JUDGMENT : PER : MR. J.B. PARDIWALA, J.: 1. This Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is at the instance of the original defendants, arising from a decree passed by the Civil Court on the strength of a settlement arrived at between the parties outside the Court and is directed against the order passed by the 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Anand, below Exh.105 in Special Civil Suit No.144 of 2009, by which the Civil Court rejected the application Exh.105 filed by the defendants to declare the settlement arrived at by the parties as a nullity alleged to have been obtained by fraud and coercion. 2. The Civil Court, while rejecting the application Exh.105 filed by the original defendants, partly held the settlement deed Exh.35 dated 11th January 2011 as legal & valid and directed the defendants to execute the necessary sale deeds in favour of the plaintiff or in favour of the party which the plaintiff would suggest and the entire cost of such sale deeds was directed to be borne by the plaintiff. The Civil Court also clarified that the plaintiff had not to pay any sale consideration. 3. For the sake of convenience, the appellants shall be referred to as the original defendants and the respondent shall be referred to as the original plaintiff. 4. The facts giving rise to this Appeal may be summarised as under : The plaintiff claims to be the lawful owner of properties bearing Revenue Survey Nos.1107/1-2, 1110/1-2-3-4, 1104/1, 1105/2, 1105/1, 1109 and 1143/1 situated at village Karamsad, Taluka and District Anand. 5. The plaintiff instituted a Special Civil Suit No.144 of 2009 in the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Anand for a declaration and injunction to the effect that the properties described in paragraph 1 of the plaint was of the ownership, occupation and possession of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had not executed any Power of Attorney in favour of the defendants to sell the suit properties. 6. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant no.1 (since deceased), on the basis of the so-called bogus Power of Attorney, executed registered sale deeds in favour of his wife i.e. the defendant no.2, and his brother-in-law i.e. the defendant no.3 fraudulently. 7. 6. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant no.1 (since deceased), on the basis of the so-called bogus Power of Attorney, executed registered sale deeds in favour of his wife i.e. the defendant no.2, and his brother-in-law i.e. the defendant no.3 fraudulently. 7. The plaintiff prayed in the suit filed by him that the transaction at the instance of the original defendant no.1 with respect to the suit properties mentioned in paragraph 4 of the plaint be declared as void and also prayed for a declaration that the ownership, occupation and possession of the suit properties continued to be that of the plaintiff. 8. The record reveals that by amendment of the plaint, certain other properties were also added in paragraph 5(B) being Revenue Survey Nos.578/1, 655/2, 265 and 260/4 situated at village Karamsad. 9. On Revenue Survey No.578/1, a complex in the name of ‘Vallabh Plaza’ was constructed. On Revenue Survey No.578/1 and 655/2, a complex in the name of ‘Radha Park’ has been constructed, and on Revenue Survey No.265 and 260/4, construction in the name of ‘Vallabh Park’ has been made. According to the plaintiff, the construction was made by the defendant no.1 and his transferee-assignee. 10. It appears that during the pendency of the suit, on 9th January 2011 the parties entered into a settlement outside the Court. Initially, the settlement was reduced into writing in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding dated 9th January 2011 duly signed by the parties and attested by a notary. At a later stage, with some modification, the terms of the settlement were reduced into writing on a stamp paper duly signed by the parties, the advocates for the parties and was notarized. 11. On the same day i.e. on 11th January 2011, the parties to the suit filed a joint written consent purshis before the Civil Court being Exh.35. The parties requested the Civil Court to accept the consent terms and pass a decree accordingly in terms of the settlement. 12. The consent terms broadly were on the following four aspects : (1) That the earlier Memorandum of Understanding dated 9th January 2011 entered into between the parties outside the Court had become redundant and the final terms were arrived at by the consent purshis dated 11th January 2011. 12. The consent terms broadly were on the following four aspects : (1) That the earlier Memorandum of Understanding dated 9th January 2011 entered into between the parties outside the Court had become redundant and the final terms were arrived at by the consent purshis dated 11th January 2011. (2) So far as the properties bearing Revenue Survey Nos.1107/1-2, 1110/1-2-3-4, 1104/1, 1105/2, 1105/1, 1109 and 1143/1 situated at village Karamsad, Taluka and District Anand were concerned, it was decided that all the sale deeds which were executed by the defendant no.1 in favour of the defendant nos.2 and 3 were to be treated as cancelled and the parties agreed that the said properties would remain in occupation and possession of the plaintiff as its true owner. So far as the properties bearing Revenue Survey Nos.578/1, 655/2, 265 and 260/4 situated at village Karamsad were concerned, it was decided that the plaintiff shall have no right, title or interest over the said properties and all the transfers made by the defendant no.1 and the construction put up on the said Survey Numbers were to be accepted by the plaintiff and the plaintiff would have no right, title or interest over the said properties. (3) The parties also agreed, in view of the consent terms that all the legal proceedings initiated against each other including RTS proceedings shall have to be disposed of in light of the settlement & the consent terms and the parties would filed necessary affidavits or statements before the appropriate authority in that regard. (4) Lastly, the Criminal Cases which were filed by the original plaintiff were to be withdrawn by the plaintiff by making appropriate statements before the concerned Court in accordance with law. 13. The learned Civil Judge took up the matter for consideration of the settlement between the parties on 11th January 2011, and after being satisfied with the genuineness and the legality of the settlement, passed an order under the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stating as under : “Parties and their learned advocates are present. The contents of the purshis containing the terms of settlement have been read over before the parties. The parties affirm that the compromise is being done without any undue influence and pressure. Hence, this compromise is recorded subject to final order below Exh.1.” 14. The contents of the purshis containing the terms of settlement have been read over before the parties. The parties affirm that the compromise is being done without any undue influence and pressure. Hence, this compromise is recorded subject to final order below Exh.1.” 14. It appears that after the consent terms were recorded and accepted by the learned Civil Judge, the parties started acting on the said consent terms. 