ORDER : 1. Even though this matter is listed for final disposal on several occasions, there was no representation for the first respondent. Finally, when the matter was listed on 18.11.2013 for hearing, it was directed to be posted under the caption 'for orders' today. Today also, there is no representation for the first respondent. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the materials placed before this court. 2. The petitioner is the Management challenging the order of the second respondent dated 20.05.2003 in directing the petitioner herein to reinstate the first respondent in the post of Night Watchman without any backwages. 3. Short facts that lead to the filing of this writ petition are as follows: The petitioner herein is a Co-operative institution constituted under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act and Rules framed thereunder. The Management of the petitioner Bank was vested with the elected Board of Directors until it was dissolved on 25.05.2001. The petitioner Bank sought approval of the cadre strength to its establishment and the Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Virudhunagar through proceedings dated 25.04.1998 approved the cadre strength to the post of Secretary, Manager, Assistant, Sub-staff numbering 1, 3, 12 and 4 respectively. For making such appointment to the post: (i) there must be an approved cadre strength and such vacancy fallen within the approved cadre strength has to be filled up with prior permission of the Deputy Registrar. (ii) no appointment shall be made to any post without calling the list of eligible candidates from the employment exchange or adopting the other modes, if the employment exchange certifies that there were no other eligible candidates. (iii) the candidates should possess all educational and other qualifications and the communal rotation has to be followed. The Management of the petitioner society was not at liberty to make appointments as it pleases. The elected Board was dissolved on 25.05.2001 and the Special Officer was appointed for the administration of the petitioner society. Through circular dated 02.07.2001, the Registrar instructed all the Special Officers to rectify the irregularities in respect of appointments made by the erstwhile Boards in violation of the above norms. The audit report for the year 2000-01, referred the appointment of the first respondent as beyond the cadre strength. There was no approved vacancy to the post of Night Watchman. Through circular dated 02.07.2001, the Registrar instructed all the Special Officers to rectify the irregularities in respect of appointments made by the erstwhile Boards in violation of the above norms. The audit report for the year 2000-01, referred the appointment of the first respondent as beyond the cadre strength. There was no approved vacancy to the post of Night Watchman. Therefore, the petitioner issued an order of dismissal on 10.10.2001 against the first respondent. An appeal was preferred by the first respondent before the second respondent u/s 41 of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 challenging the termination. The second respondent allowed the appeal on 20.05.2003, which is impugned in this writ petition, whereby the petitioner was directed to reinstate the first respondent without backwages. 4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the post of night Watchman was not an approved post and there was no cadre strength to the said post as approved by the competent authority. Therefore, the appointment of the first respondent was illegal and consequently, the termination order passed against the first respondent ought not to have been interfered with by the second respondent. Learned counsel also submitted that the finding of the second respondent in respect of the cadre strength is against the facts and based on mere presumption and assumption, when the very appointment itself is illegal and in violation of all the norms. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that there is no question of giving any opportunity of hearing to the first respondent, as his very appointment is illegal. In support of his submission, the learned counsel relied on L. Justine and Another vs. The Registrar of Coop. Societies and Others, (2003) 1 LLJ 284, to contend that the principles of natural justice need not be followed in the case of illegal appointments. He further relied on The Management of Melur Co-operative Urban Bank Limited vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appellate Authority under Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act) and Others, (2003) 4 CTC 525, to contend that when such appointment was an illegal appointment, the person who was terminated is not entitled to file an appeal under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 as he does not acquire the status of an employee. For the very same contention, the learned counsel also relied on Tindivanam Co-operative Housing Society Limited vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour and G. Rajarajan, (2003) 2 LLJ 754. 5. A perusal of the order passed by the second respondent would show that he has come to the conclusion that the appointment of the first respondent was within the cadre strength based on the working capital of the Bank. On the other hand, in the counter affidavit filed by the petitioner herein before the second respondent, it has been categorically stated that the Joint Registrar of the Cooperative Societies, Virudhunagar, through his proceedings dated 25.04.1998 approved the cadre strength as follows:- Category of Posts Number of Posts 1. Secretary 1 2. Manager 3 3. Assistant 12 4. Sub-Staff 4 6. From the perusal of the above facts, it is seen that no post of Night Watchman was either approved by the competent authority or placed within the cadre strength of the petitioner Bank. It is also specifically stated in the very same counter by the petitioner that when there was no post of watchman within the approved cadre strength, the appointment made by the then President was in respect of a non existing post. The second respondent failed to consider this aspect while passing the order. On the other hand, he has made a general observation that the petitioner Bank is having 10 crores as working capital and therefore, there is a cadre strength for such appointment. Requirement of a post cannot be construed as an automatic sanction or approval of the said post. I find no other contra material is placed by the first respondent before the second respondent with regard to the availability of the cadre strength in respect of the post of Watchman. Therefore, I am of the view that the second respondent has totally mislead himself with regard to the factum of cadre strength as his finding is against the factual aspects of the matter as placed by the petitioner before him in the counter affidavit. 7. The Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in L. Justine and Another vs. The Registrar of Coop. Societies and Others (supra) has observed that appointment of the staff made to the cooperative society by the elected body in violation of the prescribed cadre strength, etc. cannot stand and the same is null and void. 7. The Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in L. Justine and Another vs. The Registrar of Coop. Societies and Others (supra) has observed that appointment of the staff made to the cooperative society by the elected body in violation of the prescribed cadre strength, etc. cannot stand and the same is null and void. Thus, when the very appointment being an illegal appointment and has to be treated as null and void, the applicability of principles of natural justice was also considered in the above case at paragraph No. 6 as follows: 6. It is true that termination of services results in civil consequences and that audi alteram partem rule has to be followed. But the theory of principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straightjacket and it is not an absolute rule that in each and every adverse order, there should be a strict adherence to the principles of natural justice. One such exception to audi alteram partem rule is absence of any legal right to defend the impugned action and in fact, such cases are covered by the "useless formality theory" propounded by the Supreme Court in Aligarh Muslim University and Others vs. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 . 8. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on Aligarh Muslim University and Others vs. Mansoor Ali Khan (supra) to contend that when no two views are possible, there is no necessity to follow the principles of natural justice in strict sense. Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the said decision reads as follows: 19. This is the crucial point in this case. As already stated under point 4, in the case of Mr. Mansoor Ali Khan, notice calling for an explanation had not been issued under Rule 5(8)(i) of the 1969 Rules. Question is whether interference is not called for in the special circumstances of the case? 20. As pointed recently in M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India and Others, (1999) 6 SCC 237 , there can be certain situations in which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference under Article 226 is not necessary. For example where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference under Article 226 is not necessary. Similarly, if the quashing of the order which is in breach of natural justice is likely to result in revival of another order which is in itself illegal as in Godde Venkateswara Rao vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, AIR 1966 SC 828 , it is not necessary to quash the order merely because of violation of principles of natural justice. 9. Further, in a decision reported in The Management of Melur Co-operative Urban Bank Limited vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appellate Authority under Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act) and Others (supra) it is held by following the Justine's case that the persons appointed in the cooperative societies without going through the employment exchange and such appointments were made not in accordance with Rule 149 of the said rules, such appointments are not only irregular appointment but also illegal appointment and persons so appointed do not acquire the status of an employee under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 and cannot invoke 41(2). Paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 of the said decision reads as follows: 22. In the case of the second respondent in W.P. No. 21591 of 2000, a further order came to be issued on 26.12.1998 stating that as per the Managing Committee's resolution No. 14, he would be paid a consolidated pay of Rs. 1500 per month from 1.1.1999. Thereafter, another order came to be issued on 31.5.1999 stating that his employment was confirmed as per the Management Resolution No. 21 with effect from 1.6.1999 and that he would be extended with the benefits that are extended to other Junior Assistant. His pay was also fixed in the basic pay of Rs. 455 and that he would earn his next increment from 1.6.2000 and his probation was fixed as one year. 23. In the case of the second respondent in W.P. No. 21617 of 2000, after the initial order dated 4.8.1998, providing for engagement of daily wage basis, he was issued with an order dated 31.5.1999 to the effect that he would be paid consolidated wage of Rs. 1200 per month from 1.6.1999 as per the decision taken in the Management Committee's Resolution No. 21. 24. 1200 per month from 1.6.1999 as per the decision taken in the Management Committee's Resolution No. 21. 24. Therefore, the above orders by which the respective second respondents came to be employed in the petitioner's society disclose that their appointment was not pursuant to any sponsorship through Employment Exchange nor was their employment made in compliance with Rule 149 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules. None of the above said proceedings disclose that their employment was to any notified vacancy nor by absorbing the regular process of appointments which is normally made in the employment of person in the services of the petitioner society. In other words, the appointment of the respective second respondents cannot be characterised as merely an irregular appointment, but will have to be construed only as an illegal one. If that be the only conclusion that can be reached based on the available documents placed before the first respondent, the question of consideration is whether they had acquired the status of an employee in the petitioner society in order to maintain their appeal u/s 41(2) of the Act. The emphatic answer to the said question would only be 'No'. If that is the irresistible conclusion to be reached as regards the status of the respective second respondents by virtue of the orders issued by the petitioner to them while allowing them to render service in the petitioner society during the relevant period, going by the well settled proposition of law laid down by the First Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in 2002 (4) CTC 385 and the ratio of the judgment of His Lordship Mr. Justice E. Padmanabhan, in the judgment reported in Tindivanam Co-operative Housing Society Limited vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour and G. Rajarajan (supra) it will have to be held that the appeals preferred by the respective second respondents before the first respondent were not maintainable. 10. Thus, from the above decision of this Court, it is clear that the first respondent is not an employee as contemplated under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 and consequently, he is not entitled to seek any relief under 41(2) of the said Act, in view of the fact that his appointment itself is an illegal appointment as the same was made without there being any approved cadre strength to the post of Watchman. In fact, no such post was ever approved by the competent authority and therefore, there is no question of considering the cadre strength to the said post also. It is also a fact that the appointment of the first respondent was not made through the employment exchange. Therefore, the first respondent was not entitled to the relief as claimed by him under the said Act. The very same view was taken by another learned single Judge of this Court in a decision reported in Tindivanam Co-operative Housing Society Limited vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour and G. Rajarajan (supra) wherein at paragraph 11, the learned Judge has observed as follows. 11. When the appointment itself is illegal and void, the second respondent-workman cannot approach the first respondent nor he could complain that the order impugned is an illegal termination nor it could be treated as punitive or illegal. The termination in this case, as already pointed out, is a termination simpliciter or dispensing with the service of a person, who has not been appointed validly and who has not acquired any right to the post. The order passed by the first respondent, Deputy Commissioner of Labour under S. 41(2) is illegal and suffers with error apparent on the face of the record and it has to be quashed. As no valid right has accrued to the second respondent in respect of the post in which he was appointed temporarily and for a fixed period and even such appointment being invalid and non est, the second respondent cannot move the appellate authority complaining non-employment or illegal termination. 12. All these aspects both on facts as well as on law are failed to be considered by the second respondent while passing the impugned order. Thus, it has resulted in passing an erroneous order which has been rightly challenged by the petitioner Management before this Court. Accordingly, I find every justification in allowing the writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. No costs. The connected miscellaneous petition is closed.