JUDGMENT : N.V. Anjaria, J. As both the above mentioned Civil Revision Applications under section 29(2) of The Bombay Rents, Hotel And Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, arise out of common judgment and order in Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1983 decided on 22nd August 1986 by learned Assistant Judge, Surendranagar, they were heard together and are being simultaneously considered and decided hereby. 1.1. The applicants in Civil Revision Application No. 308 of 1987 are the original plaintiffs-landlord, whereas the applicant in Civil Revision Application No. 367 of 1987 is the tenant - original defendant. The landlord is aggrieved by a part of the judgment and order of the lower appellate court, whereby the court did not accept the ground of subletting and non-user for the passing the decree of eviction. On the other hand, the tenant's revision is directed against the decree passed by the lower appellate court on the ground of arrears directing him to handover the possession of the suit shop to the plaintiff. 2. It may be noted at the outset that the record and proceedings of the case in so far as the evidence led was not available. A letter dated 11th January 2013 bearing No. JUDI/357/2013 from learned Addl. District Judge, Surendranagar addressed to the Registrar General, High Court of Gujarat, was on record, which stated as under:- "With reference to the subject noted above, I have the honour to state that the record and proceedings of Reg. Civil Appeal No. 02/1983 of this Court & Reg. Civil Suit No.88/1979 of Court of Principal Civil Judge, Limdi, send to Hon'ble High Court vide above reference latter of this court in the matter of Civil Revision Application No. 308/1987 with Civil Revision Application No. 367/1987, pending before the Hon'ble High Court. Record & Proceeding of "D" file destroyed of Reg. Civil Appeal No. 02/1983 as per order 2843/98 & "C" file vide ordered No.2526/99 dated 19.07.1999 and "C" & "D" filed destroyed vide No.1865/95 dated 13.06.1995 of Reg. Civil Suit No. 88/1979 were destroyed by Record branch of this Court as per chapter 24 para 490 of Civil Manual" 3. The relevant facts may be mustered first. Civil Suit No. 88 of 1979 came to be instituted by plaintiff Alibhai Pirabhai seeking a decree of eviction against the defendants. The grounds pleaded were arrears of rent, subletting and nonuser of the premises. The relevant facts may be mustered first. Civil Suit No. 88 of 1979 came to be instituted by plaintiff Alibhai Pirabhai seeking a decree of eviction against the defendants. The grounds pleaded were arrears of rent, subletting and nonuser of the premises. It was the case of the plaintiff that the shop was rented to the defendant No.1 at a monthly rent of Rs.9.50 ps. and the tenant was also liable to pay the house tax, education cess, etc. In the suit notice dated 21st August 1978 (Exh. 50), plaintiffs demanded Rs.688.65ps. being the arrears of rent plus Rs.116/- towards education cess. It was plaintiffs' case that defendant No.1 was in arrears of rent for a period of more than six months from Kartik Sood 1 of Samvat Year 2029 to Shravan Sood 15 of Samvat Year 2034 and for further three months. The education cess was demanded in respect of period from 25th March 1968 to 13th April 1973. It was alleged in the plaint that though the defendant was in arrears as aforesaid, in order to create evidence of payment of rent, he sent a Demand Draft for Rs.351.50 ps. However, the same was returned to the defendant along with the suit notice. On the above facts, it was contended by the plaintiff that the case fell under section 12(3)(a) as the defendant did not pay the rent amount even after the suit notice, and had incurred the liability of eviction. The second ground urged was that the defendant No.1 had sublet the suit premises to defendant No.2. It was also contended that there was a change of user and defendant No.2 was running the business of foodgrains, sugar, vegetable oils, etc. in the name and style of H.Y. Narshi. 3.1 The defendant denied the allegations and contended that he had paid rent up to Samvat Year 2031 to the plaintiff No.4-Taherbhai, as according to the defendant, said Taherbhai was managing the affairs of the suit shop. It was contended that the Demand draft dated 15th June 1978 for Rs.351.50 was given to said Taherbhai. It was further contended by the defendant No.1 that he was paying the rent early on regular basis. The tenant denied the liability to pay house tax and education cess. It was contended that the Demand draft dated 15th June 1978 for Rs.351.50 was given to said Taherbhai. It was further contended by the defendant No.1 that he was paying the rent early on regular basis. The tenant denied the liability to pay house tax and education cess. In other words, he denied that the arrears of Rs.688.65ps as claimed by the landlord was not due and payable and claimed that he was not a tenant-in-arrears. 