JUDGMENT : N. V. ANJARIA, J. - The present revision application under Sec. 29(2) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 is by the tenant-original defendant No.1, against whom the trial Court passed decree for eviction of the suit premises under Sec. 13(1)(e) on the ground of sub-letting. The revision is directed against the judgment and order dated 18th March, 2006 of learned Presiding Officer, 7th Fast Track Court, Palanpur, who dismissed Regular Civil Appeal No. 6 of 2003 confirming the judgment and order of the trial Court. 2. Respondent herein the landlord instituted Regular Civil Suit No.3 of 1990 before the Court of learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Palanpur against the applicant herein and one Sureshkumar Babulal Thakkar arraigned as defendant No.1 and defendant No.2 respectively. In the suit, the plaintiffs case was that the property known as "Haresh Nivas" belonged to their ownership, of which the suit property being a shop bearing House No.1/1505 was rented to defendant No.1 from 1st July, 1974 on a monthly rent of Rs. 75/- for the purpose of transport business. It was the case of the landlord that the tenant carried the business of transport for some time, and thereafter, the shop was closed; the tenant had started his another business elsewhere in the town; he gave away the suit shop by way of sub-letting to defendant No.2 and earned big amount of Paghari. It was stated that the plaintiff gave notice dated 14th March, 1989 to the tenant as soon as he came to know about the said fact and asked the tenant to hand over the possession. In the plaint, it was further alleged that in the said notice, the defendant No.1 was a tenant in arrears and rent of for the period of 26 months plus Municipal Tax amount due for which the tenant was liable, and hence, was required to pay towards Rent and Tax total Rs. 3,281/-. 2.1. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in their common written statement (Exh. 21) denied the case of the plaintiff, further stating that the business was not closed. It was the say of the defendants that they had started business in partnership since last three years, and accordingly, defendant No.2 was the partner in the business. Defendant No. 1 accepted the case of the plaintiff that he was staying at another place and was doing up-down to Palanpur for the purpose of business. It was the say of the defendants that they had started business in partnership since last three years, and accordingly, defendant No.2 was the partner in the business. Defendant No. 1 accepted the case of the plaintiff that he was staying at another place and was doing up-down to Palanpur for the purpose of business. 3. The learned 3rd Joint Civil Judge (S.D.) framed issues at Exh. 25 and held against the applicant in respect of ground of sub-letting. The issue whether the plaintiff proved that he was entitled to decree of eviction for non-payment of rent after service of notice was answered in affirmative by the trial Court, however, in the body of the judgment, no discussion was found on that aspect. The trial Court passed judgment and decree dated 29th March, 2003 against the defendants directing them to vacate the suit premises and further directed that they should pay rent at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month to the plaintiff starting from 1st February, 2002. The lower Appellate Court considered the matter in Regular Civil Appeal preferred at the instance of the tenant, and dismissed the same, holding that the sub-letting was proved. 4. Learned Advocate Mr. J.A. Adeshra for the applicant contended that the notice dated 14th March, 1999 under Sec. 12(2) of the Rent Act was not legal and valid inasmuch as it did not terminate the tenancy. It was submitted that the same was not properly served on the tenant. According to him, therefore, no decree on the ground of arrears of rent could have been passed. It was submitted that so long as the tenant was ready and willing to pay the rent, no decree for eviction could be passed. Learned Advocate relied on decisions in Gopalbhai Karamshibhai Patel v. C.M. Joshi, Dy. Secretary, Revenue Department, 1976 GLR 108 and decision in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596 in support of his submissions. 4.1. It was next submitted that the defendant-tenant had entered into partnership by executing the deed of Partnership dated 5th January, 1988, which ought to have been believed by the Courts below. It was submitted that the stipulations in the Partnership Deed (Exh. 78) proved beyond doubt that there was no sub-letting. According to learned Advocate, the positions of applicant at Exhs. It was submitted that the stipulations in the Partnership Deed (Exh. 78) proved beyond doubt that there was no sub-letting. According to learned Advocate, the positions of applicant at Exhs. 76 and 75 also showed that there was no sub-letting. He further submitted that the finding that the Partnership deed was got up was clearly erroneous as the date of execution of Exh. 78 was prior to the institution of the suit. He submitted that neither the tenancy rights were given up, nor the possession was parted with by defendant No.1-tenant in favour of defendant No.2. According to the submission, the tenant continued the business by forming of partnership. 4.2. On the other hand, learned Advocate for the respondent Ms. Archana Acharya submitted that the decree for eviction was properly passed on the ground of sub-letting. She submitted there was a concurrent view and finding of both the Courts below in that regard and the Courts did not accept the defence of the tenant about partnership. It was submitted that the Partnership deed (Exh. 58) was entered into to avoid the liability of eviction under Sec. 13(1)(a) and it was a camouflage. She submitted that this Court may not interfere with the concurrent finding of both the Courts below which were properly arrived at. 4.3. Learned Advocate for the respondent relied on the decisions reported in (i) Sheth Jivaji Rajbhai v. Patel Hatimbhai Nazamli, 1998 (2) GLH 535; (ii) Mohammed Kasam Haji Gulambhai v. Bakemli Fatehali (Deed.) by L.Rs., 1998 (2) GLH 655; (iii) Vora Kadarbhai Majidbhai v. Mansuri Jusabhai Shakurbhai, 2001 (3) GLH 3 and Tohelram Ravaldas Gidwani v. Parshottamdas Chhaganlal Shah, 1996 (1) GCD 623. 4.4. Although, the contention of learned Advocate was found to be one of substance that the notice under Sec. 12(2) of the Act (Exh. 43), in absence of the it providing for termination of tenancy, was not a valid notice in eye of law and lacked essential ingredient under Sec. 12(2) of the Act, the said aspect and question was inconsequential. The arrears of rent as ground of eviction did not survive before the Courts below. Issue No.8 was framed by the trial Court whether eviction decree was required to be passed on the ground of arrears of rent after service of notice, even was answered in the affirmative, but thereafter, in the body of the judgment no discussion was found. The arrears of rent as ground of eviction did not survive before the Courts below. Issue No.8 was framed by the trial Court whether eviction decree was required to be passed on the ground of arrears of rent after service of notice, even was answered in the affirmative, but thereafter, in the body of the judgment no discussion was found. The trial Court ultimately recorded that protection to the tenant against eviction was not available as the decree was being passed on the ground of sub-letting. Indisputably, the only issue survived and considered was of sub-letting. The confirmation of trial Court's decree by the lower Appellate Court was on the said ground alone. Therefore, only question required to be addressed in the present revision application is whether there was a sub-letting by defendant No. 1. 5. Sub-letting is a situation where the tenant by virtue of his act divests himself of tenancy interests and transfers and assigns the control over the premises in favour of third party who is in turn invested with exclusive right to enjoy the premises. Entering into a partnership business is common to thwart the application of Sec. 13(1)(e). That the partnership is formed by the tenant is a good defence so long as the partnership is genuine and it is entered into bona fide where the tenant retains his control. The Supreme Court in Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri, 1987 (3) SCC 538 : AIR 1987 SC 1782 , held that in a case where a tenant becomes a partner of a partnership firm and allows the firm to carryon business in the demised premises while he himself retains legal possession thereof, the act of the tenant does not amount to sub-letting. It was held that whether there is genuine partnership or not must be judged in the facts of each case in the light of the principles applicable to partnership. 5.1. In Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam, 2004 (4) SCC 794 , the Supreme Court, however, observed that in order to defeat the provisions of law, a device is at times adopted by unscrupulous tenant and sub-tenants for bringing into existence a deed of Partnership which gives relationship of tenant and sub-tenant and outward appearance of partnership while in effect what has come into existence is a sub-tenant or parting with possession camouflaged under the cloak of partnership. In Celina Coelho Pereira v. Ulhas Malzabaleshwar Kholkar, 2010 (1) SCC 217 , the Supreme Court reiterated and summarised the legal position with regard to sub-letting and sub-tenancy, its essence, mode of its creation and proof. The thrust is to find out who is in possession exclusively enjoying the premises. 6. In light of the above principles available from the decisions highlighted above, now proceeding to consider the facts of the present case, the evidence which was on record tore the veil to show that the partnership was a device created wherein the tenant had transferred his interest and possession in favour of defendant No.2. The essential elements to establish sub-letting by the tenant could be gathered from certain conspicuous circumstances coming out from the evidence on record. 6.1. In the written statement, there was admission on the part of the tenant that he was staying at a different village Mumanvas and was doing up-down to Palanpur town for his business since last three years. This admission was in response to the case of the plaintiff in the plaint that tenant had closed his business, was staying at a different place and had started his own another business at Palanpur in Ganj Bazar area. In the next, the tenant further stated and admitted in the written statement also that he had closed his original business. He, however, claimed that business was not discontinued as such, but he had started new business. 6.2. Though, the defence was raised that there was a partnership, there was no mentioning of execution of Partnership deed with defendant No.2 in the written statement. Deposition of defendant No.2 (Exh. 75) indicated that he was the person sole and whole doing kirana business in the suit shop; the business in partnership was stated to have been started in the year 1987. In Exh. 75 it was claimed by defendant No. 2 that the shop was registered in his name from 1987 to 1993. Exh. 78 Partnership Deed was dated 5th January, 1988 wherein it was stated that Partnership was started in the year 1987. 