ORDER 1. By invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the Code), the petitioners have called in question the legality, validity and propriety of the impugned order dated 2.7.11 passed by I Additional Sessions Judge, Vidisha in Criminal Revision No. 61/11 affirming the order dated 25.4.11 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kurwai, District Vidisha in Criminal Case No. 12/2008/ section 145 of the Code whereby an order directing delivery of the possession to the respondent herein has been passed. 2. The facts necessary for adjudication of this matter are that the respondent herein filed an application on 23.10.08 under section 145 of the Code before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kurwai, District Vidisha. The SDM passed an order under section 145(1) of the Code and issued notices to both the parties. On the same day, an order under section 146(1) of the Code directing the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station, Kurwai to deliver the disputed land in supardgi to Anwar Khan S/o Dildhar Khan was passed. On 18.11.08, the petitioners herein have filed an application for change of receiver and by allowing the application on 29.1.09, Laxman Singh was appointed as receiver. Thereafter, after affording opportunity of being heard to both the parties, the SDM by an order dated 25.4.11 held that the respondent herein is the owner and in possession of the land in dispute and directed to the supardgidar, Laxman Singh to handover the possession to the respondent herein. The order dated 25.4.11 was tested before the Additional Sessions Judge, Vidisha in Criminal Revision No. 61/11 by the present petitioners. The Revisional Court by the impugned order dated 2.7.11 dismissed the revision and maintained the order passed by the SDM, Kurwai, Being aggrieved by both the orders, this petition has been preferred by the petitioners herein. 3. Shri Rajmani Bansal, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that there was no material before both the Courts below which shows that the respondent herein was in possession and on the contrary, the material shows that the petitioners are in possession. 3. Shri Rajmani Bansal, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that there was no material before both the Courts below which shows that the respondent herein was in possession and on the contrary, the material shows that the petitioners are in possession. Section 145 of the Code is applicable only when the person is in possession of the disputed property but in the present case, the petitioners herein are in possession of the disputed property and on the basis of this factual matrix, the apex Court granted stay in favour of the petitioners herein. The suit property was attached from the possession of the petitioners. Therefore, an order passed directing the delivery of possession to the respondent herein is illegal and arbitrary. It is further submitted that the Magistrate while deciding the proceedings under section 145 of the Code has to decide which of the party had been in possession on the date of preliminary order and within two months next before it. The SDM has not conducted any enquiry as required under proviso to section 145 (4) Code. In absence of any material to show that land was in possession of the respondent herein on the date of complaint or soon before it, section 145 of the Code could not have been invoked and the remedy is only to file a civil suit for restoration of the possession. He has placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) Kunjbihari v. Balram and another, (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 376; (ii) R.C. Patuck v. Fatima A. Kindasa and others, 1997 SCC (Cri) 679 (iii) Bharat Prasad and others v. State of Bihar and others, (2009) 6 SCC 698; and (iv) Mahar Jahan and others v. State of Delhi and others, (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 320 4. On the contrary, Shri S.K. Shrivastava, learned counsel for the respondent submits that initially Kunwarlal, the father of the petitioner No. 1 filed a civil suit for declaration, permanent injunction and for restoration of the possession by virtue of ‘Will’ against predecessors of the respondent herein. He lost from this Court and even the SLP filed before the apex Court was withdrawn by him. Meaning thereby, the possession is still with the respondent herein. He lost from this Court and even the SLP filed before the apex Court was withdrawn by him. Meaning thereby, the possession is still with the respondent herein. It is further stated that after withdrawal of the SLP the petitioners herein started creating nuisance and hindrance over the suit property, therefore, the respondent herein filed an application under section 145 of the Code which was allowed by the SDM after considering the material placed on record. The SDM opined that the respondent herein was in possession at the time of filing the application under section 145 of the Code and, therefore, passed the order in favour of the respondent herein. The conduct of the petitioners of placing the false affidavits before the SDM shows that they want to grab the property of the respondent herein by hook or crook. The finding of fact arrived at by the SDM cannot be interfered with by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code. In this regard, he has cited Sarwar Beg and others v. Satyanarain and others, 2005 (3) MPLJ 432 wherein this Court held as under: “7. When a finding of fact was arrived by the SDM on appreciation of the material before him, the same cannot interfered with by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. In a petition under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code it is not the practice of the High Court to go into the disputed question of fact. It is not open to a party to assail a concurrent finding of fact given by two Courts below. It is not a case where a glaring thing is brought to the notice of this Court which proved beyond any shadow of doubt that the facts mentioned in the order are not true. 8. When there was a clear finding in the order of the SDM that the apprehension of breach of peace exists, existence of emergency was implicit in the order, therefore, it will not be appropriate to interfere with the orders of the Courts below. The petition is, therefore, sans merit and the same is dismissed.” 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and bestowed my anxious consideration on rival contentions. 6. The petition is, therefore, sans merit and the same is dismissed.” 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and bestowed my anxious consideration on rival contentions. 6. In Kunjbihari (supra), it has been held by the apex Court that if any party claims to be in possession of the property and seeks its protection, it is for that party to approach the civil Court and get an appropriate order. The proceedings under section 145 of CrPC cannot be allowed to continue. In R.C. Patuck (supra), the apex Court observed as under: “9. It will be seen from the facts stated above that the order under section 145(1) was passed by the learned Magistrate on 16.3.1993. The question is whether the Magistrate could have passed any order in favour of the petitioner under sub-section (4) of section 145. Going by the main sub-clause (4) of section 145 it is clear that the Magistrate could initially decide who was in possession as on the date when the order under section 145 (1) was passed on 16.3.1993. In cases where the proviso to the said sub-clause (4) applied, that is, if it appeared to the Magistrate that any party had been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate might treat the party so dispossessed as if the said party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1). In other words, if the conditions mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (4) were satisfied, the Magistrate could deem a person to be in possession as on the date of the order under section 145 (1) notwithstanding the fact that he was not in fact in possession on that date, but lost possession earlier, within two months before the order ............” 7. In Bharat Prasad and others (supra), there was clear finding of fact in bataidari proceeding that the appellants are bataidars. In such circumstances, it has been held by the apex Court that if the respondents are aggrieved by the findings reached in the bataidari proceeding they have the statutory right of the appeal to be exercised according to law. In Bharat Prasad and others (supra), there was clear finding of fact in bataidari proceeding that the appellants are bataidars. In such circumstances, it has been held by the apex Court that if the respondents are aggrieved by the findings reached in the bataidari proceeding they have the statutory right of the appeal to be exercised according to law. Without doing that the effect of bataidari proceeding cannot be scuttled with the subterfuge and juggle of sections 144/145 of the Code. 8. In Mahar Jahan and others (supra), it has been held by the apex Court as under: “4. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the parties that this very property which is the subject-matter of these criminal proceedings is also the subject-matter of the civil suit pending in the civil Court. The question as to possession over the property or entitlement proceedings have remained pending for about a decade. We do not find any propriety behind allowing these proceedings to continue in view of the parties having already approached the civil Court Whichever way proceedings under section 145 CrPC may terminate, the order of the criminal Court would always be subject to decision by the civil Court. Inasmuch as the parties are already before the civil Court, we deem it proper to left the civil suit be decided and therein appropriate interim order be passed taking care of the grievances of the parties by making such arrangement as may remain in operation during the hearing of the civil suit. 9. Admittedly, the petitioner No. 1, Ramcharan is the son of Kunwarlal who had died. Phoola Bai was the widow, Deva Bai and Kasturi Bai were the daughters of the deceased, Dhiraj Singh and the respondent herein is claiming the property in dispute through them. 10. From a bare perusal of the record, it is evident that Phoola Bai and others filed a civil suit for declaration and injunction against Kunwarlal and others which was numbered as Civil Suit No. 39-A/78 wherein it was alleged that the disputed land situated at village Karmodia was owned by Dhiraj Singh (since deceased), husband of Phoola Bai. 10. From a bare perusal of the record, it is evident that Phoola Bai and others filed a civil suit for declaration and injunction against Kunwarlal and others which was numbered as Civil Suit No. 39-A/78 wherein it was alleged that the disputed land situated at village Karmodia was owned by Dhiraj Singh (since deceased), husband of Phoola Bai. The defendants have no right, title and interest over the suit property and they are interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs on the basis of forged ‘Will’ alleged to be executed by the deceased, Dhiraj Singh in their favour, hence they filed a civil suit claiming declaration of title, injunction and to restrain the defendants from interfering in their possession over the suit land. The defendant, Kunwarlal had also filed Civil Suit No. 42A/78 for declaration of title, possession and injunction in respect of the same land alleging that the land was owned by Dhiraj Singh who had died on 2.10.1977. He (Kunwarlal) was residing with the deceased, Dhiraj Singh and was serving him, The deceased, Dhiraj Singh executed a ‘Will’ dated 4.6.75 in his favour in respect of the suit land and, therefore, he has acquired the title to the suit land, therefore, he be declared as owner of the suit land. It was also prayed that the defendants be restrained from interfering in his possession and alternative, it was prayed that if the Court finds that the defendant, Phoola Bai to be in possession of the suit land then, a decree for restoration of possession be granted in his favour. 11.The suit filed by Phoola Bai was partly decreed by the Trial Court to the extent that the defendants shall not dispossess her without following the due process of law and the suit filed by Kunwarlal was decreed, hence, two civil appeals were filed by Phoola Bai and both the appeals were dismissed by the First Appellate Court and, therefore, two second appeals bearing S.A. No. 29/90 and S.A. No. 40/90 were filed by Phoola Bai and others. During the pendency of the proceedings, Phoola Bai had died and, therefore, her legal representatives were brought on record. During the pendency of the proceedings, Phoola Bai had died and, therefore, her legal representatives were brought on record. Both the second appeals were allowed by a common judgment dated 18.3.2005 passed by this Court holding that Phoola Bai being widow of Dhiraj Singh entitled to succeed his property and granted declaration of title as well as injunction whereby restrained the defendants from dispossessing her. The suit filed by Kunwarlal for declaration of title, possession and injunction was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid common judgment passed in the second appeals by this Court, Kunwarlal filed SLP wherein on 3.10.2005, the apex Court passed the following order: “Without going into this dispute as to who is in possession, we direct that status quo as of today shall be maintained” This SLP was dismissed by the apex Court as withdrawn vide order dated 19.8.2008. Thus, the rights of the parties settled by the judgment and decree passed by this Court, none of the parties is justified in re-agitating the same issue again, The parties must respect the judgments and decrees of the Courts.