15. The record reveals that in an anticipatory bail application filed by the appellants herein being Criminal Misc. Application No.534 of 2010, the plaintiff as the original complainant submitted before the Additional Sessions Judge at Anand by an application in writing that the dispute had been resolved outside the Court and he had no objection if the anticipatory bail was granted to the original defendants i.e. the appellants herein. 16. In view of such statement being made by the plaintiff before the Additional Sessions Judge, the Court, on inquiry, was satisfied about the settlement and allowed the application, granting anticipatory bail to the defendants. 17. So far as the criminal case which was already instituted in the Court was concerned, it was decided according to the consent terms that the plaintiff would make the necessary statements before the Court about the settlement so that the Court would be in a position to put an end to the prosecution and the plaintiff also informed the concerned police station about the compromise between the parties. 18. It is only thereafter, on 9th February 2011 i.e. almost after a period of 28 days from the recording of the consent terms by the learned Sessions Judge, Anand, that the defendants submitted an application before the Civil Court vide Exh.36, stating that the plaintiff had not acted in terms of the settlement and had failed to withdraw the criminal complaint as decided and, therefore, the Court should not pass any order in furtherance of the order passed below the consent terms. It appears on reading of the consent terms that there is no mention about the withdrawal of the criminal complaint because it all depends on the nature of the offences. Some offences are not compoundable even with the permission of the Court. It appears on reading of the consent terms that there is no mention about the withdrawal of the criminal complaint because it all depends on the nature of the offences. Some offences are not compoundable even with the permission of the Court. However, the fact remains that having obtained the anticipatory bail as well as the regular bail on the strength of the settlement arrived at between the parties, the defendants decided to resile themselves from the statement. 19. The record further reveals that on 18th June 2011 the defendants filed an application being Exh.38 before the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Anand, praying that the compromise between the parties should be cancelled as the same was entered into by the defendants because of undue influence, pressure and coercion on the part of the plaintiff. The defendants also took a stance before the Civil Court that at the time of recording of the settlement, the Court had not satisfied itself whether the compromise was lawful or not. In such circumstances, the defendants prayed that the suit should be tried on merits as the compromise arrived at was unlawful having been entered into by practicing fraud. The application Exh.38 filed by the defendants was adjudicated by the learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Anand, and by a reasoned order rejected the application Exh.38 filed by the defendants. The Court passed the following order : “The Application Exh.38 filed by the defendants is hereby rejected. In connection with the compromise purshis Exh.35 filed by both the parties, the Court shall pass order below Exh.1 for passing a decree as and when both the parties act according to the compromise purshis.” 20. On 17th July 2012, the defendants filed another application being Exh.105, praying for cancellation of compromise purshis being Exh.35 on the ground that the same was unlawful and requested the Court to proceed with the hearing of the suit on merits. 21. The said application Exh.105 was rejected by the learned Civil Judge vide order dated 1st September 2012. Being dissatisfied with the order dated 1st September 2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge below Exh.105, the defendants have come up with the present Appeal. 22. I. Submissions on behalf of the Defendants : Mr. 21. The said application Exh.105 was rejected by the learned Civil Judge vide order dated 1st September 2012. Being dissatisfied with the order dated 1st September 2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge below Exh.105, the defendants have come up with the present Appeal. 22. I. Submissions on behalf of the Defendants : Mr. N.K. Majmudar, the learned counsel appearing for the defendants, vehemently submitted that the order dated 11th January 2011 passed by the Court below taking the settlement on record was subject to the final order to be passed below Exh.1. 23. According to Mr. Majmudar, his clients thereafter preferred an application being Exh.38 requesting the Court to proceed with the suit on merits as his clients were forced to enter into a settlement by practicing fraud. 24. According to Mr. Majmudar, the application being Exh.38 was rejected by the Court below vide order dated 10th January 2012. However, while rejecting the said application being Exh.38, it was observed that the order below Exh.1 would be passed after verification of the settlement deed entered into between the parties. 25. Mr. Majmudar submits that the Court below, without properly appreciating the aforesaid aspect, proceeded to pass order below Exh.105, rejecting the application preferred by his clients by holding the settlement deed dated 11th January 2011 as partly allowed. In such circumstances, according to Mr. Majmudar, the impugned order dated 1st September 2012 deserves to be quashed and set-aside. 26. Mr. Majmudar submits that his clients were not agreeable for settlement, and after the compromise deed containing the terms of settlement was placed on record, his clients had shown their disagreement as the plaintiff had failed to fulfill the terms and conditions of the settlement, and without verifying the genuineness of the settlement deed, the Court below proceeded to pass the impugned order. 27. Mr. Majmudar submits that the Court below committed a substantial error of law in interpreting the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 28. Mr. Majmudar, in such circumstances, submits that the impugned order deserves to be set-aside and the Appeal be allowed, directing the Court below to proceed with the hearing of the suit being Special Civil Suit No.144 of 2009 filed by the original plaintiff, on merits. 29. Mr. 28. Mr. Majmudar, in such circumstances, submits that the impugned order deserves to be set-aside and the Appeal be allowed, directing the Court below to proceed with the hearing of the suit being Special Civil Suit No.144 of 2009 filed by the original plaintiff, on merits. 29. Mr. Majmudar, in support of his submissions, has relied on the following case-law : (1) Rajendra Prasad Gupta v/s. Prakash Chandra Mishra and others, reported in (2011)2 SCC 705 ; (2) Banwari Lal v/s. Smt. Chando Devi (through L.R.) and another, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1139 ; (3) Jawan (died) and others v/s. Mewa Singh (died) by L.Rs. and others, reported in AIR 2001 Punjab & Haryana 344; (4) Ponthinoda Sainabi and others v/s. Vatakkiloda Aboobackerkoya and others, reported in AIR 2001 Kerala 331; (5) S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by L.Rs. v/s. Jagannath (Dead) by L.Rs. and others, reported in (1994)1 GLH 81. II. Submissions on behalf of the Original Plaintiff : Mr. Kilol Shelat, the learned counsel appearing for the original plaintiff, submitted that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the learned Civil Judge in rejecting the application Exh.105 as well as Exh.38 filed by the original defendants, praying to cancel the compromise arrived at and recorded by the Court and proceed to hear the suit on merits. 