JUDGMENT 1. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2007, passed by the learned District Judge, Una, Himachal Pradesh, in Civil Appeal No. 73 of 2005. 2. Material facts necessary for adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal are that the respondent-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff for the sake of convenience) has filed a suit for specific performance of contract. According to the plaintiff, the defendant No. 1, Ramesh Chand (hereinafter referred to as the defendant No. 1 for the sake of convenience) has entered into an agreement to sell with him on 27.02.1991, Ex. PW1/A of land comprising Khewat No. 85, Khatauni Nos. 177 to 179, Khasra Nos. 574, 576, 577 and 578, measuring 0-11-47, being 73/647 share out of 1-10-69, as per Misal Haquiat for the year 1986-87, situated in Village Poona, Tehsil and District Una (hereinafter referred to as the suit land for the sake of convenience) for a consideration of Rs. 10,000/- per Kanal and had received Rs. 20,000/- as earnest money and had undertaken to receive the balance of sale consideration of Rs. 10,000/- before the Sub-Registrar at the time of attestation of the sale-deed on or before 30.03.1991. The agreement, dated 27.02.1991, was also executed. The defendant No. 1, Ramesh Chand also agreed that in case he refused to execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff, then he will pay double amount of the sum already paid as earnest money, i.e., Rs. 40,000/- to the plaintiff. It was also agreed that in case the plaintiff fails to get the sale-deed executed, then the earnest money would be forfeited. The plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract by payment of the balance sale consideration to Rs. 10,000/- to the defendant. The defendant failed to perform his part of the contract. The plaintiff has issued a notice to defendant No. 1, Ramesh Chand on 19.03.1991. It is in these circumstances, the plaintiff has filed a suit against defendant No. 1. 3. The plaintiff moved an application under Order 1, Rule 10 for impleading appellant-defendant No. 2, Dharam Singh (hereinafter referred to as the defendant No. 2 for the sake of convenience). The defendant No.1, Ramesh Chand has sold the suit land to him on 22.05.1995 vide Ex. DW1/A for a sum of Rs. 37,500/-. 3. The plaintiff moved an application under Order 1, Rule 10 for impleading appellant-defendant No. 2, Dharam Singh (hereinafter referred to as the defendant No. 2 for the sake of convenience). The defendant No.1, Ramesh Chand has sold the suit land to him on 22.05.1995 vide Ex. DW1/A for a sum of Rs. 37,500/-. The application was allowed by the learned trial Court by passing the following Order on 10.03.1997:- Application u/O. 1, Rule 10, CPC is considered. Arguments heard. The plaintiff wants to implead one Dharam Singh s/O. Watan Singh, r/o Punna, Tehsil and District Una as during the pendency of the suit, the suit land has been sold by the defendant to him. In order to avoid the multiplicity of litigation said Dharam Singh is ordered to be impleaded as a co-defendant. Hence the application u/O. 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. is allowed. Amended plaint be filed on 6.6.1997. Thereafter, the defendant No. 2 also filed the written statement, to which the replication was filed by the plaintiff. Though initially the issues were framed on 11.11.1992, but after the application was allowed and the plaint was permitted to be amended, to which the written statement was filed, the additional issues were framed on 12.03.1998. Learned Senior Sub Judge decreed the suit on 08.12.2000 for specific performance of the contract by way of execution of the sale-deed of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff on payment of Rs. 10,000/- within a period of two months from the date of the judgment, failing which, the plaintiff was entitled to get the sale-deed registered by moving an application in the Court by appointing the Local Commissioner, who has to get the sale-deed executed on behalf of the defendants in favour of the plaintiff and in case the plaintiff failed to deposit the balance consideration of Rs. 10,000/- within two months in the Court, then the suit of the plaintiff was deemed to have been dismissed with costs. 4. Shri Ramesh Chand, defendant No. 1 preferred an appeal against the judgment, dated 08.12.2000, before the learned Additional District Judge, Una, H.P. The same was allowed on 14.01.2005 and the case was remanded to the learned trial Court with a direction to re-register it at its original number and to decide the same in accordance with law by giving its findings on all the issues separately after hearing the parties. Thereafter, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Una, H.P. decreed the suit on 12.09.2005 on the basis of the statements of plaintiff, Sh. Bhag Singh and defendant No. 1, Ramesh Chand. 5. Shri Dharam Singh filed an appeal against the judgment and decree, dated 12.09.2005 in the Court of learned District Judge, Una, H.P. He dismissed the same on 31.08.2007. It is in these circumstances that this Regular Second Appeal has been filed by defendant No. 2, Shri Dharam Singh. 6. Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, on the basis of substantial questions of law framed at page No. 11 of the paper-book, has vehemently argued that both the Courts below have not correctly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence. He further argued that all the issues were required to be decided separately by the learned trial Court as per the judgment, dated 14.01.2005, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Una, H.P. on 14.01.2005 while remanding the matter to the learned trial Court. He also argued that separate findings were required to be recorded on issue No. 2(g). He also argued that Ex.DW1/A, dated 22.05.1995 could not be declared void. 7. Mr. Onkar Jairath and Mr. Tara Singh Chauhan, Advocates have supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. 8. The Civil Suit bearing No. 307/95/91 was instituted by the plaintiff, Shri Bhag Singh for specific performance of agreement, dated 27.02.1991. The trial Court passed the following order on 05.04.1991: Office report seen. Application be registered. This application u/O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 is duly supported by an affidavit and accompanying a suit for specific performance in view of the agreement of sale between himself and the defendant dated 27.2.91 which is on the file but the defendant is allegedly threatening to cause hardship to the plaintiff by not executing the sale in his favour, hence this suit. A perusal of the documents as well as affidavit on the file, I am satisfied that there exists a prima facie case in favour of the applicant whose prayer is allowed. The defendant/respondent is restrained from alienating the land measuring 0-11-47 being 73/647 share out of 1-01-69, bearing Khewat No. 85, Khatauni Nos. 177 to 179, Khasra Nos. 574, 576, 577, 578 as entered in Misal Hakiat for the year 1986-87 situated in village Poona, Tehsil & District, Una till further orders. The defendant/respondent is restrained from alienating the land measuring 0-11-47 being 73/647 share out of 1-01-69, bearing Khewat No. 85, Khatauni Nos. 177 to 179, Khasra Nos. 574, 576, 577, 578 as entered in Misal Hakiat for the year 1986-87 situated in village Poona, Tehsil & District, Una till further orders. Show-cause notice be issued to the respondent for 6.5.91. This order is subject to compliance of Order 39, R. 3, C.P.C. The order, dated 05.04.1991, was confirmed by the learned trial Court on 28.10.1994. The order, dated 28.10.1994, reads as under: Ld. Counsel for the parties have stated at bar that they do not stand any objection if the parties are directed to maintain status quo on the suit land till final decision of the main case. Accordingly, I direct the parties to maintain status quo on the suit land with regard to possession and alienation till final disposal of the main case. The application stands disposed of. Thereafter, the defendant No. 1, Ramesh Chand, during the pendency of the operation of the injunction order, sold the suit land to defendant No. 2, Shri Dharam Singh on 22.05.1995 for a consideration of Rs. 37,500/- vide Ex. DW1/A. The plaintiff filed an application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for impleading defendant No. 2, Shri Dharam Singh. The application was allowed on 10.03.1997. Thereafter, the amended plaint was filed, to which the defendant No. 2 alone filed the written statement. The written statement filed by defendant No. 1 was already on record. The replication was filed by the plaintiff. The additional issues were framed by the learned trial Court on 12.03.1998. 9. The plaintiff has also filed an application bearing CMA No. 194 of 1995 for restraining the defendant No. 2 from interfering in any manner or to take forcible possession of the suit land, measuring 0-11-47 and further restraining him from getting the mutation sanctioned in his favour qua the suit land. The parties were directed to maintain status quo. 10. Plaintiff has examined 7 witnesses. PW-1, Rajinder Kumar is document writer at Una. He has deposed that agreement Ex. PW1/A was prepared by him at the instance of Ramesh Chand, which was read over and explained by him. He has accepted Rs. 20,000/- and signed the agreement after admitting the same to be correct. PW-2, Vijay Puri is Petition Writer. Plaintiff has examined 7 witnesses. PW-1, Rajinder Kumar is document writer at Una. He has deposed that agreement Ex. PW1/A was prepared by him at the instance of Ramesh Chand, which was read over and explained by him. He has accepted Rs. 20,000/- and signed the agreement after admitting the same to be correct. PW-2, Vijay Puri is Petition Writer. PW-3, Gulzara has deposed that he has put his thumb impression as a witness on agreement Ex. PW1/A, which was written at the instance of defendant No. 1, Ramesh Chand and payment of consideration was also made to him. 11. The plaintiff has appeared as PW-5 according to him, he has agreed to purchase land from Ramesh Chand vide agreement Ex. PW1/A. The registered sale-deed was read over and explained to defendant No. 1. He admitted the contents of the same to be correct. Thereafter, he has put his signatures and after that the witnesses have signed the document. He was ready to get the sale-deed executed in his favour and approached the defendant. He has also issued a notice Ex. PW2/A through Petition Writer, but the defendant did not execute the sale deed. He has admitted that earlier the suit land was in the possession of his father and now the same is in his possession. PW-6, Ranjit Singh