Judgment K.S. Jhaveri, J.—The present appeal, under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is directed against the judgement and order dated 21.11.2006 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Kutch-Bhuj in Sessions Case No. 11 of 2003 whereby the accused-appellant has been convicted of the offence under Sections 302 & 498(A) of Indian Penal Code and is inter alia sentenced to life imprisonment and is ordered to pay fine of Rs. 5000/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years for offence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years and is ordered to pay fine of Rs. 2000/-, in default, rigorous imprisonment for six months for offence under Section 498(A) of Indian Penal Code. 2. The gist of the prosecution case is that on 11.08.2002, at around 0020 hours as the deceased had demanded money from the accused-appellant for meeting with the household expenses, he got infuriated and started physically assaulting her. In a fit of rage, he poured kerosene over her and set her on fire. It is the prosecution case that the accused-appellant used to physically and mentally torture the deceased and used to force her to bring money from her parental house. She was taken to hospital for treatment where she succumbed to the burn injuries. 2.3 (sic) Thereafter, the offence was registered against the present appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 498(A) of Indian Penal Code. Investigation was carried out and charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant. Thereafter, as the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the same was committed to the Sessions Court. 2.4 (sic) The trial was initiated against the appellant and during the course of trial the prosecution examined following witnesses as oral evidences: (i) P.W. 1 – Ravilal Velji Sota Ex. 09 (ii) P.W. 2 – Bakulbhai Soneta Ex. 11 (iii) P.W. 3 – Dr. Mahesh Akhani Ex. 15 (iv) P.W. 4 – Dayalji Parmar Ex. 20 (v) P.W. 5 – Shambhulal Thakkar Ex. 24 (vi) P.W. 6 – Bharat Thakkar Ex. 26 (vii) P.W. 7 – Dineshkumar Thakkar Ex. 30 (viii) P.W. 8 – Mansukh Lalji Patel Ex. 31 (ix) P.W. 9 – Siddique Patel Ex. 33 (x) P.W. 10 – Jitendra Vankar Ex. 36 (xi) P.W. 11 – Vikramsinh Parmar Ex. 44 (xii) P.W. 12 – Raghubha Jhala Ex. 24 (vi) P.W. 6 – Bharat Thakkar Ex. 26 (vii) P.W. 7 – Dineshkumar Thakkar Ex. 30 (viii) P.W. 8 – Mansukh Lalji Patel Ex. 31 (ix) P.W. 9 – Siddique Patel Ex. 33 (x) P.W. 10 – Jitendra Vankar Ex. 36 (xi) P.W. 11 – Vikramsinh Parmar Ex. 44 (xii) P.W. 12 – Raghubha Jhala Ex. 48 2.5 (sic) The prosecution also relied upon the following documents: (i) Post Mortem Note Ex. 16 (ii) Case papers of deceased Ex. 17, 18 (iii) Yadi for Post mortem Ex. 19 (iv) Dying Declaration Ex. 21 (v) Panchnama of scene of offence Ex. 27 (vi) Inquest Panchnama Ex. 32 (vii) Panchnama of clothes worn by accused Ex. 34 (viii) Slip on clothes of accused Ex. 35 (ix) Entry of Janva Jog No. 300/2002 Ex. 45 (x) Entry of Accidental Death No. 44/02 Ex. 46 (xi) Complaint Ex. 49 (xii) Panchnama of samples Ex. 50 (xiii) Report of FSL Ex. 51 (xiv) Yadi for sending muddamal to FSL Ex. 52 (xv) Receipt by FSL Ex. 53, 54 (xvi) Forwarding letter by FSL Ex. 55 (xvii) Forwarding letter by FSL Ex. 56 (xviii) Map of scene of offence Ex. 57 2.6 (sic) At the end of the trial and after recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., and hearing arguments on behalf of prosecution and the defence, the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted the appellant as mentioned aforesaid. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgement and order passed by the Sessions Court the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 3. Mr. P.K. Shukla, learned advocate appearing for the accused-appellant submitted that there are variations in the dying declarations given by the deceased before the doctor and the Executive Magistrate. He submitted that in the history given by the deceased before the doctor she has stated that she sustained burn injuries accidentally. In the version before the magistrate, she has stated that the accused had set her ablaze. He submitted that the dying declaration could not have been relied upon by the trial Court in view of various infirmities in the dying declaration and therefore could not have been made the basis of conviction. 3.1 Mr. Shukla has submitted that there are no eye witnesses to the incident in question who could support the prosecution case. He submitted that the dying declaration could not have been relied upon by the trial Court in view of various infirmities in the dying declaration and therefore could not have been made the basis of conviction. 3.1 Mr. Shukla has submitted that there are no eye witnesses to the incident in question who could support the prosecution case. He submitted that the prosecution witnesses are the near relatives of the complainant and therefore they cannot be relied upon. He submitted that the deposition of witnesses examined by the prosecution are full of contradictions and omissions. He submitted that in view of the same, prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case against the accused. 3.2 In support of his submissions, Mr. Shukla has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Somabhai Ganeshbhai Parmar vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2012 (3) GLR 2444 wherein this Court has held that when dying declaration is doubtful of being voluntary and truthful, conviction cannot be based on same without corroboration and that the Court cannot in all cases presume that dying person would not make a false statement. 