JUDGEMNT : Original plaintiff Ramangiri Amritgiri Goswamy, since deceased, now through legal heirs, instituted a suit for declaration and injunction that he had hereditary right as Pujari in Unai Mata temple at village Unai, Taluka Vansda. He having failed before both the courts below, presented this appeal under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to challenge the judgment and order dated 10th November 1986 passed by learned Assistant Judge, Valsad at Navsari. 2. At the time of admission of the appeal, this court framed following substantial questions of law: "(1) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Appellate Judge has not erred in not giving effect to Exh.76, as evidencing the right of the deceased Plaintiff-Ramangiri Amrutgiri and his legal representatives to act as Pujaris of "Shree Unai Mata" temple and to appropriate the income of the offerings to the Deity except on the days of "Chaitri Fair" and "Makarsankranti"?" (2) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the courts below have not erred in finding that the suit for declaration of the hereditary right of the plaintiff as Pujari was not maintainable without permission of the Charity Commissioner?" 3. The relevant facts of the case may be mustered at the outset. The original plaintiff in his suit instituted on 7th April 1977 before the court of Senior Civil Judge (S.D.) Valsad, put forth a case that the temple of Unai Mata in village Unai, Taluka Vansda, originally belonged to Vansda State, wherein, according to the plaintiff, his ancestors worked as Pujaris, and worshiped in the temple since the times of the erstwhile State. By giving pedigree of his ancestors, the plaintiff averred that the successive ancestors had inherited the right as Pujaris in the temple. It was claimed that after his ancestor Laxmangiri, his son Uttamgiri, thereafter son of Parsottamgiri being son of Uttamgiri, in the next, his son Motigiri, and thereafter, Motigiri's son of Amrutgiri, and the plaintiff Ramangiri inherited the right. It was the case that the lands around the temple were Inam lands, which were entered in the name of Pujari since 1982. Upon merger of Vansda State into State of Bombay, a registered trust came into existence and the Mamlatdar, Vansda, by virtue of his office, became sole trustee of the temple. It was contended that the registration of public trust was undertaken behind his back. Upon merger of Vansda State into State of Bombay, a registered trust came into existence and the Mamlatdar, Vansda, by virtue of his office, became sole trustee of the temple. It was contended that the registration of public trust was undertaken behind his back. It was claimed that Mamlatdar, Vansda, has declared that the Inam land was in occupation of the Pujari, and further that the Pujari was to take all the produce/income of the temple, except on two festival days, namely Chaitri Poornima and Makar Sankranti. It was contended that disregarding his right as Pujari as above, the Mamlatdar passed order dated 6th August 1976, removing him as Pujari and taking away his hereditary right to do Puja as well as of taking income of the temple. In the suit, the State Government, the Collector Valsad, and the Mamlatdar, Vansda, were arraigned as the defendants. 3.1. The defendants filed Written Statement at Exh.11, wherein it was contended that the temple was registered as a public trust under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act'), and therefore, the suit of the plaintiff was not maintainable without permission of the Charity Commissioner. The case of the plaintiff claiming hereditary right as Pujari was denied, and it was stated that the plaintiff was an employee of the temple appointed in 1933 on payment of salary, and that since then he was working as part-time Pujari in the temple. He used to discharge the duties of Pujari for two hours in the evening, and was paid total Rs.22/-per month by way of salary. It was denied that the erstwhile State of Vansda has granted the land as revenue free grant to the plaintiff. It was denied that after merger of the Vansda State, the lands were continued to be given to the Pujari on hereditary basis. It was stated that any entry in this regard in the Panchayat records was unauthorised, and was got entered collusively, behind the back and was not binding to the Trust. It was the case of the defendant that administration of Shri Unai Mata temple and its properties were under the Government, and the temple was registered under the Act as a public trust and all its properties were declared as public trust properties. It was the case of the defendant that administration of Shri Unai Mata temple and its properties were under the Government, and the temple was registered under the Act as a public trust and all its properties were declared as public trust properties. 