Judgment : This appeal is arising out of the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.47 of 2003 dated 27.12.2004 in allowing the same after setting aside the Judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.270 of 2001 dated 19.09.2003. 2. For the better appreciation of this appeal, the brief averments of the plaint as well as the written statement are reproduced hereunder: 3. The brief averments of the plaint are as follows: The defendant's society is the society registered under the Pondicherry Co-operative Societies Act. The plaintiff joined service in the first defendant society as a Junior clerk Grade-II and subsequently promoted as Deputy Manager in the year 1998. The entire functioning of the Society was maintained by the Administrator appointed by the Registrar of Co-operative Society. Whileso, one Mr.Kamalakannan who was a sales man of fair price shops number 133 and 178 failed to remit the sale proceeds relating to the months of November and December 1997 and the same was brought to the notice of then Managing Director cum Administrator, who had allowed the said Kamalakkannan to go on voluntary retirement with effect from 30.11.1997, based on the recommendation of the plaintiff. During the alleged period the plaintiff was Superintendent of the first defendant society and was having the day to day control and inspection of all the 39 shops. Though the plaintiff had found a cash deficit of Rs.20,329.30/- in respect of the fair price shop number 133 and 178 which was under the salesmanship of Mr.Kamalakannan, the plaintiff has only given oral report followed by a written report to the Managing Director. Further no effects were taken to examine the witnesses to find out the truth. Further, it is alleged that it is because of the recommendation of the plaintiff, the said Kamalakkannan was relieved under the voluntary retirement scheme which was in existance at the relevant time for a period of 180 days. While that being so, the first defendant passed an order of suspension of the plaintiff with effect from 21.06.1999 and a charge sheet was issued on 17.07.1999 for which the plaintiff has submitted his explanation on 23.07.1999. Inrespect of said charge sheet, enquiry has been held and accordingly the plaintiff was directed to the cadre of Superintendent by an order dated 20.12.1999. Inrespect of said charge sheet, enquiry has been held and accordingly the plaintiff was directed to the cadre of Superintendent by an order dated 20.12.1999. The plaintiff also filed the suit in O.S.No.10 of 1997 as against the order dated 20.12.1999 seeking for a declaration of the impugned order as null and void. In the said suit the defendant raised the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the suit stating that the civil Court has no jurisdiction and that the plaintiff has to seek remedy only before the industrial dispute. However, the Judgment was passed confirming the jurisdiction of the civil Court, against which no appeal has been preferred by the first defendant. Consequent thereto, the plaintiff was issued with second charge relating to the sale of iron pipes of the first defendant's society to one Govindaraj, who was alleged to be the Benomy of the plaintiff. Though the plaintiff had joined duty subsequent to the decree passed in O.S.No.10 of 2007, the defendant had suspended the plaintiff on 16.08.2007. Despite the submission of the explanation on 28.01.2001, the defendant had proposed to terminate the plaintiff from service. Further, the defendant had passed an order on 02.04.2001, depromoting the plaintiff to the junior most Superintendent. Hence the plaintiff for declaration to declare the impugned order as null and void and for other consequential reliefs. 4. The brief averments of the written statement filed by the first defendant and adopted by the second and third defendants are as follows: The defendant denied the allegations stating that the plaintiff only with the malafide intention is attributing the false and imaginary colour to the exercise of the power made by the Registrar of Co-operative society. The plaintiff has not exhausted the remedies available in the regulations and the suit itself is not maintainable. Though the plaintiff had discovered the absence of remittance of the sale price pertaining to the months of November and December of 1997 in respect of shop number 133 and 178 by one Kamalakannan the Salesman of the said Fair price shop, the plaintiff has not taken any action and instead the plaintiff had recommended the Managing Director to relieve the said Kamalakannan under the voluntary retirement scheme. The plaintiff himself had admitted in his evidence before the enquiry officer that he has recommended to relieve the said Kamalakannan only with the good intention to send out a troublesome person. The plaintiff himself had admitted in his evidence before the enquiry officer that he has recommended to relieve the said Kamalakannan only with the good intention to send out a troublesome person. The said action is dereliction of the duty and hence he was charge sheeted and after due enquiry he was found guilty. The allegation that out of malice the plaintiff was sacked is false. Further, in respect of the 2nd charge relating to the sale of iron pipe it is only at the instance of the plaintiff, the iron pipe was purchased in the name of Govindarajan for a low rate without following the rules and regulations of the society. The evidence collected during the enquiry relating to the said charge proved that the iron pipes were purchased only for the use of the plaintiff. The allegation that the enquiry officer has not given sufficient opportunity to the plaintiff is incorrect. Only after considering the objections and explanation submitted by the plaintiff, the impugned order of reversion of the plaintiff dated 02.04.1991 to the post of Superintendent has been passed. Hence, the defendant prays to dismiss the suit with costs. 