Judgment :- Tarun Kumar Gupta, J. The defendants are the appellants against a judgment and a decree of affirmation. The respondent Smt. Gouri Nag as plaintiff filed Title Suit being Title Suit No.41 of 1998 praying for eviction of the defendant being a licensee from the suit premises described in schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ of the plaint. The plaintiff’s case, in short, is that premises No.10 Sarbakhan Road P.S. Chitpur was the property of Pannalal Mitra and his daughter Mahamaya Bose. A trust was created by them in respect of said property through a trust deed dated 30.12.1968. As per said trust deed the property was divided into three lots and lot ‘A’ was settled to Prasanta Kumar Bose (one of the sons of Mahamaya Bose and her husband Kamal Bose), lot ‘B’ was alloted to present plaintiff Gouri Nag (married daughter of Mahamaya Bose and Kamal Bose) and lot ‘C’ was allotted to Mahamaya Bose. As per trust deed all of them got said properties for life interest and thereafter their shares would devolve upon their respective heirs on their death. Pannalal Mitra, Mahamaya Bose and her husband Kamal Bose were the original trustees. Later on lot ‘A’, lot ‘B’ and lot ‘C’ were renumbered by Kolkata Municipal Corporation as 10 A, 10 C and 10 B Sarba Khan Road respectively. The defendant being unemployed brother of plaintiff was permitted to start a business in a portion of lot ‘B’ which was described in schedule A of the plaint. The trust deed was later on revoked by a deed dated 08.09.1990 and the persons being allottees of the respective portions in terms of the original trust deed became absolute owners of said portions. The plaintiff later on purchased allotted portion of her mother Mahamaya Bose i.e., lot ‘C’ which was renumbered as 10 ‘B’ by a kobala dated 5th of July, 1986. At the prayer of the defendant plaintiff also permitted him to use some open space of lot ‘C’ property as a licensee which was described in schedule B of the plaint. Later on defendant got employment and his wife started to run a decoration business. As defendant started to misbehave with the plaintiff, plaintiff revoked the licence by sending a notice of revocation of licence dated 21.11.1990. Later on defendant got employment and his wife started to run a decoration business. As defendant started to misbehave with the plaintiff, plaintiff revoked the licence by sending a notice of revocation of licence dated 21.11.1990. As in spite of sending of said notice defendant did not vacate the suit premises, the suit for eviction was filed by the plaintiff. The defendant contested said suit filing a written statement followed by additional written statement denying material allegations of the plaint. The defendant contended inter alia that as plaintiff and Mahamaya Bose were given only life interest in respect of lot ‘B’ and lot ‘C’ property respectively through the trust deed they had neither any right of granting any licence nor any right of selling out the property. The plaintiff did not acquire any title to lot ‘C’ property on account of alleged purchase of the same from their mother Mahamaya Bose. The defendant was inducted in A schedule property by Kamal Bose, one of the trustees, at a rental of Rs.60/- per month and defendant used to pay rent first to Kamal Bose and after his death to Mahamaya Bose and thereafter in the Rent Controller Office. He being a tenant his eviction, if any, can only be effected by filing a case under West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act after sending statutory notice. His further case is that alleged revocation of the original trust dated 30.12.1968 by a deed of revocation dated 08.09.1990 was illegal. His alternative case is that if the trust deed was really revoked through said deed of revocation dated 08.09.1990 then the property returned to the settlers and that defendant No.1 Amar Nath Bose being one of the sons of Mahamaya Bose inherited 1/4th share in the entire property. He also filed a suit for partition being Title Suit No.158 of 1995 praying for declaring his 1/4th share in the suit property. Learned Trial Court framed several issues including one issue as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to get the decree as prayed for. After contested hearing learned Trial Court observed that the status of the defendant in the suit property was nothing but that of a licensee under the plaintiff and that the defendants were liable to be evicted therefrom. Present appellants filed an appeal being Title Appeal No.210 of 1990 against said judgment and decree of eviction. After contested hearing learned Trial Court observed that the status of the defendant in the suit property was nothing but that of a licensee under the plaintiff and that the defendants were liable to be evicted therefrom. Present appellants filed an appeal being Title Appeal No.210 of 1990 against said judgment and decree of eviction. However, after contested hearing said appeal was also dismissed. Hence is this second appeal. At the time of admission of the appeal the following substantial questions of law were formulated. (1) Whether the partition decree of dismissal in which the present appellant was the plaintiff an appeal being FAT No.2958 of 1999 is pending in this Hon’ble Court as such till disposal of the same, the learned Courts below should not have passed the decree adjudging the appellant as alicensee. (2) Whether the findings of the learned courts below are based on wrong approach to the case and proceeded on with inadequate appreciation of the facts and laws involved in the case. (3) Whether the learned court of appeal below erred in affirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and ought to have held that inasmuch as the suit hinges on the proper interpretation of the document being Ext.1 and that the learned Trial Court was wrong in interpreting the same as a deed of settlement. (4) Whether the purpose of a deed of trust and a deed of settlement are different the learned Court of appeal below ought to have held that the learned Trial Court was wrong in interpreting the trust deed (Ext.1) as a deed of family settlement and in decreeing the suit on the basis thereof. (5) Whether in view of the findings of the learned trial court that the deed of trust was irrevocable, the learned court of appeal below ought to have held that inasmuch as by the Trust Deed being (Ext.1) lot ‘C’ of the suit property was given life interest to Mahamaya Devi, the property, on her death, reverted back to the original status and the defendant No.1 Amar Nath Bose being the son of the said late Mahamaya Bose became the co-owner of the said property and as such was not liable to eviction. Mr. Mr. Gopal Chandra Ghosh, learned counsel for the defendants/appellants, submits that Mahamaya acquired no interest in lot ‘C’ property as there was no transfer in favour of Mahamaya by the trustees in terms of para 6 (c) of the Trust Deed and hence Mahamaya had no saleable interest in lot ‘C’ property. According to him, plaintiff Gouri did not acquire any title to lot ‘C’ property on account of alleged purchase of the same from Mahamaya through a kobala dated 5th of July, 1986. His next contention is that Gouri had no authority to grant any licence to defendant Amar Nath Bose regarding lot ‘B’ property as she had only life interest therein. His further contention is that defendant Amar Nath Bose got tenancy in the suit property from Kamal Bose, one of the trustees, and that the story of giving alleged licence by Gouri was palpably false. His next leg of submission is that trust deed dated 30.12.1968 was not revocable and hence the deed of revocation dated 8 th September, 1990 (Ext.2) was invalid. He further submits that on death of Pannalal Mitra, Prasanta Bose, one of the beneficiaries, should have been made a co-trustee in terms of the Clause 7 of the Trust Deed but Prasanta was not made a co-trustee and the alleged deed of revocation dated 8th of September, 1990 was executed only by Kamal Bose and Mahamaya Bose and there was nothing to show that said revocation was made with consent of the beneficiaries. His last but not the least important submission is that the Deed of Trust dated 30.12.1968 has the flavour of a will but not a family settlement. In this connection he refers case laws reported in AIR 1955 Supreme Court page 481 and AIR 1968 Patna page 487 to define what is family settlement. He also refers a case law reported in AIR 1978 Madras page 54 to highlight the distinction between will and gift. He further submits that the suit praying for partition filed by the present appellant defendant No.1 was dismissed and that the appeal has been filed and is pending in this Court and that this second appeal should not proceed till disposal of this first appeal arising out of said decree of dismissal of the partition suit. Mr. He further submits that the suit praying for partition filed by the present appellant defendant No.1 was dismissed and that the appeal has been filed and is pending in this Court and that this second appeal should not proceed till disposal of this first appeal arising out of said decree of dismissal of the partition suit. Mr. S. P. Roychowdhury, learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff appellant, on the other hand, submits that this is a suit for eviction of a licensee and not a suit for declaration of title and hence there is no question of stay of hearing of the second appeal till disposal of the first appeal arising out of the decree of dismissal of the partition suit filed by the present appellant defendant No.1. He next submits that the partition suit (Title Suit No. 158 of 1995) was filed by appellant defendant No.1 claiming his title through the deed of revocation dated 08.09.1990 and that at this stage he cannot be permitted to allege that the deed of revocation was illegal. He next submits that though appellant defendant No.1 took specific plea that he had tenancy right in the suit property and paid rent to Kamal Bose and then to Mahamaya Bose but only one alleged rent receipt issued by Kamal Bose was filed and that too was found by the court below to be not issued under the signature of Kamal Bose. Mr. Roychowdhury next submits that though the nomenclature of the deed dated 8th of September, 1990 was “revocation” but the same in effect was a deed enlarging the rights given to the beneficiaries by the earlier deed of settlement dated 30th December, 1968. According to him, that being the true nature of said deed dated 8 th September, 1990 it would not be hit by the irrevocability of the 1968 deed. He next submits that living trustees and immediate beneficiaries (having life estate in the 1968 deed) were signatories to the 1990 deed and that the residuary reversionary beneficiaries, i.e., the children of the immediate beneficiaries, have never objected to the 1990 Deed. In any event, he argues, the ripening of their predecessors’ life estate into absolute title ultimately ensures to their benefit and not to the detriment of their interests. In any event, he argues, the ripening of their predecessors’ life estate into absolute title ultimately ensures to their benefit and not to the detriment of their interests. He further submits that the appellants are debarred by Estoppel and Acquiescence from challenging the validity of the revocation deed of 1990 first under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act and secondly by claiming appellant No. 1’s 1/4th share in the suit property on the strength of said revocation. His last submission is that in any case the plaintiff has better title than the defendant in the suit property and hence plaintiff is entitled to get a decree of eviction treating the possession of the defendant as a licensee as defendant failed to establish his alleged tenancy right over the suit property. In support of his contention he has referred case laws reported in (1987) 4 Supreme Court Cases 193 (Smt. Shanti Sharma and others vs. Smt. Ved Prabha and others), and (1991) 4 Supreme Court Cases 572 (Swadesh Ranjan Sinha vs. Haradeb Banerjee). Mr. Roychowdhury also refers a case law reported in 50 CW N 465 (Chhabba Lal vs. Kallu Lal) to submit if a party signs a document but did not state in what capacity then it has to be presumed that he signed it in all available capacities. The admitted facts of the case may be summarized as follows:- (1) Premises No.10 Sarbakhan Road P. S. Chitpur was the property of Pannalal Mitra and his daughter Mahamaya Bose. (2) They executed a deed of trust dated 30.12.1968 dealing with said property. (3) As per said trust deed the property was divided into three lots and lot ‘A’ (subsequently renumbered as 10 A) was settled to Prasanta Kumar Bose (one of the sons of Mahamaya Bose); lot ‘B’ (later renumbered as 10 ‘C’) was allotted to Gouri Nag (married daughter of Mahamaya Bose) and lot ‘C’ was allotted to Mahamaya Bose (later renumbered as 10 ‘B’). As per trust deed all of them received said properties for life interest and thereafter their shares would devolve upon their heirs on their death. (4) Pannalal Mitra, Mahamaya Bose and her husband Kamal Bose were originally trustees. (5) The trust deed was later on revoked by deed dated 08.09.1990 and the persons being allottees of the respective portions in terms ofthe original trust deed became absolute owners of said portions. (4) Pannalal Mitra, Mahamaya Bose and her husband Kamal Bose were originally trustees. (5) The trust deed was later on revoked by deed dated 08.09.1990 and the persons being allottees of the respective portions in terms