ORDER By Court—The petitioner has challenged the penalty order dated 03.01.2002 reducing him to the post of Executive (E-1) in the scale of Rs 10,705-300-16,750 with immediate effect and his basic pay has been fixed at lowest stage, i.e. on 10,750/-and it has further been ordered that for the purpose of promotion his seniority would be counted in E-1 grade w.e.f. 03.01.2002. He has also challenged the appellate order dated 25.02.2002 whereby his appeal has been dismissed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed on 12.07.1972 in Bokaro Steel Limited on the post of Stores-man. He got regular promotions and in the year 1997 he was promoted to the post of Senior Executive (Stores). On 09.02.2001 a charge-memo was issued to the petitioner in which it was alleged that the petitioner did not check that the final notices were sent to the party immediately and after the final notices were issued to the party and the party did not lift or replace the rejected materials, the petitioner did not ask the Inspection Department to reject the whole quantity of the material. The petitioner submitted his reply on 15.02.2001. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner was transferred to B.F. (Sub-Store) where the cause of action has arisen on 30.04.1996. The petitioner assumed the charge in B.F. (Sub-Stores) on 07.11.1996. On 15.10.2001 the enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the enquiry report on 27.10.2001 and by order dated 03.01.2002 the penalty as noticed above has been imposed upon the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 18.01.2002, which was rejected on 25.02.2002. In the counter-affidavit, it has been stated that during vigilance enquiry the petitioner has given a statement that after the final and pre-emptory notice dated 24.12.1996, no reminder was given to the party. He has admitted that he should have informed the Inspection Department and Finance & Accounts Department about the two cases in issue. The enquiry was conducted in a fair manner and on the basis of evidence adduced during the course of enquiry charge against the petitioner was found proved and therefore, the order of penalty has been passed against him. The appellate authority also considered the materials available on record and finding that no case for interference has been made out, dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. 4. The appellate authority also considered the materials available on record and finding that no case for interference has been made out, dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. 4. Heard learned counsel for both the sides and perused the documents on record. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the two cases which are in issue are dated 20.11.1995 and 13.09.1995. The cause of action had arisen on 30.04.1996. The petitioner joined the department only on 07.11.1996 and therefore, it can not be said that the petitioner is responsible in any manner whatsoever, for the loss caused to the company. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the documentary evidence produced by the petitioner on record, such as, order of transfer, order of joining etc. have not been considered by the authorities and the penalty order has been passed in a mechanical manner and therefore, it is liable to be quashed. 5. From the materials on record, I gather that the petitioner has taken a specific stand that he was transferred on 30.10.1996 to B.F. (Sub-Stores) and he assumed the charge on 07.11.1996. He was not informed about the two pending cases in time and when the matter was brought to his notice he issued final notices to the supplier on 24.12.1996. The provisionally rejected cases were within the knowledge of the Inspection Department and therefore, they should have taken the prompt action and the petitioner cannot be charged of failure to maintain the devotion of duty and acting in a manner prejudicial to the interest of company. The charges are baseless and unfounded. The petitioner has brought on record the document establishing that he assumed charge in the B.F. (Sub-Stores) on 07.11.1996. In the counter-affidavit the respondents have taken the stand as under : 7. “That so far para-9 to 12 is concerned, I say that the writ petitioner has stated the date of cause of action as 30.04.1996 which is not clear to what action he is trying to point. If it is assumed as 30.03.96, the date of 2nd stage inspection in which material was declared provisionally rejected then it can be said that charge leveled is not related with the receipt and receipt stage inspection. If it is assumed as 30.03.96, the date of 2nd stage inspection in which material was declared provisionally rejected then it can be said that charge leveled is not related with the receipt and receipt stage inspection. It is related with the issue of 'Final and Pre-emptory notices” and action thereafter and during that period he was very much in Blast Furance sub store as depot Incharge” 6. From the penalty order dated 03.01.2002, I find that the disciplinary authority has recorded the findings as under : “Final and peremptory notices to M/s Quality Rubber Industries, BIADA asking them to lift the materials supplied by them against P.O. No. 80053 dated 20.11.1995 and 79770 dated 13.09.1995 from the stores within a month. However, when the party did not respond, no further action was taken by Mr. Kachap to settled the issue. Due to issue, F & A could not be recovered the amount already paid to the party and the material continued to lie in the stores un-used for a long period. Hence the charges are proved.” I find that there is no allegation of collusion or fraud on the part of the petitioner. This appears not a case of dereliction of duty, also. It is admitted that the petitioner has issued pre-emptory notices to the suppliers. 