3.2 It was further contended that it was not true that the State Government was entitled to receive the income of the temple only on two festive occasions as alleged. The defendant stated that on the contrary the plaintiff had not been giving accounts of the income, though it was his responsibility to maintain the accounts of the income collected and to deposit the same in the State exchequer. It was also contended that the plaintiff was within the knowledge of the procedure of registering the temple as a public trust and worked under it even after it became public trust. It was also stated that the Mamlatdar's declaration that the land was in occupation and use of the Pujari as Inam land even if it could be established, the same was without authority in law. 3.3 The trial court framed the following issues at Exh.15: (1) Whether the suit without the previous permission of the Charity Commissioner is maintainable?; (2) Whether the plaintiff proves that he is acquired the right of Pujari of Shri Unai Mataji hereditarily or whether he is merely a part time paid Pujari?; (3) Whether he has acquired the right to take the income from the temple except the income of the fairs in the month of Chaitra and Makar Sankranti?; (4) Whether the order dated 6-2-76 by defendant No.3 is without authority, unjust and Unlawful?; (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declare as prayed for?; (6) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction as prayed for?; (7) What order and decree?" Answering the issues on the basis of the evidence adduced on record, the trial court held that the plaintiff was unable to prove that he had acquired the right as Pujari of the temple or that he had right to take income of the temple. It held that the order passed by the Mamlatdar removing him as Pujari was legal, and consequentially, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. It held that the order passed by the Mamlatdar removing him as Pujari was legal, and consequentially, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. In appeal preferred by the original plaintiff, learned Assistant Judge, Valsad at Navsari, disallowed the appeal dismissing the Regular Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1983. The findings recorded by the trial court were affirmed, and it was held that the document at Exh.76 described as Sanad was not suggestive of or supportive to the claim of the plaintiff that he was having a hereditary right as Pujari in the temple. The said document only gave right to the ancestors of the plaintiff to receive offerings made to the deity, recorded the lower appellate court. 4. Learned advocate for the appellant Mr. B.T. Rao assailing the judgments of the courts below submitted that Exh.76 explicitly suggested that right to perform Puja as Pujari was conferred together with right to collect the offerings of the temple. It was submitted that plaintiff's right as hereditary Pujari flew from the said document, and the courts below misinterpreted it in holding against the plaintiff-appellant. He relied on Exh.77, which was a Huzur Hukum to put weight on plaintiff's case that the income received on occasions of Chaitri Poornima and Makar Sankranti was not receivable by the Pujari, meaning thereby, that rest of the produce during the year was to go to him. According to learned advocate, reading of Exh. 76 and Exh. 77 together, it was unequivocally coming out that right to do Puja was conferred as hereditary right. Other document relied on before the trial court was Exh. 57 relied on, and on that basis, it was contended that when Mamlatdar submitted the accounts of the trust to the Charity Commissioner, it was indicated that the land admeasuring 26.37 gunthas was of Pujari, and further that the income of the trust was comprised of cash and other gifts received at the temple on the two occasions of Chaitri Sud Poornima and Makar Sankranti. 4.1. Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that after 1954, no salary was received, and according to his submission, even during the times of Vansda State, all the amounts were disbursed by Maharaja, and there was no evidence regarding salary paid. He also relied on Exh. 4.1. Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that after 1954, no salary was received, and according to his submission, even during the times of Vansda State, all the amounts were disbursed by Maharaja, and there was no evidence regarding salary paid. He also relied on Exh. 59 and 58, being the particulars supplied to the Charity Commissioner and the order of the Charity Commissioner registering the trust about land having been given to Pujari and right to receive the produce/income of the temple throughout the year except on the said two festive occasions. Learned advocate for the appellant tried to garner support for his contentions from the oral evidence of the plaintiff Exh.75 and Exh.89 also, which was the testimony of a government witness Ukasinh Mohansinh. 