JUDGMENT C.R. Sarma, J. 1. Both the above mentioned writ petitions, involve the questions with regard to the right of the petitioners right to Schedule Tribe status and Permanent Resident Certificate. In WP(C) No. 483 (A)/2010, the petitioners No. 2, 3 & 4 are the sons of the petitioner No. 1. The father of the petitioner No. 1 is a Bhutanese and the mothers of the petitioners are Arunachali ladies, belonging to Schedule Tribe. In WP(C) No. 135 (AP)/2011 also the petitioner's father was a Tibetan and his mother was an Arunachali Schedule Tribe. As both the writ petitions involve similar questions of law and facts and the parties are also represented by the same set of Advocates, as agreed by the learned Counsel, appearing for both the parties, for the sake of convenience, I propose to dispose of both the writ petitions by this common judgment and order. Facts of the WP(C) No. 483 (AP)/2010: The first petitioner's father Late Jurme, born in Bhutan, migrated from Bhutan in the early part of 1940 and settled in village Dirang, West Kameng District of Arunachal Pradesh. In 1946, he married Smti Leiki Chojo of Dungkharpa Clan of Monpa tribal community of Dirang and settled in Dirang. His father-in-law Late Mindu adopted him as son as per Monpa tribal customary practice called "Bu-Tsab" and thereby he was accepted as a member of Dungkharpa Clan of Monpa tribe to which tribe he assimilated by following all the tribal customary practices of Monpa tribe. 2. The petitioner No. 1 was born to the said couple on 05.02.1960 and he was brought up as per the customary practices of Monpa tribe inasmuch as he was treated as a Monpa belonging to Dungkharpa Clan. The first petitioner married Smti Pem Chhojom, a Monpa tribal lady of Diangon in 19.01.1980 and out of the said wedlock, the petitioner Nos. 2, 3 & 4 were born. They were also brought up as per customary practices of Monpa tribal community and always treated to be a Monpa tribe of Dungkharpa Clan. 3. The petitioner claiming to be a Monpa tribal, applied for the Schedule Tribe (for short, S.T.) Certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate (PRC) and accordingly, said certificates were issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Bomdila, West Kameng District, on 03.08.2001 and 18.07.2003. Similarly, S.T. Certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate were issued to the petitioner Nos.
3. The petitioner claiming to be a Monpa tribal, applied for the Schedule Tribe (for short, S.T.) Certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate (PRC) and accordingly, said certificates were issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Bomdila, West Kameng District, on 03.08.2001 and 18.07.2003. Similarly, S.T. Certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate were issued to the petitioner Nos. 2, 3 & 4 also by the authority concerned. Subsequently, the petitioner No. 1 was elected as Member of Anchal Samiti from AS-03 Phadam & Sagar Khorung Anchal Constituency. 4. On 10.03.2009, the original right owners of Dungkharpa Clan, in their meeting, held on 10.03.2009, granted the identity of Monpa tribe of 'Dungkharpa Clan' to the petitioner No. 1 and thus, his children, i.e. the petitioner Nos. 2, 3 & 4 were also granted right of ownership of Dungkharpa title. 5. At the instigation of some rival persons, the General Secretary, All West Kameng Students' Union (AWKSU), i.e. the respondent No. 6, by his letter, dated 20.01.2009, lodged a complaint with the Deputy Commissioner, West Kameng, Bomdila, alleging that the petitioners were Bhutanese National, residing at Dirang village and that, they had illegally obtained S.T. certificates from the district authority. The Deputy Commissioner forwarded the said complaint to Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dirang to make any enquiry and submit report. 6. The Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dirang constituted a Board, comprising of four members viz., Sri Lobsang Tsering, Ex. MLA, Sri Dor Tsering, ZPM, Sri Tsering Dorjee, Head Gaonbura, Dirang and Sri Changlung, Head Gaonbura, Tawang to examine the matter. The Circle Officer, i.e. Chairman of the said Board, issued summons to the petitioner No. 1 to personally appear on 15.09.2010 with all relevant documents to prove his identity. The Board also issued letters to the Gaonburhas directing them to appear on the same date. However, the time of appearance for the petitioner No. 1 was fixed at 10.30 A.M. and the time of appearance of the Gaonburhas was fixed at 2.30 P.M. 7. The Board recorded the statements of the petitioner and Gaonburhas in separate sittings. The petitioner produced his S.T. Certificate, Permanent Resident Certificate, Birth Certificate and resolution of elders of 'Dungkharpa Clan', approving the inclusion of petitioner No. 1 in 'Dungkharpa Clan' of Monpa tribe. 8. The Board separately heard the Executive Members of All Arunachal Pradesh Students' Union (AAPSU) and All West Kameng Students' Union (AWKSU).
The petitioner produced his S.T. Certificate, Permanent Resident Certificate, Birth Certificate and resolution of elders of 'Dungkharpa Clan', approving the inclusion of petitioner No. 1 in 'Dungkharpa Clan' of Monpa tribe. 8. The Board separately heard the Executive Members of All Arunachal Pradesh Students' Union (AAPSU) and All West Kameng Students' Union (AWKSU). Though the Board had examined the said witnesses, no opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross-examine the said witnesses and the said Board came to the findings that the petitioner No. 1, being a Bhutanese origin, was not entitled to have S.T. certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate. The Board also formed an opinion that mere inclusion of petitioner into 'Dungkharpa Clan' can not accord him the S.T. status. In view of the above, the Board recommended the cancellation of petitioner's S.T. certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate. The Deputy Commissioner, on receipt of the said report, directed the Additional Deputy Commissioner, West Kameng, Bomdila to dispose of the matter. The Additional Deputy Commissioner, by the impugned order, dated 28.10.2010, held that the petitioner No. 1, being a Bhutanese origin, was not a Schedule Tribe of Arunachal Pradesh and that, his children also would not be entitled to avail the said status. 9. The Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dirang, by the impugned order, dated 07.12.2010, directed the petitioners to surrender their S.T. certificates and Permanent Resident Certificates, issued to them. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners have come up with this writ petition, on the grounds that the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dirang committed error and illegality by canceling the S.T. certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate by erroneously holding that the petitioner No. 1 was not accepted as Monpa tribal and that he failed to appreciate that the petitioners, who were born and brought up in the Monpa tribal community got assimilated in the Monpa tribal community following all the customary practices of the said community. 10. It has also been stated that the witnesses were examined behind the back of the petitioner No. 1 denying the opportunity of cross-examining them, to substantiate his claim. In view of the above, the writ petitioners prayed for issue of a writ, quashing and setting aside the impugned decision of the Board, dated 15.09.2010 and the consequential orders, dated 28.10.2010 and 07.12.2010, passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dirang. 11.
