Judgment :- 1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed to get set aside the order dated 03.09.2010 passed in I.A.No.452 of 2009 in O.S.No.26 of 2003 by the learned District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate No.I, Usilampatti. 2. Heard both sides. 3. At the hearing, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner would submit that this revision might be treated as the one filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and not under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and accordingly, a Memo was filed and the same is ordered. 4. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner would echo the cri de coeur of his client to the effect that his client/the first defendant filed an application in I.A.No.452 of 2009 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking to get the delay of 325 days condoned in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the said application was dismissed, as against which this Civil Revision Petition has been focussed on the grounds found set out in the affidavit accompanying the petition that the petitioner was suffering from jaundice which was not believed by the Court for want of clinching evidence and the suit itself was for injunction and if the petitioner is deprived of his opportunity to contest the matter, perpetually his rights would be in doldrums. 5. Whereas the learned Counsel for the first respondent inviting the attention of this Court to the records, would implore and entreat that absolutely there is no merit in this Civil Revision Petition filed by the petitioner as the affidavit is fraught with falsity and mendacity, and unworthy of even being considered as legal averments; the delay is also huge; absolutely, there is no perversity or illegality in the order passed by the lower Court. Accordingly, he would pray for the dismissal of this Civil Revision Petition. 6. The point for consideration is as to whether there is any illegality or perversity in the order passed by the lower Court in refusing to condone the delay of 325 days in filing an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure? The Point: 7. 6. The point for consideration is as to whether there is any illegality or perversity in the order passed by the lower Court in refusing to condone the delay of 325 days in filing an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure? The Point: 7. I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions of the Honourable Apex Court: (i) Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh and others reported in (2010) 6 Supreme Court Cases 786. Certain excerpts from it, would run thus: "4. The property was put to an auction-sale on 12-8-1992. Respondent 5 herein M/s Jagan Singh and Company (hereinafter shall be referred to as “the Company”) offered Rs 22,65,000, and thus was declared as the highest bidder. Sale was knocked down in its favour, and later confirmed in its favour. 5. The appellant then woke up from its slumber and filed objections under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC raising various grounds. The executing court then framed issues, reproduced by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. The case was thereafter fixed for recording of the evidence of the judgment-debtor on 19-3-1993, 17-4-1993, 8-5-1993 and 29-5-1993. However, on the aforesaid dates none appeared on behalf of the appellant. Consequently, the evidence of the appellant judgment-debtor was closed. As a necessary consequence thereof the appellant's objections came to be dismissed in default due to non-appearance. * * * * * 15. Be that as it may, we are of the opinion that the delay in filing the first appeal before the District Judge, Ludhiana, for setting aside the sale has not been so huge warranting its dismissal on such hypertechnical ground. In fact, according to us, the appellant had taken all possible steps to prosecute the matter within time. Had there been an intimation sent to the appellant by Mr P.K. Jain, its erstwhile advocate, and if even thereafter the appellant had acted callously then we could have understood the negligent attitude of the appellant but that was not the case here. No sooner the appellant came to know about the dismissal of its objection filed before the executing court, under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC it made enquiries and filed the appeal. 16. No sooner the appellant came to know about the dismissal of its objection filed before the executing court, under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC it made enquiries and filed the appeal. 16. While considering the application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not. Each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves. From the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the appellant it cannot be said that it had been absolutely callous and negligent in prosecuting the matter. * * * * * 20. Apart from the above, the appellant would not have gained in any manner whatsoever, by not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. It is also worth noticing that delay was also not that huge, which could not have been condoned, without putting the respondents to harm or prejudice. It is the duty of the court to see to it that justice should be done between the parties. 21. For the aforesaid reasons the impugned orders passed by the appellate court, and the order passed by the High Court, are hereby set aside and quashed. As a consequence, the matter stands remitted to the executing court for deciding the appellant's application filed under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC at an early date on merits. Since there are only two contesting parties to the litigation that is to say the appellant and Respondent 5, both would appear before the executing court on 20-7-2010. Being an old case an endeavour would be made by the executing court to take up the case as far as possible, on day-to-day basis and no party would seek an undue adjournment in the matter. We make it clear that we have expressed no opinion on the merits of the matter and any observation made herein would not be construed as an expression of opinion on merits." (ii) Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singhreported in(2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 685. Certain excerpts from it, would run thus: "26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Certain excerpts from it, would run thus: "26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. ***** 29. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 , this Court took the view: (AIR pp. 363-65, paras 7 & 12) “7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan, ILR (1890) 13 Mad 269: * * * 12. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan, ILR (1890) 13 Mad 269: * * * 12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration;” ***** 35. The expression “sufficient cause” implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word “sufficient” means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. 36. We find it unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall under either of these classes of cases. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn., 2005)" 8. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn., 2005)" 8. A mere running of the eye over the aforesaid precedents would display and demonstrate that the delay should not be condoned simply for the sake of asking for it. 9. Here, I would like to observe that even though there are two defendants, the first defendant independently had come forward by filing I.A.No.452 of 2009 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to get the delay of 325 days condoned in filing an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the main ground that he was suffering from jaundice and that soon after he got on his legs, once again he fell into the same illness of jaundice. 10. No doubt, he could have asked somebody's help for meeting his Advocate. Normally, in matters of illness due to jaundice, this Court cannot expect the petitioner to adduce clinching medical evidence on his side. 11. Here, keeping in mind that the suit is one for injunction and that opportunity has to be given to the petitioner to put forth his case relating to the immovable property, I would like to take a lenient view in condoning the delay of 325 days by imposing a cost of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only) payable by the revision petitioner to the respondents/plaintiffs, within a period of fifteen days from this date. Whereupon, the lower Court shall number the application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in the event of allowing the same and setting aside the exparte decree, the suit itself shall be disposed of within a period of three months thereafter as per law if there is no legal impediment for such disposal. The point is answered accordingly. 12. On balance, this Civil Revision Petition is disposed of as above. No costs.