4.2. Learned advocate for the appellant relied on Sahebgouda (dead) by L.Rs. v. Ogeppa ( AIR 2003 SC 2743 ) and Kacha Kanti Seva Samity v. Kacha Kanti Devi [2003 (0) GLHEL-SC 13623] to contend that the suit seeking to enforce the rights to perform Puja in the temple registered as public trust was maintainable without permission of the Charity Commissioner, as the right sought to be asserted was a personal right, for which the jurisdiction of civil court was not ousted. It was submitted that declaratory relief could be granted by the civil court, and the courts below committed an error in holding that the suit was bad, because permission of the Charity Commissioner was not obtained under the provisions of the Act. 4.3 On the other hand, learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that the plaintiff was not having any hereditary right to act as Pujari, and the entire suit was misconceived on that count. It was submitted that not only Exh.76 did not mention such right, the plaintiff was in fact an employee receiving salary from the then State of Vansda for acting as Pujari in the temple. It was submitted that the temple was in those days owned and controlled by the erstwhile State of Vansda, and after merger of the Vansda State into the State of Bombay, and coming into existence of State of Gujarat, the temple was registered as a public trust. The State Government exercises its control and Mamlatdar has been the ex-officio trustee. It was submitted that the temple was in those days owned and controlled by the erstwhile State of Vansda, and after merger of the Vansda State into the State of Bombay, and coming into existence of State of Gujarat, the temple was registered as a public trust. The State Government exercises its control and Mamlatdar has been the ex-officio trustee. It was submitted that the order of removal of Pujari was passed because he was found to be indulging in irregularities in collecting the offerings, was not furnishing the accounts to the trust, and was not following the instructions from the trust. 5. Having noted as above the controversy and the contents, the questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal may now be focused. The first question is with regard to the effect of document Exh.76. As was clearly emerged from the case of the plaintiff, he put forth the said document saying that his hereditary right to act as a Pujari in the Unai Mata temple was derived from the said document. Exh.76 is thus a linchpin document along with other evidence sought to be relied on by the plaintiff-appellant seeking to claim and establish his right. 5.1 The trial court considered the effect of Exh.76, and court noted that Exh.76 was only a certificate which was given as mentioned therein upon being requested by Pujari Amrutgiri and that the Sanad was not available. While the trial court considered the effect of exh.76, and held against the plaintiff, the lower appellate court had an elaborate view of Exh.76 by going into and analyzing its contents. It was of the view that Exh.76 by no means confer any hereditary right on the plaintiff to perform Puja in the temple. 5.2 When seen from the record, though document Exh.76 was described as a Sanad, it was in fact in the nature of a certificate given by the Diwan of then State of Vansda and was not a Sanad. The same was dated 24th May 1915. As the original sanad was not available, it appeared to have been recorded as a certificate describing the summary of contents of some Sanad claimed to have been issued at a prior point of time. Exh. The same was dated 24th May 1915. As the original sanad was not available, it appeared to have been recorded as a certificate describing the summary of contents of some Sanad claimed to have been issued at a prior point of time. Exh. 76 mentioned inter alia giving summary of Sanad, that in the year 1873 when dispute had arisen with respect to the stream of hot water between the State of Vansda and the Gayakwad State of Baroda, at the relevant time Pujari Motigiri and his younger brother Ramchandragiri rendered commendable services and they along with their community helped in the issue being decided in favour of the State of Vansda, and therefore, Sanad was given to the Pujari. The Maharaja was pleased to allow the said Motigir and his brother Ramchandragir to collect the offerings of the deity for all the days in the year, except the two festivals. 