ofthe original trust deed became absolute owners of said portions. (6) Said deed of revocation was executed by Mahamaya Bose and Kamal Bose as by this time Pannalal Mitra had died. (7) Gouri Nag purchased the allotted portion of her mother Mahamaya Bose i.e., lot ‘C’ through a kobala dated 5th of July, 1986. (8) Gouri Nag as plaintiffs filed a suit for eviction alleging that the defendant No.1 Amar Nath Bose being her unemployed brother was permitted to start a business in a portion of lot ‘B’ which was described in schedule ‘A’ of the plaint and also in a portion of lot‘C’ property which was described in schedule ‘B’ of the plaint as a licensee under the plaintiff without any licence fee. (9) It was further alleged in the plaint that after getting employment of defendant No.1, his wife started to run said business and that the plaintiff revoked the licence by sending a notice of revocation dated 21st of November, 1990 but in spite of said revocation defendants did not vacate the suit premises. (10) The defendants specifically alleged that they were inducted in ‘A’ schedule property by one of the trustees Kamal Bose at a rental ofRs.60/- per month and that they were never licensees under the plaintiff. (11) It was further defence case that the deed of revocation dated 08.09.1990 was illegal and inoperative as no power of revocation was kept in the original deed of trust dated 30.12.1968. (12) The alternative case of the defendants is that if the trust deed was legally revoked through said deed of revocation dated 08.09.1990 then the property returned to the settlers and the defendant No.1 Amar Nath Bose being one of the children of Mahamaya Bose inherited 1/4th share in the entire property. (13) The defendant No.1 Amar Nath Bose filed a partition suit being Title Suit No.150 of 1995 praying for partition after declaring his 1/4th share in the suit property on the strength of said deed of revocation dated 08.09.1990. (14) Said partition suit was dismissed after contested hearing and the defendant No.1 filed an appeal which is still pending in this High Court. (14) Said partition suit was dismissed after contested hearing and the defendant No.1 filed an appeal which is still pending in this High Court. Whether a person is a tenant or not relating to a property is a question of fact. The defendant appellants though took the specific plea of having tenancy in the suit premises under Kamal Kumar Bose, one of the original trustees but failed to establish the same by any cogent evidence. Though he claimed his alleged tenancy in the suit property since 1981 but was able to produce only one copy of the rent receipts which was also not proved according to law. Learned trial court also observed that the alleged signature of Kamal Kumar Bose appearing on said document did not also tally with the admitted signature of Kamal Kumar Bose appearing on other documents. Both the courts rather came to a concurrent findings of fact that the defendant appellants miserably failed to establish his alleged tenancy right in the suit property. Said concurrent findings of fact were based on evidence and cannot be said to be perverse. Both the courts below also came to concurrent findings of fact that in terms of the trust deed dated 30th December, 1968 the allottees came into possession of their respective allotted portions of the premises No.10 Sarba Khan Road, P.S. Chitpur and that those three separate lots were subsequently renumbered as 10 ‘A’ (lot ‘A’ settled to Prasanta Kumar Bose), 10 ‘C’ (lot ‘B’ settled to Gouri Nag) and 10 ‘B’ (lot ‘C’ settled to Mahamaya Bose) Sarba Khan Road . Both the courts below also came to concurrent findings of fact on the basis of evidence on record that the allottees thereafter exercised their respective rights of ownership over their allotted portions. It also came out that Mahamaya Bose sold out her allotted portion (lot ‘C’) to her daughter Gouri Nag through a Kobala dated 5th July, 1986 and that on the strength of said Kobala Gouri Nag mutated her name with the Kolkata Municipal Corporation relating to said lot ‘C’ property (10 B Sarba Khan Road) and paid taxes. Admittedly, a deed of revocation dated 8th September, 1990 was executed by original living trustees namely Mahamaya Bose and Kamal Kumar Bose by making the persons being allottees of the respective portions in terms of the original deed as absolute owners of said respective portions. Admittedly, a deed of revocation dated 8th September, 1990 was executed by original living trustees namely Mahamaya