AWARD 1. This is insurer's appeal against the award dated 03.03.2011 passed by the IXth Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Raipur (for short 'the Tribunal') in claim case No. 109/2010. 2. As against the compensation of Rs. 9,58,000/- claimed by the respondent No.1/claimant by filing application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'MV Act') for the injuries sustained by him in the motor accident on 21.11.2009, the Tribunal awarded a total sum of Rs. 1,96,700/- as compensation along with interest @ 7.5 percent per annum from the date of application till its actual payment. 3. The Tribunal, on a close scrutiny of the evidence led, held : the accident had occurred due to involvement of Turbo (Jeep Taxi) bearing registration No. CG-19-T-0460 being driven rashly and negligently by respondent No.2/Sanat Kalar and motorcycle bearing registration No. CG-04-CF-8255 owned by the respondent No. 1/claimant who was sitting in the motorcycle as a pillion rider; both drivers have contributed to the cause of accident; respondent No. 1/claimant sustained injuries in the said accident; appellant/ insurance company liable for payment of compensation to the claimant as it could not establish violation of policy conditions; and assessed and awarded aforesaid sum to the claimant and as against the appellant/insurance company. 4. Shri Sachin Singh Rajput, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit : the Tribunal has failed to see that offending vehicle was being plied in violation of terms of policy conditions, inasmuch as, the permit for offending vehicle was issued for Kanker District whereas the same was being plied in Raipur District and therefore liability of payment of compensation cannot be saddled upon the insurance company. Reference was also made to Section 66 of the MV Act relating to necessity for permits. 5. On the other hand, Shri KK Dewangan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.3 supported the award impugned and would submit in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has rightly saddled the liability upon the appellant/insurance company to pay compensation to the claimant which does not call for any interference. 6. I have heard the counsel appearing for the parties and perused the award impugned including records of the Tribunal. 7. 6. I have heard the counsel appearing for the parties and perused the award impugned including records of the Tribunal. 7. There is no dispute that said vehicle (Turbo Jeep) was being plied on a road not covered by the root mentioned in the permit, inasmuch as, the vehicle was being plied in the Raipur District whereas permit was issued for Kanker District. 8. Permit is defined in Section 2(31) of the MV Act, which reads as under: "permit means a permit issued by a State or Regional Transport Authority or an authority prescribed in this behalf under this Act authorising the use of a motor vehicle as a transport vehicle." 9. Stage carriage is defined in Section 2(40) of the MV Act, which reads as under: "stage carriage means a motor vehicle constructed or adapted to carry more than six passengers excluding the driver for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passengers, either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey." 10. It goes without saying in view of these definitions, that the purpose for which a stage carriage permit is granted is to enable a vehicle to ply as a stage carriage. Fixing of the route and the timings would amount to providing restrictions in the manner of plying the vehicle as a stage carriage under the stage carriage permit. These restrictions have clearly nothing to do with the purpose for which the permit is granted. These restrictions would amount to conditions of permit. The fact that the vehicle was plying on a road which was not covered by any of the routes specified in the permit would necessarily mean that one of the conditions of the permit was violated at the time when the accident took place. That cannot be held to mean that the vehicle was at that point of time, plying on that road without a stage carriage permit. 11. At the highest, it is a case of breach of the condition of the permit which is not the same thing as breach of the purpose for which it was issued. Indisputably, the statutory remedy which are available to the insurer to contest the claim are confined to those provide in Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of MV Act. The contract between the insurer and the insured may permit the insurer to avoid his liability under various circumstances. Indisputably, the statutory remedy which are available to the insurer to contest the claim are confined to those provide in Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of MV Act. The contract between the insurer and the insured may permit the insurer to avoid his liability under various circumstances. However, if those circumstances do not fall within the purview of Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of MV Act, the insurer cannot invoke them in aid and escape liability for the third party risk. The terms of the contract between the insurer and the insured, which determine their inter-se rights and liability, are not and should not be confused with the statutory liability of the insurer for the third party risk. 12. Matter can be looked from another angle also, if a vehicle is holding goods permit and is carrying passengers then it can be said that the vehicle in question has been used for a purpose not allowed by the permit. But same is not the case where the vehicle was plied on a road not covered by the route mentioned in the permit, inasmuch as, that amounts only to breach of conditions of the permit and does not affect the purpose for which the stage carriage permit was granted. 13. In a case where vehicle was being plied without permit, the Supreme Court in case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Challa Bharathamma and others, 2004(8) SC 517 has held: plying of a vehicle without a permit is an infraction, therefore, in terms of section 149 (2) of the MV Act, defence is available to the insurer on that aspect. Same is not the case here and the above judgment of Supreme Court is of no help to the appellant. 14. Considering every aspects of the matter, in my opinion, the Tribunal has not committed any illegality in fastening the liability upon the appellant/insurance company warranting interference of this court in the instant miscellaneous appeal. 15. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal Dismissed.