In view of the above, the writ petitioners prayed for issue of a writ, quashing and setting aside the impugned decision of the Board, dated 15.09.2010 and the consequential orders, dated 28.10.2010 and 07.12.2010, passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dirang. 11. The respondent No. 3, i.e. the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dirang, and the respondent No. 6 contested the petitioners' claim by filing two separate affidavits-in-opposition. 12. In his affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent No. 6, supporting the actions taken and the impugned orders, contended that the petitioner No. 1's father, who migrated to Arunachal Pradesh, was not accepted as son of his father-in-law by performing any "Bu-Tsab" inasmuch as, as per Monpa customary laws, only sons of close relatives, like, brother's sons and uncle's sons are adopted as "Bu-Tsab" and that there was no evidence or materials to show that the petitioner No. 1, who was a son-in-law, was adopted as son by his father-in-law. It has also been stated that the said father of the mother of the petitioner No. 1 died prior to her marriage and as such the claim of adoption as 'son' is false. It has further been contended that after the death of father-in-law of the petitioner No. 1's father, he was succeeded by his brother Dor Phunte (Khepa), who had owned the property of the deceased aforesaid. 13. Refuting the petitioners claim of assimilation in the 'Dungkharpa Clan', the contesting respondent stated that to accept as a member of a clan, all male heads of each house, to which he is already a member of the clan, must take a decision and that, the petitioner No. 1's claim that his father got assimilated into 'Dungkharpa Clan' is misleading and false. That apart, it is contended that, if 'Bu-Tsab' was performed, there was no necessity to take the decision conferring 'Dungkharpa' title on 10.03.2009 and as such the said decision negates the plea of the 'Bu-Tsab'. 14. It is also submitted that S.T. certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate were initially issued on being applied for by the petitioner No. 1, who had suppressed his actual identity and that the agreement, showing inclusion of the petitioner No. 1 into the 'Dungkharpa Clan' was hurriedly manufactured/prepared on 10.03.2009, i.e. after the lodging of the complaint by AWKSU, on 20.01.2009, and as such, the claim of assimilation is not true. 15.
15. The respondent No. 3, in his affidavit-in-opposition, admitted that the witnesses were examined separately to avoid any kind of confrontation or violence. Admitting the petitioner's claim that the petitioner No. 1 was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses, the contesting respondents stated that cross-examination was not felt necessary inasmuch as all the witnesses had stated that the petitioner was a Bhutanese. 16. The contesting respondents denied the allegation that the Board had taken decision on certain extraneous condition. The respondent No. 6, in his affidavit-in-opposition, supporting the contention, made by the respondent No. 3 and refuting the claim of the petitioners, contended that the petitioner No. 1 and his children, being the son and grand sons of a Bhutanese, were also Bhutanese. 17. It has also been contended that all the witnesses, including the Gaoburhas and the two Panchayat Members, nowhere stated that the petitioners were treated as members of the Monpa tribe and that, all of them had stated that the petitioners were Bhutanese. Supporting the impugned orders, the respondent No. 6 contended that the petitioners failed to substantiate that they belonged to Monpa tribe of Arunachal Pradesh. Facts of the WP(C) No. 483 (AP)/2010: 18. The petitioner's father Sri Serap Phuntso, who was a Tibetan, migrated to Turing area of Arunchal Pradesh in 1958 as a refugee and settled in Nukong village of Turing. He worked under the Central Public Works Department (CPWD), as work charge employee and in the year 1997, married an Arunachali lady, namely, Ms Rinchin Lamo, of Memba tribe. They used to live adopting the culture of Memba tribe and got assimilated with the said tribe. Out of the said wedlock, on 10.09.1982, the petitioner was born. In 1989, when the petitioner was 7 (seven) years old, his maternal uncle Sri Paljang Dorjee, who had no son, adopted the petitioner as his son, by observing the customary practices of Memba tribe and thereafter, the petitioner used to live as a member of Memba tribe. He passed the Senior Secondary Examination in 1997 from Govt. Higher Secondary School, Turing and thereafter, in 1999, Senior School Certificate Examination from Tuting. 19. In the said school certificates, the name of the father of the petitioner was shown as Paljang Dorjee, i.e. his adoptee father. After completing his graduation, he obtained Post Graduate Degree in 2009.
He passed the Senior Secondary Examination in 1997 from Govt. Higher Secondary School, Turing and thereafter, in 1999, Senior School Certificate Examination from Tuting. 19. In the said school certificates, the name of the father of the petitioner was shown as Paljang Dorjee, i.e. his adoptee father. After completing his graduation, he obtained Post Graduate Degree in 2009. Thus, the petitioner was brought up by his maternal uncle as a member of Memba community. In 1999, he applied for Schedule Tribe (S.T.) certificate and the Deputy Commissioner, Upper Siang, Yingkiong, issued the S.T. certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate (PRC) in his favour. 20. On being applied by him, for a post in Sarva Siksha Abhiyan (SSA), he was selected and secured 6th position in the select list of 13 (thirteen) selected candidates. 21. At this stage, at the instigation of some unsuccessful candidates, local students body submitted a complaint with the Deputy Commissioner, alleging that the petitioner, being a Tibetan had falsely obtained S.T. certificate. 22. On receipt of the said complaint, the Deputy Commissioner, relying on the Police report, found that the petitioner was a son of Tibetan and as such stayed the appointment of the petitioner, till finalization of the matter and issued show-cause notice. 23. In response to the said show-cause notice, the petitioner submitted his reply, on 09.06.2010. Failing to receive any response from the Deputy Commissioner, with regard to his reply to the show-cause notice, the petitioner filed a writ petition, being WP(C) No. 497(AP)/2010, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 24. Hon'ble the Chief Justice, by order, dated 17.03.2011, passed in WP(C) No. 497(AP)/2010, disposed of the writ petition, directing the Deputy Commissioner cum District Project Director, Sarva Siksha Abhiyan, Upper Siang District to adjudicate the show-cause notice, dated 29.04.2010, within a period of 1 (one) month and on or before 31.03.2011. 25.
