JUDGMENT D.V. SHYLENDRA KUMAR, J.-This second appeal is by the Senior Geologist (Mines), Department of Mines and Geology, Koppal, the Tahsildar, Tahsil Office, Sindhanur and the District Collector, Sath Kacheri Road, Raichur, who are arrayed as defendants 1, 3 and 4 in O.S. No. 19/2008. 2. A suit by the first respondent in this appeal for recovery of a sum of Rs. 2,28,000/-, which has come to be decreed in part for a sum of Rs. 45,100/- and this judgment and decree of the Trial Court being not disturbed in an appeal by the lower Appellate Court. 3. The defendants have presented this second appeal contending that the Trial Court could not have decreed the suit; that the amount which was decreed in favour of the plaintiff by the Trial Court on the premise that it was a security deposit and has to be refunded to the plaintiff who was a lease-cum-license holder for lifting the sand from a land which was on the Nala bed in Sy. Nos. 110 and 112 measuring to an extent of 8 acres of Mallapur village; that the original lease was for one year and was renewed for further period of one year as per the lease deed dated 13.02.2006 and 13.02.2007 respectively; that the amount had been adjusted against the bid amount and therefore, not refundable etc. 4. The appellants have also raised question of law that the suit was not tenable in view of Section 27 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (Hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' for short). 5. The plaintiff had laid the suit for recovery of the amount on the premise that the lease though was for one year and he had worked on the lease land and lifted the sand, but when the lease was renewed for the next year, the village panchayat authorities in whose jurisdiction the subject land was located had raised objection and had not allowed the plaintiff-lessee to work on the lease land and in fact had also returned half of the security deposit, i.e., a sum of Rs. 22,000 and odd sent to them saying that mining sand would affect the water in the Nala and therefore, the plaintiff having been prevented from carrying on any mining activity for the subsequent year, security deposit was to be refunded and the balance was sought to be recovered by way of damages for not permitting the plaintiff to work on the lease and also as expenditure incurred for formation of a road etc. 6. The suit had been resisted by the defendants. 7. The Trial Court though found that the suit was not maintainable in view of Section 27 of the Act and answered this issue in favour of the defendants, nevertheless proceeded to decree the suit in part. 8. The lower Appellate Court found no occasion to interfere as the points formulated by it were answered in favour of the respondent-plaintiff in the suit and dismissed the appeal. 9. It is against this judgment and decree, the present second appeal. 10. Appearing on behalf of the appellants, submission of Sri Sharanabasappa K Babshetty, learned Government Pleader is that the Trial Court should have dismissed the suit on the finding that suit was hit by Section 27 of the Act. 11. It is also contended that the security amount having been adjusted against the bid amount, the suit could not have been decreed for a sum of Rs. 45,100/-. 12. A perusal of the judgments of the Courts below and the pleadings of the parties indicates that the defendants had not taken the specific stand of the security amount having been adjusted towards the bid amount. 13. In fact, it was not disputed that the plaintiff could not work the lease for the renewed period, due to the objection raised by the Gram Panchayat who had also returned the demand draft in their favour and did not allow the plaintiff to lift the sand from the Nala bed. If it had remained as a security deposit and had not been pleaded by way of adjusting or set off against any of the deposit from the plaintiff, that cannot be contended for the first time in this second appeal. 14. In so far as the argument relating to Section 27 of the Act is concerned, I find that the finding recorded by the Trial Court on this aspect is not very correct. 14. In so far as the argument relating to Section 27 of the Act is concerned, I find that the finding recorded by the Trial Court on this aspect is not very correct. As Section 27 of the Act, acts as a bar only in respect of such suits, which are brought against any official of the department in their personal capacity and in respect of acts, which they have bona fidely performed as part of their duty. The suit had been laid for recovery of the security deposit and not because of any personal act or conduct on the part of the first defendant and therefore the provisions of Section 27 of the Act was not attracted. 15. Be that as it may, the Trial Court not having acted upon this finding, it does not make any difference and the suit having been partly decreed by the Trial Court directing the defendants to pay only the amount which had been deposited by way of security deposit and having not decreed the suit either towards damages or loss or towards the expenses incurred for formation of road etc. I do not find that findings of such nature require further examination in this second appeal and therefore, this second appeal is dismissed.