7. The charges against the petitioner is that when the party did not respond no further action was taken by the petitioner. The stand of the petitioner is that the Inspection Department should have taken prompt action. I find that no attempt has been taken by the enquiry officer or disciplinary authority to ascertain the truthfulness of the stand taken by the petitioner. No finding has been recorded in this regard in the departmental proceeding nor this aspect of the matter has been considered by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority. It has not been denied that the petitioner assumed charge on 07.11.1996. It has also not been concluded that the petitioner alone was the person responsible for taking further action in the matter. I am of the opinion that the disciplinary authority has failed to consider relevant materials and that is the reason he has arrived at a wrong conclusion and passed the order of penalty dated 03.01.2002. The appellate authority has also ignored this aspect of the matter and erroneously rejected the appeal of the petitioner. 8. I am of the opinion that the disciplinary authority has failed to consider relevant materials and that is the reason he has arrived at a wrong conclusion and passed the order of penalty dated 03.01.2002. The appellate authority has also ignored this aspect of the matter and erroneously rejected the appeal of the petitioner. 8. In the case of “Narinder Mohan Arya Versus United India Insurance Co. Ltd. And Others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 713 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the writ court should bear in mind the distinction between some evidence or no evidence but the question which is required to be posed and answered should have been as to whether some evidence adduced would lead to the conclusion as regards the guilt of the delinquent officer or not. The enquiry officer cannot base his findings on mere hypothesis and mere ipse-dixit on his part cannot be a substitute for evidence. In the case of “Krushnakant B. Parmar Versus Union of India and Another”, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178 , the Government servant who was working as Security Assistant, was found unauthorisedly absent and therefore, a departmental enquiry was instituted and the charges were found proved. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that since there is no finding recorded during the departmental enquiry that the absence was willful, the order of penalty was liable to be interfered with. Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : 16. “In the case of the appellant referring to unauthorised absence the disciplinary authority alleged that he failed to maintain devotion to duty and his behaviour was unbecoming of a government servant. The question whether “unauthorised absence from duty” amounts to failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant cannot be decided without deciding the question whether absence is wilful or because of compelling circumstances. 17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be wilful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean wilful. 17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be wilful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean wilful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant. 18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct”. 9. In the case of “Ranjit Thakur versus Union of India and Others”, reported in (1987) 4 SCC 611 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : 25. “Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the “decision-making process”. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.” 10. It is not the case against the petitioner that he intentionally did not take any further action in the matter, rather, I find that the petitioner at the first instance has issued pre-emptory notices to the supplier. It has also not been brought on record by the department that the petitioner alone can be held responsible for taking no further action in the matter. 11. I am of the opinion that the inaction alleged on the part of the petitioner cannot be said to be willful. It has also not been brought on record by the department that the petitioner alone can be held responsible for taking no further action in the matter. 11. I am of the opinion that the inaction alleged on the part of the petitioner cannot be said to be willful. May be it was a mistake on the part of the petitioner and for that penalty which has been imposed on the petitioner could not have been imposed by any reasonable employer. The impugned orders dated 03.01.2002 and 25.02.2002 are liable to be interfered with. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the writ petition is allowed and impugned orders dated 03.01.2002 and 25.02.2002 are hereby quashed.