JUDGMENT N. Chaudhury, J. 1. Whether failure of the Disciplinary Authority to appoint Presenting Officer irrespective of any prejudice to the delinquent employee who did not deny the charges by filing written statement or otherwise and rather had pleaded guilty, can vitiate the whole proceeding is the moot question to be answered in this writ petition. In this case, the writ petitioner who was a constable in the CRPF was dismissed from service, inter alia, on the basis of admitted charges of misconduct including a one involving moral turpitude bringing disrepute to the disciplined force which were also proved independently by the witnesses and an appeal preferred there against also failed. By this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the said order of dismissal dated 7.5.2011 passed by the respondent No. 4. The appellate order refusing to interfere with the order of dismissal dated 7.5.2011 has also been challenged hereby 2. The factual matrix on which this writ petition is founded is required to be narrated in short Petitioner, Ajay Kumar Paswan was a Constable in the CRPF. He was placed under suspension under Rule 10(a) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 read with Rule 27(A) of the CRPF Rule 1955 on 10.1.2011 by an order of the Commandant-186 Bn. On the same date a memorandum as to substance of imputation was served on him along with statements of imputation. By the said memorandum he was asked to give his written statement of defence within 10 days and also to state whether he desired to be heard in person. It was specifically mentioned therein that in case he failed to submit written statement as required and/or did not appear, inquiry would be held against him ex parte. The articles of charges framed against him are as follows: Article-I That No. 060876044 CT/GD Ajay Kumar Paswan of B/186 Bn CRPF while functioning as CT/GD committed misconduct in his capacity as a member of the force under section 11(1) of CRPF Act 1949 in that on 9.12.10 at 2030 hrs while on duty he consumed alcohol and opened fired in the Jawan's line without any provocation or any reason and caused panic in the Bn. Article-II That, No. 060876044 CT/GD Ajay Kumar Paswan of B/186 Bn. Article-II That, No. 060876044 CT/GD Ajay Kumar Paswan of B/186 Bn. CRPF committed an act of misconduct in his capacity as a member of the force under section 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 in that while posted in B/186 he made an illicit relationship with a married Assamese lady named Debaro Sonwal at Mahadevpur, Due to his illicit relation his family permission was cancelled and keeping in view of young stage of service and to give him an opportunity to correct himself he was posted to B/186 at Pasighat. But while posted in B/186 at Pasighat, during leave he was staying with Debario Sonwal at Mahadevpur instead of going to his home town. 3. The petitioner received the memorandum along with its annexure which are the articles of two charges referred to above and the statements of allegations as well as the list of documents and the witnesses. But he did not submit any written statement of defence and did not deny the correctness of the charges leveled against him. However, the authority by order dated 31.1.2011 appointed the Assistant Commandant of the battalion as the Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges framed against the petitioner. 4. It is to be mentioned here that when a preliminary investigation in regard to plea of guilty was held by the enquiry officer on 17.2.2011, he pleaded guilty with regard to both the charges. He also categorically denied having anything to say about the proceedings. The said plea of guilty is on record and the petitioner has neither retracted the same in his appeal petition nor he has denied the same in the writ petition. 5. The Enquiry Officer (hereinafter referred to as 'the EO') asked the witnesses as to what did they want to say and thereupon himself prepared the memorandum of their statements in presence of the petitioner (the delinquent employee herein). All the witnesses were cross examined by the Defence Assistant appointed on behalf of the petitioner as per his choice. Thereafter, the delinquent employee was asked to submit his defence statement, to produce defence document and witnesses. But he neither examined any defence witness nor did he submit defence statement. Thirteen witnesses were examined and twenty seven documents were brought on record by marking Exhibits altogether against the delinquent employee. Thereafter, the delinquent employee was asked to submit his defence statement, to produce defence document and witnesses. But he neither examined any defence witness nor did he submit defence statement. Thirteen witnesses were examined and twenty seven documents were brought on record by marking Exhibits altogether against the delinquent employee. The exhibits went on record without objection while the delinquent employee and his Defence Assistant remained present all throughout when the proceedings were held. Thereafter the Enquiry Officer submitted report before the Disciplinary Authority on 2.4.2011. On the basis of the said report the Disciplinary Authority passed order on 7.5.2011 dismissing the delinquent employee from service. At paragraph 12 of the Order the delinquent employee was asked to prefer appeal within a period of 30 days if he so desired. 