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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 364 (HP)

Jit Ram v. State Of Himachal Pradesh

2013-04-29

RAJIV SHARMA

body2013
JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. Since common questions of law and facts are involved in all the writ petitions, these were taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by this common judgment. However, in order to maintain clarity, the facts of C.W.P. No. 3571 of 2009-G have been taken into consideration. C.W.P. No. 3571 of 2009-G 'Key facts' necessary for the adjudication of this writ petition are that notification, u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for the sake of brevity) was issued on 1st October, 2003 for acquiring the land comprised in Khasra Nos. 158, 159, 160, 162 and 163, situate in Minyasi Kothi Banyog and Maujas Kanon, Kothi Bunga. Petitioners have purchased land from one Badhu Ram vide sale deeds, dated 30.05.2005 and 10.06.2005. Mutations were also attested in favour of the petitioners. A notification u/s 17(4) of the Act was issued by the State Government on 16.11.2005, for acquiring Khasra No. 161. Petitioners made representation seeking compensation for the damage caused to their houses by respondents No. 3 and 4 to respondent No. 2 on 03.08.2007. Similar representation was made to Land Acquisition Officer, Parbati Hydro Electric Project, Sainj, District Kullu, H.P. on 08.01.2009. Respondents No. 3 and 4 have sent a communication to the Executive Engineer, Division No. 1, HP PWD, Kullu on 23.01.2009, stating therein that 15 numbers of houses situate on Khasra No. 161 were likely to be damaged. A further request was made to the Assistant Engineer concerned to get the estimates prepared of these houses without material (as the material was to be taken back by the owners of houses) at the earliest. This has been placed on record by the petitioners vide Annexure P-18. The Assistant Engineer, HP PWD, prepared the drawings of the houses which were falling in Channi Nallah Dumping site Phati Kanon Kothi Bunga, Sub Tehsil Sainj and submitted the same to the Deputy Manager (Civil) on 04.04.2009. These were duly verified by the functionaries of respondents No. 3 and 4. Petitioners made a representation to the Deputy Commissioner on 01.09.2009. The Deputy Commissioner issued the necessary instructions to the S.D.M., as per the endorsement made on the representation itself. These were duly verified by the functionaries of respondents No. 3 and 4. Petitioners made a representation to the Deputy Commissioner on 01.09.2009. The Deputy Commissioner issued the necessary instructions to the S.D.M., as per the endorsement made on the representation itself. The Land Acquisition Officer, Parvati Hydro Electric Project Phase-III, Larji, District Kullu, H.P. has sent a communication to the General Manager, informing him that the spot inspection of Khasra No. 161, Phati Kanon, Kothi Bunga, Sub Tehsil Sainj was conducted on 21.01.2009 and a detailed report was sent to his office for necessary action vide letter dated 22.01.2009. He has requested the authorities to settle the matter. Similarly, the Naib Tehsildar, Sainj also informed the General Manager of respondent No. 3-Company on 23.09.2009 for taking action by referring to the report of the Patwari. The Patwari has verified that 12 houses were damaged and walls of 3 houses were damaged and the same were not fit for human habitation. The Deputy Manager (Civil) and Senior Manager (Civil) have taken the cognizance of the drawings submitted by the Assistant Engineer, HP PWD on 04.04.2009. It appears from the record that the same was marked to Assistant Engineer, HP PWD, Banjar. Petitioners have placed on record the notings, dated 30.06.2009 alongwith the record of the Assistant Engineer. 2. Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that since the possession of Khasra No. 161 has been taken over, the State Government is bound to acquire the land of the petitioners and to pay them adequate compensation. He further contended that once the notification has been issued u/s 17(4) of the Act, the same could not be withdrawn by the State Government after taking possession u/s 48 of the Act. 3. Mr. Neeraj K. Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, has vehemently argued that the notification issued u/s 17(4) of the Act has elapsed after a period of two years. 4. Mr. K.D. Shreedhar, learned Senior Advocate, for respondents No. 3 and 4, has strenuously argued that the possession of Khasra No. 161 was never taken over and it is always open to the State Government to withdraw the notification issued u/s 17(4) of the Act on 16.11.2005. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings carefully. 6. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings carefully. 6. It is evident from the pleadings that the decision was taken by respondents No. 3 and 4 in principle to acquire Khasra No. 161. However, thereafter as per Annexure R-5/1, the respondents No. 3 and 4 have made up the mind not to acquire the land. The Deputy Manager (Civil) has marked the file to Senior Manager (PH). It was recommended for de-notification of Khasra No. 161 on 15.10.2005. The Chief Engineer has also recommended the same for approval to the General Manager on 15.10.2005. The General Manager has approved the same on 17.10.2005. The Chief Engineer (PH) has told the authorities to intimate the Land Acquisition Officer for taking action on 17.10.2005. The Land Acquisition Officer has mentioned in his note that the same shall be taken into consideration at the time of hearing objections u/s 5. However, the fact of the matter is that despite Annexure R-5/1, the notification u/s 17(4) of the Act was issued by the State Government on 16.11.2005 to acquire Khasra No. 161. 7. Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate, on the basis of the drawings approved by the Assistant Engineer, which were verified by respondents No. 3 and 4 and also on the basis of letter dated 30.06.2009 placed on record at page No. 202 of the paper-book, has submitted that the possession of Khasra No. 161 was taken over. He also argued that the land of the petitioners has been utilized by respondents No. 3 and 4 for dumping the muck. However, Mr. K.D. Shreedhar, learned Senior Advocate, has seriously refuted this submission. According to him, actual possession of Khasra No. 161 was never taken over. Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate, has also argued that once the possession of Khasra No 161 has been taken over by the State Government, the notification cannot be withdrawn u/s 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. 8. Now, the Court will advert to the submissions made by the learned Advocates. As far as Section 16 of the Act is concerned, when the Collector makes an award u/s 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. 8. Now, the Court will advert to the submissions made by the learned Advocates. As far as Section 16 of the Act is concerned, when the Collector makes an award u/s 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. As far as Section 17 of the Act is concerned, the appropriate Government may direct the Collector, though no award has been made, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, Sub-section (1) and take possession of any land needed for a public purpose and thereafter, this land would vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. The petitioners have not placed any tangible material on record to establish that the State Government has ever directed the Collector to take over the possession after expiry of 15 days, as stipulated u/s 9, Sub-section (1) of the Act. Section 17(1) is also required to be read in conjunction with Sub-section (3A), whereby the Collector has also to tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto. There is no evidence on record that the Collector has ever taken over the possession or even any revenue officer has visited the spot to take over the possession. No statements have ever been recorded by the Collector or any revenue agency. The procedure, as per the CPC was also required to be followed, which, admittedly in this case, has not been followed. However, it is also clear from the material placed on record, more particularly, the drawings submitted by the Assistant Engineer on 04.04.2009 and the documents placed on record at page No. 202 that damage has definitely been caused to the land of the petitioners by throwing muck. The Patwari has visited the spot and has found that damage was caused extensively to 12 numbers of houses and walls of three houses were damaged, as per the report of the Patwari. The petitioners have not been paid even 80% of the compensation as per Section 17(3A). 9. Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned counsel for the petitioners has also argued that the land of the petitioners has been utilized and it would amount to taking physical possession. The petitioners have not been paid even 80% of the compensation as per Section 17(3A). 9. Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned counsel for the petitioners has also argued that the land of the petitioners has been utilized and it would amount to taking physical possession. However, the fact of the matter is that only damage has been caused to the property of the petitioners. 10. In Mrityunjoy Bose Vs. State of Bihar and Another, AIR 1967 Patna 286 the Division Bench has held that taking of possession referred to in Sections 16, 17(1), 34 and 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, are of the same nature. Their Lordships have further held that unless the party to the suit can show that possession over that portion of the disputed land, which are notified as having been withdrawn from acquisition is of the nature required by either Section 16 or Section 17(1) of the Act, the legality of the order of withdrawal cannot be successfully challenged. Their Lordships have further held that the Government loses its rights to withdraw from acquisition only from the date when the Collector takes possession under Sections 16 or 17, so that title vests free from all encumbrances in the Government. Their Lordships have held as under: 44. So far as the application of S. 48(1) is concerned, it seems clear that the Government loses its right to withdraw from acquisition only from the date when the Collector takes possession u/s 16 or S. 17 of the Act so that title vests free from all encumbrances in the Government. There seems to be no reason to suppose that the word 'possession' in sub-section (1) of Section 48 means possession of a kind different from that taken over u/s 16 or Section 17 of the Act. It is also from the date of taking over such possession that interest becomes payable u/s 34 of the Act. 45. As I have been unable to find that the Government took possession of the lands in question under any law much less u/s 16 or Section 17 of the Act, I am unable to hold that they acted illegally in withdrawing portions of the lands from acquisition. For the same reason, I cannot hold that the petitioners are entitled to interest from any particular date. 46. For the same reason, I cannot hold that the petitioners are entitled to interest from any particular date. 46. Point No. (3), Section 48(1) does not say that the Government has to follow any particular procedure in withdrawing any land from acquisition. It is manifest that the Land Acquisition Officer knew of the Government's intention to withdraw what they have actually withdrawn from acquisition under the notifications issued in August, 1966. The Land Acquisition Officer's awards cannot be held to be vitiated simply because he gave them in respect of only such areas of land as remained under acquisition after the withdrawals which were subsequently notified by Government in the Official Gazette. Even supposing that the officer has committed some irregularity, it is not possible for this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding him to determine the compensation of lands which now stand legally withdrawn by Government from acquisition. Such a writ would be quite valueless. This point also, therefore, fails. 53. But as the validity of withdrawal from acquisition in respect of portions of lands is under challenge before us, we have to decide whether the taking of possession as alleged by the petitioners, even if believed, would be a bar to withdrawal from acquisition under S. 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. As rightly pointed out by my learned Brother, the taking of possession referred to in sections 16, 17(1), 34 and 48(1) of the Act must be of the same nature. Hence, unless the petitioners can show that possession over that portion of the disputed lands which were notified as having been withdrawn from acquisition was of the nature required either by section 16 of Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, the legality of the order of withdrawal cannot be successfully challenged. I would agree with the contention of Mr. Lal Narain Sinha for the State of Bihar that the taking of possession either u/s 16 or u/s 17(1) is fundamentally different from the possession, if any, which the Government might have taken prior to the commencement of the acquisition proceedings. Possession for the purpose of Ss. 17 and 17(1) must be possession as a full owner, in consequence of which lands vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Possession for the purpose of Ss. 17 and 17(1) must be possession as a full owner, in consequence of which lands vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It cannot be of the same nature as any previous possession which the Government might have taken either as a lessee, or mortgagee, or licensee, or under some other colour of title, or even as a trespasser. Though the Act is silent as to the mode of taking possession either under S 16 or S 17(1) of the Act, there seems no doubt that either actual occupation by the Collector or his agents, or taking symbolic possession (where actual possession is already with the Collector), or doing something equivalent to effective possession is contemplated. Here admittedly no such formal taking of possession either under S. 16 or under S. 17(1) has been alleged to have been done. The petitioners' case all along has been that by virtue of the appropriate notification any resistance by the petitioners, the Forest Department took over actual possession from 1954. That possession cannot, therefore, be held to be possession for the purpose of S. 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Hence there is no illegality in the withdrawal from acquisition in respect of a portion of the disputed lands. 11. In Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh and Another Vs. Avinash Sharma, AIR 1970 SC 1576 their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that when a notification u/s 17(1) is issued on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9(1), the possession previously obtained will be deemed to be the possession of the Government u/s 17(1) of the Act and the land will vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. Their Lordships have held as under: 4. In the present case a notification u/s 17(1) and (4) was issued by the State Government and possession which had previously been taken must, from the date of expiry of fifteen days from the publication of the notice u/s 9(1), be deemed to be in the possession of the Government. We are unable to agree that where the Government has obtained possession illegally or under some unlawful transaction and a notification u/s 17(1) is issued the land does not vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. We are unable to agree that where the Government has obtained possession illegally or under some unlawful transaction and a notification u/s 17(1) is issued the land does not vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. We are of the view that when a notification u/s 17(1) is issued the land does not vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. We are of the view that when a notification u/s 17(1) is issued, on expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9(1), the possession previously obtained will be deemed to be the possession of the Government u/s 17(1) of the Act and the land will vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. 8. But these observations do not assist the case of the appellant. It is clearly implicit in the observations that after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification u/s 17(1) the land is vested in the Government, and the notification cannot be cancelled u/s 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers u/s 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken u/s 17(1), the land vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification. 