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2013 DIGILAW 365 (KAR)

Ramesh Mehar v. Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore

2013-03-20

S.ABDUL NAZEER

body2013
ORDER S. ABDUL NAZEER, J. 1. In this case, the petitioner has called in question the validity of the order at Annexure-A dated 24.7.2009 whereby the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore (DRT for short) has dismissed his application seeking extension of time for depositing the balance of the bid amount. 2. The 1st respondent had issued an auction notification dated 11.6.2009 proposing to sell property bearing No. 347-A (formed in R.S. No. 118/1), Assessment No. 114/1-A situated at Nittuvalli, P.B. Road, Davanagere, measuring East to West 66+64/2 feet and North to South 60+195/2 feet, with a reserve price of Rs. 1.25 crores. The petitioner deposited 10% of the reserve price with the Recovery Officer while submitting his bid. He being the successful bidder deposited 25% of the bid amount on the same date. The balance of Rs. 94,19,999/- poundage fee of Rs. 1,25,610/- should have been deposited on or before 16.7.2009. The petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 31,40,000/- on 15.7.2009. On 5.8.2009, he filed an application under Rule 18 of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 (for short DRT Rules) seeking grant of thirty days to deposit the balance of the bid amount. The 1st respondent rejected the application by his order at Annexure-A dated 24.7.2009 and forfeited Rs. 31,40,000/-. He filed an appeal challenging the said order before the DRT. The DRT has rejected the appeal by order at Annexure-B dated 23.11.2009. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would contend that petitioner was not in a position to deposit the balance of the bid amount within 15 days from the date of auction. Therefore, he made an application seeking extension of time to deposit the balance of the amount. It is argued that having regard to the expression as far as possible contained in Section 29 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (DRT Act for short), Rules 57 and 58 of Part III of Second Schedule of Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short Income Tax Rules) cannot be strictly applied to the instant case. The Recovery Officer has power to extend the time for payment of the balance of the bid amount. Alternatively, he submits that Rule 18 of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 authorises the Tribunal to make such orders to give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to secure the ends of justice. The Recovery Officer has power to extend the time for payment of the balance of the bid amount. Alternatively, he submits that Rule 18 of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 authorises the Tribunal to make such orders to give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to secure the ends of justice. Since the petitioner has deposited a part of the bid amount, the Tribunal ought to have accepted the reasons assigned and extended the time to deposit the balance of the amount. 4. On the other hand, Sri N. Devadas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the third respondent submits that petitioner has failed to deposit the balance of the bid amount within the period prescribed in Rule 57 in the Second Schedule of Income Tax Rules. Therefore, the first respondent has rightly rejected the application. Rules 57 and 58 are mandatory in character. In this connection, he has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in C.N. Paramsivam & another vs. Sunrise Plaza Tr. Partner & others, 2013 AIR SCW 1036. He draws my attention to Rule 60 of the Income Tax Rules and submits that an option is available to the defaulter or any person whose interest is affected by the sale to apply for setting aside the sale on deposit of the entire amount within 30 days from the date of sale. If the time is extended to the auction purchaser, the right of the defaulter or any person whose interest is affected will be defeated. Therefore, the Recovery Officer is justified in rejecting the application of the petitioner. 5. Learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent Bank submits that the Bank has no objection for grant of time for depositing the balance of the bid amount as it is interested in the recovery of the amount advanced to the petitioner. 6. I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties made at the Bar and perused the materials placed on record. 7. The material facts are not in dispute. The petitioner has deposited 10% of the reserve price with the 1st respondent. He has also deposited 25% of the bid amount on the date of auction. He ought to have deposited balance of Rs. 94,19,999/- poundage fee of Rs. 1,25,610/- on or before 16.7.2009. He has deposited a sum of Rs. 7. The material facts are not in dispute. The petitioner has deposited 10% of the reserve price with the 1st respondent. He has also deposited 25% of the bid amount on the date of auction. He ought to have deposited balance of Rs. 94,19,999/- poundage fee of Rs. 1,25,610/- on or before 16.7.2009. He has deposited a sum of Rs. 31,40,000/- on 15.7.2009 and an application was filed on 5.8.2009 under Rule 18 seeking extension of time. In the application, he has asserted that he had approached Canara Bank, Davanagere Branch, seeking financial assistance in order to pay balance of the bid amount by mortgaging the property in question. However, the certified copies of the title deeds of the property and the copy of the OA order have not been furnished by the 2nd respondent. He was furnished with only xerox copies of the documents. 