JUDGMENT M.C. Garg, J.:- The appellant is aggrieved of the order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rewa, who has been pleased to dismiss the claim petition as filed by the appellants on the ground of res judicata and also on the ground that it was barred by limitation. 2. This Court while admitting the appeal framed following substantial question of law for deciding this appeal i.e.: - 1. “Whether the learned Commissioner under Workmen's Compensation Act committed substantial error of law in holding that the order passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal holding the application filed under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act to be not maintainable amounts to res judicata? 2. Whether in view of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, the claim petition filed under Workmen's Compensation Act can be said to be barred by limitation? If so, whether the delay in view of section 10 of Workmen's Compensation Act is liable to be condoned. 3. Whether the claim petition filed under Workmen's Compensation Act could be dismissed when the Commissioner has come to the conclusion that the accident has occurred arising out of and during the course of employment? 4. Whether the claim petition filed by appellants before the Commissioner was barred under section 167 of Motor Vehicles Act?” 3. To appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the parties it would be necessary to take note of some brief facts. 4. The appellants, who are parents of Late Ramesh Sen @ Lalla claimed: compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act before the Motor Accident Claims tribunal with respect to the compensation to be awarded on account of the death of Late Ramesh Sen @ Lalla, who was aged about 19 years when he succumbed the fatal injuries, which were caused to him while driving Jeep No. MP 09 S 781 during the course of his employment with the owner of the said Jeep being the first respondent. The deceased was having a valid driving licence issued by the R.T.O., Rewa. The appellants being the parents were totally dependent upon the income of the deceased son, who was being paid the salary of Rs. 3,000 per month by the respondent No. 1. The deceased was having a valid driving licence issued by the R.T.O., Rewa. The appellants being the parents were totally dependent upon the income of the deceased son, who was being paid the salary of Rs. 3,000 per month by the respondent No. 1. The accident took place on 9th December, 1996 at about 8.00 a.m. at National Highway No. 7 - Rewa-Mirzapur Road, when the Jeep being driven by Ramesh Sen dashed into a truck owned by the M.P. State Electricity Board. 5. The appellants then filed a claim case before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rewa but on the advice of the said Tribunal, filed a case before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The order giving such advice by the Tribunal is dated 30th October, 2002 and copy thereof is annexed with the present appeal as Annexure A-1. 6. The claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act was filed on 19th November, 2002, however, the learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation dismissed the claim petition on the ground of res judicata and being time barred vide order dated 10th February, 2004 (Annexure A-3). It is this order, which is being challenged in this appeal. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the aim filed by the appellants before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under section 166, Motor Vehicles Act was not maintainable and in fact no such claim as decided on merits. It is, thus, submitted that the decision given by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal earlier i.e. in 2002 would not constitute res judicata in this case and therefore, the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation has committed error in having dismissed the, claim filed before the Commissioner, workmen's Compensation, filed by the' appellants under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 8. At this juncture it would be appropriate to take note of the order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal where the original petition was filed on behalf of the appellants and which was disposed of vide order dated 30th October, 2002, in Claim Case No. 130/2002, which was instituted on 17-1-1997. 9. This claim case made under section 166 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal vide order dated 30th October, 2002. 10. 9. This claim case made under section 166 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal vide order dated 30th October, 2002. 10. In these proceedings, the first respondent had accepted that he was a registered owner of the Jeep bearing No. MP 09 S 1781, which was being driven by the son of the appellants, who at the relevant time was aged about 19 years and on account of the accident from the said vehicle on National Highway No. 7, the said son of the appellants was expired. There is also no dispute that at the relevant time the deceased was earning Rs. 3,000 per month. 11. The Accident Claims Tribunal had framed following issues in that case: - XXX XXX XXX That, claim was rejected because the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal held as under: - “i. That, from the evidence on record it is proved that the deceased was driving the vehicle under the employment of the respondent No. 1. ii. That, as the deceased hit a stationary truck the driver of the truck was not at fault. As the deceased died as a result of his own fault he is not entitled to claim any compensation from the respondents. iii. That, the appellants have committed a mistake by presenting the application before the MACT. As the deceased was himself at fault the MACT does not have any jurisdiction in the matter and no relief can be granted to the appellants. iv. That, if the appellants want they can approach the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The time spent in pursuing the proceedings before the MACT would not come in their way. They are given two months time to present the application and if they do so delay would not come in their way.” The relevant paragraphs are reproduced as under: - XXX XXX XXX 13. According to the appellants in view of the observations made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, they immediately preferred claim before the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation along with application under section 5 of the Limitation Act as also the application under Order 33 Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code for exemption from payment of Court fees. 14. Vide impugned order the Commissioner, Workmen Compensation while dismissing the Claim preferred by the appellant held as under: - i. That, there was no dispute between the parties as regard jurisdiction before the MACT. 14. Vide impugned order the Commissioner, Workmen Compensation while dismissing the Claim preferred by the appellant held as under: - i. That, there was no dispute between the parties as regard jurisdiction before the MACT. As on date of accident both MACT as well as the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation had jurisdiction to deal with the claim. ii. That, the ratio of the Division Bench judgment in the case of Jagdamba Prasad Soni v. State of M.P. and others, 2003(2) MPLJ 584 is that the matter should have been adjudicated 'Stricto Sensu' means as per procedure. As the claim was decided by the MACT after evidence and as per procedure on merits the claim is barred by res judicata. iii. That, the claim has been preferred 6 years after the date of accident and is barred by limitation. The relevant paragraph is reproduced as under: - XXX XXX XXX 15. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that in the given facts, while the appellants could have approach the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal provided such claim would have been filed under section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act but he was not entitled to file a claim under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, there was nobody against whom negligence could have been averred and therefore, the only person from whom he could have claimed compensation was the owner of the Jeep under whose employment the deceased was working at the relevant time. 16. By relying upon the judgment of the Division Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Pennamma Kurien, 1995 ACJ 760 it has been contended that the appellants were not entitled to file claim under the Motor Vehicles Act in the present case and as such dismissal or rejection of their claim under Motor Vehicles Act would not prevent them to file a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act. They have relied upon paragraphs 5 to 8 of the said judgment. Those paragraphs reads as under: “5. They have relied upon paragraphs 5 to 8 of the said judgment. Those paragraphs reads as under: “5. Section 110-AA of the old Act is extracted below: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, where the death or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under the Act and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation may, without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter VILA, claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both.” (It is the same as section 167 of the new M.V. Act except that in the place of the words “without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter VII-A”, the corresponding provision in the new M.V. Act contains the words “without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X”. This is because Chapter VII-A of the old M.A. Act corresponds to Chapter X of the new M.V. Act). 6. Section 110-AA, even by a reading, conveys the message that one cannot have multiple or double advantage with the same cause of action. If a person has obtained a relief through the remedy provided in one of two statutes, he is debarred from availing of the remedy provided in the other statute. There can be no doubt on that proposition. 7. But if the person who filed the application under one Act is non-Suited on any ground, can it be held that he too would be debarred from filing the application under the other Act? Dismissal of the application filed under one statute must be taken as the consequence of a finding that he has no valid claim to be made under that Act. If no valid claim can be made, its corollary is that it was not a claim recognizable under law. If so, there is no bar in making a claim under the other statute. 8. The said principle can be discerned from the words employed in section 110-AA itself, “where death of or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the W.C. Act,” then only the claimant is debarred from making claims under both statutes as he is obliged to select only one of them. The bar would operate only if death or bodily injury to a person “gives rise to a claim” for compensation under both Acts. The bar would operate only if death or bodily injury to a person “gives rise to a claim” for compensation under both Acts. In other words, if death or bodily injury to a person does not give rise to a claim under any one of the Acts, there would be no bar in making a claim under the other Act even if he had made an unsuccessful move under the other Act earlier. Dismissal of an application under one of the Acts would tantamount to a finding that no legal claim arose under that Act.” It will also be relevant to take note of the facts of that case, which are 'Stricto Sensu' applicable in the present case. The facts has been discussed in paragraph-9 of the judgment, i.e.: - “9. A driver, who on account of his own negligence caused the accident, cannot get any valid claim for compensation under the M.V. Act (except under a claim of “no-fault liability”). If that driver had died in the accident his legal heirs would not get any better claim under the Motor Vehicles Act.” Paragraph 13 of that judgment is also relevant. “13. Section 110-AA of the old M.V. Act, after amendment through Act 47 of 1982, contained the words “without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter VII-A”. Section 167 of the new M. V. Act is identical, to section 110-AA of the old Act as it stood after the amendment through Act 47 of 1982. It is, therefore, manifest that the interdict contained in the provision is without prejudice to any claim that may be made under “no-fault liability”. The scheme of Chapter VII-A (and also that of its corresponding chapter in the new Motor Vehicles Act) would reveal that the doctrine of no-fault liability is a new statutory innovation' made by Parliament as distinguished from the pristine tortious liability which was based on the theory of, fault (vide United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 1990 ACJ 751 (Kerala). So the Parliament while foreclosing a claimant from making double benefit under two different statutes, has taken care to segregate the compensation received on the basis of the principle of “no fault liability”. That amount remains different from any other compensation. So the claimants cannot be visited with any consequence for receiving any compensation amount towards “no-fault liability”. 17. So the Parliament while foreclosing a claimant from making double benefit under two different statutes, has taken care to segregate the compensation received on the basis of the principle of “no fault liability”. That amount remains different from any other compensation. So the claimants cannot be visited with any consequence for receiving any compensation amount towards “no-fault liability”. 17. This judgment virtually takes care of even the submission of the learned counsel for the Insurance Company, who submitted that if the claim would have been filed under section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act even in this case, the said claim would have been maintainable but it is not the case. The judgment, which have been relied upon delivered by Division Bench of this Court in the Case of Shahjahan Begum and ors. v. Lakhan Pratap Singh and Anr., 2005 STPL (Comp.) 791 M.P. has he has under: “4. On the pleadings of the parties, it is found that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the jeep and not because of sudden defect, developing in the engine thereof, as alleged. Shabbir Khan was the driver of the jeep and Lakhan Pratap Singh, the owner thereof. Shabbir Khan died in this accident. The jeep was insured with the insurance company. However, claimants are not entitled to compensation because the driver himself was negligent in causing the accident and he cannot take advantage of his own negligence. Consequently, the claim petition has been rejected. It has been found that the jeep was on hire with the District Small Produce Co-operative Union, Chhatarpur. Claimants can approach the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation for compensation. The Tribunal has assessed the income of deceased at Rs. 4,000 per month against the claim of Rs. 6,000 per month. Claimants are not satisfied with this award, therefore, it has been challenged through this appeal. 5. The question for determination is how the accident has taken place and who is responsible for the same? F.I.R. has been lodged by Bhagwant Singh, AW2. He has stated that the jeep was being driven rashly and negligently which caused the accident. It has been signed by him and exhibited by Shajahan, AW1, Bhagwant Singh, AW2, has admitted lodging of F.I.R. and making of statement. With this background, it is difficult to accept his statement that the accident occurred due to mechanical defect. He has stated that the jeep was being driven rashly and negligently which caused the accident. It has been signed by him and exhibited by Shajahan, AW1, Bhagwant Singh, AW2, has admitted lodging of F.I.R. and making of statement. With this background, it is difficult to accept his statement that the accident occurred due to mechanical defect. Therefore, finding of negligence on the part of driver by Claims Tribunal is sustainable and is upheld. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, the claim petition is not maintainable. Claimants are entitled to approach the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. If they approach the Commissioner within a month, application shall be entertained and decided on merits in accordance with law at the earliest.” This answers substantial question No. 1. The said question is answered in the positive by holding that the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation having dismissed the claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act, committed a serious error by holding that the order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal holding that the application filed by the appellant under section 166, Motor Vehicles Act to be not maintainable, amounts to res judicata. 18. Now, coming to the question as to whether finding returned by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in this case can be said to have created a res judicata against the appellants having filed the accident claim case. The issue has been discussed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar, AIR 1966 SC 1332 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court in that case has discussed as to what constitute res judicata. Paragraph 13 of the judgment is relevant, which is reproduced here as under: - “13. Re. (iv): This brings us to the main point that has been urged in these appeals, namely, that the High Court had not heard and finally decided the appeals arising out of Suit Nos. 77 and 91. One of the appeals was dismissed on the ground that it was filed beyond the period of limitation while the other appeal was dismissed on the ground that in the appellant therein had not taken steps to print the records. It is therefore urged that the two appeals arising out of Suit Nos. 77 and 91. One of the appeals was dismissed on the ground that it was filed beyond the period of limitation while the other appeal was dismissed on the ground that in the appellant therein had not taken steps to print the records. It is therefore urged that the two appeals arising out of Suit Nos. 77 and 91 had not been heard and finally decided by the High Court, and so the condition that the former suit must have been heard and finally decided was not satisfied in the present case. Reliance in this connection is placed on the well-settled principle that in order that a matter may be said to have been heard and finally decided, the decision in the former suit must have been on the merits. Where, for example, the former suit was dismissed by the trial Court for want of jurisdiction, or for default of plaintiffs appearance, or on the ground of non-joinder of parties or misjoinder of parties or multifariousness, or on the ground that the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce probate or letters of administration or succession certificate when the same is required by law to entitle the plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or on the ground of improper valuation or for failure to pay additional Court fee on a plaint which was undervalued or for want of cause of action or on the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any), the decision not being on the merits would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit. But none of these considerations apply in the present case, for the Additional Civil Judge decided all the four suits on the merits and decided the issue as to title on merits against the appellant and his father. It is true that the High Court dismissed the appeals arising out of Suit Nos. 77 and 91 either on the ground that was barred by limitation or on the ground that steps had not been taken for printing the records. Even so the fact remains that the result of the dismissal of the two appeals arising from Suit Nos. It is true that the High Court dismissed the appeals arising out of Suit Nos. 77 and 91 either on the ground that was barred by limitation or on the ground that steps had not been taken for printing the records. Even so the fact remains that the result of the dismissal of the two appeals arising from Suit Nos. 77 and 91 by the High Court on these grounds was that the decrees of the Additional Civil Jude who decided the issue as to title on merits stood confirmed by the order of the High Court. In such a case, even though the order of the High Court may itself not be on the merit the result of the High Court's decision is to confirm the decision on the issue of title which had been given on the merits by the Additional Civil Judge and thus in effect the High Court confirmed the decree of the trial Court on the merits, whatever may be the reason for the dismissal of the appeals arising from Suit Nos. 77 and 91. In these circumstances though the order of the High Court itself may not be on the merits, the decision of the High Court dismissing the appeals arising out of Suit Nos. 77 and 91 was to uphold the decision on the merits as to issue of title and therefore it must be held that by dismissing the appeals arising out of Suit Nos. 77 and 91 the High Court heard and finally decided the matter for it confirmed the judgment of the trial Court on the issue for title arising between the parties and the decision of the trial Court being on the merits the High Court's decision confirming that decision must also be deemed to be on the merits. To hold otherwise would make res judicata impossible in cases where the trial Court decides the matter on merits but the appeal Court dismisses the appeal on some preliminary ground thus confirming the decision of the trial Court on the merits. It is well-settled that where a decree on the merits is appealed from, the decision of the trial Court loses its character of finality and what was once res judicata again becomes res subjudice and it is the decree of the appeal Court which will then be res judicata. It is well-settled that where a decree on the merits is appealed from, the decision of the trial Court loses its character of finality and what was once res judicata again becomes res subjudice and it is the decree of the appeal Court which will then be res judicata. But if the contention of the appellant were to be accepted and it is held that if the appeal Court dismisses the appeal on any preliminary ground, like limitation or default in printing, thus confirming into the trial Court's decision given on merits, the appeal Court's decree cannot be res judicata, the result would be that even though the decision of the trial Court given on the merits is confirmed by the dismissal of the appeal on a preliminary ground there can never be res judicata. We cannot therefore accept the contention that even though the trial Court may have decided the matter on the merits there can be no res judicata if the appeal Court dismisses the appeal on a preliminary ground without going into the merits, even though the result of the dismissal of the appeal by the appeal Court is confirmation of the decision of the trial Court given on the merits. Acceptance of such a proposition will mean that all that the losing party has to do to destroy the effect of a decision given by the trial Court on the merits is to file an appeal and let that appeal be dismissed on some preliminary ground, with the result that the decision given on the merits also becomes useless as between the parties. We are therefore of opinion that where a decision is given on the merits by the trial Court and the matter is taken in appeal and the appeal is dismissed on some preliminary ground, like limitation or default in printing, it must be held that such dismissal when it confirms the decision of the trial Court on the merits itself amounts to the appeal being heard and finally decided on the merits whatever may be the ground for dismissal of the appeal.” This paragraph tells us as to what till constitute res judicata. In the case in hand the decision given by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was not a decision given on merits inasmuch as, while deciding Issue No. 6 it was held: XXX XXX XXX Thus, by making the aforesaid observations the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at that time decided that no suit under the Motor Vehicles Act could have been filed by the appellants because the decision himself was the person liable for negligence and he himself was driving the vehicle which led to his death. It was not a case where the third party was invoked and therefore, it could not have been said that it was a case covered by section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, thus, by the aforesaid decision it could not be decided on merits that the appellant was not entitled to claim compensation from his employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act, therefore, the principle of res judicata regarding negligence which had been discussed only in relation to the liability to third party would not have been brought into the picture why the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation dismissed the claim filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Thus, it cannot be said that the claim filed by the appellants under the Workmen's Compensation Act was very much maintainable (sic). It could not have been dismissed on the principle of res judicata. The question Nos. 3 and 4 is decided accordingly. 19. Now, next Issue No. 2 i.e. consideration of delay. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that in this case the appellants were bona fidely prosecuting their claim under the Motor Vehicles Act and thus, were entitled to seek condonation of the period which transpired during the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. On these, they were protected under the section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, which reads as under: - “14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction. - (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of the appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the Court under rule of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the Court of other cause of a like nature.” As far as this question is concerned, since, this issue has not been dealt with by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in the spirit of the aforesaid section of the Limitation Act, we leave this question to be decided by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation Act. This issue stands answered by the Division Bench Judgment of the Kerala High Court. 20. All these issues are accordingly decided against the respondents. With the aforesaid observation the appeal is allowed. Parties are directed to appear before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, who would decide the claim petition on merits but as far as the issue of limitation is concerned, he would be entitled to give his own opinion to take into consideration the provisions contained under section 14 of the Limitation Act as stated above. Parties will appear before the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation on 8-4-2013. A copy of this order along with the record be sent to the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation to proceed with the case in terms with the order passed by this Court and decide the matter expeditiously. Appeal allowed.