12. In Rajkumar Rajindra Singh Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Another, AIR 1982 HP 92 the Division Bench of this Court has held that when the possession is taken by the Government, the provisions of Section 48 cannot be invoked. Their Lordships have held as under: 14. Another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents was that the possession was not handed over to the P.W.D. authorities by the petitioner and the petitioner was incapable of handing over such possession. We cannot accept this contention of the learned counsel for the respondents because it is not at all necessary as to who delivers the possession to the respondents. The only criteria for the application of S. 48 of the Act is as to whether the possession has been taken over by the Government. We cannot accept this contention of the learned counsel for the respondents because it is not at all necessary as to who delivers the possession to the respondents. The only criteria for the application of S. 48 of the Act is as to whether the possession has been taken over by the Government. In view of the fact that possession of the acquired property had been taken by the Government on 28.10.69 it was not within the competency of the Government to have invoked the provisions of S. 48 of the Act for the withdrawal of the acquisition proceedings. 13. The Apex Court in Jethmull Bhojraj Vs. State of Bihar and Others, AIR 1972 SC 1363 have held that the Government becomes the owner of the lands notified for acquisition only when the Collector takes possession of those lands either u/s 16 or u/s 17(1). Their Lordships have further held that the possession of any land notified for acquisition is taken when the Collector has made an award u/s 11 and not before it. But an exception is provided u/s 17(1). In cases of urgency, if the Government so directs, the Collector may though no award has been made u/s 11, on the expiration of the 15 days from the publication of the notices mentioned in Section 9(1), take possession of any waste or arable land and the land shall thereupon vest absolutely with the Government free from all encumbrances. Their Lordships have further held that the Collector cannot take possession of the land in question unless the Government directs him to do so. Their Lordships have held as under: 10. The next point that arises for decision is whether delivery of the lands notified for acquisition was taken u/s 17(1) as contended by the appellant. The Government becomes the owner of the lands notified for acquisition only when the Collector takes possession of those lands either u/s 16 or under Sec. 17(1). Both those provisions provide that when the Collector takes possession under those provisions the lands notified for acquisition shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Until and unless possession is taken under either of those provisions, the lands notified for acquisition do not vest in the Government. Both those provisions provide that when the Collector takes possession under those provisions the lands notified for acquisition shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Until and unless possession is taken under either of those provisions, the lands notified for acquisition do not vest in the Government. Section 48(1) of the Act provides: Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any lands of which possession has not been taken. 11. Section 36 is not relevant for our present purpose. Possession referred to in Section 48 necessarily is the possession taken either u/s 16 or u/s 17(1). Section 17(1) says: In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9 sub-section (1), take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a Company. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Ordinarily possession of any land notified for acquisition is taken when the Collector has made an award u/s 11 and not before it. But an exception is provided u/s 17(1). In cases of urgency, if the Government so directs, the Collector may, though no award has been made u/s 11, on the expiration of the 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in S. 9(1) take possession of any waste or arable land and the land shall thereupon vest absolutely with the Government free from all encumbrances. From this provision, it is plain that the Collector cannot take possession of the land in question unless the Government directs him to do so. The Government directs him to do so only in cases of urgency. Even when the Government directs the Collector to take possession, he cannot do so until expiration of 15 days from the publication of a notice u/s 9(1). There is no material on record to show that the Government had given to the Collector any direction u/s 17(1); nor is there any material to show that the lands in question had been taken possession of by the Collector u/s 17(1). There is no material on record to show that the Government had given to the Collector any direction u/s 17(1); nor is there any material to show that the lands in question had been taken possession of by the Collector u/s 17(1). It is true that in the order-sheet maintained by the Land Acquisition Officer, a note was made on October 17, 1959: Shri B.P. Yadav Kgo, to deliver possession at the spot to the representative of the R.O. on 16-11-59 Draft addressed to R.O. is signed. But there is nothing to show that this order was implemented. According to the respondent this order was not implemented. In the instant case also, no direction was ever issued by the State Government to the Collector to take over the possession. 14. In Balwant Narayan Bhagde Vs. M.D. Bhagwat and Others, AIR 1975 SC 1767 Hon'ble Justice Untwalia, J. has taken the view that even the delivery of so-called "symbolical" possession is delivery of "actual" possession of the right title and interest of the judgment-debtor. However, the majority view is contrary to the same. His Lordship Bhagwati, J. (concurring) (for himself and Gupta, J.) has held that there can be no question of taking 'symbolical' possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government is taking of actual possession of the land. The majority view reads as under: Bhagwati, J. (on behalf of himself and Gupta J.):- We agree with the conclusion reached by our brother Untwalia, J., as also with the reasoning on which the conclusion is based. But we are writing a separate judgment as we feel that the discussion in the judgment of our learned brother Untwalia, J., in regard to delivery of 'symbolical' and 'actual'-possession under Rules 35, 36, 95 and 96 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not necessary for the disposal of the present appeals and we do not wish to subscribe to what has been said by our learned brother Untwalia, J., in that connection, nor do we wish to express our assent with the discussion of the various authorities made by him in his judgment. We think it is enough to state that when the Government proceeds to take possession of the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take actual possession of the land since all interests in the land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking 'symbolical' possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of deter-mining what part was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was done by the Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities, as that would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it. We are of the view, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, that the Tahsildar took actual possession of that part of the land which was waste or arable and handed it over to the Principal of the Agricultural College. It is true that the Special Land Acquisition Officer in his letter dated 13th December, 1961 to the Commissioner stated that possession of the entire land was still with the appellant and it was not actually taken possession of by the Principal, Agricultural College, But it is obvious that this statement was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer because he thought that actual possession of the land could not be regarded as having been taken, unless the appellant was excluded from the land and since the appellant immediately, without any obstruction, entered upon the land and continued in possession, "the land was not actually taken possession of by the Principal, Agricultural College". This was plainly erroneous view, for the legal position is clear that even if the appellant entered upon the land and resumed possession of it the very next moment after the land was actually taken possession of and became vested in the Government, such act on the part of the appellant did not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting. There can, therefore, be no doubt that actual possession of 19 acres 16 gunthas of waste and arable land was taken by the Tahsildar on 3rd April, 1959 and it became vested in the Government. (Neither the Government nor the Commissioner could thereafter withdraw from the acquisition of any portion of this land under S. 48(1) of the Act. 15. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar Vs. State of Punjab and others, (1996) 3 AD 50 have laid down that the normal mode of taking possession is drafting the panchnama in the presence of panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is the accepted mode of taking possession of the land. Their Lordships have held as under: 4. It is seen that the entire gamut of the acquisition proceedings stood completed by April 17, 1976 by which date possession of the land had been taken. No doubt, Shri Parekh has contended that the appellant still retained their possession. Their Lordships have held as under: 4. It is seen that the entire gamut of the acquisition proceedings stood completed by April 17, 1976 by which date possession of the land had been taken. No doubt, Shri Parekh has contended that the appellant still retained their possession. It is now well-settled legal position that it is difficult to take physical possession of the land under compulsory acquisition. The normal mode of taking possession is drafting the Panchanama in the presence of Panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is the accepted mode of taking possession of the land. Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession. 16. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. Mahesh Dutta and Others, (2009) 9 JT 537 (1) have again discussed the principles of taking of possession of acquired land in cases of urgency. Their Lordships have held as under: 16. It is a well settled proposition of law that in the event possession of the land, in respect whereof a Notification had been issued, had been taken over, the State would be denuded of its power to withdraw from the acquisition in terms of Section 48 of the Act. Whether actual or symbolic possession had been taken over from the land owners is essentially a question of fact. Taking over of possession in terms of the provisions of the Act would, however, mean actual possession and not symbolic possession. The question, however, is as to whether the finding of fact arrived at by the High Court that physical possession, indeed, had been taken over by the Collector is correct or not. 26. These decisions, as noticed hereinbefore, do not lay down an absolute rule. The question as to whether actual physical possession had been taken in compliance of the provisions of Section 17 of the Act or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 27. When possession is to be taken over in respect of the fallow or Patit land, a mere intention to do so may not be enough. It is, however, the positive stand by the appellant that the lands in question are agricultural land and crops used to be grown therein. 27. When possession is to be taken over in respect of the fallow or Patit land, a mere intention to do so may not be enough. It is, however, the positive stand by the appellant that the lands in question are agricultural land and crops used to be grown therein. If the lands in question are agricultural lands, not only actual physical possession had to be taken but also they were required to be properly demarcated. If the land had standing crops, as has been contended by Mr. Raju Ramachandran, steps in relation thereto were required to be taken by the Collector. Even in the said certificate of possession, it had not been stated that there were standing crops on the land on the date on which possession was taken. We may notice that delivery of possession in respect of immoveable property should be taken in the manner laid down in Order XXI Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 28. It is beyond any comprehension that when possession is purported to have been taken of the entire acquired lands, actual possession would be taken only of a portion thereof. The certificate of possession was either correct or incorrect. It cannot be partially correct or partially incorrect. Either the possession had actually been delivered or had not been delivered. It cannot be accepted that possession had been delivered in respect of about 10 acres of land and the possession could not be taken in respect of the rest 55 acres of land. When the provisions of Section 17 are taken recourse to, vesting of the land takes effect immediately. 17. The Apex Court in Prahlad Singh and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2011) 2 RCR(Civil) 863 has held that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of the acquired land and when there is no crop or structure on the land only symbolic possession could be taken. Their Lordships have held as under: 16. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2011) 2 RCR(Civil) 863 has held that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of the acquired land and when there is no crop or structure on the land only symbolic possession could be taken. Their Lordships have held as under: 16. In P.K. Kalburqi V. State of Karnataka the Court referred to the observations made by Bhagwati, J. in Balwant Narayan Bhagde V. M.D. Bhagwat that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of the acquired land and observed that when there is no crop or structure on the land only symbolic possession could be taken. 20. If the present case is examined in the light of the facts which have been brought on record and the principles laid down in the judgment in Banda Development Authority case it is not possible to sustain the finding and conclusion recorded by the High Court that the acquired land had vested in the State Government because the actual and physical possession of the acquired land always remained with the appellants and no evidence has been produced by the respondents to show that possession was taken by preparing a panchnama in the presence of independent witnesses and their signatures were obtained on the panchnama. 21. A reading of the Khasra girdawari and jamabandis, copies of which have been placed on record, shows that actual and physical possession of the acquired land is still with the appellants. Jamabandis relate to the year 2005-2006. Copies of notice dated 10-2-2011/11-2-2011 issued by the Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. Relates to Appellant 1, Prahlad Singh and this, prima facie, supports the appellants' assertion that physical possession of the land is still with them. 22. Respondents 3 to 6 have not placed any document before this Court to show that actual possession of the acquired land was taken on the particular date. Therefore, the High Court was not right in recording a finding that the acquired land will be deemed to have vested in the State Government. 18. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Banda Development Authority, Banda Vs. Moti Lal Agarwal and Others, (2011) 5 JT 106 have again discussed the rule of taking possession. Their Lordships have held as under: 37. 18. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Banda Development Authority, Banda Vs. Moti Lal Agarwal and Others, (2011) 5 JT 106 have again discussed the rule of taking possession. Their Lordships have held as under: 37. The principles which can be culled out from the above noted judgments are: (i) No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land. (ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the concerned State authority to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking of possession. (iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/structure exists, mere going on the spot by the concerned authority will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the concerned authority will have to give notice to the occupier of the building/structure or the person who has cultivated the land and take possession in the presence of independent witnesses and get their signatures on the panchnama. Of course, refusal of the owner of the land or building/structure may not lead to an inference that the possession of the acquired land has not been taken. (iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such document. (v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilised in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the Court may reasonably presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken. 38. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the action of the concerned State authorities to go to the spot and prepare panchnama showing delivery of possession was sufficient for recording a finding that actual possession of the entire acquired land had been taken and handed over to the BDA. 38. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the action of the concerned State authorities to go to the spot and prepare panchnama showing delivery of possession was sufficient for recording a finding that actual possession of the entire acquired land had been taken and handed over to the BDA. The utilization of the major portion of the acquired land for the public purpose for which it was acquired is clearly indicative of the fact that actual possession of the acquired land had been taken by the BDA. Once it is held that possession of the acquired land was handed over to the BDA on 30.6.2001, the view taken by the High Court that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed due to non-compliance of Section 11A cannot be sustained. 19. In Brij Pal Bhargava and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2011) 2 SCALE 692 their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that whether the possession was taken is a question of fact, which is required to be taken into consideration pragmatically. Their Lordships have held as under: 12. Shri Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of Mathura Vrindavan Development Authority (respondent No. 3) pointed out that it would be impossible for the Collector or Revenue officers to enter each bigha of land for taking possession thereof and, therefore, the pragmatic approach has to be adopted by the Court while considering as to whether possession has been taken or not. The learned senior counsel also pointed out that the documents show that actual possession was taken. He also tried to point out the photograph suggesting that not only the possession has been taken, but number of other activities of construction were going on at the land including drawing the layout thereof and building the roads therefor. The learned senior counsel relied on the reported decision in Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi Vs. Lt. Governor, Govt. of N.C.T. Delhi and Others, AIR 2010 SC 1143 , as also in Dahyabhai Ranchhoddas Dhobi and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, AIR 2010 SC 3006 where the view has been taken about the pragmatic approach to be adopted by the Courts in deciding as to whether the possession was taken or not. 13. Lt. Governor, Govt. of N.C.T. Delhi and Others, AIR 2010 SC 1143 , as also in Dahyabhai Ranchhoddas Dhobi and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, AIR 2010 SC 3006 where the view has been taken about the pragmatic approach to be adopted by the Courts in deciding as to whether the possession was taken or not. 13. Seeing the report and the orders passed, we are thoroughly convinced that not only the possession was taken, but there are activities going on at the behest of the Mathura Vrindavan Development Authority. This is apart from the fact that this is a pure question of fact which has been answered by the High Court in no uncertain terms. In this view of the matter, we are of the clear opinion that even on this count, the appellants must fail. 20. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Vs. State of Haryana and Others, AIR 2012 SC 468 have again discussed the mode of taking the possession as under: 23. The respondents have not produced any other evidence to show that actual possession of the land, on which crop was standing, had been taken after giving notice to the appellant or that he was present at the site when possession of the acquired land was delivered to the Senior Manager of HSIIDC. Indeed, it is not even the case of the respondents that any independent witness was present at the time of taking possession of the acquired land. 29. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the record prepared by the revenue authorities showing delivery of possession of the acquired land to HSIIDC has no legal sanctity and the High Court committed serious error by dismissing the writ petition on the specious ground that possession of the acquired land had been taken and the same vested in the State Government in terms of Section 16. 31. Similar view was expressed in C. Padma v. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu (supra), Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (supra), Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig (supra) and Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (supra). In all the cases, challenge to the acquisition proceedings was negatived primarily on the ground of delay. In all the cases, challenge to the acquisition proceedings was negatived primarily on the ground of delay. An additional factor which influenced this Court was that physical possession of the acquired land had been taken by the concerned authorities. In none of these cases, the landowners appear to have questioned the legality of the mode adopted by the concerned authorities for taking possession of the acquired land. Therefore, these judgments cannot be relied upon for sustaining the High Court's negation of the appellant's challenge to the acquisition of his land. 21. The possession of Khasra No. 161 has not been taken over as per the modes prescribed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments cited hereinabove. It is settled law by now that only when the possession is taken u/s 17(1) of the Act, the Government cannot withdraw from acquisition u/s 48 of the Act. In the instant case, the notification has been issued u/s 17(4) of the Act on 16.11.2005 and the same could be withdrawn only in the manner in which the notification u/s 17(4) of the Act has been issued. There cannot be automatic lapse of notification issued u/s 17(4) of Act u/s 11A of the Act, as argued by Mr. Neeraj K. Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General in view of the urgency Clause. 22. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Murari and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1996) 8 AD 577 have held that withdrawal from acquisition must be by a notification de-notifying the acquisition of land. Their Lordships have held as under: 18. It may be noticed that Ss. (1 of Section 48 of the Act contemplates that except in the case provided for in Section 36, the government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. This section thus confers power on the government to withdraw any land from the acquisition but such power can be exercised only before taking possession of the land sought to be acquired. In this connection before we proceed to examine the relevant decisions it would be appropriate to refer to the observations made by the full bench of the High court in the impugned judgment with regard to this controversy. In this connection before we proceed to examine the relevant decisions it would be appropriate to refer to the observations made by the full bench of the High court in the impugned judgment with regard to this controversy. The original record in which the Minister concerned is said to have passed the order for withdrawal was produced before the High court which was perused by the full bench, The photostat copies of the notings were also placed on record of the High court and after the perusal of the original record the full bench found that in fact no order has been made by the Minister concerned which may be said to be an order for withdrawal of acquisition. The High court observed that mere communication of the misconstrued orders by the officials would not have the effect of an order of the government withdrawing from acquisition. The High court on a careful perusal of the original file and the noting contained therein and approved by the Minister came to the definite conclusion that the Minister had directed that the matter be taken up with the NCT Delhi for denotifying and for release of the land immediately which was indicative of the fact that the Minister had not himself passed the order for releasing the land from acquisition and the release from acquisition was left to the decision of NCT, Delhi and since NCT Delhi did not give its consent the release of the said land was not denotified. The High court, therefore, took the view that the communication sent to the appellants concerned purporting to be an order u/s 48 of the Act is invalid and the land acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed on the basis of such invalid communication. In our opinion the view taken by the High court cannot be said to be erroneous calling for any interference by this court. 