6. That on 16.5.2011 the delinquent employee submitted an appeal petition before the competent authority wherein also he did not deny the facts alleged against him as to opening fire in the camp and meeting Debaro Sonwal a civilian lady on 6.1.2010 when QAT party came to the house of the said lady and took away the delinquent employee. Of course, a vague allegation was made vide paragraph 19 of the petition that finding of the enquiry officer as well as disciplinary authority was wholly perverse, illegal and liable to set aside and a prayer was made for setting aside the penalty of dismissal from service. By order dated 3.10.2011 the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal observing, inter alia, that the delinquent employee pleaded guilty of Article I and II of the Charge sheet, that to uphold the principle of natural justice the delinquent employee was handed over the copies of statements/other records and statements of P.Ws. to enable him to present defence statement and evidence but he did not produce anything. As per the report of EO the charges framed against the delinquent employee were fully proved and under such circumstances there was no scope to interfere with the order of punishment, held the Appellate Authority. The appellate order further reveals that illicit relationship between the delinquent employee and aforesaid married civilian lady was proved before the Enquiry Officer on the written complaint of neighbor of the lady as well as written complaint of the husband of the lady. Hence, this writ petition. 7. Heard learned counsel Mr. P.D. Nair on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Hence, this writ petition. 7. Heard learned counsel Mr. P.D. Nair on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Muk Pertin on behalf of the Union of India. Learned counsel Mr. Pertin has also produced the original records of the Disciplinary Proceedings which I have carefully perused. 8. Learned counsel Mr. P.D. Nair did not argue that the delinquent employee did not plead guilty or that the fact as to arresting the delinquent employee from the house of civilian lady by QAT party on the allegation of neighbor is not correct. The learned counsel of the petitioner has made his submissions only on one point, namely, that the Disciplinary Authority did not appoint any Presenting Officer and that the enquiry officer himself conducted the proceeding and thus he acted like a Presenting Officer as well and as such the Disciplinary proceeding has been vitiated. The learned counsel has placed reliance on two judgments of this court and the same are as follows: (i) 2011 (3) GLT 281 Union of India v. Ram Lakhan Sharma. (ii) 2011 (1) GLT 2S7 Salam Kesho Singh v. State of Manipur. 9. In the case of Union of India v. Ram Lakhan Sharma (Supra) the writ petitioner was a constable of CRPF. While posted at Agartala a civilian lady lodged an FIR against him at the Airport Police Station alleging that he had committed rape on her. A case was registered under section 376 IPC by the Police Station and investigation started when the Commandant of the CRPF Bn. placed him under suspension and the charge sheet was also served on him initiating disciplinary proceeding on two charges, namely, unauthorized absence and indiscipline/moral turpitude in view of the aforesaid incident. There was a disciplinary proceeding but no presenting officer was appointed. The enquiry officer submitted report holding that charges were proved and the disciplinary authority imposed penalty of removal from service accepting the report of the enquiry officer. In the mean time he was acquitted in the corresponding police case. Initially, the writ petitioner challenged the said order before Hon'ble Allahabad High Court which disposed of the petition directing the writ petitioner to prefer appeal before the Appellate Authority under the Service Rules. Accordingly, the writ petitioner therein preferred statutory appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police who was the appellate authority. Initially, the writ petitioner challenged the said order before Hon'ble Allahabad High Court which disposed of the petition directing the writ petitioner to prefer appeal before the Appellate Authority under the Service Rules. Accordingly, the writ petitioner therein preferred statutory appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police who was the appellate authority. The said appeal having been eventually dismissed on 22.7.2004, the writ petitioner preferred a revision before the Inspector General of Police, CRPF as provided under the Rules and the same also was dismissed on 2.3.2005. The writ petitioner thereafter filed W.P. (C) No. 14/2006 before this High Court and a learned Single Bench allowed the writ petition setting aside the penalty on the ground that the proceeding was vitiated for non appointment of Presenting Officer. The writ appeal in question was preferred by the Union of India challenging the said Judgment of the learned Single Judge. Dismissing the appeal by the Judgment on 10.1.2011 the Division Bench of the High Court held that although Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules 1955 does not prescribe appointment of Presenting Officer but to comply with the principles of natural justice disciplinary authority should appoint a Presenting Officer. In the said case it has been held that disciplinary proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding and the IO should not act either for the disciplinary authority or for the delinquent officer and should act independently and should not put questions like presenting officer. Paragraph 18 of the said judgment is quoted below: 18. We are of the further opinion that in various disciplinary proceedings the statutory authority is working like an administrative authority when they have to act independently and discharge their duty as the statute prescribed applying their judicial mind. It is a settled position of law that the disciplinary proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding and the Inquiry Officer while acting in a disciplinary proceeding is to act like a judicial authority. We are of the further opinion that the Inquiry Officer should not act either for the Disciplinary Authority or for the delinquent Officer. He is to act independently to take the inference of fact which is placed before him by the parties. He should not put questions like a Presenting Officer to the delinquent Office to prove the charges leveled against the delinquent Officer. He is to act independently to take the inference of fact which is placed before him by the parties. He should not put questions like a Presenting Officer to the delinquent Office to prove the charges leveled against the delinquent Officer. From such action of the inquiring officer it can be easily said that the inquiring officer is to the extent biased to the delinquent officer, which is unwarranted in law. If the statutory authority acted beyond the power vested on him then where the delinquent officer will go except to the Court of law, which course really has been taken by the respondent-writ petition to prove the biasness of the inquiring officer in the writ petition and ultimately succeeded. 