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2013 DIGILAW 360 (PNJ)

Jaswinder Kaur v. State of Punjab

2013-03-19

Mehinder Singh Sullar

body2013
JUDGMENT Mr. Mehinder Singh Sullar, J. (Oral) - The crux of the facts and material, culminating in the commencement, relevant for disposal of the instant petition and emanating from the record, is that, initially, petitioner-complainant Jaswinder Kaur wife of Hartar Singh (for brevity “the complainant”) has filed a complaint dated 31.12.2003 (Annexure P1) to the Superintendent of Police, Kapurthala for registration of a criminal case u/ss 379 & 411 IPC and Arms Act against Sukhjeet Singh son of Massa Singh and his wife Jagpal Kaur. During the course of investigation, the allegations contained in the complaint (Annexure P1) were stated to have been found to be false by ASI Jasbir Singh of Police Station City Kapurthala, vide report dated 6.1.2004 (Annexure P2). 2. Not only that, subsequently, after the expiry of more than 7½ years, the SHO of the Police Station prepared and submitted the impugned Calendar (Annexure P3) against the petitioner-complainant u/s 182 IPC, in which, she was summoned as an accused to face the trial of indicated offence by the CJM, by virtue of very brief impugned summoning order dated 12.8.2011 (Annexure P4). 3. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has preferred the present petition to quash the impugned Calendar (Annexure P3) and summoning order (Annexure P4), invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.PC, inter-alia on the ground that no Court can take cognizance of the indicated offence, in view of bar contained u/s 195 Cr.PC at this belated stage after the expiry of more than 7½ years. 4. The factual matrix has been duly acknowledged by the learned State counsel. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, having gone through the record and legal provisions with their valuable help and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, the instant petition deserves to be accepted in this context. 6. As is evident from the record that, the petitioner-complainant moved a complaint (Annexure P1) to SP on 31.12.2003. After investigation, ASI Jasbir Singh found the allegations contained in the complaint to be false, by means of report dated 6.1.2004 (Annexure P2) and exonerated the accused, whereas the present prosecution u/s 182 IPC was initiated against the petitioner on 12.8.2011. 6. As is evident from the record that, the petitioner-complainant moved a complaint (Annexure P1) to SP on 31.12.2003. After investigation, ASI Jasbir Singh found the allegations contained in the complaint to be false, by means of report dated 6.1.2004 (Annexure P2) and exonerated the accused, whereas the present prosecution u/s 182 IPC was initiated against the petitioner on 12.8.2011. Section 182 IPC postulates that “whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to be false, shall be punished under this section.” There is no material on record, much less cogent, particularly in the impugned Calendar, even to suggest remotely that the petitioner knew or believed that the information contained in the complaint (Annexure P1) was false. In this manner, all the essential ingredients of the pointed offence are deeply lacking in the instant case. Moreover, the maximum sentence provided under Section 182 IPC is for a term which may only extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 7. Sequelly, section 468 Cr.PC posits that “no court shall take cognizance of any offence beyond the period of limitation of one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.” In the present case, the report (Annexure P2) is dated 6.1.2004, whereas the Court has taken cognizance on 12.8.2011, vide summoning order (Annexure P4) (after the expiry of more than 7½ years). Meaning thereby, the cognizance of the offence u/s 182 IPC against the petitioner is otherwise barred by limitation, as envisaged under Section 468 Cr.PC. It cannot possibly be disputed that the object of Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecution is clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time and also to prevent abuse of the process of the Court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of offence. It is not a matter of dispute that the plea of bar of limitation can be raised at any stage of proceedings and that even when it was not raised, the Magistrate should have considered this aspect of the matter of limitation while exercising the powers and authority in the light of sections 468 and 473 Cr.PC. 8. It is not a matter of dispute that the plea of bar of limitation can be raised at any stage of proceedings and that even when it was not raised, the Magistrate should have considered this aspect of the matter of limitation while exercising the powers and authority in the light of sections 468 and 473 Cr.PC. 8. Therefore, taking cognizance by the Magistrate, in pursuance of the impugned summoning order (Annexure P4) after more than 7½ years, beyond the period of limitation at this belated stage, is not only illegal and time barred, but without jurisdiction as well and cannot legally be maintained. This matter is no more res integra and is now well settled. 9. An identical question came to be decided by this Court in case Balwinder Kaur v. State of Punjab and Ors., [2012(4) Law Herald (P&H) 3347 (DB)] : 2012 (3) SCT 228, wherein it was ruled that in that eventuality, no court can take cognizance of the offence punishable u/s 182 IPC, beyond the prescribed period of limitation, as contemplated under section 468 Cr.PC. The ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid judgment “mutatis mutandis” is applicable to the facts of the present case and is the complete answer to the problem in hand. Therefore, initiation of criminal prosecution u/s 182 IPC against the petitioner deserves to be and is hereby quashed in the obtaining circumstances of the case. 10. No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 11. In the light of aforesaid reasons, the instant petition is accepted. Consequently, the impugned Calendar (Annexure P3) and summoning order (Annexure P4) are hereby quashed. The petitioner is discharged from the indicated criminal prosecution in this relevant connection. ---------0.B.S.0------------