19. Here it would be relevant to refer to some of the decisions of this court on the question of release of the land u/s 48 and its validity under the law. In our opinion the view taken by the High court cannot be said to be erroneous calling for any interference by this court. 19. Here it would be relevant to refer to some of the decisions of this court on the question of release of the land u/s 48 and its validity under the law. In the case of Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar this court observed that perhaps the appellants wanted to persuade this court to strike down the entire notification so that when a fresh notification is issued they may be able to get a higher compensation in view of sudden spurt and rise in the price of land and other commodities in between the period when the acquisition was made and when the actual possession was taken. This court took the view that it was not acceptable to uphold the aforesaid process of reasoning. The release was declared to be bad as a result of which the entire notification issued u/s 4 would be deemed to be valid and the land specially belonging to the landowner would form part of the acquisition. It has been further held that the release being a separate and subsequent act of the Collector, could not invalidate the entire notification but would only invalidate the portion released, with the result that the original notification would be restored to its position as it stood on the date of its notification. Assuming therefore, that there was release of certain areas of land belonging to certain landowners, the entire notification could not be rendered invalid. Further this court in a recent decision rendered in State of Maharashtra v. Umashankar Rajabhau took the view as follows: IT is brought to our notice that after the notification was quashed by the High court, no further steps were taken by the government. It is not necessary since it is being challenged in the appeal in respect of these three plots. A submission was made that the Corporation does not need these three plots of lands for the employees. So long as there is no notification published u/s 48(1) of the Act withdrawing from the acquisition, the court cannot take notice of any subsequent disinclination on the part of the beneficiary. 20. A submission was made that the Corporation does not need these three plots of lands for the employees. So long as there is no notification published u/s 48(1) of the Act withdrawing from the acquisition, the court cannot take notice of any subsequent disinclination on the part of the beneficiary. 20. The same view was expressed by this court in yet another decision in the case of U.P. Jal Nigain v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. In this view of the matter even if we assume that there was an order for release of certain land from acquisition the same could not be given effect to in the absence of a notification denotifying the acquisition of land. In the instant case, the respondent-State, though could take unilateral decision to de-notify the acquisition, but has not issued any notification de-notifying the earlier notification issued on 16.11.2005 as per law. 23. Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amarnath Ashram Trust Society and Another Vs. Governor of U.P. and Others, AIR 1998 SC 477 have held that the decision to withdraw must be supported by reasons and the exercise must be undertaken in a bonafide manner and not arbitrarily. Their Lordships have held as under: 10. However, it is not necessary to go into this larger question whether in such a case the State Government can withdraw from acquisition without the consent of the company as the justification given by the Government is otherwise not sustainable. As stated earlier the reason given by the Government for withdrawing from the acquisition is that as no part of the cost of acquisition was to be born by the Government the acquisition could not have been sustained as for a public purpose. We have already pointed out that in this case the acquisition was not for a public purpose but it was an acquisition for a company under Chapter VII of the Act. In respect of an acquisition for a company under Chapter VII of the Act law does not require that the State should also bear some cost of the acquisition to make it an acquisition for public use. Thus the decision of the Government to withdraw from acquisition was based upon misconception of the correct legal position. Such a decision has to be regarded as arbitrary and not bona fide. Thus the decision of the Government to withdraw from acquisition was based upon misconception of the correct legal position. Such a decision has to be regarded as arbitrary and not bona fide. Particularly in a case where as a result of a decision taken by the Government other party is likely to be prejudicially affected, the Government has to exercise its power bona fide and not arbitrarily. Even though Section 48 of the Act confers upon the State wide discretion it does not permit it to act in an arbitrary manner. Though the State cannot be compelled to acquire land compulsorily for a company its decision to withdraw from acquisition can be challenged on the ground that power has been exercised mala fide or in an arbitrary manner. Therefore, we cannot accept the submission of the learned counsel for the State that the discretion of the State Government in this behalf is absolute and not justiciable at all. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (1998) 3 AD 308 have held that withdrawal from acquisition has to be notified. A notification in Official Gazette is required to be issued if the State Government decides to withdraw from the acquisition u/s 48 of the Act of any land of which possession has not been taken. Their Lordships have held as under: 30. It was submitted by Mr. Salve that Section 48 of the Act did not contemplate issue of any notification and withdrawal from the acquisition could be by order simpliciter. He said that Sections 4 and 6 talked of notifications being issued under those provisions but there was no such mandate in Section 48. It was thus contended that when statute did not require to issue any notification for withdrawal from the acquisition, reference to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act was not correct. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is as under: 21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind, notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws.-Whereby any Central Act, or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction, and conditions, if any, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued. Mr. Mr. Salve said that Section 21 expressly referred to the powers being given to issue notifications etc. under an Act or Regulations and under this that power included power to withdraw or rescind any notification in the similar fashion. It was therefore submitted that when Section 48 did not empower the State Government to issue any notification and it could not be read into that provision that withdrawal had to be issued by a notification. His argument, therefore, appeared to be that on correct interpretation of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act before reaching the stage of Section 48, the State Government could withdraw notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act by issuing notifications withdrawing or rescinding earlier notifications and that would be the end to the acquisition proceedings. We do not think that Mr. Salve is quite right in his submissions. When Sections 4 and 6 notifications are issued, much has been done towards the acquisition process and that process cannot be reversed merely by rescinding those notifications. Rather it is Section 48 under which, after withdrawal from acquisition is made, compensation due for any damage suffered by the owner during the course of acquisition proceedings is determined and given to him. It is, therefore, implicit that withdrawal from acquisition has to be notified. 