10. The above quoted judgment shows that the facts of the said case are not identical with the case in hand. There was no confession or pleading of guilty in the reported case. In the case in hand, not only did the delinquent employee fail to deny the charges leveled against him by way of filing written statement or otherwise he also specifically pleaded guilty when the proceeding had started. Moreover, he did not submit defence statement on being given the opportunity after prosecution witnesses had deposed against him and they were cross-examined by the Defence Assistant. Here in this case, allegations not having been denied there would have been no difficulty in imposing punishment on him. The proceeding that was held was in his interest and he was given all opportunities. Even by filing this writ petition, the petitioner has not stated anywhere that he did not plead guilty. In this view of the matter the case of Ram Lakhan Sharma (supra) does not apply to the case in hand and as such question of applying the law laid down therein also can not arise. 11. In the case of Salam Kesho Singh v. State of Manipur reported in (2011) 1 GLT 287, the writ petitioner who was a Rifle Man in Manipur Rifle was arrested in connection with a case under section 384/511/34 IPC read with section 10/13 UA(P) Act and was remanded in police custody on 24.3.2002. There was a disciplinary proceeding against him and the enquiry was made by the Deputy Commandant of his unit. There was a disciplinary proceeding against him and the enquiry was made by the Deputy Commandant of his unit. Basing on the findings of the enquiry officer, the said writ petitioner was terminated from service on 4.10.2004 and an appeal filed there against was also dismissed on 23.9.2005. The writ petitioner then filed W.P. (C) No. 236/2006 before this High Court alleging that the proceeding was not held fairly. However, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition 16.4.2009. On appeal, a division bench of this Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order of termination holding that the same was passed without application of mind. In the said case also there was no presenting officer and the Division Bench of this Court held that an Enquiry Officer cannot assume the role of a judge and also of a prosecutor. It was further held that even if the relevant service rule is silent about the appointment of the presenting officer, absence of a presenting officer will make the enquiry totally vitiated. It is necessary to mention here that the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench is based on the proposition that an enquiry officer has to remain impartial. However, in this case also, the delinquent employee did not plead guilty. Rather there was specific denial of the charges by filing written statement of defence. Thus there is fundamental factual difference of the reported case with the case in hand and as such, the said case is also not applicable here. 12. However, it needs to be mentioned here that no service Rules require appointment of enquiry officer as a matter of compulsion. The disciplinary authority itself may hold the enquiry and punish its employee. In the event, the disciplinary authority himself holds an enquiry can a question arises that there should be a Presenting Officer? So far as, the issue as to putting question to the witnesses by the enquiry officer is concerned, the same is not unknown even under the law of evidence. Section 165 of the Evidence Act deals with Judge's power to put question. The relevant part of the section goes as below: 165. So far as, the issue as to putting question to the witnesses by the enquiry officer is concerned, the same is not unknown even under the law of evidence. Section 165 of the Evidence Act deals with Judge's power to put question. The relevant part of the section goes as below: 165. Judge's power to put question or order production.--The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witnesses or of the parties, about any fact relevant or irrelevant;.... If the law of evidence permits a Judge to put questions to the parties or to the witnesses in order to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts, and this being widely used by the Judges throughout the country, it is not clear as to how an enquiry officer after being equated with a Judge in a judicial proceeding be denied that privilege. However, question shall be different if a specific case of personal bias is made out against a particular Judge. The same analogy must apply in case of disciplinary proceeding as well. After all, the very purpose of the disciplinary proceeding is to reach the bottom of the fact while affording adequate opportunities to the affected party. 13. All procedural irregularities and/or violation may not ipso facto render a decision of the disciplinary authority vitiated unless the alleged violation of procedure is a substantive one and more particularly of the nature of 'no hearing', 'no opportunity' and 'no notice' categories. It is true that substantive provision has normally to be complied with and substantive compliance of such provision may not be sufficient. One line extract of all these requirements is that there should be full opportunities to the delinquent employee for presenting its defence and to cross examine the evidence led by the prosecution side. If there is any shortcoming in this aspect, obviously the proceeding would be vitiated but mere technical violations of procedural safeguards would not be sufficient to hold a proceeding bad. This is the law as settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma reported in (1996) 3 SCC 364 . 