3.2 With regard to ground of subletting the defence of the tenant was that defendant No.2 was a partner in partnership firm which was created by way partnership deed (Exh.54). It was the case that in partnership with defendant No.2, he was running the business in the suit shop without transferring in any manner the tenancy rights. It was accordingly contended that there was subletting. The partnership business was subsequently dissolved. Defendant produced the extract of registration slip, copy of partnership deed (Exh.54) as well as dissolution deed (Ex.83) and further contended that he was doing business after dissolution of the partnership. 3.3 Defendant No.2 by filing Written Statement at Exh.4 denied the plaintiffs case. Contending that he has no personal knowledge about the condition of rent, his defence to counter the allegations of subletting was on the same lines as that of defendant No.1. It was his say that they had started partnership with other partners and the firm was doing business of dealing in foodgrains, tea, sugar, etc. He denied that he was a sub-tenant or that he ever enjoyed the possession of the suit premises as sub-tenant. 3.4 The trial court framed the issues and after considering the evidence on record dismissed the suit with regard to relief for possession of the premises. it decreed the suit only to the extent of Rs.116.15ps, which was the amount claimed by the landlord towards unpaid education cess. With regard to ground of arrears of rent, the trial court reasoned that since the defendant had sent the Demand Draft, it could not be said that he was not ready and willing to pay the rent. it decreed the suit only to the extent of Rs.116.15ps, which was the amount claimed by the landlord towards unpaid education cess. With regard to ground of arrears of rent, the trial court reasoned that since the defendant had sent the Demand Draft, it could not be said that he was not ready and willing to pay the rent. It took view that the payment of rent was a matter of oral evidence only and once the amount tendered by the defendant was returned by the plaintiff, his own conduct of not accepting the rent would preclude him to serve subsequently a notice on the ground of arrears of rent. On the ground of subletting, the trial court held that the tenant had entered into a partnership agreement which did not amount to subletting and that the conditions of partnership deed indicated that there was no transfer of tenancy rights. The case of the plaintiff regarding nonuser of the premises since many years was not believed. 3.5 The lower appellate court in the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs, concurred with the trial court in so far the grounds under section 13(1)(e) and 13(1)(k) namely subletting and non-user were concerned. But, it allowed the appeal on the ground of arrears of rent and passed the decree for eviction. According to lower appellate court, there was no evidence that the defendant had paid the rent due. Though he had stated in evidence that he was maintaining the notes with regard to the amounts of rent paid to the plaintiff, no such notes were produced and that it was a false defence created by him. 3.6 As stated above, the landlord in his Civil Revision Application assailed non-passing of decree by the court below on the ground of sub-letting, whereas the tenant by filing second captioned Civil Revision Application questioned the passing of decree for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent against him. C.R.A. No. 308 of 1987 4. On the ground of subletting, the plaintiff pleaded that the suit shop was sublet to one Jaswantlal Vrajlal and Ramniklal Harjibhai Trivedi. Thereafter, partnership in the name of H.Y. Narshi was doing business in the suit shop and in that defendant No.2 was a sub-lettee. C.R.A. No. 308 of 1987 4. On the ground of subletting, the plaintiff pleaded that the suit shop was sublet to one Jaswantlal Vrajlal and Ramniklal Harjibhai Trivedi. Thereafter, partnership in the name of H.Y. Narshi was doing business in the suit shop and in that defendant No.2 was a sub-lettee. According to him, though the partnership was created, it was a cloak and there was a transfer of possession in favour of defendant No.2 describing him as partner. The tenant denied the case and further denied that the suit shop was ever sublet to said Jayantilal or Ramniklal. He further contended that the partnership firm was legally formed and defendant No.1 and 2 were running business. According to defendant No.1 and 2, all the allegations levelled by the plaintiff regarding subletting were baseless and the landlord wanted to get back the possession somehow and anyhow. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr. P.J. Yagnik for the applicant landlord in Civil Revision Application No. 308 of 1987 vehemently contended by referring to Exh. 40 at which the partnership deed and other documents were produced that the tenant had parted with possession in favour of defendant No.2. In his submission the partnership was a camouflage and in fact no genuine partnership existed. He submitted that grocery items were being sold in the premises under the name of partnership firm, and the partnership was subsequently dissolved also. 4.2 Learned advocate for the respondent tenant Mr. Jinesh Kapadia Submitted that the partnership was evident from Ex.54 and various stipulation. Therein governing relationship between the partners showed that there was neither a transfer of exclusive possession by Def.No.1 in favor of def.No.2, nor the tenancy rights were given up by the tenant. It was submitted by him that both courts had recorded concurrent finding after properly interpreting Ex.54. It was submitted that this Court while exercising powers under Sec.29(2) of the Act may not interfere when the findings were not perverse. 