24. Hon'ble the Chief Justice, by order, dated 17.03.2011, passed in WP(C) No. 497(AP)/2010, disposed of the writ petition, directing the Deputy Commissioner cum District Project Director, Sarva Siksha Abhiyan, Upper Siang District to adjudicate the show-cause notice, dated 29.04.2010, within a period of 1 (one) month and on or before 31.03.2011. 25. On being so directed, the Deputy Commissioner, by his order, dated 09.03.2011, relying on the report, submitted by the Circle Officer and perusing the reply, submitted by the petitioner, came to the findings that the petitioner was a son of a Tibetan refugee, that the petitioner failed to establish that he was adopted by his maternal uncle following established norms, that the maternal uncle of the petitioner, being a Buddhist by religion, was governed by the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and that the adoption, as claimed by the petitioner, was made not as per law. The Deputy Commissioner also came to the findings that the deed of adoption was not properly executed and that there no decision was also taken by any recognized village authority, i.e. Gaonburha or Notary etc. in this regard. In view of the above, the Deputy Commissioner, held that the petitioner's claim that he was entitled to S.T. status was not be acceptable. Accordingly, by the said order, the Deputy Commissioner, cancelled the S.T. certificate as well as the Permanent Resident Certificate, issued to the petitioner and directed him to surrender the same. 26. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has come up with this writ petition, challenging the order, dated 09.03.2011, aforesaid. 27. The petitioner's contention is that, the Deputy Commissioner failed to properly consider the reply, submitted by the petitioner and also to appreciate, that the petitioner, who was born to a S.T. mother, was adopted and brought up by his maternal uncle, as member of Memba tribe and that, the petitioner, by adopting customary practices of Memba tribe got assimilated with the said tribe and thus became entitled to be recognized as a S.T. It has also been contended that the Deputy Commissioner failed to appreciate the certificate, issued by the village authority, on 06.10.1999, whereby, the village authority granted permission to the adoption of the petitioner, by his maternal uncle. 28.
28. It has also been contended that, before passing the impugned order, no enquiry was made in conformity with the direction, made by the Supreme Court, in the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil & Anr. Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development & Ors., reported in (1994) 6 SCC 241 , It has further been contended that the Deputy Commissioner failed to consider the factors, like, petitioner's upbringing, his acceptance and reorganization by the tribal community and thereby committed gross illegality by arbitrarily canceling the S.T. certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate, which were earlier granted him. 29. Contesting the petitioner's claim, the State respondent, by filing affidavit-in-opposition, contended that the petitioner, being a son of a Tibetan refugee, was not entitled to acquire the S.T. status by virtue of being a son of a tribal lady and that the petitioner failed to produce any substantive evidence in support of his claim. It has been contended that the certificates, issued by the village authority, on 06.10.1999, 24.11.1999 and 03.03.2011, were subsequently prepared as makeshift arrangement and that, no adoption took place as per law. It has also been contended that a decision accepting a person as a member of the Memba tribe is to be taken by the Memba community itself and not by a few persons of Mankota village and as such, the said certificate, issued by some persons of Mankota village, can not confer the right of S.T. to the petitioner. 30. The contesting respondents, supporting the impugned orders, have contended that the impugned order was passed after giving necessary opportunity to the petitioner and that the petitioner had obtained his S.T. certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate, by concealing the material facts at the time of submitting the application seeking the said certificates and as such those were rightly cancelled after verification. 31. The petitioner, refuting the contention, made in the affidavit-in-opposition, filed an affidavit-in-reply and averred that though his natural father was a Tibetan, he being born and brought up in Memba community, to which his mother belonged, was entitled to get the benefit of S.T. status and that the Deputy Commissioner failed to appreciate the materials, on-record, in passing the impugned orders. 32.
32. From the above, it appears that in both the cases, the question involved is as to whether children born out of a marriage between a non tribal father and tribal mother can claim tribal status, i.e. Schedule Tribe status. 33. In the WP(C) No. 483(AP)/2010, the father of the petitioner No. 1, i.e. the grand father of the Petitioner Nos. 2, 3 and 4 was a Bhutanese and he married a Monpa lady of schedule tribe community of Arunachal Pradesh. In the said case, it has been claimed that the said Bhutanese National, after his marriage; was adopted as son by his father-in-law, that the petitioners were brought up as a member of Monpa community and that, they got assimilated with the members of said community. It has also been claimed that the petitioner No. 1 was conferred with the right of ownership of Dungkharpa Clan of Monpa tribe, that the petitioner No. 1 also got elected as a Member of Anchal Samiti and thus, he was recognized as a Member of Monpa of Dungkharpa Clan of Monpa community. 34. In WP(C) No. 135(AP)/2011, the petitioner's father, who was a Tibetan, settled in Arunchal Pradesh and he married a local schedule tribe lady of Memba community. The petitioner, who was born to the said couple, was adopted as son by his maternal uncle and he grew up as member of Memba community, by adopting the culture of the said community. 35. In both the cases, the petitioners were granted S.T. certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate and after receipt of complaints from Students Organization, the Deputy Commissioner cancelled the said certificates as indicated above. 36. Mr. P.K. Tiwari, learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioners, has submitted that, as the petitioners in both the cases were born and brought up in the society of schedule tribe, i.e. in the society of their mothers, they got assimilated with the culture and religion and other disabilities and shortcomings, to which members of the said communities were subjected.
36. Mr. P.K. Tiwari, learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioners, has submitted that, as the petitioners in both the cases were born and brought up in the society of schedule tribe, i.e. in the society of their mothers, they got assimilated with the culture and religion and other disabilities and shortcomings, to which members of the said communities were subjected. The learned Counsel, has also submitted that, as the petitioners have assimilated with the members of the respective tribal community and got adjusted with their customs and other day-to-day aspect of the life, they were entitled to the benefits to which the other members of the said communities were entitled, in as much they lived together, facing all the common hardships to which the community was exposed. 37. Mr. Tiwari, learned Counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that in WP(C) No. 483(AP)/2010, the petitioner No. 1's father was adopted as a son by his father-in-law and after such adoption, he acquired all the rights and privileges to which a son of a Monpa community would have been entitled. That apart, it is also submitted that the petitioner No. 1, was elected as a Member of the Anchal Samiti and he was conferred with the right of owner of Dungkharpa Clan and thus, he was accepted as a member of the said community. Therefore, it is submitted that the Deputy Commissioner committed error by canceling the S.T. certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate, already issued to the petitioners. 38. It has also been contended that the Board constituted to look into the matter with regard to the social status of the petitioners, did not allow the petitioner No. 1 to cross-examine the witnesses, examined by the Board and that, the evidence of witnesses were taken in absence of the petitioner, that too without affording him opportunity of Cross-examination and thereby the principle of natural justice was violated, causing much prejudice to the petitioner. 39. The learned Counsel has also submitted that in view of the guidelines, prescribed by the Supreme Court, in the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil And Another (supra), the scrutiny should have been done by a Committee, constituted in terms of the guidelines, prescribed by the Supreme Court. Therefore, it is submitted, the recommendations of the Board, which was not constituted as per guidelines, prescribed by the Supreme Court, could have been acted upon by the Deputy Commissioner. 40.
