Judgment N. Paul Vasanthakumar, J. 1. Heard MR.Ravichandran, learned Additional Government Pleader for appellants and Mr.SV.Srinivasan, learned counsel for respondent. 2. This writ appeal is filed against the initiation of suo-motu proceedings by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.23309 of 2010, wherein, the learned Single Judge has initiated suo-motu proceedings on the basis of the instruction given by the 1st appellant to the learned Government Pleader, who appeared before the learned Single Judge viz., Mr.L.S.M.Hasan Fizal, who was directed by the Court to get the particulars about the shorter route which is available, in order to examine the issue in question. The Commissioner of Police, instead of furnishing the information sought for by this Court, blindly stated that such information cannot be sought for by the Court. Such attitude of the 1st appellant was taken serious note of by the learned Single Judge, which culminated in initiation of suo-motu proceedings. If the 1st appellant has got any grievance about the initiation of suo-motu proceedings, the remedy open to him is to go before the learned Single Judge and explain as to how the information sought for cannot be furnished. The initiation of suo-motu proceedings is not an order or relating to the merits of the dispute. 3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the decision reported in (2006) 5 SUPREME COURT 399 (MIDNAPORE PEOPLES' COOP.BANK LTD., VS. CHUNILL NANDA) in paragraph No.12 held thus:- "12. ...... whether an intra-court appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent was available against the interlocutory order dated 20.11.1998 containing the directions on merits of the dispute. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for an appeal from a "judgment" of a Single Judge in exercise of original jurisdiction to a Division Bench. In Shal Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben D. Kania the scope of clause 15 of the Letters Patent was considered. This Court held: "The concept of a judgment as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure seems to be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted by sub-section (2) of Section 2 cannot be physically imported into the definition of the word 'judgment' as used in clause 15 of the Letters Patent because the Letters Patent has advisedly not used the term 'order' or 'decree' anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the givers of the Letters Patent was that the word 'judgment' should receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation than the word 'judgment' used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time, it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial Judge would amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to the number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent. It seems to us that the word 'judgment' has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense. In other words, a judgment can be of three kinds: (1) A final judgment- * * * (2) A preliminary judgment- * * * (3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment – Most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43 Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and, therefore, appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43 Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before such an order can be a judgment the adverse effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote. (SCC pp.55-56, para 113) * * * ... in other words every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. (SCC p.57 para 115) * * * ... any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice to one party or the other cannot be treated as a judgment otherwise the appellate court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge ... .... .... the interlocutory order in order to be a judgment must contain the traits and trappings of finality either when the order decides the questions in controversy in an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings. (SCC p.58, para 119)". Again in paragraph Nos.14 to 16, it is further held thus: "14. The above principle was reiterated in Mithailal Dalsangar Sing vs. Annabai Devram Kini and Subal Paul v. Malina Paul. In the latter case, this Court held: (SCC pp.370-71, paras 32 & 35) "32. While determining the question as regards clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the court is required to see as to whether the order sought to be appealed against is a judgment within the meaning thereof or not. Once it is held that irrespective of the nature of the order, meaning thereby whether interlocutory or final, a judgment has been rendered, clause 15 of the Letters Patent would be attracted. * * * 35. ... Clause 15 of the Letters Patent confers a right of appeal on a litigant against any judgment passed under any Act unless the same is expressly excluded. Clause 15 may be subject to an Act but when it is not so subject to the special provision the power and jurisdiction of the High Court under clause 15 to entertain any appeal from a judgment would be effective". 15. Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories: (i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case. (ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case. (iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question which is not the subject matter of the main case. (iv) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties. 16. (iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question which is not the subject matter of the main case. (iv) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties. 16. The term "judgment" occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent will take into its fold not only the judgments as defined in Section 2(9) CPC and though may not finally and conclusively determine the rights of parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy, may have finality in regard to some collateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory orders which fall under categories (i) to (iii) above, are, therefore, "judgments" for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters Patent. On the other hand, orders falling under categories (iv) and (v) are not "judgments" for the purpose of filing appeals provided under the Letters Patent". The initiation of suo-motu contempt proceedings may cause some inconvenience to the 1st appellant and the same has not finally determine his right as stated in clause (iv). Hence, the said initiation cannot be treated as judgment in the eye of law. Further, in the decision reported in AIR 2010 SC 1137 (S.B.MINERALS VS. M/S MSPL LTD.), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the order admitting S.A. is not an appealable order. 4. Applying the above judgments to the facts of this case, we are of the firm view that this Writ Appeal filed against initiation of suo-motu proceedings is not at all maintainable. Consequently, the writ appeal is dismissed. The Registry is directed to post the suo-motu contempt proceedings initiated in W.P.No.23309 of 2010 before the learned Single Judge, and the appellants can appear before the learned Single Judge and defend their matter. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.