5. In admitting this appeal, the following substantial questions of law are framed by this Court. "1. Whether the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to try matter exclusively which comes under the jurisdiction of Registrar of Cooperative Societies? 2. Whether the civil Court can interfere with respect of proportionality when the same is within the discretion of the appointing authority? 3. Whether the Court not exceeded its limitation placed on it by Om Kumar Vs. The Union of India 2001 (2) SCC 356 and its order to the contrary is manifestly erroneous? 4. Whether the lower appellate Court was correct in granting back wages when the same was not sought for by the plaintiff?" 6. 3. Whether the Court not exceeded its limitation placed on it by Om Kumar Vs. The Union of India 2001 (2) SCC 356 and its order to the contrary is manifestly erroneous? 4. Whether the lower appellate Court was correct in granting back wages when the same was not sought for by the plaintiff?" 6. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent/plaintiff was working as a Deputy Manager and for the misconduct 2 separate distinct charges were framed i.e. Ex.A2 and Ex.A3 and after duly conducting the enquiry and based on the findings of the Enquiry officer, the order was passed dated 02.04.2001 which is marked as Ex.A27 in reverting him to the cadre of Superintendent as Junior post and the same was challenged before the Civil Court by filing O.S.No.270 of 2001 and the Court below after going into the merits of the case and after carefully considering the evidence on record dismissed the suit and as against which an appeal was filed and allowed. Eventhough, there is a finding that the first charge is proved and furthermore the Court exceeding its limitation and interfered with the amount of punishment awarded and also granted the relief of reinstatement with backwages and furthermore the Civil Court has no jurisdiction at all to entertain such suit as per the provisions contained under Section 144 of The Pondicherry Co-operative Societies Act 1972 which is analogous to the provisions of the Section 156 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. Furthermore for the said proposition that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in a case namely P.Eswaramoorthy and 15 others ... Petitioners Versus R.J.B. Leoraj and 10 others ... Respondents reported in 2008(6) CTC 770 In the reported Judgment, the Division Bench has held as hereunder: "24 “TAMIL” d) The decision in Somasundaram v. Liyakat Ali [ 1997 (1) CTC 4 : 1998 (2) LLJ 719 may not be a good law. The employees therein filed a Civil Suit regarding promotion issue. As remedy for the aggrieved parties in that case are available either under Section 153 or by an industrial dispute under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, they could not have gone before the Civil Court. The employees therein filed a Civil Suit regarding promotion issue. As remedy for the aggrieved parties in that case are available either under Section 153 or by an industrial dispute under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, they could not have gone before the Civil Court. Therefore, the bar under Section 156 of the Co-operative Societies Act as well as the implied ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court by the provisions of the I.D. Act will directly apply and the suit is barred." 7. Furthermore, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the very face of the order under challenge which is marked as Ex.A27 shows that sufficient opportunities have been given and thereby natural justice have been followed in the case of the respondent which is reflected under references of the order passed. After taking lineant view and after considering the lenghty services, family condition and on humanitarian grounds an order of reversion was passed and no serious lapses have been taken place and hence the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such claim. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that this is not the first case wherein the respondent has approached the Civil Court for the illegal order passed by the appellant/defendant and in earlier occasion also the respondent has filed O.S.No.10/2000 and wherein the preliminary issue was also raised about the Civil Court jurisdiction and the same was also decided in favour of the respondent/plaintiff and rightly a decree was passed and after upholding the decree and Judgment passed, revocation of the order of management was passed which is marked as Ex.A21 and after reinstating the respondent/plaintiff into services, again such illegal order was passed on the flimsy charges framed and the same has not been proved through valid enquiry and after considering all aspect of the matter, the First Appellate Court after setting aside the Judgment and decree of the trial Court granted decree rightly reinstating the respondent/plaintiff into services and hence the appellant/defendant is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 9. 9. It is not disputed that in the earlier proceeding there was a disciplinary action taken against the respondent/plaintiff herein, and O.S.No.10/2000 was filed and after accepting the Judgment and decree the respondent/plaintiff was reinstated into service vide order of the appellant which is marked as Ex.A21 and the contention of the respondent/plaintiff shall not sustainable in the light of the substantial questions of law raised in this appeal with the special reference to the fact that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction according to the case put forward on different cause of action.Hence the question of Estoppel shall not arise and each circumstances of the case shall be looked into by the Court and decide the question of law on merits. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant with regard to the charge framed there is a clear cut finding by the First Appellate Court that the 1st charge is proved and with regard to the 2nd charge, there is a finding that it is not proved through valid substantial evidences. As regarding the first charge proved, absolutely there is no regular appeal or cross appeal on the side of the respondent and as it infers that there is no lapses on the part of the appellant/defendant in conducting the enquiry in a fair manner and after following the principles of Natural justice. If there is any lapses on the part of the Management and there is a infringment of right of the individual,that can be questioned before the Civil Court. With regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Civil Court has every jurisdiction to question the Management and cited a Judgments of this Court in cases namely 1. Madurai District Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society Limited A.No.1437 by its Special officer ... Appellant Versus S.Sankara Narayanan and others ... Respondents reported in 1982 1 MLJ 140 2. The Musiri Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd., by the Special Officer ... Appellant Versus Ranganathan and others ... Respondents reported in 1985 1 MLJ 67 3. The Central Co-operative Bank Limited Kumbakonam, represented by (Board of Management) Special Officer Kumbakonam ... Appellant Versus M.Parthasarathy ... Respondent reported in 1988 1 MLJ 210 10. The Musiri Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd., by the Special Officer ... Appellant Versus Ranganathan and others ... Respondents reported in 1985 1 MLJ 67 3. The Central Co-operative Bank Limited Kumbakonam, represented by (Board of Management) Special Officer Kumbakonam ... Appellant Versus M.Parthasarathy ... Respondent reported in 1988 1 MLJ 210 10. Though, in the above Judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent a decision was rendered by holding that the Civil Court has jurisdiction, the Judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is arising out of the Writ Petitions and the Division Bench has held after referring to the Judgments rendered by this Court by holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction at the time of the relief sought for and the above decision cited by the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant is squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the case and with due respect after following the same, that too after rejecting the three Judgments cited by the respondent/plaintiff this Court holds that civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant/respondent submitted that the Court can interefere with punishment awarded unless the punishment awarded is 'shockingly' disproportionate to the misconduct proved. However, in a rarest of the case the Court could award alternate penalty and cited a Judgment of the Supreme Court in a case namely Om Kumar & Others ... Appellants Versus Union of India ... Respondent reported in 2000 SC 3689 12. In the reported Judgment the Apex court has held as hereunder: “TAMIL” "69. The principles explained in the last preceding paragraph in respect of Article 14 are now to be applied here where the question of 'arbitrariness' of the order of punishment is questioned under Article 14 70. In this context, we shall only refer to these cases. In Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India this Court referred to 'proportionality' in the quantum of punishment but the Court observed that the punishment was 'shockingly' disproportionate to the misconduct proved. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1996) 1 LLJ1231 SC) , this Court stated that the Court will not interfere unless the punishment awards was one which shocked the conscience of the Court. Even then, the court would remit the matter back to the authority and would not normally substitute one punishment for the other. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1996) 1 LLJ1231 SC) , this Court stated that the Court will not interfere unless the punishment awards was one which shocked the conscience of the Court. Even then, the court would remit the matter back to the authority and would not normally substitute one punishment for the other. However, in rare situations, the Court could award an alternative penalty. It was also so stated in Ganayutham. “TAMIL” 71. Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment is disciplinary cases is questioned as 'arbitrary' under Article 14, the Court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The Court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing Court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The Court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the Courts, and such extreme or rare cases can the Court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment. On Facts:" 13. As already pointed out as well as referred to, the appellant/defendant after considering the lengthy of services as well as family circumstances, awarded the punishment under Ex.27 and hence punishment at any cast shall not be construed as shockingly disproportionate and hence the modification of punishment awarded by the First Appellate Court in reinstating the respondent with backwages is not in accordance with law. 14. With due respect after considering the above cited Judgment of the Apex Court in a case reported in 2000 SC 3689, this Court holds that the interference of the First Appellate Court with the punishment awarded is not in accordance with law and the same is liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside. In the result, the appeal is allowed after setting aside the Judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court made in A.S.No.47/2003 dated 27.12.2004 and confirming the Judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.270/2001 dated 19.09.2003 in dismissing the suit. Consequently, connected C.M.P. is also closed.