30. Mr. Shelat raised a preliminary contention as regards the maintainability of this Appeal. According to Mr. Shelat, this Appeal is not maintainable in view of the bar under Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 31. Mr. Shelat submitted that the Court below rightly came to the conclusion that there was no coercion, threat or pressure on the part of the plaintiff against the defendants to settle the matter. 32. Mr. Shelat submitted that after the application being Exh.38 filed by the defendants was rejected, the defendants further improved their case by filing another application being Exh.105 and the said application was also rightly rejected by the Court below after taking into consideration the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to Mr. 32. Mr. Shelat submitted that after the application being Exh.38 filed by the defendants was rejected, the defendants further improved their case by filing another application being Exh.105 and the said application was also rightly rejected by the Court below after taking into consideration the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to Mr. Shelat, having taken the benefit under the consent terms and having acted upon the consent terms, the present Appeal preferred by the defendants is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 33. Mr. Shelat submitted that the trial Court, after taking into consideration all the relevant aspects of the matter, has recorded a finding of fact that there was no material produced by the defendants worth the name to substantiate the allegations of fraud and undue pressure. In such circumstances, Mr. Shelat prays that there being no merit in this Appeal, the same deserves to be dismissed with cost. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and having gone through the materials on record, two questions fall for our consideration in this Appeal. First, whether the present Appeal is maintainable taking into consideration the provisions of Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and secondly, whether the Court below committed any error in passing the order impugned. Before examining the issues on merits, we would like to look into the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals with withdrawal and adjustment of suits. Before examining the issues on merits, we would like to look into the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals with withdrawal and adjustment of suits. Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 reads as under : Compromise of suit.—Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit: Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation.—An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES : By the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, the following changes have been effected in Rule 3: (i) The words "in writing and signed by the parties" have been added after the words "lawful agreement or compromise" in sub-rule (1); (ii) The words "so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit" have been substituted for the words "so far as it relates to the suit"; (iii) A proviso has been inserted; (iv) Explanation has also been added. OBJECT OF AMENDMENT : 34. Rule 3 as originally enacted read thus: "3. OBJECT OF AMENDMENT : 34. Rule 3 as originally enacted read thus: "3. Compromise of suit.—Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement of compromise, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit." The Law Commission considered the provision. It stated: "(i) It is considered that an agreement or compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 should be in writing signed by the parties. A similar provision has been made by the Orissa Amendment to this rule, which appears to be worth adopting. It may be stated that oral agreements or compromises are difficult of proof, and are often set up to delay the progress of the suit." The Law Commission, therefore, suggested that after the words "lawful agreement or compromise", the words "in writing and signed by the parties" should be inserted. The suggestion has been accepted and the rule has been amended accordingly. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it was observed: "Clause 77—Sub-clause (iii).—It is provided that an agreement or compromise under Rule 3 should be in writing and signed by the parties. This is with a view to avoiding the setting up of oral agreements or compromises to delay the progress of the suit. (ii) The Commission also noted that the words 'lawful agreement or compromise' had created problems." It noted:– "The words 'lawful agreement or compromise’ in Order 23, Rule 3 have created some controversy as to whether they exclude agreements which are voidable under Section 19-A of the Contract Act. One view is, that such agreements are not excluded. That view is based on the reasoning that the expression 'lawful' excludes only two classes of agreements—those which are 'unlawful' and those which are 'void'." But a contrary view has been taken in some other cases. The Commission, therefore, stated:– "The matter requires to be clarified, and the wider view of these words, i.e. the latter view, should, it is considered, be incorporated. Necessary amendment is proposed." The recommendation was accepted and Explanation to Rule 3 had been inserted. The Commission, therefore, stated:– "The matter requires to be clarified, and the wider view of these words, i.e. the latter view, should, it is considered, be incorporated. Necessary amendment is proposed." The recommendation was accepted and Explanation to Rule 3 had been inserted. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it was stated:– "The words 'lawful agreement or compromise' in Rule 3 have given rise to a conflict in the matter of interpretation. One view is that agreements which are voidable under S.19-A of the Contract Act are not excluded. While this stand is taken by the High Courts of Allahabad, Calcutta, Madras and Kerala, a contrary view has been expressed by the High Courts of Bombay and Nagpur. An Explanation has, therefore, been added to the rule to clarify the position." (iii) Again, the words "so far as it states to the suit" in Rule 3 had created confusion and there was cleavage of opinion on interpretation thereof. The Law Commission considered the confusion and stated:– “There is an apparent conflict of decisions as to the interpretation of the words 'so far as it relates to the suit' used in Order 23, Rule 3. The question that arises in practice is, whether a decree which records the terms of a compromise in respect of matters beyond the scope of the suit is executable, or whether the terms of the decree relating to matters outside the suit can be enforced (as a contract) only by a separate suit. It is not, however, possible to resolve the conflict of decisions by verbal changes, since the application of the rule may vary according to the facts of each case. A general amendment is not thus possible, no change is considered necessary." 