Bose and Kamal Kumar Bose by making the persons being allottees of the respective portions in terms of the original deed as absolute owners of said respective portions. Much was argued about the validity as well as true nature of said deed of revocation dated 8th September, 1990. Though defendant appellants in one hand branded said revocation deed dated 8 th September, 1990 as illegal and inoperative as there was no power of revocation in the original trust deed dated 30th September, 1968 but on the other hand, claimed his 1/4th share in the entire property on terms of said deed of revocation. It is also worthy to note even at the expense of repetition that defendant No.1 appellant Amar Nath Bose filed a partition suit being Title Suit No.150 of 1995 claiming his 1/4th share in the suit property on the strength of said deed of revocation dated 8th September, 1990 but the same was dismissed on contest. Admittedly, a deed should not be branded just by its nomenclature. One must examine that true nature and purports of the deed form its contents to determine its true nature. I find much substance in the submission of Mr. Roychowdhury that though the nomenclature of the deed dated 8th September, 1990 was revocation but the same in effect was a deed enlarging the rights given to the beneficiaries by the earlier deed of settlement dated 30th December, 1968. Admittedly, the living trustees and immediate beneficiaries (having life estate through the 1968 deed) were signatories to the 1990 deed and the residuary reversionary beneficiaries, i.e., the children of the immediate beneficiaries, have never objected to said 1990 deed. Admittedly, no suit was filed by anybody including the children of the immediate beneficiaries challenging said deed dated 8th September, 1990. Again if said deed dated 8th September, 1990 is treated as a deed enlarging the rights given to the beneficiaries through the original deed dated 30th December, 1968 then said subsequent deed of 1990 will not be hit by the irrevocability of the 1968 deed. Again if said deed dated 8th September, 1990 is treated as a deed enlarging the rights given to the beneficiaries through the original deed dated 30th December, 1968 then said subsequent deed of 1990 will not be hit by the irrevocability of the 1968 deed. If said deed of 1990 is accepted as a deed of enlarging the rights given to the beneficiaries then it is clear that the plaintiff respondent became absolute owner not only of the lot ‘B’ property (premises No.10 ‘C’ Sarba Khan Road) in view of the original allotment but also of lot ‘C’ (premises No.10 B Sarba Khan Road) in view of the purchase of the same from her mother Mahamaya Bose, the original allottee of lot ‘C’, through a kobala dated 5th July, 1986. I have already stated that it came out from the evidence on record, both oral and documentary, that plaintiff respondent Gouri Nag was exercising her absolute right as an owner in respect of both 10 ‘B’ and 10 ‘C’ Sarba Khan Road premises by mutating her name and by paying taxes. Under these circumstances, even if it is admitted for argument’s sake that plaintiff respondent Gouri Nag failed to establish creation of licence in favour of defendant appellants in respect of suit premises but she having a better title than the defendant appellants in the suit premises is entitled to get a decree of eviction when the defendant appellants have miserably failed to establish the specific case of tenancy in the suit premises. In view of the factual position as stated above I am of opinion that the case laws referred by learned counsel for the appellants have not much bearing in this case and accordingly I will refrain from discussing those case laws. Again as this is a suit for eviction of a licensee and not a suit for declaration of title so there is no question of stay of hearing of the second appeal till disposal of the first appeal arising out of the decree of dismissal of the partition suit (Title Suit No.158 of 1995) filed by the present defendant No.1 appellant. As a result, the appeal is hereby dismissed on contest. However, I pass no order as to costs. Send down lower court record along with a copy of this judgment to the lower court at the earliest. As a result, the appeal is hereby dismissed on contest. However, I pass no order as to costs. Send down lower court record along with a copy of this judgment to the lower court at the earliest. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment be supplied to the learned counsels of the parties, if applied for.