is registration clerk, office of Sub-Registrar, Una. 12. DW-1, Shri S. N. Bali, Advocate, Una has deposed that he has issued notice Ex. DW-1/A to Bhag Singh through registered AD and the copy of notice is Ex. DW1/A and postal receipt is Ex. PW1/B and AD is Ex. DW1/C. 13. DW-2 Ramesh Chand has deposed that he has received Rs. 20,000/- from the plaintiff for sale of land @ of Rs. 10,000/- per kanal and sale-deed was executed on 20.03.1991. He also deposed that his land was mortgaged with Bakshi Ram for a consideration of Rs. 10,000/-. He has gone to the office of Sub- Registrar on 18.03.1991 and 20.03.1991 to get the sale-deed executed, but Bhag Singh did not turn up. On 20.03.1991, a notice was issued to Bhag Singh through Advocate. Copy of the notice is Ex. DW1/A. He has agreed to sell the land @ of Rs. 10,000/- per kanal. He has denied the receipt of the notice. 14. On 20.03.1991, a notice was issued to Bhag Singh through Advocate. Copy of the notice is Ex. DW1/A. He has agreed to sell the land @ of Rs. 10,000/- per kanal. He has denied the receipt of the notice. 14. DW-3, Ashok Kumar has deposed that he has gone to the office of Sub Registrar with Ramesh on 18.03.1991 and 20.03.1991. However, Bhag Singh did not turn up. In his cross-examination, he has deposed that on 20.03.1991, he has not appeared before the Tehsildar along with Ramesh. 15. Plaintiff has produced the copy of Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid for the years 1986-87, Ex. P1, copy of agreement Ex. PW1/A, copy of notice Ex. PW-2/A and acknowledgment Ex.-PW2/B. The defendants have also produced the copy of notice Ex.-DW1/A, copy of acknowledgment Ex. D1, postal receipt Ex. DW1/B, copy of mortgage deed Ex. D1 and copy of sale deed Ex. D1/C. 16. Learned Senior Sub-Judge, Una, H.P. has also taken into consideration that the suit land has been sold by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2 during the pendency of stay orders. Learned Senior Sub-Judge, Una, H.P. has decreed the suit for specific performance on 08.12.2000. 17. Ramesh Chand, defendant No. 1 alone has filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Una, H.P. Defendant No. 2, Dharam Singh was arrayed as proforma respondent No. 2. Learned Additional District Judge, Una, H.P. allowed the appeal, as noticed above, on 14.01.2005 by remitting the matter to the learned trial Court. 18. Learned Advocates appearing on behalf of plaintiff, Bhag Singh and defendant No. 1, Ramesh Chand made statements before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Una, H.P. on 12.09.2005 that the matter has been compromised between the parties and have prayed that the same may be disposed of. Shri Ramesh Chand, duly identified by learned counsel Shri R.C. Seth, Advocate on 31.05.2005 vide separate statement has stated that he has no objection if the suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff as per Ex. PW1/A. The plaintiff, duly identified by his counsel Sh. C.M. Sharma, Advocate, vide separate statement has also affirmed the statement of defendant No. 1 Ramesh Chand to be correct. Mr. C.M. Sharma and Mr. PW1/A. The plaintiff, duly identified by his counsel Sh. C.M. Sharma, Advocate, vide separate statement has also affirmed the statement of defendant No. 1 Ramesh Chand to be correct. Mr. C.M. Sharma and Mr. R. C. Seth, learned counsel for the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 vide their separate statement recorded on 01.09.2005, have stated that they do not press the compromise, dated 02.05.1995, as mentioned on page No. 13 of the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Una, dated 14.01.1995, passed in Civil Appeal No. 8/2001. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of Shri Dharam Singh has not made any statement. Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of defendant No. 1 has also argued before the learned trial Court that the principle of lis pendens applies and defendant No. 2 Dharam Singh could not get any title, since the matter has been conciled between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. In view of this, the learned trial Court decreed the suit. A decree for specific performance of contract by way of execution of sale deed of the land, as detailed in the plaint, was passed in favour of the plaintiff Bhag Singh against defendant Nos. 1 and 2. The sale deed Ex. DW1/A executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2, Dharam Singh on 22.05.1995, was cancelled. However, defendant No. 2, Dharam Singh was held entitled to be paid a sum of `27500/- by defendant No. 1 as a consequence of cancellation of sale deed, Ex. DW1 /A. It was also held by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Una, H.P. that in case the amount of `27500/- was not paid by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2, then the defendant No. 2 shall be entitled to recover this amount from defendant No. 1 with interest @ `6% per annum with costs. Defendant No. 1, Ramesh Chand and defendant No. 2, Bhag Singh were ordered to execute a sale deed of the suit land measuring 0-11-47 in favour of the plaintiff Bhag Singh accompanied by delivery of possession of the suit land to him within a period of one month. The defendant No. 2 was also declared entitled to withdraw decretal money of `10,000/- deposited in the trial Court by the plaintiff vide R.D. Register No. 59, Treasury Voucher No. 4, dated 16.04.2001. 