35. The Law Commission, however, again considered the question and stated:– "We have given some thought to the matter and come to the conclusion that— (i) the controversy should be put an end to, and (ii) the only way to put an end to it is to widen the provision, by requiring the court to pass a decree covering the whole compromise, so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject matter of the compromise is confined to the subject of the suit. This will avoid the unnecessary controversy that arises under the present wording, namely, how much of the compromise has attained the force of a decree, and how much is to be left to be enforced by separate agreements, and so on. No doubt, such a widening can, theoretically, raise questions of jurisdiction and court fees. In most cases, however, the wide power will not affect jurisdiction and court fee. In any case,the proposed simplification is needed, and should override any such objections." The Commission, hence, recommended:– "Accordingly, we recommend that in Order 23, Rule 3, for the words "so far as it relates to the suit", the words "so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit", should be substituted." The recommendation has been accepted and amendment has been made in Rule 3. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it was stated:– "In view of the words 'so far as it relates to the suit' in Rule 3, a question arises whether a decree which refers to the terms of a compromise in respect of matters beyond the scope of the suit is executable or whether the terms of the decree relating to the matters outside the suit can be enforced only by a separate suit. The amendment seeks to clarify the position." (iv) A proviso to Rule 3 has been inserted. It enacts that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the another that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, if the court which shall decide the question and it also provides that no adjournment should be granted for the purpose of deciding the question unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. The Law Commission (Law Commission’s Fifty-fourth Report, pp.205-207) observed that the expression "proved" had raised an interesting question as to how far is the court bound to hold an inquiry as to the factum of the compromise. The Law Commission (Law Commission’s Fifty-fourth Report, pp.205-207) observed that the expression "proved" had raised an interesting question as to how far is the court bound to hold an inquiry as to the factum of the compromise. Referring to a case decided by the High Court of Mysore (Shetty v.Sasani, AIR 1970 Mys 209) and quoting Punjab Amendment (For Punjab Amendment see, “High Court Amendments”, infra.), the Commission recommended to add Proviso to Rule 3 stating:– "Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the court shall decide the question, but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question whether there has been any adjustment or satisfaction, unless the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, thinks fit to grant such adjournment." (Law Commission’s Fifty-fourth Report, p.207) In Statement of Objects and Reasons, it was stated:– "A proviso has been added to clarify that no adjournment should ordinarily be granted where a decision is necessary as to whether an adjustment or satisfaction has or has not been arrived at.(Notes on Clauses, Gaz. of India, dt.8.4.1974, Extra., Pt.II, S.2, p.327). NATURE AND SCOPE : Rule 3 of Order 23 provides that (a) where the court is satisfied that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement in writing and signed by the parties; or (b) where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the court shall record such agreement, compromise or satisfaction and pass a compromise decree accordingly. It also states that where one party alleges adjustment or settlement of the suit and the other party denies it, the court shall decide the question. The Explanation declares that a void or voidable agreement or compromise shall not be deemed to be lawful. OBJECT : Rule 3 is based on the general principle that all matters which can be decided in a suit can also be settled by means of an agreement, compromise or settlement (K.K.Chari v/s. R.M. Seshadri, (1973)1 SCC 761 (777). Like Rule I of Order 23, the underlying object of this rule also is to permit the parties to settle their disputes. Like Rule I of Order 23, the underlying object of this rule also is to permit the parties to settle their disputes. Order 23, Rule 3 pre-eminently pertains to pending suits and not to decrees in which the rights of the parties have been crystallised. Rule 3 thus recognises, respects and encourages freedom of parties to the suit to settle and compromise lis between them. Rule 3 seeks to avoid the multiplicity of litigation by permitting parties to the suit to amicably come to an adjustment or settlement in writing and signed by the parties which is lawful. It is intended to shorten the litigation and precisely for that reason, it has been provided that the agreement, compromise or satisfaction may relate to the whole of the suit or part thereof. It may include matters which are the subject-matter of the suit or matters which are beyond the subject-matter in the suit (Star Construction and Transport Co. v/s. India Cements Ltd., (2001)3 SCC 351 ). It may, therefore, happen that there may be two decrees in one suit; (i) consent decree, i.e. where the claim is partly compromised on the basis of agreement, consent or compromise; and (ii) decree passed by the court i.e., where the claim is contested in part and the claim is determined and adjudicated by the court (see Bai Chanchal v/s. Syed Jalaluddin, (1970)3 SCC 124 : AIR 1971 SC 1081 ). An application under Order 23, Rule 1 may be treated as an application under Order 23, Rule 3, if it otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 3 (Banwari Lal v/s. Chando Devi, (1993)1 SCC 581 ). CONDITIONS : For Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code to apply, the following conditions must be fulfilled:– (i) There must be an agreement or compromise; (ii) It must be in writing and signed by the parties; (iii) It must be lawful; (iv) It must be recorded by the court; and (v) A compromise decree must have been passed by the court. ORDER 23, RULES 3 AND 1 : RELATIVE SCOPE: 36. The ambit and scope of Rule 1 of Order 23 and Rule 3 of Order 23 is different. Whereas under the former, the court has to deal with the plaintiff alone, under the latter it has to deal with both the parties, i.e. the plaintiff and the defendant. ORDER 23, RULES 3 AND 1 : RELATIVE SCOPE: 36. The ambit and scope of Rule 1 of Order 23 and Rule 3 of Order 23 is different. Whereas under the former, the court has to deal with the plaintiff alone, under the latter it has to deal with both the parties, i.e. the plaintiff and the defendant. Hence, before recording a compromise, the court must find out whether there is any agreement, settlement or compromise between the parties which is legal and lawful. The court for deciding the issue may rely on the affidavits of the parties. In appropriate cases, the court may also order personal appearance of the parties (D.P. Chadha v/s. Triyugi Narain, (2001)2 SCC 221 ). We shall now consider some decisions of the Supreme Court on Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In Pushpa Devi Bhagat v/s. Rajinder Singh, reported in AIR 2006 SC 2628 , the Supreme Court observed that Order 23, Rule 3 consists of two parts. The first part provides that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the court shall order such agreement or compromise to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith. The second part provides that where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or part of the subject-matter of the suit, the court shall order such satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith. Drawing the distinction between the first and the second part, the court stated : “What is the difference between the first part and the second part of Rule 3 ? The first part refers to situations where an agreement or compromise is entered into in writing and signed by the parties. The said agreement or compromise is placed before the court. When the court is satisfied that the suit has been adjusted either wholly or in part by such agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties and that it is lawful, a decree follows in terms of what is agreed between the parties. The said agreement or compromise is placed before the court. When the court is satisfied that the suit has been adjusted either wholly or in part by such agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties and that it is lawful, a decree follows in terms of what is agreed between the parties. The agreement/ compromise spells out the agreed terms by which the claim is admitted or adjusted by mutual concessions or promises, so that the parties thereto can be held to their promise(s) in future and performance can be enforced by the execution of the decree to be passed in terms of it. On the other hand, the second part refers to cases where the defendant has satisfied the plaintiff about the claim. This may be by satisfying the plaintiff that his claim cannot be or need not be met or performed. It can also be by discharging or performing the required obligation. Where the defendant so 'satisfies' the plaintiff in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, nothing further remains to be done or enforced and there is no question of any 'enforcement' or 'execution' of the decree to be passed in terms of it.” It has been held that the legislature has designedly used the word ‘or’ in Rule 3. The word ‘satisfaction’ has been used in contradistinction to the word ‘adjustment’ by agreement or compromise by the parties. The requirement of ‘in writing and signed by the parties’ does not apply to the second part where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of whole or part of the subject-matter of the suit. In Silver Screen Enterprises v/s. Devki Nandan, reported in AIR 1970 SC 669 , the Supreme Court held that Order 23, Rule 3 is a mandatory provision. Once a dispute is validly settled by the parties out of court, it is open to a party to litigation to move the court to pass a decree in accordance with the compromise. The court has no discretion in the matter and has no power to refuse to pass a decree on the ground that it considers the compromise or settlement to be too favourable to one of the parties. In Star Construction and Transport Co. The court has no discretion in the matter and has no power to refuse to pass a decree on the ground that it considers the compromise or settlement to be too favourable to one of the parties. In Star Construction and Transport Co. v/s. India Cements Ltd., reported in (2001)3 SCC 351 , it was held that Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code provides for a decree on lawful agreement or compromise between the parties. Such agreement, compromise or satisfaction may relate to the whole of the suit or part of the suit. It may also include matters beyond the subject-matter of the suit. But where the factum of agreement, compromise or adjustment is in dispute, powers under Rule 3 cannot be exercised by the court without adjudicating the dispute and without recording satisfaction that there was lawful agreement, compromise or settlement. In Banwari Lal v/s. Chando Devi, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1139 , it was observed by the Supreme Court that a decree passed on the basis of the compromise between the parties is essentially a contract between the parties which derives sanctity by court superadding its seal and approval to the contract. Nevertheless, the consent terms retain all elements of a contract to which the court’s imprimatur is affixed to give it the authenticity and sanctity of an executable order. The Court observed that the purpose and object of amendment in Rule 3 of Order 23 is to ensure that the agreement, compromise or settlement is legal and lawful. The Explanation to Rule 3 makes it clear that if an agreement or compromise is void or voidable under the Contract Act, 1872, it shall not be deemed to be lawful. It was also stated that the purpose and object of Amendment Act of 1976 is to compel the party challenging the compromise to question the same before the court which had recorded the compromise. The court is enjoined to decide the controversy whether the parties have arrived at an adjustment in a lawful manner. 37. It was further said that after the amendment, neither an appeal lies nor a suit maintainable against an order recording the compromise and the only remedy available to an aggrieved party challenging the validity of compromise is to file an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1A(2). Section 96(3) of the Code is not a bar to such appeal. 37. It was further said that after the amendment, neither an appeal lies nor a suit maintainable against an order recording the compromise and the only remedy available to an aggrieved party challenging the validity of compromise is to file an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1A(2). Section 96(3) of the Code is not a bar to such appeal. If the agreement is fraudulent, it shall be deemed to be void and not lawful. In Shankar Sitaram v/s. Balkrishna Sitaram, reported in AIR 1954 SC 352 , the Supreme Court held that it is well-settled that a consent decree is as binding upon the parties thereto as a decree passed in invitum. The fact that the decree is consensual in nature or passed in default of appearance is not relevant. A judgment by consent is intended to end litigation between the parties just as much as a judgment from a decision of the court. It has, therefore, the same binding force just as one is passed after consent. A compromise decree thus operates as res judicata. 38. In Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao v/s. Valluri Jagannadha Rao, reported in AIR 1967 SC 591 , however, the Apex Court drew distinction between res judicata and estoppel and observed that a decree passed on compromise does not operate as res judicata but might create as estoppel by conduct of parties. 39. Having considered the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we shall answer the first question as regards the maintainability of the present Appeal. 40. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the parties entered into a settlement and the terms of the settlement were reduced into writing duly signed by both the sides including the respective counsel of the parties. It is also not in dispute that to a certain extent the defendant did take advantage of the settlement for the purpose of obtaining anticipatory bail in connection with the complaint which was lodged by the plaintiff. The settlement between the parties was placed before the Court on 11th January 2011. The Court recorded its satisfaction and passed an order recording the compromise subject to passing of the final order below Exh.1. After almost 28 days i.e. on 9th February 2011, the defendants submitted before the Civil Court that the settlement was not legal and the defendants were forced to enter into the settlement. The Court recorded its satisfaction and passed an order recording the compromise subject to passing of the final order below Exh.1. After almost 28 days i.e. on 9th February 2011, the defendants submitted before the Civil Court that the settlement was not legal and the defendants were forced to enter into the settlement. Thus, the defendants for the first time after 28 days resiled from the compromise and prayed before the Civil Court to set-aside the compromise and proceed with the suit on merits. Such a stance of the defendants led the Court to adjudicate whether there was a compromise or not, and after adjudication the Civil Court came to the conclusion that the compromise was legal and valid and the allegations of fraud, undue pressure and coercion levelled by the defendants were baseless. 41. According to Mr. Shelat, since the challenge in the present Appeal is to a compromise decree, the bar under Section 96(3) of the Code would come into play and, therefore, the Appeal is not maintainable. 42. We are not impressed by such submission of Mr. Shelat as regards the maintainability of the Appeal for the simple reason that when on a dispute as regards the legality and validity of a compromise being raised, an inquiry is made in view of the proviso to Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code and the suit is decreed on the basis of a compromise based on that inquiry, it could not be held to be a decree passed on consent within the meaning of Section 96(3) of the Code. Section 96(3) of the Code contemplates non-appealability of a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. When one of the parties sets-up a compromise and the other disputes it and the Court is forced to adjudicate on whether there was a compromise or not and to pass a decree, it could not be understood as a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. No appeal is provided after 1st February 1977 against an order rejecting or accepting a compromise after an inquiry under the proviso to Order 23, Rule 3, either by Section 104 or by Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code. No appeal is provided after 1st February 1977 against an order rejecting or accepting a compromise after an inquiry under the proviso to Order 23, Rule 3, either by Section 104 or by Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code. It is only when the acceptance of a compromise receives the imprimatur of the Court and it becomes a decree, or the Court proceeds to pass a decree on merits rejecting the compromise set up, it becomes appealable, unless of course, the appeal is barred by Section 96(3) of the Code. When there is a contest on the question, whether there was a compromise or not, a decree accepting the compromise on resolution of that controversy, cannot be said to be a decree passed with the consent of the parties. Therefore, the bar under Section 96(3) of the Code could not have application. We, thus, accordingly reject the preliminary contention of Mr. Shelat as regards the maintainability of the present Appeal and hold that the Appeal is maintainable. (See Kishun alias Ram Kishun (dead) through L.Rs. v/s. Bihari (D) by L.R., AIR 2005 SC 3799 ) We shall now proceed to consider, whether the Civil Court committed any error in passing the order impugned. The question, whether the plaintiff or defendants had or had not agreed to the compromise, and whether he had or had not signed the compromise terms, is a question of fact. Whether the parties had entered into a compromise or not, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The onus of establishing that a suit has been adjusted or compromised, is on the person who pleads or asserts such compromise or adjustment. But, where a compromise is arrived at between the parties and one of the parties alleges that it was not legal or lawful, then in such circumstances, the burden of proof is on the party alleging illegality of compromise. In the present case, it is for the defendants to establish that the settlement arrived at was not legal or lawful and that they were forced to enter into the settlement. In the present case, it is for the defendants to establish that the settlement arrived at was not legal or lawful and that they were forced to enter into the settlement. Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code requires that the Court recording the compromise should be satisfied on being proved that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties. Only upon such proof to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court shall order such satisfaction, agreement or compromise to be recorded and thereupon pass a decree in accordance therewith. Proviso to Rule 3 prescribes that if it is alleged by one party and denied by other that adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived, it is the duty of the court to decide the question recording reasons therefor. The explanation provides that agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Contract Act shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code. Therefore, while recording the compromise, a duty is cast upon the court to record that it has been proved to its satisfaction that the compromise is effected and it is open to the party to deny the same at the time when the compromise is recorded. The person denying it may also ask for an adjournment. Thus, the Court has every jurisdiction to examine, whether the agreement or compromise is lawful within the meaning of the explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code. However, while recording the compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, it is not necessary for the court to say in express terms in the order that it was satisfied that the compromise was a lawful one. It will be presumed to have done so, unless the contrary is shown (see Suleman Noor Mohamed v/s. Umerbhai Janubhai, AIR 1978 SC 952 ). 43. In the present case, the application for compromise was filed on 11th January 2011 duly signed by the parties and their respective counsel. On the same day, the learned Civil Judge, after being satisfied with the genuineness and the legality of the settlement, passed an order recording the compromise subject to the final order below Exh.1. 