Therefore, it is submitted, the recommendations of the Board, which was not constituted as per guidelines, prescribed by the Supreme Court, could have been acted upon by the Deputy Commissioner. 40. The learned Counsel has submitted that the respondent authorities committed gross error and illegality by canceling the S.T. certificates and Permanent Resident Certificates of the petitioners, without considering the relevant factors, viz., (i) under what circumstances, the petitioners were born, (ii) what was the status of the petitioners in the society, (iii) what was their acceptability in the society, (iv) by whom and how they were brought up, (v) what life they had led in the society, (vi) whether they suffered any social disability and shortcomings, such as, economic, educational, social etc. and (viii) whether they got assimilated in the tribal society as their member. 41. Referring to the said argument, Mr. Tiwari, leaned Counsel, appearing for the petitioner in WP(C) No. 135(AP)/2011, has submitted that the petitioner, being adopted as a son by his maternal uncle, was brought up as a member of the community to which the adoptee father belonged and thus, he suffered from all the disadvantages and shortcomings etc. of the members of the society, to which his adoptee father belonged, i.e. Memba community. 42. In support of his argument, the learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioner, has relied on the following decisions: (i) Arabinda Kumar Saha & Anr. Vs. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2001 (3) GLT 45. (ii) A.S. Khongphai Vs. Stanley D.D. Nichols Roy & Anr., reported in 2008 (1) GLT 180. (iii) Pritam Rongpi Vs. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2008 (1) GLT 248. (iv) Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 400 . (v) Wilson Reade Vs. C.S. Booth & Ors., reported in AIR 1958 Assam 128. (vi) N.E. Horo Vs. Smt. Jahanara Jaipal Singh, reported in (1972) 1 SCC 771 . (vii) Kumari Madhuri Patil & Anr. Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development & Ors., reported in (1994) 6 SCC 241 . (viii) Kumari Madhuri Patil & Anr. Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development, Thane & Ors., reported in (1997) 5 SCC 437 . (ix) Arshad Jamil Vs. State of Uttarakhand & Ors., reported in (2011) 9 SCC 313 . (x) Phriensibon Kharmuthi Vs. Commissioner and Secretary, Education Department, Govt. of Meghalaya & Ors., reported in 2009 (3) GLT 43.
(viii) Kumari Madhuri Patil & Anr. Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development, Thane & Ors., reported in (1997) 5 SCC 437 . (ix) Arshad Jamil Vs. State of Uttarakhand & Ors., reported in (2011) 9 SCC 313 . (x) Phriensibon Kharmuthi Vs. Commissioner and Secretary, Education Department, Govt. of Meghalaya & Ors., reported in 2009 (3) GLT 43. (xi) Dayaram Vs. Sudhir Batham & Ors., reported in (2012) 1 SCC 333 . and (xii) Anjan Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2006) 3 SCC 257 . 43. Refuting the said arguments, advanced by the learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioners, Mr. K. Ete, learned Additional Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh, submitted that a child born through a non tribal father, can not be entitled to the status of schedule tribe, on the ground that his mother is a schedule tribe and that they lived in a tribal locality. The learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that the father of the petitioner No. 1 in WP(C) No. 483(AP)/2010 being a National of Bhutan, his son, i.e. the petitioner No. 1 and the petitioner Nos. 2, 3 & 4, who were grand children of the said Bhutanese, did not acquire the right to enjoy the schedule Tribe status of Arunachal Pradesh. It has also been submitted, by the learned Additional Advocate General, that there is no substantive and reliable evidence to believe that the father of the petitioner No. 1 in WP(C) No. 483(AP))/2010 was adopted as son by his father-in-law. It is also submitted that 'Dungkharpa' being a clan of the Monpa tribe, the conferment of any title or right of Dungkharpa Clan does not indicate that the petitioner No. 1 acquired the membership of Monpa community. 44. It is submitted that the maternal uncle of the petitioner in WP(C) No. 135(AP)/2011, being a Buddhist, he was governed by the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and as such, the said adoption, as claimed by the petitioner, not being as per law, can not confer the right of a son. It is also submitted that the petitioners, in both the cases, were given sufficient opportunity to substantiate their claim, but they failed to do so. 45.
It is also submitted that the petitioners, in both the cases, were given sufficient opportunity to substantiate their claim, but they failed to do so. 45. The learned Additional Advocate General, has submitted that in WP(C) No. 483(AP)/2010, a Board was constituted and the Board, after examining the witnesses, came to the findings that the petitioner No. 1 was the son of a Bhutanese National, while petitioner Nos. 2, 3 & 4 were the grand children of the said Bhutanese and as such, they did not acquire the status of schedule tribe of Arunachal Pradesh. 46. It is also submitted that the certificates regarding adoption in respect of the petitioners in WP(C) No. 135(AP)/2011, being issued on 06.10.1999 and 24.11.1999, i.e. long after the alleged adoption, can not be accepted as reliable document in favour of the claim of adoption inasmuch as the alleged adoption took place in 1989. Therefore, it is submitted that the said certificates, which were issued long after the said date of adoption, raise doubt about the veracity of the petitioner's claim, regarding adoption. 47. The learned Additional Advocate General has also submitted that the Deputy Commissioner committed no error by passing the impugned orders. In support of his contention, the learned Advocate General has also relied on the decisions, held in the cases of Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra), Anjan Kumar (supra) and Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika (supra). 48. Mr. D. Panging, learned Counsel, appearing for the respondent No. 6 in WP(C) No. 483(AP)/2010, has submitted that there was no material to show that the petitioners had assimilated with the Dungkharpa Clan of Monpa tribe and that, the right given by Dungkharpa Clan can not give the status of the member of Monpa community. 49. The learned Counsel has also referred to the averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition, filed by the respondent No. 6. In his affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent No. 6, clearly contended that though the petitioners in WP(C) No. 483(AP)/2010 claimed that the petitioner No. 1's father was adopted by his father-in-law, after the death of the said father-in-law, he was succeeded by his brother Dor Phunte (Khepa) and that, his ancestral property was owned by the said son of the brother of the father-in-law of the petitioner. In the said affidavit, it has also been stated that the father of the petitioner No. 1 had married his mother after the death of his mother's father.