6.3. Furthermore, there were ample evidence which showed that the possession was parted with - there was parting of possession, both physical and legal, in favour of defendant No.2. The exclusive possession of defendant No.2 was inferable from photographs, Assessment Register of Municipality and Certificate under the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act (Exh. 6.3. Furthermore, there were ample evidence which showed that the possession was parted with - there was parting of possession, both physical and legal, in favour of defendant No.2. The exclusive possession of defendant No.2 was inferable from photographs, Assessment Register of Municipality and Certificate under the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act (Exh. 69). Furthermore, evidence (Exh. 61) of the plaintiff read with admission of the defendant in the written statement noted above and in his testimonial evidence (Exh. 75) showed that he was enjoying exclusive possession and occupation of the suit shop and doing business there. 6.4. In Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. S. B. Sardar Ranjitsing, AIR 1968 SC 933 , the Supreme Court held that if the landlord prima facie shows that the third party is in exclusive premises let out, it would be then for the tenant to rebut the evidence. Similar was the law reiterated in Krishnawati v. Hans Raj, 1974 (1) SCC 289 . In Gopal Sharan v. Satyanarayan, 1989 (3) SCC 556, it was observed that sub-letting means transfer of exclusive rights to enjoy the property in favour of third party. The acid test is parting with legal possession for valuable consideration which could be ordinarily a hidden circumstance. 6.5. There was yet another circumstance which clearly showed that the tenant was not associated, much less actively, in the so-called partnership business and that his was no participation. Exh. 69 was the form which was produced by the witness (Exh. 67) one Vijaykumar Kanaiyalal Shah, who was an employee of Palanpur Nagarpalika in the Shops and Establishment Department. The licence under the Shops and Establishment Act applied for the suit shop was upon Exh. 69 application. Exh. 69 was by and in the name of defendant No. 2-Sureshkumar Babulal Thakkar only. In Exh. 69, name of owner was shown to be that of defendant No.2 and the name of business was "Bhavani Kirana Store' to be run by him for which licence was applied for. The licence (Exh. 70) further reinforced that it was defendant No.2 in whose name the licence was obtained and he was the only person running the business in the suit shop. 7. The licence (Exh. 70) further reinforced that it was defendant No.2 in whose name the licence was obtained and he was the only person running the business in the suit shop. 7. In light of above scenario of emerging out of facts and evidence on record, and considered with reference to the position of law discussed above, no interference is warranted in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Courts below against the applicant-tenant. 8. Nor the jurisdictional bounds of this Court for exercise of it revisional powers under Sec. 29(2) of the Act, could be disregarded, the scope and ambit of which was explained and reiterated in Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri, AIR 1987 SC 1782 : 1987 (3) SCC 538 , which was also relied on by this Court in Thakkar Bhagubhai Jamnadas v. Pranjivan Chunilal Tailor, 1996 (1) GCD 41. The Supreme Court stated that in exercising revisional power under Sec. 29(2), the High Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind by the lower Court. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived at taking all material and relevant facts in mind. In order to warrant interference, the decision must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Lastly, such a decision does not lead to a miscarriage of justice. But, in the guise of revision, substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken a particular view, is not permissible. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction if it substitutes its own view in place of that of the Courts below because it considers it to be a better view. The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant. In the case before the Supreme Court above, the findings of the trial Court were reversed by the Appellate Court and it was not a case of concurrent findings of fact. 9. For the foregoing reasons and discussions, the present Revision Application is dismissed. 10. The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant. In the case before the Supreme Court above, the findings of the trial Court were reversed by the Appellate Court and it was not a case of concurrent findings of fact. 9. For the foregoing reasons and discussions, the present Revision Application is dismissed. 10. It was pointed out by learned Advocate for the respondent-landlord from the affidavit filed on record that the landlord after due process and procedure of law, had taken over the possession of the premises during the pendency of this Revision Application, and the tenant had handed over the same. Learned Advocate for the applicant, however, pleaded no instruction and no knowledge in that regard, and submitted that in any case, such development would be subject to outcome of the present Revision. Application dismissed.