19. The defendant No. 2 was also declared entitled to withdraw decretal money of `10,000/- deposited in the trial Court by the plaintiff vide R.D. Register No. 59, Treasury Voucher No. 4, dated 16.04.2001. 19. What emerges from the facts enumerated hereinabove, is that an agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 vide Ex. PW1/A on 27.02.1991. However, the defendant No. 1 sold the suit land in favour of defendant No. 2 during the pendency of restraint order. Learned trial Court has rightly decreed the suit for specific performance by taking into consideration the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties. However, in appeal which was preferred only by Ramesh Chand, the matter was remitted to the learned trial Court. 20. Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the plaintiff has vehemently argued that the additional issue No. 2(g) which was framed on 12.03.1998, was required to be dealt with and separate findings ought to have been recorded by the learned trial Court, since according to him, the 1st Appellate Court has directed that all the issues should be decided separately. However, the fact of the matter is that since the matter has been compromised between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, the issues were not required to be decided separately. It is on the basis of the statements of plaintiff and defendant No. 1 accompanied by the statements of learned Advocates appearing on their behalf, the matter was compromised and a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant No. 1 has also been ordered to pay a sum of `27500/- to defendant No. 2 after Ex. DW1/A was cancelled. Learned trial Court has rightly ordered the defendant No. 1 to pay a sum of `27,500/- to defendant No. 2 along with decretal amount of `10,000/- deposited by the plaintiff in the Court. Thus, the defendant No. 2 has been ordered to pay a sum of `37,500/-, which was the sale price. The suit land could not be sold by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2 during the pendency of the Civil Suit, more particularly, when there was an interim order, dated 05.04.1991, which was confirmed on 28.10.1994. The parties were directed to maintain status quo in CMA No. 194 of 1995 preferred by the plaintiff as per order, dated 07.08.1998. 21. The parties were directed to maintain status quo in CMA No. 194 of 1995 preferred by the plaintiff as per order, dated 07.08.1998. 21. The defendant No. 1 cannot set up any right against the plaintiff. The defendant No. 2 cannot be termed as bona fide purchaser since he has purchased the property during the pendency of litigation on 22.05.1995 vide Ex. DW1/A. The Courts below have correctly appreciated the evidence led by the parties. There is no illegality or perversity in the judgments of both the Courts below. 22. In Smt. Ram Peary and others v. Gauri and others, AIR 1978 Allahabad 318, it is held that the subsequent transferee, even though he has obtained the transfer without notice of the original contract, cannot set up against the plaintiff-contractor any right; for it would defeat the rule of lis pendens which is founded upon public policy. Therefore, Section 52 is not subject to Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. The Court has held as under: 7. In the light of these principles we have got to consider whether in the event of a conflict arising between the doctrine of lis pendens enshrined in S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the rule availing a subsequent transferee without notice, contained in S. 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act either the one or the other should prevail. Ordinarily, it is true that the title acquired by the subsequent purchaser is good, the sale to him being not void. But he who purchases during the pendency of the suit is bound by the decree, that may be made against the person from whom he derives title. The litigating parties are exempted from the necessity of taking any notice of a title so acquired (See Samarendra Nath Sinha v. Krishna Kumar Nag ( AIR 1967 SC 1440 ). As to the vendor and the prior contractor it is as if no such title existed. The litigating parties are exempted from the necessity of taking any notice of a title so acquired (See Samarendra Nath Sinha v. Krishna Kumar Nag ( AIR 1967 SC 1440 ). As to the vendor and the prior contractor it is as if no such title existed. Section 52 places a complete embargo on the transfer of any right to immoveable property pending suit, which is directly and specifically in question in such a litigation; it enacts that during the pendency of the suit in which any right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise alienated by any party to the suit so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree. Thus, in the present case it may be that the subsequent transferee was entirely ignorant of any right on the part of the contractor, and also of the pendency of the suit filed against the vendor by such contractor, yet as the transfer was made to him by the vendor after the institution of the suit of the contractor and while it was pending, the subsequent purchaser cannot set up against the contractor any right from which his vendor is excluded by the decree. The title of the subsequent purchaser is good