JUDGMENT Hon’ble B.S.Verma, J. (Oral) 1. Mr. Rajendra Dobhal, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. G.D. Joshi, Advocate for the petitioner, Mr. H.M. Raturi, Standing Counsel for respondent no.1 as well as Mr. Siddhartha Sah, Advocate for respondent nos.2 to 8. 2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has sought a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned judgment and order dated 6.9.2002 (Annexure No.11 to the writ petition) passed by Additional District Judge, Nainital. 3. Relevant facts giving rise to the present writ petition in brief are that the landlord/respondents moved an application for release of the shop in question under Section 21(1)(a) U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) on the ground of bonafide need stating therein that the shop is required by them for doing business as the members of the family are unemployed. According to the respondent, as stated in the release application, the financial position of the petitioner is well and he is having 5 Bigha land in Village Chotti Haldwani, Tehsil Kaladhungi, District Nainital. The elder brother of petitioner is in government service. The tenant/petitioner can shift his business to another shop. 4. The release application was resisted by the petitioner by filing written statement/objection wherein he alleged that there is no bonafide need of the landlord. 5. Both the parties led documentary evidence by way of affidavits along with annexures in support of their respective contentions. After hearing both the parties and after going through the evidence led by them, learned Prescribed Authority, vide judgment and order 17.1.1995, rejected the release application of the landlord/respondents. Feeling aggrieved, the landlord/respondents preferred an appeal being Rent Control Appeal No.2 of 1995 in the court of Additional District Judge/Ist Fast Track Court, Nainital. After re-appreciating the evidence, learned appellate court came to the conclusion that Mohd. Rafi and Noor Ahmad have attained majority and they are unemployed and there is no evidence to this fact that they are doing some business; they have a right to do business. Ultimately by judgment and order dated 6.9.2002, learned A.D.J., allowed the release application of the landlord and set aside the judgment of the Prescribed Authority dated 17.1.1995. In his judgment, learned A.D.J. has also given categorical finding that the shop in question is bonafidely required by the landlord/respondent for doing business. Ultimately by judgment and order dated 6.9.2002, learned A.D.J., allowed the release application of the landlord and set aside the judgment of the Prescribed Authority dated 17.1.1995. In his judgment, learned A.D.J. has also given categorical finding that the shop in question is bonafidely required by the landlord/respondent for doing business. He has also given finding on comparative hardship. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order of the learned A.D.J. dated 6.9.2002, the tenant/petitioner has filed the present writ petition before this Court. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material placed on record. 8. At the outset it may be mentioned that the scope of writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 is limited. This Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot sit like a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate or re-evaluate the evidence so as to arrive at a different conclusion. Only perversity in the impugned order can be seen to find out whether there is a case of mis-reading of evidence by the courts concerned. 9. It has been observed by the Apex Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and others [(2003) 6 Supreme Court Cases, 675 that “On the other hand, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.” 10. In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash” [(2004) 3 S.C.C. page 682], the Apex Court has observed inter alia in paragraph 4 of the judgment that “An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” 11. The Apex Court in the case of Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through L.RS. and others [(2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases, 1] while dealing with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has observed as under:- “38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law.” 12. Learned senior counsel appearing for the tenant/petitioner has contended that only the petitioner Digambar Singh was made party in the suit before the Prescribed Authority while it is admitted fact that father of the petitioner Late Sri Moti Singh was original tenant of the disputed shop. After his death, the tenancy devolved on all his legal heirs. Thus, all the legal heirs who have inherited as joint tenant should also have been impleaded and release application filed only against the petitioner who is one of the legal heir is not maintainable in the absence of other legal heirs. 13. After his death, the tenancy devolved on all his legal heirs. Thus, all the legal heirs who have inherited as joint tenant should also have been impleaded and release application filed only against the petitioner who is one of the legal heir is not maintainable in the absence of other legal heirs. 13. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondents/landlord submitted that there being a joint tenancy, if one of them is impleaded, the proceedings are binding on all others and it is not necessary to implead all the joint tenants. 14. Undisputedly, release application was filed by the landlord/respondents impleading Digambar Jain as defendant in the application, who is one of the legal heir of Late Sri Moti Singh. Other legal heirs have not been impleaded. Now question arises before this Court as to whether after the death of original tenant, his tenants become joint tenants or they get the right of tenants in common? It is settled position of law that after the death of sole tenant his legal heirs inherit the right of tenancy as joint tenants. Now question comes as to whether release application is maintainable impleading one of the joint tenant or all the joint tenants should have been impleaded to maintain the application for release? 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ashok Chintaman Juker vs. Kishore Pandurang Mantri reported in 2001 (1) RCR 581, AIR 2001 SC 2251 in paragraph No. 11 has held as under:- “11. The question that arises for consideration in such cases is whether the tenancy is joint or separate. In the former case notice on any one of the tenants is valid and a suit impleading one of them as a defendant is maintainable. A decree passed in such a suit is binding on all the tenants. Determination of the question depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. No inflexible rule or strait-jacket formula can be laid down for the purpose. Therefore, the case in hand is to be decided in the facts and circumstances thereof.” 16. As per ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, release application against one of the joint tenant without impleading other joint tenants is maintainable and decree passed therein would be having binding effect against all the tenants. 17. Therefore, the case in hand is to be decided in the facts and circumstances thereof.” 16. As per ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, release application against one of the joint tenant without impleading other joint tenants is maintainable and decree passed therein would be having binding effect against all the tenants. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioners has next contended that the finding of the appellate court that the need of the landlord is bona fide is not based on appraisal of evidence. 18. The finding on the point of bona fide need is a finding of fact and the evidence cannot be reassessed in writ jurisdiction. From a bare perusal of the impugned order passed by the learned appellate court, it is evident that the points of bona fide need and comparative hardship have been elaborately dealt with by court below. There is finding recorded by the appellate court that Mohd. Rafi and Noor Ahmad have attained majority and they are unemployed and they have bonafide requirement for the disputed shop to engage them in business. The findings have been recorded by the appellate court on appraisal of evidence led by the parties. 19. For the reasons and discussion made above, I do not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order passed by the appellate court. The writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed. 20. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. However, to do the complete justice, the petitioner/tenants are granted one year’s time from today to vacate the disputed shop provided the petitioner furnishes a written undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within a period of eight weeks from today to the effect that he will vacate the shop in dispute before the expiry of the said period of one year and shall deliver its vacant and peaceful possession to the respondents/landlord and shall also continue to pay/deposit the rent to the landlord/respondent month to month till the expiry of the aforesaid period of one year.