8. It is clear from the application that the petitioner intended to mortgage the property in question for raising loan from Canara Bank, Davanagere Branch to enable him to deposit the balance of the bid amount. He had not acquired title to the property as on the date of his application. Therefore, question of raising the loan by mortgaging the said property does not arise. It is thus clear that petitioner has not made out any ground for extension of time. Be that as it may. 9. Section 29 of the DRT Act provides for application of certain provisions of the Income Tax Act with necessary modification. It states that the provisions of the Second and Third Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the Income Tax Certificate Rules, 1962 as in force from time to time shall as far as possible, apply with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and the rules referred to the amount of debt due under the DRT Act instead of Income Tax. 10. Section 222 of the Income. Tax Act, 1961 authorises the Tax Recovery Officer to recover the arrears of due from the assessee specified in the certificate by one or more of the modes mentioned in the said provision in accordance with the Rules laid down in the Second Schedule. The Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act provides for the procedure for recovery of tax. Rules 57 and 58 are relevant for the purpose of this case, which are as under:– "57. The Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act provides for the procedure for recovery of tax. Rules 57 and 58 are relevant for the purpose of this case, which are as under:– "57. Deposit by purchaser and resale in default:– (1) On every sale of immovable property, the person declared to be the purchaser shall pay, immediately after such declaration, a deposit of twenty-five per cent on the amount of his purchase money, to the officer conducting the sale; and, in default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be resold. (2) The full amount of purchase money payable shall be paid by the purchaser to the Tax Recovery Officer on or before the fifteenth day from the date of the sale of the property. 58. Procedure in default of payment: In default of payment within the period mentioned in the preceding rule, the deposit may, if the Tax Recovery Officer thinks fit, after defraying the expenses of the sale, be forfeited to the Government, and the property shall be resold, and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all claims to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may subsequently be sold." 11. As stated earlier, these provisions are made applicable for recovery of the amount due to the Bank having regard to Section 29 of the DRT Act. The language employed in these Rules is clear that on every sale of immovable property, the person declared to be the purchaser has to deposit immediately after such declaration 25% of the amount of his purchase money to the Officer conducting the sale and in default of such deposit, the property has to be resold forthwith. The full amount of purchase money payable shall be paid by the purchaser before fifteenth day from the date of the sale of the property. If the Recovery Officer thinks fit, after defraying the expenses of the sale, the deposit be forfeited to the Government and the property has to be resold and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all the claims to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may subsequently be sold. 12. If the Recovery Officer thinks fit, after defraying the expenses of the sale, the deposit be forfeited to the Government and the property has to be resold and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all the claims to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may subsequently be sold. 12. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that having regard to the expression as far as possible contained in Section 29 of the DRT Act, the Recovery Officer is empowered to exercise his discretion and grant extension of time/enlargement of time. 13. In Paramsivam's case (supra), the Apex Court has answered this question as under:– "The phrase as far as possible may be indicative of a certain inbuilt flexibility the scope of that flexibility extends only to what is not at all practicable. The Income Tax Rules make provisions that do not strictly deal with recovery of debts under the RDDB Act. Such of the rules cannot possibly apply to recovery of debts under the RDDB Act. The use of the words as far as possible in S.29 of RDDB Act simply indicate that Income Tax Rules are applicable except such of them as do not have any role to play in the matter of recovery of debts recoverable under RDDB Act. The use of the word as far as possible in S.29 do not give discretion to the Recovery Officer to apply the said Rules or not to apply the same in specific fact situation. Rule 57, 58 of Income Tax Rules deal with process of recovery of amount due and present no difficulty in enforcing them for recovery of dues under RDDB Act. It is clear from a plain reading of the above that the provision is mandatory in character. The use of the word shall is both textually and contextually indicative of the making of the deposit of the amount being a mandatory requirement. It is thus clear there is no reason to hold that Rules 57 and 58 of the Income Tax Rules are anything but mandatory in nature, so that a breach of the requirements under those Rules will render the auction non est in the eyes of law." 14. It is clear that Rules 57 and 58 of the Income Tax Rules are mandatory in nature. It is clear that Rules 57 and 58 of the Income Tax Rules are mandatory in nature. If that is so, the DRT has no discretion to extend the time for payment of balance of the bid amount contrary to these Rules. 15. It is to be stated here that under Rule 60 of the Income Tax Rules, the defaulter or any person whose interest is affected by the sale, may, at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale, apply to the Tax Recovery Officer to set aside the sale within thirty days from, the date of the sale subject to the conditions contained in Rules 60(1)(a), 60(1)(b) and 61. If time is extended, it will affect the rights of the defaulter or any person whose interest is affected by the sale under these Rules. 16. It is no doubt true that Rule 18 of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 authorises the Tribunal to make such order to give such direction as may be necessary or expedient to secure the ends of justice. Under this Rule, the Recovery Officer has no jurisdiction to pass any order. It is a general power conferred on the Tribunal to issue such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court in Paramsivam's case (supra) has clearly held that Rules 57 and 58 of the Income Tax Rules are mandatory in nature. Rules 57 and 58 are the specific provisions for sale of the property of the defaulter by auction. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot pass an order under Rule 18 of the DRT Rules contrary to Rules 57 arid 58 of the Income Tax Rules. 17. I am of the view that the 1st respondent is justified in rejecting the application of the petitioner seeking extension of time and the DRT is right in dismissing the appeal. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner is entitled for refund of the amount said to have been deposited by him with the DRT pursuant to the order of this Court dated 1.9.2010. Ordered accordingly. 18. In view of the dismissal of the writ petition as above, I.A. No. 4 of 2012 does not survive for consideration. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs.