Judgment 1. Heard Mr. D. Shivakumaran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. S. Ravi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 14 and Mr. V. Ananthakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 15 to 18. 2. The petitioner is the Management of the Salem Urban Co-operative Bank Limited and the challenge is to an order passed by the Labour Court, Salem in C.P.No.581 of 1991 dated 6.8.2002. The respondents 1 to 8 were the petitioners before the Labour Court in C.P.No.581 of 1991. The said Petition was filed under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (I.D. Act) to compute the difference of salary payable to each of the respondents for the period from 6.10.1983 to 30.11.1997 , being a total sum of Rs.6,73,087/- . 3. The Claim petition was resisted by the petitioner by filing a counter statement as well as the additional counter. The Labour Court by an order dated 6.8.2002, computed the claim made by the respondents 1 to 8 herein and passed an order in their favour. Challenging the same, the present Writ Petition has been filed. 4. The first ground of challenge is by contending that the Labour Court in its order stated that the petitioner Bank did not produce any oral or documentary evidence, but it is the case of the petitioner that seven documents were filed along with I.A.No.581 of 1997, and elaborate arguments were advanced, yet the Labour Court failed to mark those documents nor dealt with the arguments advanced by the petitioner herein. The second ground of attack is by contending that the respondents 1 to 8 are guilty of suppression of material facts before the Labour Court and failed to bring to the notice of the Court that they had earlier filed a Writ Petition which was dismissed and the Writ Appeal filed against the said order was also dismissed; that at no point of time, they had discharged their duty in the promoted post and that the order which they sought to rely upon i.e. the order of the Special Officer dated 14.7.1994, had been initially kept in abeyance by proceedings dated 20.7.1995 and subsequently cancelled by proceedings dated 3.8.1999. That the respondents 1 to 8 have not challenged the order dated 23.8.1995 which was passed before the cancellation of the order dated 14.7.1994. That the respondents 1 to 8 have not challenged the order dated 23.8.1995 which was passed before the cancellation of the order dated 14.7.1994. Further, it is stated that the respondents 1 to 8 did not hold the post and no right will accrue in their favour. 5. The stand taken by the petitioner Management was supported by the respondents 10 to 14. 6. The respondents 1 to 8 would contend that no documents were produced before the Labour Court, the order dated 3.8.1999, cancelling the order dated 14.7.1994 was never furnished to the petitioner and they have been unjustly denied, the monetary benefits as their seniority was correctly fixed by the earlier Special Officer and though the Labour Court passed the order in 2002, till date the respondents/claimants have not been able to realise the fruits of the order. 7. After considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on either side and perusing the materials available on record, it is seen that the amount claim by the respondents 1 to 8 is on account of their claim that they are seniors to the other private respondents and therefore, they should be paid the difference in salary. This was objected by the respondents 10 to 14 and they filed a Revision Petition before the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The Joint Registrar by order dated 12.7.1995, directed that the dispute has to be adjudicated under section 90 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 and directed the respondents/petitioners therein to invoke the provisions of section 90 of the Act. After the said order, the Joint Registrar by another order dated 20.7.1995, kept the order dated 14.7.1994, in abeyance, which was in favour of the respondents 1 to 8. Subsequently another order was passed by the Special Officer on 23.8.1995 reiterating the earlier order dated 20.7.1995 and kept the entire proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, it is evident that the respondents 1 to 8 did not enjoy the benefits of the order dated 14.7.1994. 8. The respondents 1 to 8 filed a Writ Petition being W.P.No.12511 of 1995, challenging the proceedings dated 20.7.1995, and for a direction not to withhold the arrears of salary payable to them. The Hon”ble Mr. Justice P. Sathasivam (as he then was) by a detailed order dated 14.6.1997, dismissed the Writ Petition. 8. The respondents 1 to 8 filed a Writ Petition being W.P.No.12511 of 1995, challenging the proceedings dated 20.7.1995, and for a direction not to withhold the arrears of salary payable to them. The Hon”ble Mr. Justice P. Sathasivam (as he then was) by a detailed order dated 14.6.1997, dismissed the Writ Petition. However, it was made clear that if the respondents 1 to 8 were aggrieved by the other order dated 23.8.1995, it was open to them to approach the appropriate Board. At this stage it would be beneficial to refer to the operative portion of the order dated 14.6.1997 in W.P.No.12511 of 1995. "12.) In view of the above factual legal position, I am unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners to quash the impugned order which has been issued by the first respondent to the 2nd respondent in the normal course of administration. Since I have already held that there is no cause of action as far as the direction issued by the first respondent to the second respondent though the second respondent has withheld the benefits granted by the first respondent in pursuance of the direction referred above, in view of decision referred above, I am of the view that the petitioners are not entitled to challenge the said order of the first respondent dated 20.7.1995. Further, there is no need to give notice to the petitioners before issuing any administrative instructions to the second respondent by the first respondent. Hence the contention that before passing the impugned order the first respondent has failed to issue any notice thereby the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the ground of violation of natural justice cannot be countenanced. Hence, I am not in a position to accept the second argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 13. Net result, I am of the view that the present Writ Petition filed against the administrative order issued by the first respondent dated 20.7.95 to the second respondent is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. However, I make it clear that if the petitioners are aggrieved against the consequential order of the 2nd respondent dated 23.8.95, it is always open to them to approach the appropriate forum in accordance with law to redress their grievance. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. However, I make it clear that if the petitioners are aggrieved against the consequential order of the 2nd respondent dated 23.8.95, it is always open to them to approach the appropriate forum in accordance with law to redress their grievance. In such event the dismissal of the present writ petition would not affect their case. I also make it clear that the present dismissal of the writ petition would not affect their defence in the Civil Appeal filed by the respondents 3 to 10." 9. The respondents 1 to 8 preferred a Writ Appeal against the said order along with the Application to condone the delay and the Hon’ble First Bench of this Court by an order dated 18.3.1998, dismissed the appeal on merits as well as being barred by limitation as the appellants have not shown sufficient cause to condone the delay. 10. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Brijpal Singh, [ (2005) 8 SCC 58 ], the right to money or benefit which is sought to be executed under Section 33-C(2) must be an existing one, that is, already adjudicated upon and must arise in course of and in relation to relationship between industrial workman and employer. The difference between a pre-existing right or benefit and one which is considered just and fair is vital. It is not competent for Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) to arrogate to itself functions of Industrial Tribunal and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but which may appropriately be made the subject-matter of an industrial dispute, Labour Court cannot first decide workman's entitlement and then compute the benefit so adjudicated. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer, and thereafter for purpose of implementation thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that power of interpretation is treated as incidental to Labour Court's power under Section 33C(2), like that of executing court's power to interpret the decree for purposes of its execution, workman can proceed under Section 33C(2) only after Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under Section 33-A or reference under Section 10. 11. 11. Therefore, it is evident that the order dated 14.7.1994, which the respondents 1 to 8 seek to rely upon was not given effect to and the respondents 1 to 8 did not work in the promoted post. Further, the respondents 1 to 8 did not challenge the order dated 23.8.1995, rather when they challenged to the order dated 20.7.1995, by filing a Writ Petition which was dismissed and confirmed by the Hon’ble Division Bench. However, by suppressing all these facts, the respondents 1 to 8 filed a Claim Petition to compute the arrears of salary which they stated that they would be entitled to on account of the revised seniority. In fact, the prayer before the Labour Court was one of the prayers in W.P.No.12511 of 1995, which was rejected. Therefore, the respondents 1 to 8 could not have sought for a similar relief before the Labour Court, that too by suppressing the filing of the Writ Petition and the order passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench. 12. It is a settled legal position that the power of the Labour Court under section 33 C (3) of the Act is in the nature of the power of an Executing Court. Therefore, the prior to an order being passed in the Computation Petiton, the entitlement of the claimant ought to have been crytalised and the only duty to be done by the Labour Court is to compute the entitlement. In the instant case, at no point of time it had been confirmed that the respondents 1 to 8 are entitled for any monetary benefits on account of their position in the seniority. In fact the order dated 14.7.1994, itself was not given effect to and was kept in abeyance and subsequently on 3.8.1999 was cancelled. However, these aspects were not gone into the Labour Court. The Labour Court drew an adverse inference by stating that the Management did not produce any document to show that the order dated 14.7.1994 was either superseded or cancelled. In the order passed by the Labour Court it has stated that no oral or documentary evidence was produced by the Management. 13. The Labour Court drew an adverse inference by stating that the Management did not produce any document to show that the order dated 14.7.1994 was either superseded or cancelled. In the order passed by the Labour Court it has stated that no oral or documentary evidence was produced by the Management. 13. It is the consistent case of the petitioner that documents were produced and in paragraph No.7 of the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, it has been stated that I.A.No.21 of 2001, was filed for restoration of an earlier Interlocutory Application, which was dismissed for default and the said Application was allowed on 25.2.2002, subject to payment of cost of Rs.2,000/- which was paid to the respondents 1 to 8 and thereafter the case was re-opened by the Labour Court and the documents which were marked by the petitioner along with I.A.No.581 of 1997 was taken up. However, the petitioner was not aware that the document was not marked before the Labour Court. 14. This specific averment made in the Writ Petition has not been denied by the respondents 1 to 8 by filing a counter affidavit. 15. On a perusal of the additional counter statement filed by the petitioner before the Labour Court, it is seen that the petitioner brought to the notice of the Labour Court about the order passed by this Court in the Writ Petition filed by the respondents 1 to 8. Yet the Labour Court did not make any attempt to consider the said order, though the petitioner has produced the same along with I.A.No.581 of 1997. 16. Be that as it may, the Labour Court in the instant case has committed a serious error of law and has proceeded solely on the basis that there was no record to show that the order dated 14.7.1994 has been cancelled. These aspects need not be gone into for the simple reason that the respondents 1 to 8 challenged the order dated 20.7.1995, by which the order dated 14.7.1994 was kept in abeyance and the said Writ Petition was dismissed on 14.6.1997 and confirmed by the Hon'ble Division Bench by order dated 18.3.1998. In the said Writ Petition one of the prayer was, not to withhold the arrears of salary payable to respondents 1 to 8 herein. In other words, the prayer was to pay salary at enhanced rate in the promoted post. In the said Writ Petition one of the prayer was, not to withhold the arrears of salary payable to respondents 1 to 8 herein. In other words, the prayer was to pay salary at enhanced rate in the promoted post. This relief was also rejected by the Writ Court. Therefore, the respondents having failed before this Court in the earlier Writ Petition, suppressed the fact of filing the Writ Petition, the orders passed thereon and approached the Labour Court for a relief which they are not entitled to both on law as well as on facts. 17. Hence, for all the above reasons, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the order passed by this Labour Court, impugned in this Writ Petition is wholly untenable, illegal, perverse, arbitrary and liable to be set aside. 18. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned order is quashed. No costs.