1. This is plaintiff's 1st appeal against judgement and decree dated 16.12. 2008 rendered by ld. 1st Additional District Judge, Srinagar, whereby his suit for recovery has been dismissed as time barred. 2. Heard. I have perused the record. 3. Brief question raised by ld. appellant's counsel in this appeal is, whether the suit is governed by Article 119 of the first schedule to the Jammu and Kashmir Limitation Act (for short the Act), corresponding to Article 113 of Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act) and that the ld. trial Court while dismissing the suit has wrongly interpreted the said provision? 4. Briefly, appellant's case before the trial Court was that the appellant is a subsidiary company of Air India, has its head office at Mumbai and is operating a hotel namely, "Centaur Lake View Hotel, Srinagar" at Srinagar. Respondent No. 1 is a production company run by respondent No. 2, who is the son of the then Information and Broadcasting Minister, Late Shri Pramod Mahajan, in the Union Cabinet and respondent No. 3 is its Chief Coordinator. Appellant had provided boarding and lodging facilities to a group/team of the respondents, who had come to Srinagar for organizing a cultural programme under the title of "Vijay Diwas", in their hotel at Srinagar from 4th August till 16th August, 1999. Total bill raised on both counts was Rs. 9, 93, 512/ but after giving discount on special request the same was reduced to Rs. 7,33,512/. The group/team checked out from the hotel on 16.08.1999 whereas respondent No. 3 checked out on 17.08.1999. While checking out, respondent No. 3 had requested the appellant that matter regarding realization of the boarding and lodging bill may be settled through appellant's head office at Mumbai and in this regard he had affixed his signature on the said bill. Appellant's case further was that the respondents did not liquidate the bill within one month. Appellant vide his No. 6578 dated 18.09.1999 referred the matter to Ministry of Civil Aviation under whose control principal Company, that is, Air India is functioning. There was no response from the Ministry. On 09.11.1999 appellant vide no. HCI/CLVH FOM/99/2167 gave a reminder to respondent No. 3 at his given address. Appellant vide his No. 6578 dated 18.09.1999 referred the matter to Ministry of Civil Aviation under whose control principal Company, that is, Air India is functioning. There was no response from the Ministry. On 09.11.1999 appellant vide no. HCI/CLVH FOM/99/2167 gave a reminder to respondent No. 3 at his given address. After that appellant kept on regularly raising the demand for realization of the amount to the respondents through its head office as well as through the Ministry but there was no substantial outcome. Ultimately appellant was constrained to issue legal notice to respondent No. 3 dated 23.12.2005 through registered post on the given address of respondent No. 3 but there was no response to this notice also. Appellant send another notice dated 24.06.2006 to respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2, however, vide his reply dated 16.07.2006 send through his advocate, Mr. G. I. Gujral, addressed to appellant's advocate, Mr. Ram Singh, denied the claim of the appellant. Appellant's case further was that cause of action had initially accrued to it in August, 1999 when respondents had failed to liquidate the bill and lately with the denial of respondent No. 2, communicated vide his reply dated 16.07.2006. 5. Record reveals that the suit was filed on 31.10. 2006. Respondents were set ex parte on 24.03.2007 as they failed to appear in spite of substituted service effected vide publication of the notice in newspaper, Indian Express, dated 24.02.2007. Appellant was asked by the trial court to lead ex parte evidence. Statements of 4 witnesses appearing for the appellant were recorded by the ld. trial Court. 6. Ld. trial Court, however, without appreciating the evidence and recording a clear finding on merit of the case, took up and laid emphasis on the question of limitation observing that "the most important point of law which arises in the case is whether the suit is barred by limitation", that "the question of limitation being that of law has also to be decided even if the same is not set up by the defendant" and further that "the law of limitation does not destroy, but it bars the remedy. The law cannot come to the help of a person who considers slumber more sweeter than toil The person who is deprived of the money has to enforce his claim within statutory period of limitation. The law cannot come to the help of a person who considers slumber more sweeter than toil The person who is deprived of the money has to enforce his claim within statutory period of limitation. The law of limitation does not distinguish between private persons and the government. Both have to be treated at par with each other as regards the treatment under law." 7. While dealing with the question of limitation, ld. Trial Court, it appears, has been of the opinion that suit was covered under Articles 94 and 119 the Act. This is evident from observation of the trial Court that "as per Article 94, 119 Limitation Act, the period of limitation for enforcing the claim of outstanding amount is six years from the time the amount becomes due to be paid to the appellant". Ld. trial Court seems to have taken the view that programme was organized from 4th August to 16 August, 1999 and payment, as per customary tradition, should generally have been made on the date of checking out or in any case within one month after that as agreed on the date of checking out. Ld. trial Court then held that "the initial cause of action accrued to the plaintiff not after the expiry of one month from the date of checking out, i.e. 17.08.1999 which cannot be beyond 18.09.1999 and the period of six years expires on 18.09.2005." 8. Ld. counsel for the appellant, Mr. B. A. Bashir, Sr. Advocate, sought to project that for limitation the case is governed by Article 119 of the Act under which time for filing the suit is six years commencing from the date when the right to sue accrues to the plaintiff. Mr. Bashir argued that ld. trial Court, while holding that period of limitation for enforcing the claim of outstanding amount is six years from the time the amount becomes due to be paid, has totally ignored that under Article 119 time reckons from the date when the right to sue accrues and not from the time the amount becomes due. Mr. Bashir argued further that in this case right to sue accrued to the appellant when respondent No. 2 conveyed the total denial of appellant's claim through his reply dated 16.07.2006 to the legal notice issued by the appellant. Mr. Bashir argued further that in this case right to sue accrued to the appellant when respondent No. 2 conveyed the total denial of appellant's claim through his reply dated 16.07.2006 to the legal notice issued by the appellant. Limitation thus commenced from the month of July, 2006 and the suit filed on 31.12.2006 was clearly within time. In support ld. counsel relied upon AIR 1983 Karnataka 98, AIR 1973 Gauhati 27, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1433 and AIR 1960 Supreme Court 335. 9. Section 3 of the Act provides for a bar against filing a suit, appeal or application after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed therefor under the first schedule to the Act. First Schedule to the Act prescribes time period within which a suit, appeal or application can be filed. First Division of the first Schedule prescribes a particular period of limitation for different kinds of suits. The list however, is not exhaustive because all sorts of suits likely to be filed could not have been visualized. The first Division therefore, contains Article 119 as a residuary Article. This residuary Article applies to all those suits which are not governed by any other Article. 10. The simple question for determination, therefore, is whether the suit filed by the appellant is/is not governed by any of the Articles other than the Residuary Article 119? If the suit is not governed by any other Article, Article 119 would apply and in that case, next question arising would be whether ld. trial Court has fallen into error in computing the period of limitation? The authorities relied upon by ld. Appellant's counsel would provide apt guidance for determining the second question. 11. Reply to the 1st question, however, is as simple as the question is. Suit filed by the appellant before the trial Court was for recovery of money payable by the respondents to the appellant partially as lodging charges for the lodging facility provided by the appellant to a cultural group of respondents in its hotel at Srinagar and partially as boarding charges, that is, price of food and other eatables provided by the appellant during the stay of group in its hotel This is indisputable and clear from the bill, Annexure P-1, to the suit, which was presented by the appellant to respondent-3 at the time of his checking out on 17.8.1999 and comprises Rs. 6,00,843/ as room charges and Rs. 3,86,931/ as food charges. The total amount shown in the bill was Rs. 9, 93,471/ but the appellant after providing facility of rebate had reduced it to Rs. 7,33,512/. Schedule-1 to the Act provides for specific Articles governing suits of this nature and Article 119 need not to apply. These articles are article 8 & 9 which read: Description of suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 8. For the price of food or drink sold by the keeper of a hotel, tavern or lodging house One year When the food or drink is delivered. 9. For the price of lodging. One year When the price becomes payable. 12. In case of the recovery of the price of food etc. period of limitation commences on day to day basis, that is, every day in respect of the price of food served on that day whereas for lodging charges, that is, price of lodging period of limitation commences from the day when the price becomes payable. 13. Respondent no. 3 had checked out on 17.9.1999 so the lodging charges became payable on that day and the limitation for filing suit is to be reckoned from that day. Limitation for filing the suit as regard the recovery of price of food is to be reckoned from the day for the food served on that day. 14. Viewed thus, suit of the appellant on both the counts, that is, recovery of lodging charges and recovery of boarding charges, was hopelessly time barred. Since specific articles to govern the suit of appellant are available, Article 119 does not apply. 15. When confronted with Articles 8 and 9 of the Schedule to the Act, Mr. Bashir, ld. Senior Advocate made an effort to project that even if the suit is governed under these two Articles, limitation will commence from the day when respondent No. 2 conveyed the total denial of appellant's claim through his reply dated 16.07.2006. Contention of Mr. Bashir though attractive, however, would not hold water when language of Articles 8 and 9 is compared with the language of Article 119. Article 119 provides that limitation commences from the date when right to sue accrues. Settled legal position, which stands projected in the case law (supra) cited by ld. Contention of Mr. Bashir though attractive, however, would not hold water when language of Articles 8 and 9 is compared with the language of Article 119. Article 119 provides that limitation commences from the date when right to sue accrues. Settled legal position, which stands projected in the case law (supra) cited by ld. appellant's counsel, is that right to sue accrues when the right of the plaintiff is denied or infringed. Under Articles 8 and 9, however, limitation does not commence from the date when right to sue accrues. This means commencement of limitation under Articles 8 and 9 is independent of the denial of plaintiffs right. Under these two Articles, limitation commences from the date when the food etc is served or when the price of lodging becomes payable and the price of lodging would become payable when lodging is complete, that is, when in case of hotel, the guest leaves the hotel. 16. Before, closing, I feel it apt to point out that ld. Judge of the trial Court has not dealt with sufficient deliberation the question of limitation, which was an important aspect of the case and had led to dismissal of the suit. Ld. Court has referred together to Articles 94 and 119 of the Act saying that; "as per Article 94,119 of Limitation Act, the period of Limitation for enforcing the claim of the outstanding amount is 6 years from the time the amount becomes due to be paid to the plaintiff. The approach of the ld. judge obviously had not been meticulous. The two articles, that is, Article 94 and 119 of the Act, which provide for the same period of six years, cannot apply simultaneously. Article 94 covers a particular kind of suit, that is, suit for recovery of money "payable to the plaintiff for money found to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff on accounts stated between them". On the other hand, Article 119 is residuary article and applies as said above. 17. For all that has been said above, appeal is dismissed. Judgment of trial Court is up held, though for a reason other than that given by Ld. trial Court.