JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri S.C. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri V.D. Yadav, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, learned Standing Counsel and learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha. 2. Through this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 3.10.2012 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (in short, ‘DDC’), by which the revision filed by Sumiran against the Gaon Sabha has been allowed. 3. Sri Tripathi contends that impugned order has been passed by the learned DDC without notice to the petitioners as the petitioners were not impleaded as party in the aforesaid revision, whereas they have been materially affected by the order of the DDC. He has also brought on record the memo of the revision from the perusal of which, it transpires that only Gaon Sabha was impleaded as respondent. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the parties agree that the writ petition may be disposed of on its own merit on the legal premises. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition is taken up for final disposal. 6. It is not in dispute that the revision was filed by respondent No. 2 against the order dated 3.11.2010 passed in appeal No. 517 (Sumiran v. State and others) passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. The revision has been allowed taking note of the facts that by virtue of allowing the revision, chak holder Nos. 534, 248, 212 and 292 would be affected. Petitioners are the chak holders of 292 and 212. From the perusal of the memo of revision, Annexure 2 to the writ petition, it is clear that in the revision, only Gaon Sabha was impleaded as a party and not the petitioners. On being confronted as to whether respondent No. 2 was made party in the revision or not, learned counsel contends that from the perusal of the memo of revision, which has been brought on record, it is clear that any of the chak holders, whose chaks have been affected by the impugned order, has not been impleaded as a party, meaning thereby, the order impugned is defective for non-joinder of necessary parties and also suffers from breach of principles of natural justice. 7. 7. The Apex Court in the case of D.K.Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., 1993 SCC 259 , has observed as under: “The cardinal point that has to be borne in mind, in every case, is whether the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and the authority should act fairly, justly, reasonably and impartially. It is not so much to act judicially but is to act fairly, namely, the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. In other words application of the principles of natural justice that no man should be condemned unheard intends to prevent the authority from acting arbitrarily effecting the rights of the concerned person. It is fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will affect the right of any person without first being informed of the case and giving him/her an opportunity of putting forward his/her case. An order involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 : (1978) 2 SCR 272 ; the Constitution Bench held that ‘Civil consequences’ covers infraction of not merely property or personal right but of civil liberties, material deprivation and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation every thing that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. In State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284 : AIR 1952 SC 75 : 1952 Cri LJ 510; per majority, a seven judge Bench held that the rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the purview of Article 14 of the Constitution as any rule of substantive law. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : (1978) 2 SCR 621 another Bench of seven judges held that the substantive and procedural laws and action taken under them will have to pass the test under article 14. The test of reasons and justice cannot be abstract. They cannot be divorced from the needs of the nation. The tests have to be pragmatic otherwise they would cease to be reasonable. The test of reasons and justice cannot be abstract. They cannot be divorced from the needs of the nation. The tests have to be pragmatic otherwise they would cease to be reasonable. The procedure prescribed must be just, fair and reasonable even though there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the right of that individual. The duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action. Even executive authorities which take administrative action involving any deprivation of or restriction on inherent fundamental rights of citizens, must take care to see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done. They have a duty to proceed in a way which is free from even the appearance of arbitrariness, unreasonableness or unfairness. They have to act in a manner which is patently impartial and meets the requirement of natural justice. The law must therefore be now taken to be well-settled that procedure prescribed for depriving a person of livelihood must meet the challenge of Article 14 and such law would be liable to be tested on the anvil of Article 14 and the procedure prescribed by a statute or statutory rule or rules or orders affecting the civil right or result in civil consequences would have to answer the requirement of Article 14. So it must be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. There can be no distinction between quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for the purpose of principles of natural justice. The aim of both administrative inquiry as well as the quasi judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule or natural justice is calculated to secure justice or to put in negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable only to quasi-judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. It must logically apply to both. Therefore, fair play in action requires that the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable. The manner of exercise of the power and its impact on the rights of the person affected would be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. It must logically apply to both. Therefore, fair play in action requires that the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable. The manner of exercise of the power and its impact on the rights of the person affected would be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Article 21 clubs life with liberty, dignity of person with means of livelihood without which the glorious content of dignity of person would be reduced to animal existence. When it is interpreted that the colour and content of procedure established by law must be in conformity with the minimum fairness and processual justice, it would relieve legislative callousness despising opportunity of being heard and fair opportunities of defence. Article 14 has a pervasive processual potency and versatile quality, equalitarian in its soul and allergic to discriminatory dictates. Equality is the antithesis of arbitrariness. It is thereby, conclusively held by this Court that the principles of natural justice are part of Article 14 and the procedure prescribed by law must be just, fair and reasonable.” 8. Otherwise also, the DDC was exercising power vested in him under sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Act, which reads as under: “48(1). The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than an interlocutory order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings, may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, made such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit.” 9. From the perusal of language used in the aforesaid section, it is clear that the DDC in entertaining the revision against any order other than the interlocutory order shall pass final order only after due notice and hearing to the other side. Here it is apparent that no hearing has been afforded to the petitioners while passing the impugned order, therefore, this order has been passed in gross violation of sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Act. 10. It is settled that when a Statute requires to do certain thing in a particular manner, then that thing must be done in that very manner and other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. 10. It is settled that when a Statute requires to do certain thing in a particular manner, then that thing must be done in that very manner and other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. The aforesaid legal proposition is based on a legal maxim “ Expressio unius est exclusio alterius”, meaning thereby that ‘if a Statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that very manner and other manner and procedure is ordinarily not permissible’. (Vide Taylor v. Taylor, (1876) 1 Ch.D. 426; Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253; Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1527 ; Haresh Dayaram Thakur v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2000) 6 SCC 179 ; Dhanajaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka etc. etc., (2001) 4 SCC 9 ; Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and others, (2002) 1 SCC 633 ). 11. It is also well-settled that where a Statute provides the consequence for non-performance of such act as provided for, then those provisions are mandatory and not directory. While determining as to whether a provision is mandatory or directory, apart from the consequence, the language used in the statute has also to be seen. Further, in addition to the language used therein, the Court has to examine the context in which the provision is made and the purpose behind it to achieve. It may also be necessary to find out the intention of the legislature for enacting it and the serious and general inconveniences or injustice to persons relating thereto from its application. Here, in this case, the intention of the Legislature is to pass final order only after due notice and hearing to the affected parties. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Act, so far it relates to notice and hearing is concerned, it is mandatory in character and its violation would result in void orders. 12. In view of the foregoing discussions, the orders impugned cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 13. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. 14. The impugned order dated 3.10.2012 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby quashed. 12. In view of the foregoing discussions, the orders impugned cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 13. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. 14. The impugned order dated 3.10.2012 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back before the DDC to decide the revision on merit after hearing all concerned in accordance with law expeditiously, but not later than six months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order of this Court. ——————