31. Principles of law are, therefore, well settled. A notification in the Official Gazette is required to be issued if the State Government decides to withdraw from the acquisition u/s 48 of the Act of any land of which possession has not been taken. An owner need not be given any notice of the intention of the State Government to withdraw from the acquisition and the State Government is at liberty to do so. Rights of the owner are well protected by sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Act and if he suffered any damage in consequence of the acquisition proceedings, he is to be compensated and sub-section (3) of Section 48 provides as to how such compensation is to be determined. There is, therefore, no difficulty when it is the owner whose land is withdrawan from acquisition is concerned. However, in the case (of) a company, opportunity has to be given to it to show cause against any order which the State Government proposes to make withdrawing from the acquisition. Reasons for this are not far to seek. There is, therefore, no difficulty when it is the owner whose land is withdrawan from acquisition is concerned. However, in the case (of) a company, opportunity has to be given to it to show cause against any order which the State Government proposes to make withdrawing from the acquisition. Reasons for this are not far to seek. After notification u/s 4 is issued, when it appears to the State Government that the land in any locality is needed for a company, any person interested in such land which has been notified can file objections u/s 5-A(1) of the Act. Such objections are to be made to the Collector in writing and who after giving the objector an opportunity of being heard and after hearing of such objections and after making such further enquiry, if any, as the Collector thinks necessary, is to make a report to the State Government for its decision. Then the decision of the State Government on the objections is final. Before the applicability of other provisions in the process of acquisition, in the case of company, previous consent of the State Government is required u/s 39 of the Act nor unless (sic) the company shall have executed the agreement as provided in Section 41 of the Act. Before giving such consent, Section 40 contemplates a previous enquiry. Then compliance with Rules 3 and 4 of the Land Acquisition (company) Rules, 1963 is mandatorily required. After the stage of Sections 40 and 41 is reached, the agreement so entered into by the company with the State Government is to be published in the Official Gazette. This is Section 42 of the Act which provides that the agreement on its publication would have the same effect as if it had formed part of the Act. After having done all this, State Government cannot unilaterally and without notice to the company withdraw from acquisition. Opportunity has to be given to the company to show cause against the proposed action of the State Government to withdraw from acquisition. A declaration u/s 6 of the Act is made by notification only after formalities under Part VII of the Act which contains Sections 39 to 42 have been complied and report of the Collector u/s 5-A(2) of the Act is before the State Government who consents to acquire the land on its satisfaction that it is needed for the company. A declaration u/s 6 of the Act is made by notification only after formalities under Part VII of the Act which contains Sections 39 to 42 have been complied and report of the Collector u/s 5-A(2) of the Act is before the State Government who consents to acquire the land on its satisfaction that it is needed for the company. A valuable right, thus, accrues to the company to oppose the proposed decision of the State Government withdrawing from acquisition. The State Government may have sound reasons to withdraw from acquisition but those must be made known to the company which may have equally sound reasons or perhaps more which might persuade the State Government to reverse its decision withdrawing from acquisition. In this view of the matter it has to be held that Yadi (Memo) dated 11-4-1991 and Yadi (Memo) dated 3-5-91 were issued without notice to the appellant (L & T Ltd.) and are, thus, not legal. In the instant case though the possession has not been taken, as discussed above, but at the same time, no notification has been issued in the official gazette to withdraw from the acquisition u/s 48 of the Act. 25. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shanti Sports Club and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 2010 SC 433 have held that discretion to withdraw from acquisition must be made known to public at large and the same can be done only by issuing a notification in the official gazette. Their Lordships have held as under: 37. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, we shall now consider whether note dated 8.6.1999 recorded by the then Minister for Urban Development can be treated as a decision of the Government to withdraw from the acquisition of land in question in terms of Section 48(1) of the Act, which lays down that except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. Although, the plain language of Section 48(1) does not give any indication of the manner or mode in which the power/discretion to withdraw from the acquisition of any land is required to be exercised, having regard to the scheme of Parts II and VII of the 1894 Act, which postulates publication of notification u/s 4(1), declaration u/s 6 and agreement u/s 42 in the official gazette as a condition for valid acquisition of the land for any public purpose or for a company, it is reasonable to take the view that withdrawal from the acquisition, which may adversely affect the public purpose for which, or the company on whose behalf the acquisition is proposed, can be done only by issuing a notification in the official gazette. 38. The decision to acquire the land for a public purpose is preceded by consideration of the matter at various levels of the Government. The revenue authorities conduct survey for determining the location and status of the land and feasibility of its acquisition for a public purpose. The final decision taken by the competent authority is then published in the official gazette in the form of a notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act. Likewise, declaration made u/s 6 of the Act is published in the official gazette. The publication of notifications u/s 4(1) has two-fold objectives. In the first place, it enables the land owner(s) to lodge objections against the proposed acquisition. Secondly, it forewarns the owners and other interested persons not to change the character of the land and, at the same time, make them aware that if they enter into any transaction with respect to the land proposed to be acquired, they will do so at their own peril. When the land is acquired on behalf of a company, consent of the appropriate government is a must. The company is also required to execute an agreement in terms of Section 41 of the Act which is then published in the official gazette in terms of Section 42 thereof. When the land is acquired on behalf of a company, consent of the appropriate government is a must. The company is also required to execute an agreement in terms of Section 41 of the Act which is then published in the official gazette in terms of Section 42 thereof. As a necessary concomitant, it must be held that the exercise of power by the government u/s 48(1) of the Act must be made known to the public at large so that those interested in accomplishment of the public purpose for which the land is acquired or the concerned company may question such withdrawal by making representation to the higher authorities or by seeking courts intervention. If the decision of the Government to withdraw from the acquisition of land is kept secret and is not published in the official gazette, there is every likelihood that unscrupulous land owners, their agents and wheeler-dealers may pull strings in the power corridors and clandestinely get the land released from acquisition and thereby defeat the public purpose for which the land is acquired. Similarly, the company on whose behalf the land is acquired may suffer incalculable harm by unpublished decision of the Government to withdraw from the acquisition. 26. Similarly, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajinder Singh Bhatti and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, AIR 2009 SC 2232 have held that since the Act provides for publication of notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act in the Official Gazette, obviously the withdrawal from land acquisition proceedings by taking resort to Section 48(1) of the Act must be done in the same manner. Their Lordships have explained the word 'withdrawal' as under: 27. In the context of Section 48, the word "withdraw" is indicative of the voluntary and conscious decision of the government for withdrawal from the acquisition; statutory lapse u/s 11-A is entirely different. The object of Section 11-A is to arrest delay in making award. An obligation is cast on the Collector u/s 11-A to make the award within the time prescribed therein failing which statutory consequence follows namely, acquisition proceedings lapse automatically. 31. It is true that Section 48 does not in express terms require the decision of the government for withdrawal of acquisition to be published in the official gazette. An obligation is cast on the Collector u/s 11-A to make the award within the time prescribed therein failing which statutory consequence follows namely, acquisition proceedings lapse automatically. 31. It is true that Section 48 does not in express terms require the decision of the government for withdrawal of acquisition to be published in the official gazette. In Abdul Majeed, this Court has held that there should be publication of the withdrawal of the notification published u/s 4(1) and declaration u/s 6 by exercising power u/s 48(1). Even on first principles, such requirement appears to be implicit. The Act provides for the publication of notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act in official gazette. Obviously the withdrawal from land acquisition proceedings by taking resort to Section 48(1) of the Act also must be in the like manner. As a matter of fact, this aspect is no more res integra. 32. In the case of M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (1998) 3 AD 308, the identical contentions which have been advanced before us by the senior counsel were raised in that case. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 was also pressed into service there. This Court considered: It was submitted by Mr. Salve that Section 48 of the Act did not contemplate issue of any notification and withdrawal from the acquisition could be by order simpliciter. He said that Sections 4 and 6 talked of notifications being issued under those provisions but there was no such mandate in Section 48. It was thus contended that when the statute did not require to issue any notification for withdrawal from the acquisition, reference to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act was not correct. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is as under: 21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, to amend, vary or rescind, notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws.--Where by any Central Act, or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any) to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued." Mr. Salve said that Section 21 expressly referred to the powers being given to issue notifications etc. Salve said that Section 21 expressly referred to the powers being given to issue notifications etc. under an Act or Regulation and under this that power included power to withdraw or rescind any notification in a similar fashion. It was therefore submitted that when Section 48 did not empower the State Government to issue any notification and it could not be read into that provision that withdrawal had to be issued by a notification. His argument, therefore, appeared to be that on correct interpretation of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act before reaching the stage of Section 48, the State Government could withdraw notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act by issuing notifications withdrawing or rescinding earlier notifications and that would be the end to the acquisition proceedings. We do not think that Mr. Salve is quite right in his submissions. When Sections 4 and 6 notifications are issued, much has been done towards the acquisition process and that process cannot be reversed merely by rescinding those notifications. Rather it is Section 48 under which, after withdrawal from acquisition is made, compensation due for any damage suffered by the owner during the course of acquisition proceedings is determined and given to him. It is, therefore, implicit that withdrawal from acquisition has to be notified. Principles of law are, therefore, well settled. A notification in the Official Gazette is required to be issued if the State Government decides to withdraw from the acquisition u/s 48 of the Act of any land of which possession has not been taken. In view of the legal position exposited by this Court in the case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd., with which we respectfully agree, we hold, as it must be, that decision of the government for withdrawal from acquisition has to be published in the official gazette. We answer point (two) in affirmative. 27. It is reiterated that it was necessary for the State Government to issue a notification to de-notify the acquisition, dated 16.11.2005 and there would not be automatic lapse of the notification issued on 16.11.2005, whereby it is decided to acquire Khasra No. 161. Section 11A of the Act, in these circumstances, would not be applicable {See Satendra Prasad Jain and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1993 SC 2517 . Section 11A of the Act, in these circumstances, would not be applicable {See Satendra Prasad Jain and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1993 SC 2517 . It is pertinent to state at this stage that though respondents No. 3 and 4 have decided not to acquire Khasra No. 161, but as a matter of fact, the notification u/s 17(4) of the Act was issued on 16.11.2005. The delay will not stall the notification issued u/s 17(4) of the Act on 16.11.2005 till the State Government decides in accordance with law to de-notify the acquisition issued earlier on 16.11.2005. 28. What emerges from the analysis made hereinabove, is that the actual physical possession of the land has not been taken over. The State Government has not issued any notification de-notifying the acquisition issued on 16.11.2005. The houses of the petitioners have been damaged by the muck thrown by respondents No. 3 and 4. Though it is argued by Mr. K.D. Shreedhar, learned Senior Advocate that the contractors are responsible for causing the damage, if any, but still the Principal employer is vicariously liable for the action of his contractors/agents. Respondents No. 3 and 4 cannot be absolved of their liabilities. 29. Similarly, the petitioners in CWP Nos. 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 434, 435, 436, 437, 453, 454 and 455 of 2010 have also purchased the land. The houses constructed by them on this land have been damaged by respondents No. 3 and 4. They have claimed the compensation in accordance with law. Consequently, the writ petitions are disposed of by issuing the following mandatory directions: (i) The State Government is directed to complete the acquisition proceedings initiated on the basis of notification issued u/s 17(4) of the Act on 16.11.2005; (ii) In case the respondent-State does not intend to acquire the land, it shall be open to it to issue notification de-notifying the acquisition, dated 16.11.2005, in a bonafide manner after taking into consideration all the observations made hereinabove; and (iii) In case the Government decides to withdraw the notification, dated 16.11.2005, in that eventuality, the respondent No. 5 shall determine the amount of compensation due to the damage suffered by the petitioners strictly as per Section 48(2) of the Act to be paid within a period of six months. The pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. No costs.