14. If there is any shortcoming in this aspect, obviously the proceeding would be vitiated but mere technical violations of procedural safeguards would not be sufficient to hold a proceeding bad. This is the law as settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma reported in (1996) 3 SCC 364 . 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the aforementioned case that test should be one of prejudice when allegations of procedural violations come to the fore. Looking from a different angle, the prejudice theory appears to be all the more relevant one. Even after deletion of the requirement of second show cause notice from Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India vide 42nd amendment of the Constitution, Supreme Court held in the case of Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan reported in (1991) 1 SCC 471 that a second show case notice was required as a measure of the principles of natural justice and that failure to do the same would vitiate the disciplinary proceeding. But in the subsequent judgment in the case of Managing Director of ECIL v. V. Karunakar reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 the Hon'ble Supreme Court brought in the theory of prejudice vide paragraph 31 of the said judgment and the ratio of Ramzan Khan stood fundamentally modified. It was observed in the said judgment-- if after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished..... This aspect of the prejudice theory vis--vis violation of the principle of natural justice should be applicable also in all other phases of the proceeding as and when the question of procedural violation is raised. After all, principles of natural justice are not mere formalities that as and when even a technical non compliance of the principle is occasioned, the whole proceeding would be ipso facto vitiated. The settled law is that it has to be analyzed with the touch stone of prejudice. After all, principles of natural justice are not mere formalities that as and when even a technical non compliance of the principle is occasioned, the whole proceeding would be ipso facto vitiated. The settled law is that it has to be analyzed with the touch stone of prejudice. Reverting to the case in hand, there is no dispute that the delinquent employee was not recovered from the house of a civilian woman by the QAT party after receipt of complaint by the husband as well as another neighbor lady of the locality. It is also not disputed that family permission was denied to the delinquent employee in view of the complaint by his own wife in the context of his morally objectionable behavior. It is also not disputed that he was holding the gun in barrack and that he was caught when he was trying to fire from the gun and really a shot was fired. The leave position of the delinquent employee is also not disputed. Finally it is not the case of the delinquent employee that either of the charges was falsely drawn. Strangely enough, he has made no allegation of personal bias against the Enquiry Officer either during the proceeding or by way of filing appeal or even by making any specific statement in the writ petition. Now, if he has no allegation of personal bias against the enquiry officer and as is apparent from the record that he participated in the disciplinary proceeding to the fullest extent by engaging Defence Assistant of his choice, that he thoroughly cross-examined the witnesses of the prosecution and finally preferred statutory appeal, it cannot be said by any stretch imagination that he has been prejudiced for non appointment of a Presenting Officer and consequent asking of questions by the Enquiry officer to the witnesses. No where till that stage did he make any whisper about action of the enquiry officer. So, not only that it is too late in the day to raise allegation of personal bias against the enquiry officer it is also clear that even if a presenting officer had been appointed there would have been no change in the finding in as much as the incidents are admitted Taking all these aspects in to consideration it has to be held that no prejudice was caused to the delinquent employee because of non appointment of presenting officer. Under the facts and circumstance, particularly in view of pleading of guilty by the delinquent employee which still has not been retracted even during pendency of the writ petition, failure on the part of the respondents in not appointing a presenting officer as a supplementary measure of natural justice in addition to the provision to Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules 1955 is not a substantive failure of procedure and as such there is no reason to interfere with the findings impugned in this writ petition. 15. Besides, it appears from above that in the case of Ram Lakhan Sharma (Supra), the writ petitioner/delinquent employee apart from preferring appeal also exhausted the revisional remedy available under the statute. But in the case in hand, the writ petitioner has not exhausted that remedy as well. 16. On the totality of circumstances, the writ petitioner has failed to make out a case for judicial review. After all the standard of proof in a disciplinary proceeding is that of pre-ponderance of probability and not that of proof beyond reasonable doubt and as such there is no scope to interfere with the finding of the domestic enquiry more so when a writ proceeding cannot be equated to an appeal. The writ petition fails. It is dismissed. However, no order as to costs. Petition dismissed