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2013 DIGILAW 39 (ALL)

Meera Tandon (Smt. ) v. Shiv Shanker Lal Gupta & Others

2013-01-04

SUDHIR AGARWAL

body2013
Sudhir Agarwal, J.— 1. Heard Sri K.M.Garg, Advocate for the petitioner, Sri R.C.Singh, Advocate for respondents No.1 and 4 and Sri M.K. Gupta, Advocate for respondents No.5 to 10. 2. This writ petition is directed against judgment and order dated 19th July, 2001 (Annexure 21 to the writ petition) passed by XVIth Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar in Rent Appeal No.39 of 1999, allowing the appeal filed by respondents No.1 to 4 and setting aside Trial Court's judgment and order dated 23rd January, 1999 passed in Case No.12 of 1993 under Section 21(1)(b) of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972"), directing the petitioner to hand over vacant possession of disputed accommodation to the respondents No.1 to 4 within 45 days so that respondents-landlords may demolish and reconstruct the same, whereafter the petitioner-tenant may get the accommodation again. 3. The respondents No.1 to 3 are sons of Sri Ganesh Shanker Gupta and respondent no.4 is the wife of respondent No.1. These four respondents filed an application under Section 21(1)(b) of Act, 1972 before Prescribed Authority, Kanpur Nagar registered as Release Case No.12 of 1993 stating that accommodation comprise of seven rooms, one store room, two kitchens, one Kothari, Dalan, Verandah, latrine, bathroom and courtyard situated on the ground floor of House No.25/13 (new number 25/16), Karachi Khana, Kanpur, is in the tenancy of petitioner and now being in dilapidated condition, needs to be demolished for reconstruction and therefore it be directed to be vacated for the said purpose. 4. The application was contested by the petitioner-tenant by filing written statement disputing the contention of respondents no.1 to 4 that the said accommodation is in dilapidated condition. The petitioner-tenant, in support of her stand, filed an Engineer Expert's report to demonstrate that as per the said report, disputed accommodation is quite sound and strong and not in dilapidated condition. 5. The landlord, on the contrary, filed another expert's report. The respondents No.1 to 4 (landlord) also admitted before Trial Court that entire house no.25/13(new 25/16), Karachi Khana, Kanpur measuring about 1380 sq.yards was initially owned by Sri Om Nath Kapoor, Son of Sri Amar Nath Kapoor wherefrom it was purchased by respondents No.1 to 4 vide sale deed dated 29th November, 1982, registered on 25th February, 1983. Now since the accommodation is in dilapidated condition hence needs reconstruction after demolition. Now since the accommodation is in dilapidated condition hence needs reconstruction after demolition. 6. During pendency of application No.12 of 1993, about 122 sq. yards area of aforesaid disputed accommodation sought to be sold by respondents No.1 to 4 to respondents No.5 to 10 and this fact was brought to the notice of Prescribed Authority vide affidavit dated 20th November, 1998 filed by one Ravindra Nath Tandon, son of Late R.N.Tandon on behalf of the petitioner. The subsequently sale deed dated 17th April, 1998 (which is on record as Annexure 16A to the writ petition), was actually executed in favour of respondents No.5 to 10 by respondents No.1 to 4. 7. The Trial Court considered application and dismissed the same vide judgment dated 23rd January, 1999 observing that neither there was any compliance of Rule 17 of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1972") nor respondents No.1 to 4 could prove that disputed accommodation is in dilapidated condition. The mere fact that accommodation constituted a part of an old building necessarily would not result in rendering the entire building in dilapidated condition. It also disbelieved report of Engineer submitted by respondents No.1 to 4 observing that in a very careless manner it was prepared mentioning therein life of building being 150 years though in the sale deed dated 29th November, 1982, whereby respondents No.1 to 4 had purchased the accommodation in question from Sri Om Nath Kapoor, the age of building was mentioned as 80 years only. 8. The respondents No.1 to 4, aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of Trial Court, preferred Rent Appeal No.39 of 1999, which has been allowed by Appellate court vide impugned judgment dated 19th July, 2001. 9. There are some further subsequent events which are very material to the issue in question and therefore it is necessary to refer the same also at this stage. 