In the said affidavit, it has also been stated that the father of the petitioner No. 1 had married his mother after the death of his mother's father. In view of the above, it is submitted that the claim that the petitioner No. 1's father was adopted as the son by his father-in-law is not correct. 50. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel, appearing for the respondent No. 6, has referred to the decisions, held in the cases of Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika (supra) and Arshad Jamil (supra). 51. Having heard the learned Counsel, appearing for both the parties, it appears that in both the cases, the petitioners claimed the status of schedule tribe by virtue of their upbringing and assimilation amongst the members of community to which their mothers belonged and the adoption as son of a member of the community. They also claimed that, after their assimilation and adoption aforesaid, they followed all the customary rights of the respective communities and thus, they acquired the right to enjoy the status of schedule tribe. The prime contention of the petitioners in both the writ petitions is that the S.T. certificates and Permanent Resident Certificates were arbitrarily and illegally cancelled, without affording them sufficient opportunity and without considering the essential factors, which are required to be determined for the purpose of ascertaining the social status of a person. 52. The further contention of the petitioners is that the decision to take away the Schedule Tribe status and Permanent Resident Certificate, which were earlier granted to them, after following due procedure, was taken without making proper enquiry as per the guidelines, prescribed by the Supreme Court from time to time, more particularly, in the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra). 53. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Arabinda Kumar Saha (supra), referred to the following observation made in the case of Wilson Reade Vs. C.S. Booth & Ors.
53. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Arabinda Kumar Saha (supra), referred to the following observation made in the case of Wilson Reade Vs. C.S. Booth & Ors. (supra), reported in AIR 1958 Assam 128: the test which will determine the membership of the individual will not be the purity of blood, but his own conduct in following the customs and the way of life of the tribe, The way in which he was treated by the community and the practice amongst the tribal people in the matter of dealing with the tribal people in (he mater of dealing with persons whose mother was a Khasi and father was a european. In the said case, the appellant was born of a general category father while his mother was a Schedule Caste. The question which arose was whether the appellant could be treated as a Schedule Caste. The Court held that, to determine as to whether a person belongs to a particular class or community, it is to be examined as to whether the person was accepted by that community as a part of it. Therefore, acceptance of the community as one of the members of their community is a primary requirement in respect of a person, who is born through a non tribal father. 54. Another Division Bench of this Court, in the case of A.S. Khongphai (supra), observed that for determining the question whether a person belongs to the Khasi community or not for the purposes of special representation, not only the purity of blood would be a criteria but all the surrounding circumstances would have to be looked into. 55. In the case of Pritam Rongpi (supra), the question regarding social status of respondent No. 6, who was initially promoted as a member of schedule caste and subsequently got promotion to the higher rank on the ground that he belonged to member of Schedule Tribe (Hills) community, came up for determination. The petitioner alleged that the respondent No. 6 was not a member of schedule tribe community. The respondent No. 6 contended that, he having accepted the traits of the Karbi people, should be treated as a member of Schedule Tribe (Hills) community for all purposes. Necessary certificate in this regard was issued. The said decision was challenged by the petitioner in the said writ petition.
The respondent No. 6 contended that, he having accepted the traits of the Karbi people, should be treated as a member of Schedule Tribe (Hills) community for all purposes. Necessary certificate in this regard was issued. The said decision was challenged by the petitioner in the said writ petition. A learned Single Judge, referring to the guidelines, made in the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil And Another (supra), observed that the scrutiny of the case of the respondent No. 6 was not considered by the committee, as prescribed by the Supreme Court and as such, directed the State Government of Assam to complete the process of constitution of a Scrutiny Committee and Vigilance Cell in compliance of the directions made by the Supreme Court in the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil And Another(supra) within a period of 30 (thirty) days from the date of receipt of the order. Direction was also made to refer the case of the petitioner for necessary scrutiny by such committee and accordingly disposed of the writ petition. The Court further observed that, till such steps were taken by the respondent authorities, the social status of R.6 as found by the Deputy Commissioner would continue. 56. In the case of Rameshbhai Dabhai (supra), the question regarding social status of a person (Schedule Caste/Schedule Tribe), one of whose parents belonged to the Schedule Tribe and the other came from the upper caste, came up before the High Court. The High Court proceeded on the basis of the issue settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Valsamma Paul case, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 545 , followed by Punit Rai case, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 204 and Anjan Kumar case, reported in (2006) 3 SCC 257 . The High Court upheld the decision of the Scrutiny Committee cancelling the tribal certificate, obtained by the appellant, on the ground that his father was non tribal, belonging to the Hindu caste Kshatriya. The High Court did not consider that the appellant's mother was a schedule tribe and the appellant himself and other siblings were married to Nayaks (ST). The High Court also did not refer to the evidence, regarding their upbringing as a member of Nayak community and the appellant's acceptance in that community. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by filing an appeal.
The High Court also did not refer to the evidence, regarding their upbringing as a member of Nayak community and the appellant's acceptance in that community. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by filing an appeal. While allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court observed: 55. In an inter-caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal there may be a presumption that the child has the caste of the father. This presumption may be stronger in the case where in the inter-caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal the husband belongs to a forward caste. But by no means the presumption is conclusive or irrebuttable and it is open to the child of such marriage to lead evidence to show that he/she was brought up by the mother who belonged to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe. By virtue of being the son of a forward caste father he did not have any advantageous start in life but on the contrary suffered the deprivations, indignities, humilities and handicaps like any other member of the community to which his/her mother belonged. Additionally, that he was always treated as a member of the community to which her mother belonged not only by that community but by the people outside the community as well. 56. In the case in hand the tribal certificate has been taken away from the appellant without adverting to any evidence and on the sole ground that he was the son of a Kshatriya father. The orders passed by the High Court and the Scrutiny Committee, therefore, cannot be sustained. The orders passed by the High Court and the Scrutiny Committee are, accordingly, set aside and the case is remitted to the Scrutiny Committee to take a fresh decision on the basis of the evidence that might be led by the two sides. It is made absolutely clear that this Court is not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case of the appellant or the private contesting respondent. 57. In the case of Wilson Reade (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, had examined the question as to whether the appellant could be recorded as a member of Khasi tribe under the Constitution. The father of the appellant was an Englishman, who married late Ka Lainshap Phanwar, a Khasi woman.
57. In the case of Wilson Reade (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, had examined the question as to whether the appellant could be recorded as a member of Khasi tribe under the Constitution. The father of the appellant was an Englishman, who married late Ka Lainshap Phanwar, a Khasi woman. The appellant had never seen his father. From his childhood, he lived amongst the Khasis and excepting a daughter of his, who was married to a Bengali and another, who married an American, all his children were married to Khasis. The appellant himself married a Khasi woman. It was also found that the appellant was considered as a member of the Khasi tribe and he was enjoying the privileges of that community, identifying himself whole-heartedly with the community trying his level best for its welfare all throughout The Court came to the findings that the petitioner could establish that he was a member of Khasi community. 58. In the case of N.E. Horo (supra), the Supreme Court held that the concept of a tribe is bound to undergo changes, when numerous social, economic, educational and other like factors in a progressive country start having their impact. It is noteworthy that a Hinduism Munda and a Munda converted to Christianity can inter-marry and conversion to Christianity does not become an obstacle in the way of such marriage among the Mundas. 59. In the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil and Another (supra), the question was as to whether the appellant belonged to Schedule Tribe (Mahadeo Koli). The said issue was raised at the time of the appellants' admission in MBBS Course. The caste certificate, issued by the respective Executive Magistrate were cancelled and confiscated on the ground, that the Committee, which scrutinized the matter, held that the appellants were not 'Mahadeo Koli', but they were 'Koli' by caste, which is recognized as Other Backward Class, i.e. OBC. They preferred an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, who found that the certificates were issued by an Officer, without jurisdiction. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appellants' writ petition. The Supreme Court, on appeal, upheld the cancellation and confiscation of the certificates, ordered by the Scrutiny Committee and affirmed by the appellate authority. The Supreme Court, with the following observation, laid down the below noted guidelines for issuance of social status certificates. 13.
The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appellants' writ petition. The Supreme Court, on appeal, upheld the cancellation and confiscation of the certificates, ordered by the Scrutiny Committee and affirmed by the appellate authority. The Supreme Court, with the following observation, laid down the below noted guidelines for issuance of social status certificates. 13. The admission wrongly gained or appointment wrongly obtained on the basis of false social status certificate necessarily has the effect of depriving the genuine Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes or OBC candidates as enjoined in the Constitution of the benefits conferred on them by the Constitution. The genuine candidates are also denied admission to educational institutions or appointments to office or posts under a State for want of social status certificate. The ineligible or spurious persons who falsely gained entry resort to dilatory tactics and create hurdles in completion of the inquiries by the Scrutiny Committee. It is true that the applications for admission to educational institutions are generally made by a parent, since on that date many a time the student may be a minor. It is the parent or the guardian who may play fraud claiming false status certificate. It is, therefore, necessary that the certificates issued are scrutinised at the earliest and with utmost expedition and promptitude. For that purpose, it is necessary to streamline the procedure for the issuance of social status certificates, their scrutiny and their approval, which may be the following: 1. The application for grant of social status certificate shall be made to the Revenue Sub-Divisional Officer and Deputy Collector or Deputy Commissioner and the certificate shall be issued by such officer rather than at the Officer, Taluk or Mandal level. 2. The parent, guardian or the candidate, as the case may be, shall file an affidavit duly sworn and attested by a competent gazetted officer or non-gazetted officer with particulars of castes and sub-castes, tribe, tribal community, parts or groups of tribes or tribal communities, the place from which he originally hails from and other particulars as may be prescribed by the Directorate concerned. 3. Application for verification of the caste certificate by the Scrutiny Committee shall be filed at least six months in advance before seeking admission into educational institution or an appointment to a post. 4.
3. Application for verification of the caste certificate by the Scrutiny Committee shall be filed at least six months in advance before seeking admission into educational institution or an appointment to a post. 4. All the State Governments shall constitute a Committee of three officers, namely, (I) an Additional or Joint Secretary or any officer higher in rank of the Director of the department concerned, (II) the Director, Social Welfare/Tribal Welfare/Backward Class Welfare, as the case may be, and (III) in the case of Scheduled Castes another officer who has intimate knowledge in the verification and issuance of the social status certificates. In the case of the Scheduled Tribes, the Research Officer who has intimate knowledge in identifying the tribes, tribal communities, parts of or groups of tribes or tribal communities. 5. Each Directorate should constitute a vigilance cell consisting of Senior Deputy Superintendent of Police in over-all charge and such number of Police Inspectors to investigate into the social status claims. The Inspector would go to the local place of residence and original place from which the candidate hails and usually resides or in case of migration to the town or city, the place from which he originally hailed from. The vigilance officer should personally verify and collect all the facts of the social status claimed by the candidate or the parent or guardian, as the case may be. He should also examine the school records, birth registration, if any. He should also examine the parent, guardian or the candidate in relation to their caste etc. or such other persons who have knowledge of the social status of the candidate and then submit a report to the Directorate together with all particulars as envisaged in the pro forma, in particular, of the Scheduled Tribes relating to their peculiar anthropological and ethnological traits, deity, rituals, customs, mode of marriage, death ceremonies, method of burial of dead bodies etc. by the castes or tribes or tribal communities concerned etc. 6.
by the castes or tribes or tribal communities concerned etc. 6. The Director concerned, on receipt of the report from the vigilance officer if he found the claim for social status to be "not genuine" or 'doubtful' or spurious or falsely or wrongly claimed, the Director concerned should issue show-cause notice supplying a copy of the report of the vigilance officer to the candidate by a registered post with acknowledgement due or through the head of the educational institution concerned in which the candidate is studying or employed. The notice should indicate that the representation or reply, if any, would be made within two weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice and in no case on request not more than 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. In case, the candidate seeks for an opportunity of hearing and claims an inquiry to be made in that behalf, the Director on receipt of such representation/reply shall convene the committee and the Joint/Additional Secretary as Chairperson who shall give reasonable opportunity to the candidate/parent/guardian to adduce all evidence in support of their claim. A public notice by beat of drum or any other convenient mode may be published in the village or locality and if any person or association opposes such a claim, an opportunity to adduce evidence may be given to him/it. After giving such opportunity either in person or through counsel, the Committee may make such inquiry as it deems expedient and consider the claims vis--vis the objections raised by the candidate or opponent and pass an appropriate order with brief reasons in support thereof. 7. In case the report is in favour of the candidate and found to be genuine and true, no further action need be taken except where the report or the particulars given are procured or found to be false or fraudulently obtained and in the latter event the same procedure as is envisaged in para 6 be followed. 8. Notice contemplated in para 6 should be issued to the parents/guardian also in case candidate is minor to appear before the Committee with all evidence in his or their support of the claim for the social status certificates. 9. The inquiry should be completed as expeditiously as possible preferably by day-today proceedings within such period not exceeding two months.
8. Notice contemplated in para 6 should be issued to the parents/guardian also in case candidate is minor to appear before the Committee with all evidence in his or their support of the claim for the social status certificates. 9. The inquiry should be completed as expeditiously as possible preferably by day-today proceedings within such period not exceeding two months. If after inquiry, the Caste Scrutiny Committee finds the claim to be false or spurious, they should pass an order cancelling the certificate issued and confiscate the same. It should communicate within one month from the date of the conclusion of the proceedings the result of enquiry to the parent/guardian and the applicant. 10. In case of any delay in finalising the proceedings, and in the meanwhile the last date for admission into an educational institution or appointment to an officer post, is getting expired, the candidate be admitted by the Principal or such other authority competent in that behalf or appointed on the basis of the social status certificate already issued or an affidavit duly sworn by the parent/guardian/candidate before the competent officer or non-official and such admission or appointment should be only provisional, subject to the result of the inquiry by the Scrutiny Committee. 11. The order passed by the Committee shall be final and conclusive only subject to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. No suit or other proceedings before any other authority should lie. 13. The High Court would dispose of these cases as expeditiously as possible within a period of three months. In case, as per its procedure, the writ petition/miscellaneous petition/matter is disposed of by a Single Judge, then no further appeal would lie against that order to the Division Bench but subject to special leave under Article 136. 14. In case, the certificate obtained or social status claimed is found to be false, the parent/guardian/the candidate should be prosecuted for making false claim. If the prosecution ends in a conviction and sentence of the accused, it could be regarded as an offence involving moral turpitude, disqualification for elective posts or offices under the State or the Union or elections to any local body, legislature or Parliament. 15.
If the prosecution ends in a conviction and sentence of the accused, it could be regarded as an offence involving moral turpitude, disqualification for elective posts or offices under the State or the Union or elections to any local body, legislature or Parliament. 15. As soon as the finding is recorded by the Scrutiny Committee holding that the certificate obtained was false, on its cancellation and confiscation simultaneously, it should be communicated to the educational institution concerned or the appointing authority by registered post with acknowledgement due with a request to cancel the admission or the appointment. The Principal etc. of the educational institution responsible for making the admission or the appointing authority, should cancel the admission/appointment without any further notice to the candidate and debar the candidate from further study or continue in office in a post. 60. While laying down the above guidelines, the Supreme Court further observed: 14. Since this procedure could be fair and just and shorten the undue delay and also prevent avoidable expenditure for the State on the education of the candidate admitted/appointed on false social status or further continuance therein, every State concerned should endeavour to give effect to it and see that the constitutional objectives intended for the benefit and advancement of the genuine Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes or backward classes, as the case may be are not defeated by unscrupulous persons. 61. In 1997, in the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil & Anr. Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development, Thane & Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court modified the direction made in 1994 with regard to the constitution of the committee, holding that there would be three committees comprising of five members with quorum of three members. 62. In the case of Dayaram (supra), the Supreme Court considered the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra). The Supreme Court, while holding that the scheme laid down in the Madhuri Patil will continue in force till suitable legislation was made, made modification in respect of the second sentence of Direction No. 13, thereby providing provision for intra-court appeal as per State law or if letters patent permits. 63. In the case of Arshad Jamil (supra), the question regarding genuineness of caste certificate came up for examination. The appellant claimed that he belonged to Other Backward Classes (OBC). Subsequently, his certificate was found to be not genuine and his caste certificate was cancelled by the Tahsildar.
63. In the case of Arshad Jamil (supra), the question regarding genuineness of caste certificate came up for examination. The appellant claimed that he belonged to Other Backward Classes (OBC). Subsequently, his certificate was found to be not genuine and his caste certificate was cancelled by the Tahsildar. He approached the High Court by filing a writ petition. The High Court's order was challenged before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court observed that the caste certificate was initially issued to the appellant without making a proper and detailed enquiry and that the Tahsildar proceeded on the basis of certain observations of two persons. The Supreme Court further observed that, a caste certificate being a very important and substantial document should be granted after holding proper enquiry and that such certificate should not be issued in a perfunctory manner. 64. In the case of Phriensibon Kharmuthi (supra), the order of termination, without holding a departmental proceeding, was challenged. The Court held that, as the petitioner had abandoned her post and the record revealed misconduct, insubordination and negligence of duty, no prejudice was caused by not holding a departmental proceeding. In the present case, in view of failure to give opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses and non holding of the proper enquiry by the Committee, as prescribed by the Supreme Court in Kumari Madhuri Patil's case, the findings arrived at by the Deputy Commissioner can't stood in the eye of law. Therefore, the said decision doesn't help the respondents. 65. In the case of Anjan Kumar (supra), the question whether the offshoot of tribal woman married to non tribal husband could claim status of Schedule Tribe, came up before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, referring to a catena of decisions, more particularly, the decision held in the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra), observed that the precedent for granting tribe certificate being that one must suffer disabilities wherefrom one belongs and that, the offshoots of wedlock of tribal woman married to a non tribal husband (Forward Class) can not claim Schedule Tribe status only on the ground of such marriage.
Supreme Court further observed that to sustain the claim of Schedule Caste/Schedule Tribe, one must show that he or she suffered disabilities-socially, economically and educationally cumulatively and the authority concerned, before whom such claim is made, is duty bound to satisfy itself that the applicant suffered from the said disabilities before such certificate is issued. It was also observed that any authority concerned, who issued such certificates in a routine manner would be committing a dereliction of constitutional duty. 66. In view of the above cited decisions and the principles laid down therein, there is no difficulty in understanding that when a claim for Schedule Tribe or Schedule Caste certificate is made by children of non tribal father and tribal mother, the authority concerned has the obligation to make thorough and serious enquiry with regard to me social, economical and educational status of the claimant. The authority concerned must come to the conclusion that the claimant suffered from the said disabilities cumulatively. That apart, such authority is also required to examine whether such claimant has been accepted and recognized by the members of the tribe or caste and the manner in which the claimant was brought up and what life he used to live. At the same time, the authority is required to examine whether the claimant, being a son of forward class father, did not have any advantageous start in life and whether he suffered deprivation, indignities, humilities and other handicaps, like, any other member of the community to which his/her mother belonged and whether he/she was always treated or accepted as a member of the community to which his/her mother belonged, not only by that community but also by the people outside the community as well. Any decision, regarding issuance of caste or tribe certificate, without examining the above mentioned factors or such other factors regarding social disadvantage of the claimant cannot be maintained. There is nothing, on-record, to show that in the present cases, the ST certificates were issued to the petitioners in both the writ petitions, after making such thorough enquiry. In fact, the certificates appear to be issued, on being applied for such certificate by the claimants.
There is nothing, on-record, to show that in the present cases, the ST certificates were issued to the petitioners in both the writ petitions, after making such thorough enquiry. In fact, the certificates appear to be issued, on being applied for such certificate by the claimants. As the claimants were offshoots of a non tribal father and a tribal mother, the authority concerned has a lawful duty to examine the entire aspect of the matter with regard to the social, economic, educational status and the upbringing of the petitioners. 67. In the case at hand, upon receipt of the complaint about the genuineness of the certificates, issued to the petitioners in WP(C) No. 483(AP)/2010, a Board was constituted by the Additional Deputy Commissioner and the Board, examined the petitioner No. 1 and other witnesses. From the record, it appears that no notice was issued to the petitioner Nos. 2, 3 & 4, whose ST certificates were also cancelled directing the petitioners to surrender their certificates. There is no dispute that the petitioner No. 1 was not allowed to cross-examine other witnesses, examined by the Board. Further, the witnesses were examined in the absence of the petitioner. Therefore, as the witnesses were examined in the absence of the petitioner No. 1 and he was not allowed to be cross-examine by the petitioner to substantiate his claim, much prejudice was caused to him and as such, there was clear violation of the principles of natural justice. The Additional Deputy Commissioner, on the basis of recommendation, made by the Board, for cancellation of the ST certificates and Permanent Resident Certificate, issued the impugned order, directing all the petitioners of WP(C) No. 483(AP)/2010 to surrender their certificates. In fact, no opportunity was given to the petitioner Nos. 2, 3 and 4 to substantiate their claim. There is nothing, on-record, to find that the Board or the Additional Deputy Commissioner had considered the social status, upbringing, disadvantage etc. in respect of the petitioners. Therefore, the decision of the Board and the subsequent impugned order, passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner can not stand in the eye of law. 68.
There is nothing, on-record, to find that the Board or the Additional Deputy Commissioner had considered the social status, upbringing, disadvantage etc. in respect of the petitioners. Therefore, the decision of the Board and the subsequent impugned order, passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner can not stand in the eye of law. 68. In the case of the petitioner in WP(C) No. 135(AP)/2011, also the Deputy Commissioner, on the basis of the complaint, received from Students Organization, regarding genuineness of the ST certificate of the petitioner directed the Circle Officer to make an enquiry and on the basis of such enquiry and the Police Verification Report, he came to the findings that the petitioner's father was a Tibetan and that, the petitioner's claim that he was adopted by his maternal uncle was not acceptable on the ground that the said maternal uncle being a Buddhist by religion, the adoption was not made as per the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Here also, the Deputy Commissioner did not make any enquiry regarding social, economic and educational status etc. of the petitioner. He also foiled to consider as to how the petitioner was brought up, whether he was accepted and recognized by the members of the community to which his mother belonged and whether he suffered from any disadvantageous start in life, despite being a son of a Tibetan father and whether he suffered the deprivation, indignities, humilities and handicaps, like, any other member of the community, to which his mother belonged In view of the above mentioned principles, laid down by the Supreme Court, for deciding the social status (SC/ST) of a person, the said factors were very much relevant and essential for consideration of the matter. 69. In view of the above, it is found that the authority concerned passed the impugned orders without adhering to the due procedure and also without making proper enquiries. There can be no doubt that issuance of SC/ST certificate to a non deserving person causes deprivation and injustice to the genuine SC/ST candidates in getting admission in educational institution, employment in job and also in enjoying other special privileges. At the same time, failure to issue such certificate to genuine candidates, who are entitled to get a such certificate, despite being son of a non tribal father, causes serious injustice to such genuine person(s). 70.
At the same time, failure to issue such certificate to genuine candidates, who are entitled to get a such certificate, despite being son of a non tribal father, causes serious injustice to such genuine person(s). 70. In the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra), the Supreme Court has provided the requirement of constituting a Scrutiny Committee by all the State Governments for looking into the matter regarding grant of social status certificate. The Supreme Court has emphasized the requirement of such Scrutiny Committee and its constitution at the earliest with utmost expedition and promptitude. As revealed from the materials, on-record, despite making the said direction in 1994 (subsequently modified in 1997 and 2011), no attempt was made by the respondent authorities to comply with the said direction. It clearly found that no enquiry was caused by the respondent authority as per direction made in the above referred cases, more particularly, in the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra), in respect of ST certificates and Permanent Resident Certificates of the petitioners in both the writ petitions. The processes by which the impugned orders were passed, are not inconformity with the direction made by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the recommendation, made by the Board in respect of the petitioners in WP(C) No. 483 (AP)/2010 and the impugned order passed therein as well as the impugned order, dated 09.03.2011, passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner in respect of the petitioner in WP(C) No. 135 (AP)/2011 can not be sustained. 71. The impugned orders passed in the said two writ petitions and the recommendation, made by the Board, constituted in WP(C) No. 483 (AP)/2010, are, accordingly, set aside. 72. The matters are remitted for decisions of the Caste Scrutiny Committee, constituted as per the Scheme, laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra). If the said Scrutiny Committee has not yet been constituted, the State Government shall constitute the Committee as per the Scheme aforesaid within a period of 30 (thirty) days from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment and order. The authority concerned shall refer the case of the petitioners to the Scrutiny Committee.
If the said Scrutiny Committee has not yet been constituted, the State Government shall constitute the Committee as per the Scheme aforesaid within a period of 30 (thirty) days from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment and order. The authority concerned shall refer the case of the petitioners to the Scrutiny Committee. The Committee shall examine and decide the matter regarding social status of the petitioners as per the guidelines, made by Courts from time to time, after giving sufficient opportunity to the parties to substantiate their claims, if necessary, by adducing and cross examining the witnesses, in addition to producing relevant documents/papers etc. The Committee, while deciding the claim of the petitioners as per the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, shall also take into consideration the social status, i.e. social, economic and educational etc. of the petitioners/claimants, their upbringing, their acceptance and reorganization by the society, the difficulties, disadvantage, disabilities, indignities, humilities etc. suffered by them and such other relevant factors, for arriving at a just decision. The Scrutiny Committee shall complete the enquiry within a period of 2 (two) months. Till the entire process is completed, the operation of the S.T. certificates, issued to the petitioners shall remain suspended. It is made clear that this Court is not expressing any opinion on the merit of the cases. A copy of this judgment and order be forwarded to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh for doing the needful. With the above directions, the writ petitions are disposed of. Disposed off