43. In the present case, the application for compromise was filed on 11th January 2011 duly signed by the parties and their respective counsel. On the same day, the learned Civil Judge, after being satisfied with the genuineness and the legality of the settlement, passed an order recording the compromise subject to the final order below Exh.1. The learned Civil Judge has very clearly observed in its order that the parties and their advocates were present. The contents of the compromise purshis containing the terms of the settlement were read over before the parties. The parties also confirmed that the settlement was arrived at without any undue influence or pressure. 44. The record further reveals that the defendants placed the settlement arrived at before the Court for the purpose of obtaining anticipatory bail in connection with the complaint which was lodged by the plaintiff and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Anand, after taking into consideration the settlement, granted anticipatory bail as well as regular bail to the defendants. It is, thus, clear that the defendants received the benefits and after deriving such benefits the conduct of the defendants is wholly inconsistent with the stand that they had been forced or coerced to enter into the settlement. Our attention was drawn to the contents of the compromise. Nothing has been shown to us which could be termed as unlawful. The terms of the settlement have been discussed by us in the earlier part of our judgment. Mr. Majmudar, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, has not been able to point out anything to show that the compromise is not lawful or that any part of the compromise or agreement is unlawful. Admittedly, when the compromise was recorded, it was not denied by the defendants. No material worth the name has been produced to substantiate alleged fraud and misrepresentation. In such circumstances, when the settlement had been arrived at and decree passed on the basis that the settlement was lawful and such decree having acted upon, the question of reopening and setting aside the same would not arise. 45. No material worth the name has been produced to substantiate alleged fraud and misrepresentation. In such circumstances, when the settlement had been arrived at and decree passed on the basis that the settlement was lawful and such decree having acted upon, the question of reopening and setting aside the same would not arise. 45. It is a plain and basic rule of pleadings that in order to make out a case of fraud or coercion there must be (a) an express allegation of coercion or fraud, and (b) all the material facts in support of such allegations must be laid out in full and with a high degree of precision. In other words, if coercion or fraud is alleged, it must be set out with full particulars. (See Shanti Budhiya Vesta Patel and others v/s. Nirmala Jayprakash Tiwari and others, reported in (2010)5 SCC 104 ) In Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai, reported in AIR 1951 SC 280 , it was held thus : "24. We turn next to the questions of undue influence and coercion. Now it is to be observed that these have not been separately pleaded. It is true they may overlap in part in some cases but they are separate and separable categories in law and must be separately pleaded. 25. It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any court ought to take notice, however, strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. (See Order 6, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code)" 46. No case has been made out to bring the compromise even within Section 23 of the Contract Act so as to term it as unlawful. It has not been pleaded that the compromise is forbidden by law or that the compromise, if allowed, would defeat the provision of any law, or is fraudulent or otherwise. No case has been made out to bring the compromise even within Section 23 of the Contract Act so as to term it as unlawful. It has not been pleaded that the compromise is forbidden by law or that the compromise, if allowed, would defeat the provision of any law, or is fraudulent or otherwise. The case cannot also be brought within the meaning of ‘fraud’ as defined in Section 17 of the Contract Act. It has not been contended that there was any attempt to deceive the defendants or to enter into a contract with regard to any suggestion of fact which was not true, which the defendants believe to be true or that there was any concealment of fact or that the compromise made was without any intention of performing it or any act intending to deceive or otherwise. The case also cannot be brought within the definition of ‘undue influence’ as defined in Section 16 of the Contract Act. No such relation has been pleaded that the plaintiff was in a position to dominate the Will of the defendants for obtaining unfair advantage over them. No fiduciary relationship is being sought to be established between the parties. Neither it is pleaded that the mental capacity of the defendants was affected by age, illness or bodily stress. Although it was sought to be pleaded that there was coercion in obtaining the consent of the defendants but the same also does not come within the definition of ‘coercion’ as defined in Section 15 of the Contract Act. ‘Coercion’ is defined as ‘committing or threatening to commit any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code or unlawful detaining or threatening to detain any property to the prejudice of any person, whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into the agreement’. There was no allegation of detaining or threatening to detain any property to the prejudice of the defendants. 47. For all these reasons, it cannot be said that the consent in the compromise was obtained in violation of Section 14 of the Contract Act. 48. We shall now deal with the decisions relied upon by Mr. Majmudar in support of his submissions. 49. 47. For all these reasons, it cannot be said that the consent in the compromise was obtained in violation of Section 14 of the Contract Act. 48. We shall now deal with the decisions relied upon by Mr. Majmudar in support of his submissions. 49. In Rajendra Prasad Gupta (supra), the challenge before the Apex Court was the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad taking the view that once the application for withdrawal of the suit is filed the suit stands dismissed as withdrawn even without any order on the withdrawal application and, therefore, the second application was not maintainable. The Apex Court did not agree with the proposition as laid by the High Court and observed that the rules of procedure were handmaids of justice. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives inherent powers to the court to do justice. The Apex Court further observed that the provision must be interpreted to mean that every procedure is permitted to the court for doing justice unless expressly prohibited, and not that every procedure is prohibited unless expressly permitted. The Bench ruled that there was no express bar in filing an application for withdrawal of the withdrawal application. 