10. During pendency of appeal, a family partition took place between respondents No.1 to 4 and other family members vide partition deed dated 7th February, 2000, which became part of Court's order dated 17th December, 2000 in Suit No.443 of 2000 before Civil Judge (Senior Division) Kanpur Nagar, as a result whereof respondents No.1 and 4 got 34 percent share in the disputed building and respondents No.2 and 3 got 66 percent share. Thus some part of disputed accommodation came to the exclusive share of respondents no.1 and 4 and other part to the share of respondents No.2 and 3. Thereafter, respondents No.2 and 3 sold their entire share in the disputed building, which they have acquired through the aforesaid partition deed dated 7th February, 2000 to respondents No.5 to 10 vide sale deed dated 16th April, 2004. The consequence therefore, would be that respondents No.2 and 3 i.e. Sri Gauri Shanker Gupta and Sri Uma Shanker Gupta ceased to have any interest in the accommodation in question, which is now to the extent of share of respondents No.2 and 3 is owned by respondents No.5 to 10, who were not party in the proceedings before the Courts below. 11. In respect to other part of the building, including the first floor over the part of building in which disputed accommodation exist on the ground floor, there are certain subsequent events including litigation, which have been placed on record but, for brevity, I am not going into such further details and suffice it to mention that there come to have exist such material subsequent events which have to be taken into consideration and their consequences also have to be appreciated by the Court of first instance or the Courts of fact and without looking into those aspects, the accommodation in question cannot be directed to be vacated by the petitioner at the instance of respondents No.1 to 4, two of whom have now ceased to have any interest in the property in dispute and they have now been replaced by new persons i.e. by respondents No.5 to 10. 12. Sri K.M.Garg, in this respect, has pointed out that change of ownership has necessitated, afresh to be examined the satisfaction of requirement of Rule 17 of Rules, 1972 failing which order impugned in the writ petition cannot be given effect to. He has made further submissions in respect to various other aspects of the matter but only one more submission, in my view, need be mention hereat. He pleaded that findings of Appellate Court in respect to condition of disputed accommodation whether dilapidated or not is very shallow, superficial, perfunctory and casual. The issue is substantive one and forms the very basis of application. It is a mixed question of facts and law. He pleaded that findings of Appellate Court in respect to condition of disputed accommodation whether dilapidated or not is very shallow, superficial, perfunctory and casual. The issue is substantive one and forms the very basis of application. It is a mixed question of facts and law. Before reversing the findings of Trial Court on this aspect, Appellate Court was under an obligation to look into the condition of disputed accommodation in its entirety, various evidence available before it and thereafter to examine whether in view of such evidence it has been proved by landlord that building is in dilapidated condition and thereafter it has to be seen further whether claim of landlord for its vacation for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction is genuine and satisfy requirement of law including conditions prescribed in Rule 17 of Rules, 1972. 13. Sri M.K.Gupta, learned counsel appearing for respondents no.5 to 10 though attempted to justify findings of Appellate Court on the condition of building but his stress is quite faint and after some arguments, he could not dispute that findings on the condition of building recorded by Appellate Court are not happily worded and he finds it difficult to claim that the same satisfy requirement of law and can be said to be a reasoned and speaking order. He, however, could not dispute that in view of subsequent events, the case deserve to be reconsidered/examined but instead remanding it to the Trial Court, he submitted that entire exercise may be undergone by Appellate Court. 14. In my view, justice can be done by setting aside the impugned appellate judgment and order dated 19th July, 2001 and remanding the matter to the Appellate Court to decide the appeal afresh. The Appellate Court shall permit the parties to place on record subsequent events, evidence, if any, adduced by parties and thereafter decide appeal afresh looking into the subsequent events also and in particular requirement of Rule 17 of Rules, 1972 in changed circumstances. 15. I refrain myself in expressing any opinion on the merits of the contentions otherwise raised by petitioner's counsel for the reason that since the matter is being remanded to the Appellate Court, any expression or opinion on merits of the matter as such may prejudice the interest of either of the party and therefore I am refraining from doing so. 16. 16. This writ petition is accordingly allowed to the exent that appellate judgment dated 19th July, 2001 (Annexure 21 to the writ petition) is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded to the Appellate Court for deciding the Appeal No.39 of 1999 (Shiv Shanker Lal & Ors. Vs. Smt. Meera Tandon & Ors.) afresh, as directed above. The Appellate Court shall endeavour to decide the appeal expeditiously but in any case within six months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before it, subject to other business of the Court. 17. The parties shall bear their own costs. _____________