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2013 DIGILAW 391 (AP)

Voosa Satyanarayana v. Sunkara Veerapandu

2013-06-05

SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU

body2013
JUDGMENT The only substantial question of law that arises for determination in this second appeal is: “Whether a debtor who does not hold any lands and who lives by selling milk derived from she buffalo reared by him, is a ‘small farmer’ within the definition of Section 3(t) of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Indebtedness (Relief) Act, 1977 (AP Act 7 of 1977) or Act 45 of 1987.” The plaintiff is the appellant herein. He filed the suit for recovery of money based on Ex.A1 promissory note dated 05.10.1986 executed by the first defendant for Rs.10,000/- which is said to have been borrowed thereunder from the plaintiff. After issuing Ex.A2 demand notice, which was received by the first defendant as per Ex.A3 postal acknowledgment, the plaintiff filed the suit in the trial Court. Apart from pleading failure of part of consideration under Ex.A1 and partial discharge of the debt, the first defendant contended that he is a ‘small farmer’ within the meaning of the AP Act 7 of 1977 and that therefore the suit debt stood discharged. After death of the first defendant, the defendants 2 to 7 were impleaded as his legal representatives. After trial, the trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for. The defendants 5 and 6 filed appeal in the lower appellate Court on the point of exorbitant nature of interest and entitlement of the benefits of the AP Acts 7 of 1977 and 45 of 1987. The lower appellate Court found that the interest claimed is not exorbitant and is not liable to be scaled down, but the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the first defendant and consequently the defendants 2 to 7 are entitled to the benefits of the Andhra Pradesh Act 45 of 1987. Questioning the same, the plaintiff filed this second appeal. The appellants’ counsel did not question any findings of the lower appellate Court on facts. The lower appellate Court came to the conclusion after going through evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 and D.Ws.1 and 2 that the deceased first defendant was not holding any land at all and that he was living by selling milk derived from she buffalo reared by him. The lower appellate Court came to the conclusion after going through evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 and D.Ws.1 and 2 that the deceased first defendant was not holding any land at all and that he was living by selling milk derived from she buffalo reared by him. In those circumstances, the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that dairy farming is included in the definition of ‘agriculture’ under Section 3(a) of the AP Act 7 of 1977 and that principal means of livelihood of the first defendant was therefore agriculture and consequently the first defendant is not entitled to the benefits of the AP Act 45 of 1987. It is contended by the appellants’ counsel that a person in order to become a ‘small farmer’, has to satisfy all the ingredients of Section 3(t) of the Act and that it is not sufficient if he satisfies only one of the ingredients thereunder by taking aid of Section 3(a) of the Act. On the other hand, it is contended by the respondents’ counsel that dairy farming is included in the definition of ‘agriculture’ under Section 3(a) of the Act and that in case a person’s principal means of livelihood is from agriculture, i.e., dairy farming, then that person would be entitled to the benefits of the AP Act 45 of 1987. The respondents’ counsel also sought to rely upon N. SUDHAKARARAO v. Y.BASAVARAO (1984(2) A.P.L.J. 226)in this regard. Relief under the AP Act 7 of 1977 and the AP Act 45 of 1987 was granted by the legislature to three types of debtors, namely a ‘small farmer’, an ‘agricultural labourer’ and a ‘rural artisan’. That is how a ‘debtor’ is defined under Section 3(j) of the Act. The plea in this case is that the first defendant is a ‘small farmer’. It is not plea of the first defendant or other defendants that the first defendant was an agricultural labourer or a rural artisan. Therefore, it has to be seen whether the first defendant satisfied requirements /ingredients/statutory facts contained in the definition of a ‘small farmer’ under the Act. It is not plea of the first defendant or other defendants that the first defendant was an agricultural labourer or a rural artisan. Therefore, it has to be seen whether the first defendant satisfied requirements /ingredients/statutory facts contained in the definition of a ‘small farmer’ under the Act. Section 3(t) of the Act defines ‘small farmer’ in the following terms: “3(t) ‘small farmer’ means a person whose principal means of livelihood is income derived from agricultural land and who holds and personally cultivates, or who cultivated as a tenant or sharecropper or mortgagee with possession, agricultural land which does not exceed in extent. (i) in the case of persons other than members of the Scheduled Tribes, one hectare, if it is wet, or two hectares, if it is dry; (ii) in the case of the members of the Scheduled Tribes, two hectares, if it is wet, or four hectares, if it is dry but does not include any person whose annual household income, other than from agriculture exceeds one thousand and two hundred rupees in any two years within three years immediately preceding the commencement of this Act.” The above definition discloses that a person in order to become a ‘small farmer’ has to satisfy two primary ingredients, namely (1) that his principal means of livelihood is income derived from agriculture; and (2) that he holds and personally cultivates agricultural land which does not exceed the prescribed extent. Both the ingredients have to be satisfied before claiming that he is a ‘small farmer’. Both the ingredients have to be read conjointly and not disjointly. Unless both the ingredients are satisfied, a person does not become a ‘small farmer’. Section 3(a) of the Act defines ‘agriculture’ in the following terms: “(a) ‘agriculture’ with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions includes— (i) horticulture; (ii) the raising of crops (including plantation crops), grass or garden produce; (iii) dairy farming; (iv) poultry farming; (v) breeding of livestock and bees; (vi) grazing; but does not include the cutting of wood only.” Definition of ‘agriculture’ contained in 3(a) is useful for interpreting the first ingredient of Section 3(t). If both section 3(a) and 3(t) are read together, then what emerges is that a person in order to claim himself to be a ‘small farmer’, should necessarily hold, possess and personally cultivate less than the prescribed extent of the land and it is immaterial that in addition to personal cultivation of the land, that person has got any dairy farming and depends on income from dairy farming also. The legislature gave relief to a ‘small farmer’ only and not to every agriculturist who comes within the definition of 3(a) of the Act. This Court interpreted Section 3(a) of the Act in N. SUDHAKAR RAO (1 supra) in that context and not de hors the definition and the ingredients contained in Section 3(t) of the Act. In that view of the matter, the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate Court is erroneous in law. The lower appellate Court did not read Section 3 (t) of the Act in its entility and was carried away by a paragraph in N. SUDHAKAR RAO (1 supra) of this Court. I find on the substantial question of law that a person who does not hold any land and who lives from income derived from business in milk drawn by him from she buffalo reared by him, is not a ‘small farmer’ and is not entitled to the benefits of the AP Act 7 of 1977 and the AP Act 45 of 1987. In the result, the second appeal is allowed with costs throughout setting aside judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court and restoring the decree granted by the trial Court.