the parties, going through the plaint, application under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) CPC and the judgments of the trial court and the High Court, we are of the opinion that the present suit could not be dismissed as barred by limitation without proper pleadings, framing of an issue of limitation and taking of evidence. Question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. Ex facie in the present case on the reading of the plaint it cannot be held that the suit is barred by time. The findings recorded by the High Court touching upon the merits of the dispute are set aside but the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is affirmed. We agree with the view taken by the trial court that a plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure." 19. In M/s Ashok Construction Company Vs. Union of India, 1971(3) SCC 66 the Supreme Court held that question of limitation is not a pure question of law. Para 8 of the report states as under: "8. The question of limitation was not a pure question of law. Whether the claim was barred by law of limitation depended upon proof of facts. From the date of settlement of claims three years had not lapsed before a notice asking for reference was made. Prima facie, the claim was not barred by the law of limitation." 20. The question of limitation was not a pure question of law. Whether the claim was barred by law of limitation depended upon proof of facts. From the date of settlement of claims three years had not lapsed before a notice asking for reference was made. Prima facie, the claim was not barred by the law of limitation." 20. Thus, taking into consideration the aforesaid facts and for the reasons aforementioned, it cannot be held that the claims made by respondent No.1 were beyond the period of limitation. As such, the Sole Arbitrator has committed illegality in deciding the said issue as preliminary issue without taking/recording evidence on the question of limitation, which has rightly been set aside by the learned District Judge and rightly remanded to the Sole Arbitrator for disposal on merits in accordance with law. I hereby affirm the said finding. The first question is answered accordingly. Answer to Second Question : 21. The question as to whether by the issuance of no claim certificate or no dues certificate by respondent No. I would debar him from making further claim is no longer res integra and as it stands decided by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court. In Chairman and MD., N.T.P.C. Ltd. Vs. M/s Reshmi Constructions. Builders and Contractors, AIR 2004 SC 1330 , the Supreme Court held that usually the public sector undertakings have upper hand in the contractual matters and they would not release the money unless no demand certificate is signed. Likewise, in National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Boghara Polyfab Private Limited, (2009) 1 SCC 267 the similar proposition has been laid down as under: "49. Obtaining of, undated receipts-in-advance in regard to regular/ routine payments by government departments and corporate sector is an accepted practice which has come to stay due to administrative exigencies and accounting necessities. The reason for insisting upon undated voucher/ receipt is that as on the date of execution of such voucher/receipt, payment is not made. The payment is made only on a future date long after obtaining the receipt. If the date of execution of the receipt is mentioned in the receipt and the payment is released long thereafter, the receipt acknowledging the amount as having been received on a much earlier date will be absurd and meaningless. The payment is made only on a future date long after obtaining the receipt. If the date of execution of the receipt is mentioned in the receipt and the payment is released long thereafter, the receipt acknowledging the amount as having been received on a much earlier date will be absurd and meaningless. Therefore, undated receipts are taken so that it can be used in respect of subsequent payments by incorporating the appropriate date. But many a time, matters are dealt with so casually that the date is not filled even when payment is made. Be that as it may. But what is of some concern is the routine insistence by some government departments, statutory corporations and government companies for issue of undated "no-dues certificate" or "full and final settlements vouchers" acknowledging receipt of a sum which is smaller than the claim in full and final settlement of all claims, as a condition precedent for releasing even the admitted dues. Such a procedure requiring the claimant to issue an undated receipt (acknowledging receipt of a sum smaller than his claim) in full and final settlement, as a condition for releasing an admitted lesser amount, is unfair, irregular and illegal and requires to be deprecated." 22. In R.L. Kalathia and Company Vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 2 SCC 400 the Supreme Court has observed as under : "12. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Polyfab (P) Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 267 , the question involved was whether a dispute raised by an insured, after giving a full and final discharge voucher to the insurer, can be referred to arbitration. The following conclusion in SCC para 26 is relevant: (SCC pp. 284-85) "26. When we refer to a discharge of contract by an agreement signed by both the parties or by execution of a full and final discharge voucher/receipt by one of the parties, we refer to an agreement or discharge voucher which is validly and voluntarily executed. If the party which has executed the discharge agreement or discharge voucher, alleges that the execution of such discharge agreement or voucher was on account of fraud/coercion/undue influence practised by the other party and is able to establish the same, then obviously the discharge of the contract by such agreement/voucher is rendered void and cannot be acted upon. Consequently, any dispute raised by such party would be arbitrable." 13. Consequently, any dispute raised by such party would be arbitrable." 13. From the above conclusions of this Court, the following principles emerge: (i) Merely because the contractor has issued "no-dues certificate", if there is an acceptable claim, the court cannot reject the same on the ground of issuance of "no-dues certificate". (ii) Inasmuch as it is common that unless a discharge certificate is given in advance by the contractor, payment of bills are generally delayed, hence such a clause in the contract would not be an absolute bar to a contractor raising claims which are genuine at a later date even after submission of such "no-claim certificate". (iii) Even after execution of full and final discharge voucher/receipt by one of the parties, if the said party is able to establish that he is entitled to further amount for which he is having adequate materials, he is not barred from claiming such amount merely because of acceptance of the final bill by mentioning "without prejudice" or by issuing "no-dues certificate".". 23. Having ascertained the legal position, I shall now revert back to the I facts of the instant case that the final bill was signed on 30-3-2001, but immediately thereafter, on 8-8-2001, respondent No.1 made a specific objection to the Chief Engineer, SECL stating inter alia that the final bill is not accepted in full and final satisfaction of the claims and finding him in need of money, he (respondent No.1) is receiving the payment. Thus, in view of the aforesaid specific objection made by respondent No.1 and no such denial of this letter having been made by the other side, it cannot be said that the amount has been received by respondent No.1 in full and final satisfaction of his claim and thus, such no claim certificate has been issued by respondent No.1 as mentioned in the memo dated 8-8-2001 and it cannot be concluded to be the certificate signed in token of full and final satisfaction of his claim and as such the learned District Judge has rightly held that there is no accord and satisfaction and the claims made by respondent No.1 are entertainable. Thus, the second question is answered accordingly. 24. Consequently, the appeal, as framed and filed, has no merit; it deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal Dismissed.