4. Ms. Chetna M. Shah, learned APP has supported the order of the trial Court and has submitted that the trial Court has gone into the evidence in detail and has come to the conclusion that the appellant is guilty of the offence so convicted of. She has submitted that considering the barbaric act committed by the appellant in setting his wife ablaze after pouring kerosene, the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant. She also submitted that the sentence imposed upon the appellant is just and proper and does not deserve to be reduced or quashed. 4.1 Ms. Shah submitted that going by the contents in the dying declaration and the vardhi sent for recording the dying declaration it is amply clear that the accused-appellant is guilty of the offence charged against him. Ms. Shah further submitted that the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate is in accordance with law. She submitted that even in the complaint, the brother of the deceased has clearly stated that she had confided in him that it was the accused-appellant who had committed the alleged offence. 5. We have gone through the judgement and order passed by the Court below. She submitted that even in the complaint, the brother of the deceased has clearly stated that she had confided in him that it was the accused-appellant who had committed the alleged offence. 5. We have gone through the judgement and order passed by the Court below. We have also perused the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the trial Court and also considered the submissions made by learned Advocates for both the sides. 6. The trial Court has examined the evidences on record in detail and has come to the conclusion that the appellant is guilty of the offence under Sections 302 & 498(A) of Indian Penal Code. The trial Court has considered the dying declaration given by the deceased, the complaint, the medical evidence and the panchnamas to come to the conclusion that the deceased was done to death by the accused-appellant by pouring kerosene over her and setting her on fire. 6.1 It is not in dispute that the deceased sustained burn injuries at the house of the accused where they were living. The incident occurred at around 00.20 hours on 11.08.2002 and she was admitted in the hospital on the same day where he expired. 6.2 Now, let us consider the dying declaration, its contents and the procedure followed while recording the same. It is borne out that after knowing the condition of the deceased, the police authorities sent a police vardhi to Mr. Dayalji Parmar, Executive Magistrate (P.W. 4) for recording the statement of the deceased. It is also borne out that before recording the statement of the deceased, the Magistrate (PW 04) asked for the opinion of the duty doctor about her condition that whether she was fit to make a statement. The record shows that after receiving the opinion of the doctor that she was fit and conscious enough to record the statement, the Executive Magistrate (PW 04) at 03.40 pm started recording the dying declaration of the deceased. 6.3 The victim-Laxmiben has clearly stated in her dying declaration that her husband did not earn money for a living and that when she demanded money for household expenses, he poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. The victim has appended her finger and thumb impressions of both the hands and left leg toe impression on the said statement after the recording of dying declaration was over at around 03.45 pm. 7. The victim has appended her finger and thumb impressions of both the hands and left leg toe impression on the said statement after the recording of dying declaration was over at around 03.45 pm. 7. P.W. 4, Mr. Dayalji Parmar is the Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration. According to him, the police had moved an application before him for recording the statement of Laxmiben vide Ex. 19 and he had visited the hospital where Laxmiben was admitted and contacted the duty doctor for his opinion about her fitness to make a statement. He asserted that the doctor declared Laxmiben fit to make a statement and that thereafter he recorded the dying declaration. P.W. 04 has reiterated the very facts as mentioned by the deceased in her dying declaration. 8. In the complaint given on 11.08.2002, the complainant brother of deceased has mentioned that after two years of the marriage of his sister with the accused-appellant, small quarrels started taking place as the accused-appellant did not earn regularly and did not give money to the deceased for household expenses. Thereafter, the accused-appellant used to physically assault the deceased and she used to return to her parental house. It is also stated in the complaint that the accused-appellant used to come to the complainant’s house to pacify the deceased and after assuring them that he shall not beat her, he used to bring her back to her matrimonial house. 8.1 It is also stated in the complaint that on the previous night the deceased had called the complainant and informed that they shall be coming to the complainant’s house on 11.08.2002. However, on 11.08.2002, at around 01.00 am, the complainant received a phone call from the neighbours of the accused-appellant that his sister had sustained burn injuries. Hearing this, the complainant, along with his mother and brother rushed to Red Cross Hospital where the victim was brought for treatment. 8.2 As per the complaint, when the mother of the deceased inquired with her as to how she had sustained the burn injuries, she stated that after the telephone call on the previous night when she asked for money the accusedappellant got infuriated and locked her up in the bathroom and poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. 8.2 As per the complaint, when the mother of the deceased inquired with her as to how she had sustained the burn injuries, she stated that after the telephone call on the previous night when she asked for money the accusedappellant got infuriated and locked her up in the bathroom and poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. The complainant has stated that this very fact was also mentioned by the deceased to her elder sister who had also come to the hospital by then. 9. The statement of the deceased in the form of dying declaration is fully acceptable since on receipt of intimation from the police, the Executive Magistrate (PW 04) reached the hospital and after satisfying himself through the statement of the duty doctor that the deceased was conscious and fit to make a statement, recorded her statement in the form of question and answer. From the dying declaration as well as the complaint, as mentioned aforesaid, it is borne out that the accused-appellant had set her on fire. 10. In the case of Shudhakar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2012) 7 SCC 569 , the Apex Court has held that a “dying declaration” is the last statement made by a person at a stage when he is in serious apprehension of his death and expects no chances of his survival. At such time, it is expected that a person will speak the truth and only the truth and that normally in such situations, courts attach intrinsic value of truthfulness to such statement. It is also held that once such statement has been made voluntarily, it is reliable and is not an attempt by deceased to cover up truth or falsely implicate a person, then courts can safely rely on such dying declaration and it can form the basis of conviction, more so where version given by other prosecution evidence, there is no reason for courts to doubt truthfulness of such dying declaration. 10.1 It is settled position of law that if a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration and that if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the Court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not and that while scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the Court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances. In that view of the matter, it is clear that the dying declaration in the present case being voluntary and made in a fit state cannot be discarded. 11. The Janva Jog Entry No. 300/2002 as recorded by the police also mentions that the deceased mentioned that she was burnt by her husband on account of a scuffle between them for money for household expenses. Pursuant to this entry, yadi was sent to Executive Magistrate for recording dying declaration. 12. The two brothers of the deceased are examined as P.W. 1 & 5 respectively. Each of them have supported the prosecution case intoto. They have stated that the deceased had confided in them that the accused-appellant had set her ablaze after a scuffle between them. They have stated that the accused-appellant had physically assaulted her and thereafter locked her in the bathroom and set her on fire. 12.1 P.W. 2, 6, 9 & 10 being panch witnesses have turned hostile. As far as P.W. 7 & 8 are concerned, nothing incriminating is found from their evidence. P.W. 3 has stated that he was informed by the deceased that the injuries were sustained by her accidentally. He has stated that the death of the victim happened due to shock due to extensive burns. He has deposed that the victim had received 98 to 100% IInd to IIIrd degree burns on the whole body except left sole and that she was conscious when was brought to the hospital. 12.2 Moreover, a perusal of the panchnama of scene of offence shows that blood stains were found on the wall of the main room. There is no evidence in the panchnama which suggests that the bathroom was forcibly opened. A matchbox was found from the room which smelt of kerosene. An unlit matchstick was also found lying nearby. 12.2 Moreover, a perusal of the panchnama of scene of offence shows that blood stains were found on the wall of the main room. There is no evidence in the panchnama which suggests that the bathroom was forcibly opened. A matchbox was found from the room which smelt of kerosene. An unlit matchstick was also found lying nearby. Kerosene soot was found from the ceiling of bathroom. 12.3 From the panchnama of clothes worn by the deceased, it is found that the shorts (bermuda) worn by the deceased at the time of scene of offence smelt of kerosene. The accused had sustained burn injuries on his hands, face and stomach and was being treated for the same. The FSL report shows that there were blood stains on the shorts worn by the accused-appellant. 