against him on the ground of breach of covenant, but against the plaintiff contractor who seeks specific performance of the contract against the vendor, the subsequent transferee can be in no way better position that the vendor himself. It is well settled that in a suit for specific performance of contract in respect of immoveable property a right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in question. (see Gauri Dutt Mahraj v. Sheikh Sukur Mohammad (75 Ind App 165) (AIR 1948 PC 147)). As story has put it in the passage above quoted, the effect of the doctrine of lis pendens is not to annul the conveyance but only to render it subservient to the rights of the parties in the litigation. The conveyance in favour of the subsequent purchaser is treated as if it never had any existence. The conveyance in favour of the subsequent purchaser thus yields to the adjudication of the rights obtained by the contractor, in the consequence of a decree obtained against the vendor in a suit for specific performance of the contract. The conveyance in favour of the subsequent purchaser is treated as if it never had any existence. The conveyance in favour of the subsequent purchaser thus yields to the adjudication of the rights obtained by the contractor, in the consequence of a decree obtained against the vendor in a suit for specific performance of the contract. In Durga Prasad v. Deep Chand ( AIR 1954 SC 75 ) (supra) their Lordships were dealing with the form of the decree in a suit directing specific performance of contract between the vendor and the plaintiff and in that connection, with a view to convey to the plaintiff, without canceling the subsequent sale, they without enforcing the contract against the subsequent purchaser, directed him to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resided in him to the plaintiff. It was not a case falling within the mischief of S. 52 of the T.P. Act. In our opinion, therefore, when the doctrine of lis pendens renders a transfer subservient to the rights of the plaintiff seeking specific performance of a prior contract entered into by the vendor in his favour and when on account of the operation of the doctrine of lis pendens such conveyance is treated as if it had never any existence, the subsequent transferee, even though he had obtained the transfer without notice of the original contract, cannot set up against plaintiff-contractor any right; for it would defeat the rule of lis pendens which is founded upon public policy. And considered in that manner, S. 52 of the T.P. Act is not subject to S. 19 (b) of the Specific Relief Act. 8. We may yet arrive to a similar conclusion in a different manner. A judgment inter parties raises an estoppel only against the parties to the proceedings in which it is given, and their privies, for example, those claiming of deriving title under them. (Halsburys Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 15, para 372). 8. We may yet arrive to a similar conclusion in a different manner. A judgment inter parties raises an estoppel only against the parties to the proceedings in which it is given, and their privies, for example, those claiming of deriving title under them. (Halsburys Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 15, para 372). The transferee pendente lite would be treated as a representative in the interest of the parties to the suit and the judgment which has been pronounced, in the absence of fraud and collusion, would have the effect of finally determining the rights of the parties and the cause of action which would sustain the suit in which the doctrine of lis pendens applied would be merged in the judgment duly pronounced in what may be described as the previously decided suit. The decision being res judicata would bind not only the parties thereto but also the transferees pendente lite from them. In a case to which besides the vendor the subsequent transferee is also impleaded in the array of the defendants, the judgment is final and binding not only on the parties to the original contract but also the transferee pendente lite from vendor. The conveyance in favour of the subsequent purchaser is treated as if it never had any existence. There would then be no lis or action which would survive, enabling the subsequent purchaser to take the defence of bona fide transfer for value without notice of the original contract. Accordingly, we take the view that lis pendens affects the transferee pendente lite and S. 52 of the T.P. Act is not subject to S. 19(b) of the new Specific Relief Act. The conveyance in favour of the subsequent purchaser pending the suit brought by the plaintiff contractor for specific performance of the contract between him and the vendor is taken as if it had never any existence. 23. In Balwinderjit Kaur v. Financial Commissioner (Appeals), AIR 1987 Punjab and Haryana 189, the learned single Judge has held that the vendees purchasing property from vendors during pendency of a Civil Suit against vendors for specific performance of agreement to sell property, would be bound by decree against vendors. Learned single Judge has held as under: 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length, I find that the petitioner must succeed. Learned single Judge has held as under: 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length, I find that the petitioner must succeed. By now it is well laid down that in the case of a transfer which is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act the question of good faith which is essential to be established before an equitable relief can be granted in favour of a subsequent vendee under Section 41 or S. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act is totally irrelevant (See Shanu Ram v. Basheshar Nath (1966) 68 Pun LR (D) 44. In the face of this settled legal position, the plea raised on behalf of respondents 5 to 10 that they were bona fide purchasers without notice from Paramjit Singh and Jagjit Singh was obviously of no consequence. Respondents 5 to 10 having purchased the property from these two vendors during the pendency of the civil litigation against them are bound by the decree passed against them, i.e., the vendors and, in view of that, no question of title remained to be settled between the parties, i.e., the petitioner and the subsequent vendees. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar Shaw and another v. Farida Khatoon and another (2005) 11 Supreme Court Cases 403: ( AIR 2005 SC 2209 ) have explained the doctrine of lis pendens as under: 14. An alienee pendente lite is bound by the final decree that may be passed in the suit. Such an alienee can be brought on record both under this rule as also under O. 1, Rule 10. Since under the doctrine of lis pendens a decree passed in the suit during the pendency of which a transfer is made binds the transferee, his application to be brought on record should ordinarily be allowed. 15. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is an expression of the principle pending a litigation nothing new should be introduced. It provides that pendente lite, neither party to the litigation, in which any right to immovable property is in question, can alienate or otherwise deal with such property so as to affect his appointment. This Section is based on equity and good conscience and is intended to protect the parties to litigation against alienations by their opponent during the pendency of the suit. This Section is based on equity and good conscience and is intended to protect the parties to litigation against alienations by their opponent during the pendency of the suit. In order to constitute a lis pendens, the following elements must be present: 1. There must be a suit or proceeding pending in a Court of competent jurisdiction. 2. The suit or proceeding must not be collusive. 3. The litigation must be one in which right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question. 4. There must be a transfer of or otherwise dealing with the property in dispute by any party to the litigation. 5. Such transfer must affect the rights of the other party that may ultimately accrue under the terms of the decree or order. 16. The doctrine of lis pendens applies only where the lis is pending before a Court. Further pending the suit, the transferee is not entitled as of right to be made a party to the suit, though the Court has a discretion to make him a party. But the transferee pendente lite can be added as a proper party if his interest in the subject-matter of the suit is substantial and not just peripheral. A transferee pendente lite to the extent he has acquired interest from the defendant is vitally interested in the litigation, whether the transfer is of the entire interest of the defendant; the latter having no more interest in the property may not properly defend the suit. He may collude with the plaintiff. Hence, though the plaintiff is under no obligation to make a lis pendens transferee a party; under Order XXII, Rule 10 an alienee pendente lite may be joined as party. As already noticed, the Court has discretion in the matter which must be judicially exercised and an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests. The Court has held that a transferee pendente lite of an interest in immovable property is a representative-in-interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest. He is entitled to be impleaded in the suit or other proceedings where the transferee pendente lite is made a party to the litigation; he is entitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of the case. 25. He is entitled to be impleaded in the suit or other proceedings where the transferee pendente lite is made a party to the litigation; he is entitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of the case. 25. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy and others (2006) 13 Supreme Court Cases 608: ( AIR 2007 SC 1332 ) have held that a transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. Their Lordships have held as under: 12. The principles specified in Section 52 of the T.P. Act are in accordance with equity, good conscience or justice because they rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. The principle of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the T.P. Act being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith or bona fide arises. The principle underlying Section 52 is that a litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subject-matter of the suit. The Section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the Court. 26. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arjan Singh v. Punit Ahluwalia and others (2008) 8 Supreme Court Cases 348: ( AIR 2008 SC 2718 ) have considered Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as under: 17. Was the order of injunction operative so as to attract the provisions of Rule 2A of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure or invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the court under Section 151 thereof. The learned Trial Judge opined that it was so because it was for the court to pass an appropriate order thereunder. Was the order of injunction operative so as to attract the provisions of Rule 2A of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure or invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the court under Section 151 thereof. The learned Trial Judge opined that it was so because it was for the court to pass an appropriate order thereunder. The High Court, however, differed with the aforementioned finding of the learned Trial Judge to hold that no order of injunction was operative. It, furthermore, held that any transaction carried out in violation of the order of the court is void; it would be a nullity. The decision of the High Court is based on the decisions of different High Courts including Pranakrushna and others v. Umakanta Panda and others [AIR 1989 Orissa 148], Phani Bhushan Dey v. Sudhamoyee Roy & Anr. [(1987) 91 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1078] and Harbalas and others v. The State of Haryana and others, 1973 Punjab Law Journal 84]. We agree with the High Court on this issue. If the order of injunction was operative upto a particular date, technically the order of injunction shall not remain operative thereafter. The owner of the land Dr. Bawa and the defendant No. 2 Sanjeev Sharma, thus, could have entered into the compromise. The effect thereof would be that the said deed of sale was not binding on the appellant. It would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, as adumbrated under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The said deed of sale would not come in the Courts way in passing a decree in favour of the appellant. Its validity or otherwise would not be necessary to be considered as the appellant is not bound thereby. Sanjeev Sharma and consequently Puneet Ahluwalia would be deemed to be aware of the pendency of the suit. Even Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act will be attracted. 27. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A. Nawab John and others v. V.N. Subramaniyam (2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases 738: (AIR 2012 SC (Civ) 2355) have held that pendente lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer same legal rights and obligations of his vendor as may be eventually determined by Court. Their Lordships have held as under: 18. Their Lordships have held as under: 18. It is settled legal position that the effect of Section 52 is not to render transfers affected during the pendency of a suit by a party to the suit void; but only to render such transfers subservient to the rights of the parties to such suit, as may be, eventually, determined in the suit. In other words, the transfer remains valid subject, of course, to the result of the suit. The pendente lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his vendor as may be eventually determined by the Court. The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subject-matter of the suit. The section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the court. [Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy, AIR 2007 SC 1332 , para 12] 28. Since all the parties belong to the same village, i.e. Poona, it can safely be presumed that defendant No. 2, Dharam Singh knew about the pendency of the Case. In these circumstances, he cannot be treated as bona fide purchaser. 29. In Baldev Singh and others v. Chhota Singh and another, AIR 2002 Punjab and Haryana 47, the learned single Judge has held that since the suit land was situated in small village and all parties also belong to that village, subsequent purchaser must be knowing earlier transaction of sale of land and cannot be held to be bona fide purchaser. The learned single Judge has held as under: 23. For the reasons given above, the conclusion reached is that Nachhatar Singh had entered into an agreement to sell land with Chhota Singh vide agreement dated 23-6-1990 and had received Rs. 30,000/- as earnest money. Chhota Singh was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the breach was committed by Nachhatar Singh. Agreement dated 23-5-1990 set up by Baldev Singh etc. was false, forged and anti-dated. Baldev Singh etc. 30,000/- as earnest money. Chhota Singh was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the breach was committed by Nachhatar Singh. Agreement dated 23-5-1990 set up by Baldev Singh etc. was false, forged and anti-dated. Baldev Singh etc. are not bona fide purchasers of the land, as when they purchased the land, they were aware of agreement in favour of Chhota Singh dated 23-6-1990, as it is a small village and all of them belong to this village. In small villages if any transaction takes place, it spreads like wild fire. 30. Accordingly, in view of the observations and analysis made hereinabove, there is no merit in this Regular Second Appeal and the same is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any. No costs. Appeal dismissed.