50. In our opinion, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court has no application to the facts of the present case. This decision is in no manner helpful to the clients of Mr. Majmudar. In Banwari Lal (supra), the challenge before the Supreme Court was an order passed by the High Court on a revision application filed on behalf of the respondent. The High Court took the view that the trial Court could not have entertained the application filed on behalf of the appellant, for recall of the order recording a compromise alleged to have been entered between the appellant and the respondent. The Supreme Court, in the facts of that case, held that a party who proposes to challenge a compromise can file a petition under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, or an appeal under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can question the validity of the compromise in view of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code. The Court held that if the agreement or the compromise itself was fraudulent, then it shall be deemed to be void within the meaning of the explanation to the proviso to Rule 3 and as such not lawful. In the said case, the plaintiff challenged the order recording the compromise on the ground that his counsel, in collusion with the defendant of the said suit, had played a fraud on him by filing a fabricated petition of compromise although no compromise had been effected between him and the defendant. The details of fraud were mentioned in the petition and it was stated that the alleged compromise itself was void, illegal and against the requirement of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court took the view that entertaining of the application filed on behalf of the plaintiff and considering the question as to whether there had been a lawful agreement or compromise on the basis of which the Court could have recorded such agreement or compromise by the trial Court was proper. The Supreme Court held that since the material produced on the record showed that the compromise was not lawful within the meaning of Rule 3, the order recording compromise could be recalled. 51. We fail to understand how this judgment would also help the clients of Mr. Majmudar. In the present case, we have come to the conclusion that the compromise entered into between the parties is lawful and the allegation of fraud levelled by the defendants has been found to be without any basis. In Jawan and others (supra), the issue before the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court was with regard to the validity of a compromise between the parties. In the said case, a suit was filed for possession of land on the basis of prior possession and title. The parties entered into a compromise within two months of filing of the suit. However, the application to take compromise on record was filed only at the stage of argument after a period of almost 12 years. Taking into consideration the evidence on record, the Division Bench found that there was no proper and admissible evidence led as to the validity of compromise. The Court found substance in the plea by the opposite party that the compromise was the outcome of coercion, misrepresentation and fraud. Taking into consideration the evidence on record, the Division Bench found that there was no proper and admissible evidence led as to the validity of compromise. The Court found substance in the plea by the opposite party that the compromise was the outcome of coercion, misrepresentation and fraud. The Court found that the opposite party received only a small portion of land in terms of the settlement and the possession of that piece of land was also not given to the opposite party. It was also noticed by the Court that the applicant was not competent to enter into a compromise at the relevant date being divested of title. It is in such circumstances that the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court allowed the Appeal rejecting the application moved by the parties for recording compromise under the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code. 52. This decision would also not help the clients of Mr. Majmudar in any manner as in the said case there was evidence to show that the compromise was not legal and the same was the outcome of coercion, misrepresentation and fraud which is not the case so far as the present Appeal is concerned. 53. In Ponthinoda Sainabi and others (supra), the challenge before the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court was the judgment and decree passed by the subordinate court. The suit was filed for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule properties. The suit was dismissed. However, certain findings were entered and the 1/3rd plaintiffs were declared to be entitled to 1/share. It was found that all the necessary parties were not impleaded and a right to file a fresh suit for partition was reserved. It is against such order and decree that the appeals were filed before the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. The Division Bench noticed that out of three defendants, two defendants were dead on the date of compromise. The sole surviving defendant did not sign the deed of compromise being unconscious and dying within seven days. The Karnavan of Tarwad on whose behalf the alleged compromise was purported to have been executed was also dead. The Court noticed that both the Mukhthiyars who signed the compromise on behalf of the parties were highly interested in the defendants. The sole surviving defendant did not sign the deed of compromise being unconscious and dying within seven days. The Karnavan of Tarwad on whose behalf the alleged compromise was purported to have been executed was also dead. The Court noticed that both the Mukhthiyars who signed the compromise on behalf of the parties were highly interested in the defendants. It was also found that the power of attorney authorizing the Mukhthiyars was to conduct or defend the cases and no authority was given to him to enter into any compromise. The Division Bench found that there was lot of haste in arriving at a compromise which was shrouded with suspicion. The Division Bench also found that the terms of the compromise exhibited some foul play and was not valid. In such circumstances, the Division Bench upheld the view of the lower court that the compromise was not valid. 54. Even this decision would not help the clients of Mr. Majmudar as the same is in the facts of the case. 55. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by L.Rs. (supra), the Supreme Court observed that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree – by the first court or by the highest court – has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. The Court held that it could be challenged in any court even in a collateral proceeding. There cannot be any debate with the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court. But, merely alleging fraud without any evidence or foundation for the same, a valid and a legal compromise entered into between the parties and a decree drawn on the basis of such a compromise cannot be set at naught on a mere plea of fraud or coercion. In our opinion, this decision of the Supreme Court would also not help the appellants in any manner. 56. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that no case has been made out by the appellants for interference. In the result, this Appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. In view of the order passed in the main matter, the connected Civil Application would not survive and is accordingly disposed of. Interim relief granted earlier stands vacated.