13. Even if the history regarding accidental death is concerned, no explanation has come forth regarding the blood stains found on the wall and on the shorts worn by the accused. Moreover, it is not the case that she was in the kitchen at midnight where she accidentally caught fire. The incident in question happened in the bathroom where kerosene soot is found. It can happen that the accused assaulted the deceased in the main room and thereafter poured kerosene on the deceased and tried to lit matchstick in the main room itself but the deceased trying to escape ran to the bathroom and he put her on fire in the bathroom itself. A matchbox smelling of kerosene and unlit matchstick was found from the main room. 13.1 Learned Counsel for the appellant has challenged the testimonies of the complainant (P.W. 1) and P.W. 5 on the ground that they are related to the deceased and are thereby interested witnesses. We are unable to accept this submission, so far as PW 1 and PW 5 are concerned inasmuch as it is no doubt true that they are closely related to the deceased, being brothers of the deceased and for that reason they may be interested witnesses. However, the law is well settled that the testimony of a partisan or interested witness cannot be discarded merely on that account. The testimony of such a witness cannot be equated with that of a tainted witness. However, the law is well settled that the testimony of a partisan or interested witness cannot be discarded merely on that account. The testimony of such a witness cannot be equated with that of a tainted witness. In Swaran Singh vs. State of Punjab, 1976 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 646 = (1976 Cri LJ 1757), Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows in para 10 :— “More over, it is not the law that the evidence of an interested witness should be equated with that of a tainted evidence or that of an approver so as to require corroboration as a matter of necessity. The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as such, but the Courts require as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is made and the Court is satisfied that the evidence of interested witnesses have a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration.” 13.2 We are also unable to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that if the prosecution does not produce independent witnesses and merely produces interested witnesses adverse inference be drawn. There is no law requiring the prosecution to necessarily produce independent witnesses and adverse inference be drawn merely on account of their non-production. 14. Thus, from the panchnama of scene of offence and panchnama of clothes worn by the accused-appellant coupled with the fact that the accused-appellant also sustained injuries, it is clear that the appellant is guilty of pouring kerosene over his wife and putting her on fire. The versions of the prosecution witnesses is also supported by the dying declaration of the deceased which cannot be lost sight of. We are of the opinion that this is clearly a case of culpable homicide. 15. In the present case, we do not find any doubt in the nature of the dying declaration recorded. The same is also corroborated by the panchnama and other evidence on record. Therefore, the decision relied upon by learned advocate for the appellant in the case of Somabhai Parmar (Supra) shall not be applicable on the facts of the present case. In the present case, we do not find any doubt in the nature of the dying declaration recorded. The same is also corroborated by the panchnama and other evidence on record. Therefore, the decision relied upon by learned advocate for the appellant in the case of Somabhai Parmar (Supra) shall not be applicable on the facts of the present case. 15.1 On the other hand in the case of Panneerselvam vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2008) 17 SCC 190, the Apex Court has held as under: “7. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence. 8. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross- examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.” 15.2 In the case of Gopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2009) 12 SCC 600 , the Apex Court in para 13 has observed as under: “13. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.” 15.2 In the case of Gopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2009) 12 SCC 600 , the Apex Court in para 13 has observed as under: “13. Law relating to appreciation of evidence in the form of more than one dying declaration is well settled. Accordingly, it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout. If the deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declarations, that is to say, if there is more than one dying declaration they should be consistent. However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the Court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not. While scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the Court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances.” 16. It appears from the record that the learned Sessions Judge noticed the vital aspects of the case while holding that the prosecution had proved the offence as committed by the appellant-accused. The prosecution has been able to prove the case against the appellant-accused and therefore we see no reason to interfere. 17. As per the latest decision of the Apex Court, we have appreciated, re-appreciated and re-evaluated the evidence led before the trial Court in its entirety but we are unable to persuade ourselves to take a different view than the one taken by the trial court. 18. Accordingly, appeal is hereby dismissed. The judgement and order dated 21.11.2006 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Kutch-Bhuj in Sessions Case No. 11 of 2003 is confirmed. However, life imprisonment as awarded by the trial Court would not be till last breath and the case of the appellant may be considered by the appropriate authority in accordance with law. R & P, if lying with this court, to be sent back forthwith. * * * * *