5.3 Even going by the contents of the said sanad stated to have been reproduced in Exh. 76 document, the right conferred upon the ancestors of the plaintiff was only to receive the offerings made to the deity. It was in the nature of gift as the Ruler was pleased with their act of helping the State in a particular dispute. Moreover, it was rightly held by the courts below that when the Sanad itself was not available, what was recorded in Exh. 76 claimed to be the contents of the sanad was merely out of memory. In any case, as stated above, Exh.76 did not indicate that a hereditary right was reserved for the plaintiff to perform as Pujari in the temple. Having regard to total reading of the contents of Exh.76, even at a particular place the word `hereditary' was found, it was certainly used therein, the document was capable of being read and construed as investing any hereditary right on the plaintiff for working and continuing as Pujari in the said Unai Mata temple. What was given was only a right to receive offerings by the ruler of the erstwhile State to a Pujari, who was a Pujari in the temple at that time. 5.4. Learned advocate for the appellant-plaintiff placing reliance on Exh.77 tried to seek support of his case that the plaintiff enjoyed a hereditary right. What was given was only a right to receive offerings by the ruler of the erstwhile State to a Pujari, who was a Pujari in the temple at that time. 5.4. Learned advocate for the appellant-plaintiff placing reliance on Exh.77 tried to seek support of his case that the plaintiff enjoyed a hereditary right. Exh.77 was a Huzur Hukum dated 16th January 1947 signed by the Diwan as well as Maha Raolji Saheb of the Vansda State. It was stated therein that the Goddess Unai temple was situated in village Unai and the administration thereof was done by the State of Vansda. It took exception to the situation that during the last two years the Pujari tried to usurp the administration of the temple and tried to appropriate the produce/income of the temple for himself. It appears that Pujari Ramangir had not submitted the accounts of the produce of the temple properly and he got receipts passed, printed on his own. Exh.77 document was in the nature of order of reprimand to Pujari Ramangir who was found to be acting against the norms of Vansda State in the administration of the temple. Therefore, rather than supporting the case of the plaintiff, Exh. 77 showed that even at the time when the temple was under the erstwhile Vansda State, it was the State which was exercising complete control over the administration of the temple, including in the matters of taking the produce/income of the temple. 5.5 The courts below further recorded that security bond (Exh.105) was given by the plaintiff, which was produced by witness Mohammadbin, who was Government employee and Godown Manager deposed at Exh.104. The same also fortified that the plaintiff was an employee. Exhs. 57 and 59, which were respectively the application for registration of the trust, and the statement of income of the trust, relied on by learned advocate for the appellant only indicated that the right to receive offerings was given to the plaintiff. On the basis of said evidence, nothing could be further culled out, certainly not to conclude that there was a hereditary right with the plaintiff as a Pujari of the temple. 5.6 Furthermore, the trust came to be registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act as evidenced from Exh.85, whereas the suit was instituted years thereafter by the plaintiff in the year 1978. 5.6 Furthermore, the trust came to be registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act as evidenced from Exh.85, whereas the suit was instituted years thereafter by the plaintiff in the year 1978. For all these years till the order dated 6th August 1976 (Exh.52) was passed removing the plaintiff as Pujari, he acquiesced with the administration carried out by the trust and worked under the trust. The letters dated 28th March 1966 (Exh.53), 18th April 1964 (Ex.54), 10th April 1965 (Exh.55), 5th April 1976 (Exh.56) were amongst the other material on record, which showed that the Pujari was under the control of the trust, and the trust used to give instructions to him with regard to the work of Puja in the temple. Exh. 53 was the communication where the plaintiff was instructed that on a particular festive days after morning Puja in the temple, the Pujari should not entertain the devotees by sitting outside the temple or anywhere int he precincts of the temple and further that the offerings to the Goddess should not be accepted personally by the Pujari. Similar instruction was given in Exh. 54 letter that Pujari shall not entertain the devotees by taking them to his own house and by accepting from them the gifts directly. Letters Exhs. 56 and 57 when seen were also on the same lines. It appeared that those instructions were required to be given to the plaintiff as he was trying to assume control of the offerings made in the temple and was appropriating for himself. It was instructed that only the appointed Government employees would have authority to accept the gifts in the temple. 5.7 What could be clearly gathered from those letters was that the trust was the administrator of the affairs of the temple including the offerings and gifts received in the temple and the trust was issuing instructions to the Pujari from time to time exercising its control and that such instructions were required to be issued because of the acts and conduct on the part of the plaintiff as a Pujari in directly accepting the gifts and entertaining the devotees. In other words, the contents of the aforesaid Exhibits go to show that the plaintiff was required to act in a particular manner, not to permit family members in the temple, and not to entertain the devotees or accept offerings on his own. In other words, the contents of the aforesaid Exhibits go to show that the plaintiff was required to act in a particular manner, not to permit family members in the temple, and not to entertain the devotees or accept offerings on his own. These material on record could be seen in the context of the case of the defendant that the plaintiff was acting as an employee and no hereditary right was given to him to do Puja. It was also contended that the name of the plaintiff was notified in the Government Gazette as Pujari of Unmai Mata temple as an employee. 6. From the above conspectus, it became clear that the then State of Vansda had given to the ancestor of the plaintiff, who was engaged as Pujari in the temple in those days, a right to receive the offerings of the temple during the year. It was a benefit conferred by the then Ruler of the Vansda State on a particular occasion on being pleaded. That was the only way Exh. 76 could be construed for its contents. Even as regards the taking of offerings document at Exh. 77 showed that the erstwhile State was exercising control over the acts of the Pujari with regard to collection of offerings. After registration of the temple as public trust (Exh.85), the dominion and control of the trust in respect of the offerings and plaintiff's acts and conduct in that regard and on the administration thereof were evinced from Exh. 53 to Exh. 56 mentioned above. In any case, right to receive offerings and hereditary right as Pujari are distinct and different kind of rights. The later kind claim could not be made on the basis of or with reference to the former kind of right. Right to receive offerings cannot be equated with a hereditary right to perform Puja in the temple. 7. For the reasons and discussion above, the courts below did not err in not giving effect to Exh.76 as it could not be read or construed from its contents as evidencing the right of the deceased plaintiff Ramangiri Amrutgir and his legal representatives to act as Pujari of Shree Unai Mata temple. 7. For the reasons and discussion above, the courts below did not err in not giving effect to Exh.76 as it could not be read or construed from its contents as evidencing the right of the deceased plaintiff Ramangiri Amrutgir and his legal representatives to act as Pujari of Shree Unai Mata temple. As discussed above, Exh.76 attended by other evidence on record reflected only that what was given to the ancestor of the plaintiff was to have the income of offerings to the deity as the erstwhile Ruler of Vansda State was pleased with him for helping the State on a particular occasion. 8. Now adverting to the second question as to whether the suit in question was maintainable without the permission of the Charity Commissioner. In Sahebgouda (supra) relied on by learned advocate for the appellant, the question before the Supreme Court related to the maintainability of the suit wherein the appellants' case was that they were ancestral Pujaris of the Amogsidda and prior to that their father and grandfather performed the Puja by turns. In that suit, decree for declaration that the plaintiffs' were the ancesetral vahivatdars and Pujaris and had Pujariki rights in the temple was prayed and consequentially decree of permanent prohibitory injunction was also prayed for. The question whether such a suit was barred by section 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was considered and it was held that jurisdiction of the civil court was not ousted as no declaration regarding the trust property was claimed. The court held as under: "The allegations made in the plaint show that the only right claimed by the appellants is that of being ancestral Pujaris of the temple. The appellants do not claim themselves to be the trustees of any trust as defined under Section 2(18) of the Act. No declaration regarding the existence or otherwise of a trust or that any particular property is the property of such trust which comes within the purview of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner under Section 79 of the Act has been claimed. The only relief claimed is a declaration regarding the right of the appellants to function as hereditary Pujaris or their Pujariki rights of performing Puja in the temple and a consequential decree for injunction for restraining the respondents from interfering with the aforesaid rights of the appellants. The only relief claimed is a declaration regarding the right of the appellants to function as hereditary Pujaris or their Pujariki rights of performing Puja in the temple and a consequential decree for injunction for restraining the respondents from interfering with the aforesaid rights of the appellants. The reliefs so claimed do not at all come within the ambit of Section 19 or Section 79 of the Act on which the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner has the jurisdiction to hold an inquiry and give a decision. (para 11) (emphasis supplied) 8.1 Thus in the context of prayers made which do not touch any question on the affairs of the trust, the Supreme Court ruled that suit filed by the appellant was not barred and it was observed that the fact that the application was pending before the Assistant Charity Commissioner for registration of the temple and its property as public trust was irrelevant. In Kacha Kanti Seva Samity (supra) the claim of the plaintiff was for shebaitship and it was claimed that the deity in question was gift to their forefathers by the then King and the same was their private deity and they were the shebaites. It was held that the right claimed was a private right. In Vinayaka Dev Idagunji v. Shivaram ( AIR 2005 SC 3081 ) the suit was to establish right to be heriditary Archakas (Pujaris) in the temple and share in the offerings made to the deity. In that decision, the Supreme Court held that it was a suit only in relation to personal/private rights of archakas and not in the nature of exercising public right in the public trust, and it was held that the suit was not covered under section 50 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. 8.2 While the proposition established in the above decision that a claim for right to worship and to do Puja in the temple is a private right and no question relating to public trust would be arising in such a suit, in order to find out whether the same position is obtained in the present case also is gatherable from the plaint and the prayers of the suit would be material to judge the real nature of the suit. In that light, if the plaint of the suit in this case is considered, it was the case of the appellant-plaintiffs that they were doing Puja in capacity of heriditary Pujaris at the Unai Mata Temple in the erstwhile Vansda State and that after merger of the erstwhile Vansda State and formation of Gujarat State the temple was registered as public trust under the Bombay Public Trust. The temple and its properties were registered as public trust properties in early fifties. In the suit, the Mamlatdar was the ex-officio trustee, who was arraigned as defendant. Two fold prayers are made in the suit. First was for declaration that the plaintiff was heriditary Pujari in the temple. The second prayer was for seeking accounts of the offerings received in the trust temple. 8.3 Therefore, it was not a suit which was only for purpose of declaration of private right of a Pujari in the temple. The prayer was also made to have the accounts of the offerings received as income by the temple which was a public trust. In the circumstances, it could not be said that the suit did not raise any question relating to the affairs of the public trust. The income of offerings was the property of the trust in respect of which the plaintiffs were claiming their right and were further claiming accounts thereof. Since the temple was registered as a public trust in early 1950s the plaintiff worked under the trust as Pujari. The cause of action for instituting the suit was based on order of removal of plaintiff as Pujari passed by the Mamlatdar trustee in 1976. 8.4 In this view of facts, when the prayer was also to have the accounts of the income of the trust, which was in terms of offerings paid in the temple, the suit fell within the purview of section 50 of the Bombay Public Trust Act. The relief claimed was one which was falling within the ambit of the provisions of the Bombay Public Trust Act. Therefore, the bar of section 80 of the Act wherein express language is used stating that "any question which is by or under this Act be decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under the Act ..... would apply." 9. Therefore, the bar of section 80 of the Act wherein express language is used stating that "any question which is by or under this Act be decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under the Act ..... would apply." 9. A support could be derived for in respect of the question held as above from the Apex Court decision in Kanbi Manji Abji v. Kanbi Vaghji Mavji ( AIR 1993 SC 1163 ) wherein on the facts of that case Hon'ble the Apex Court held that when the effect of the prayers was an interference in the management of the temple and as a consequence in the administration of the trust, and therefore, such a suit would fall within the purview of section 50 of the Act and was not maintainable. 10. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed.