JUDGMENT Mr. K. Kannan, J. (Oral).:- The landlord had sought for eviction on the ground of personal necessity to allow for the property to be used for his son who was an Advocate in practice for nearly 10 years and also had a plea that the tenant was guilty of ceasing to occupy the premises for a period in excess of four months, the statutory period. The Courts below found the grounds as established and ordered ejectment. 2. Learned Senior counsel reads to me the provisions of Section 13 (3) (a) (ii) of the Haryana Urban Control of Rent Act, 1973 to contend that the provision could be that the landlord could be evicted only if the son intends to practice “as a lawyer” and for a person who is already a practitioner the provision cannot apply. The said Section would require to be reproduced for a better understanding:- 13(3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. (a) in the case of a residential building, if (i) xx xx xx (ii) he requires it for use as an office or consulting room by his son who intends to start practice as a lawyer, qualified architect or chartered accountant or as a “registered practitioner” within the meaning of that expression used in the Punjab Medical Registration Act, 1916, the Punjab Ayurvedic and Unani Practitioners Act, 1963, of the Punjab Homeopathic Practitioners Act, 1965, or for the residence of his son who is married: Provided that such son is not occupying in the urban area concerned any other building for use as office, consulting room or residence, as the case may be, and has not vacated it without sufficient cause after the commencement of the 1949 Act.” 3. It must be noticed that this provision itself was introduced by Act 16 of 1976 in response to decisions on this subject from several Courts with conflicting views. The previous cases had been with reference to whether a person who takes a property for residential purpose could be taken as subjecting it to non-residential purpose by having an office as a lawyer. The conflict in views was in the context of prohibition under the various rent enactments by conversion of residential building for non-residential purpose and vice versa. The previous cases had been with reference to whether a person who takes a property for residential purpose could be taken as subjecting it to non-residential purpose by having an office as a lawyer. The conflict in views was in the context of prohibition under the various rent enactments by conversion of residential building for non-residential purpose and vice versa. The issue therefore was whether the use of a portion of the premises constituted a non-residential use that fell within the interdict of conversion of building from residential to non-residential building. The Haryana Act has also undergone a change for allowing for eviction as a ground for landlord in respect of residential building for the purpose of a son who intended to start practice. 4. The expression “intends to start practice” is a syntactical expression that cannot conceal an intendment of the legislature. Learned senior counsel would argue that intendment was to restrict a requirement of a landlord only if his son was going to start practice in future and cannot be used for a person who has already begun his practice. In my view, it will lead to absurd situation that commencement of a profession which is a sure guarantee as fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution must suffer fetter through alleged legislative intendment in a State statute. The intendment of law must be for perceived by reading any state law to conform to the constitutional guarantees. If therefore, a person had a right to carry on his profession, the law cannot impose a new condition that the landlord who wants this premises must literally stop his son from practicing, secure his possession and then the son must commence his practice. It amounts to putting an artificial barrier to a constitutional right. The expression, in my view, must be understood as only a need for a landlord for the son who may have started his profession or who may start his profession in future. It is a common experience that no action for eviction, although a summary procedure prescribed under the Rent Acts, do not see the light of the day within few years. Litigation lingers on for several years. It is a common experience that no action for eviction, although a summary procedure prescribed under the Rent Acts, do not see the light of the day within few years. Litigation lingers on for several years. If the interpretation as propounded by the learned Senior counsel were to be accepted it would mean even in a genuine case of landlord approaching the Court when his son was intending to start a practice by the time the petition for eviction is concluded after a few years, the son would have completed his course and must be waiting to start his business to obtain eviction of the premises. I have already outlined the absurdity of the situation that is likely to result if such an interpretation is to be given. I therefore, discard the argument and hold that the Section must be understood for both types of situation of a person who has already commenced his profession and who may commence his profession after filing of the petition. 5. Learned Senior counsel argues in the alternative that the provision itself is intended only for a landlord requiring the premises for a residential building and even a Division Bench ruling that found that restriction of the need for a residential building only for personal necessity as being violative of Article 14 cannot mean that there is any provision for the landlord’s requirement if he seeks in respect of non-residential building. The argument is that while the Courts have rejected a distinction drawn between the residential and non-residential building, it has not so far made any legislation they would allow for eviction on the ground of personal requirement in respect of non-residential building. This argument also, in my view, is erroneous. The Courts that declares a distinction which is brought through suitability between the residential and nonresidential building for personal necessity as offending Article 14 cannot leave the situation of the landlord’s requirement for nonresidential building in a vacuum. The obvious corollary is that if the restriction of the need cannot be made only for a residential building, it must mean that the landlord has a right to apply to the Court for not merely a residential building but also in respect of non-residential building. The obvious corollary is that if the restriction of the need cannot be made only for a residential building, it must mean that the landlord has a right to apply to the Court for not merely a residential building but also in respect of non-residential building. If such logical extension is not given, it will lead to a situation where the tenant will not be able to even argue that the property must be used only for the personal need of the landlord to enable his son to start his practice. It will mean again that even a specific requirement as given under Section 13 (3) (a) (ii) is not even available for a tenant to plead. The argument that there is no eviction possible at all for the landlord for there is no specific provision for non-residential building suffers from a fundamental vice in understanding that the Rent Act is the sole repository for a landlord’s right in respect of any particular provision under the Act. The landlord may not be able to traverse outside the provision. It means therefore that for any of the grounds mentioned under the Rent Act, a resort to the provisions of Transfer of Property Act will stand excluded. On the other hand, if there is not even a situation which the Act does not contemplate, such as in this case when the tenant wants to contend that there is no specific provision under the Haryana Act for the landlord to obtain eviction in respect of nonresidential building, then that argument would lead to a situation that the landlord seeks to an inference that may not have a relief under the Act but he will still have under the Transfer of Property Act. I cannot allow such an inference also to be made, for, it has come by means of a judicial direction extending to a Division Bench ruling in 1999 (1) RLR 689 State of Haryana Vs. Ved Parkash Gupta and another referred to above as applying to further situation where the landlord seeks for eviction for his personal need for residential or non-residential building without any distinction. The applicability of this provision to non-residential building has been specifically dealt with by the Supreme Court in Ved Parkash Gupta Vs. State of Haryana 1997 (2) RCR (Rent) 160. 6. The applicability of this provision to non-residential building has been specifically dealt with by the Supreme Court in Ved Parkash Gupta Vs. State of Haryana 1997 (2) RCR (Rent) 160. 6. The attempt was made at the time of trial eliciting in the cross examination of the witnesses that since name board was hung outside the house, it must be understood that he was carrying on his profession at his own house and there was no requirement to eject the tenant for the sake of his son’s profession. There is no method by which a tenant can dictate to a landlord that a person who carries on his profession at home must continue to do so and he will not set up a practice in an independent building. In this case, the fact that the landlord’s son was carrying on his profession at home cannot fetter his need if he wants to set up his profession from an independent building which is demised to the tenant. I will hold that the landlord’s requirement is fully established. 7. As regards yet another ground that the tenant had ceased to occupy, the landlord sought to adduce evidence by summoning an official from electricity board that electricity connection had been disconnected and the tenant had ceased to occupy. When there was specific evidence relating to electricity supply and oral evidence tendered through an official, the tenant has filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 that he had additional documents to show that he continued in business. The Appellate Court had rejected the application and affirmed the order of the Rent Controller. I do not find any error in the view taken by the Appellate Court that there was lack of justification for not filing the documents which he ought to have known at the time of trial and after the evidence was tendered by the landlord. I, therefore will not make any modification with reference to the finding rendered on yet another ground which has been held against the tenant by the two Courts below. 8. The orders of the Courts below are confirmed and the revision petition is dismissed. Time for eviction is two months. --------0.B.S.0------------