5. From the relevant material on record it was noticed that the trial court considered and appreciated the partnership deed (Exh.58) and in particular conditions No. 5, 8, 9 and 11 thereof and recorded a clear finding that the tenant had not transferred his tenancy rights. The execution of the partnership deed and the covenants therein did not suggest that the same was created to circumvent the provisions of section 13(1)(e) as such. The execution of the partnership deed and the covenants therein did not suggest that the same was created to circumvent the provisions of section 13(1)(e) as such. It was a genuine partnership under which the business was continued by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 as partners. The lower appellate court recorded also that there was not a single condition in the partnership deed which could be said to be illegal or which may raise any suspicion about the intention of the partners in running the partnership business. It was noted on the basis of the stipulations of the partnership deed (Exh.54) that defendant No.1 had not absolved himself from any liability, was one of the partners of the firm, had contributed to the capital and was sharing the losses of the business. Both the courts below therefore concurrently reached to a conclusion that in formation of partnership by defendant No.1 tenant with defendant No.2 there was no act of subletting. When partnership was found to be genuine there was no question of parting with tenancy right. Nor it could be said that the tenant had divested himself of legal possession of the premises. 5.1 In Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri [ 1987 (2) GLH 261 ] the Supreme Court stated that in a case where a tenant becomes a partner of a partnership firm and allows the firm to carry on business in the premises while he himself retains the legal possession thereof, the act of the tenant does not amount to subletting. It held, "The main question in issue in this appeal as well as before the High Court in revision was whether there was a genuine partnership at all in which the appellant was a partner. It is true that since after 4th of October, 1960 partnership firm was carrying on business in the premises in question. It is well settled that if there was such a partnership firm of which the appellant was a partner as a tenant the same would not amount to subletting leading to the forfeiture of the tenancy. For this proposition see the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Mehta Jagjivan Vanechand v. Doshi Vanechand Harakhchand, AIR 1972 Guj. 6 . For this proposition see the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Mehta Jagjivan Vanechand v. Doshi Vanechand Harakhchand, AIR 1972 Guj. 6 . Thakkar, J. of the Gujarat High Court as the learned Judge then was, held that the mere fact that tenant entered into a partnership and allowed the premises being used for the benefit of partnership does not constitute assignment or subletting in favour of the partnership firm entitling a landlord to recover possession. This view is now concluded by the decision of this Court in Madras Bangalore Transport Co. (West) v. Inder Singh, 1986(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 377 : (1986) 3 SCC 62 : AIR 1986 SC 1564 ." (Para 5) 5.2 The court laid down the tests and stated in paragraph 8, that in order to establish partnership, important elements are (1) there must be an agreement entered into by all parties concerned, (2) the agreement must be to share profits of business, and (3) the business must be carried on by all or any of the persons concerned acting for all. 5.3 As seen above, there was a concurrent finding reached by both the courts below that it was a genuine partnership. The finding recorded was on the basis of due appreciation of the contents and conditions of the deed of partnership and the attendant circumstances coming out from the evidence on record. In that view no ground was made out which may require this court exercising revisional powers under Section 29(2) of the Act, the scope of which was explained in Patel Valmik Himatlal v. Patel Mohanlal Muljibhai [1998(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 256 : (1998) 7 SCC 383 ] in these words. "The powers under Section 29(2) are revisional powers with which the High Court is clothed. It empowers the High Court to correct errors which may make the decision contrary to law and which errors go to the root of the decision but it does not vest the High Court with the power to rehear the matter and reappreciate the evidence. The mere fact that a different view is possible on reappreciation of the evidence cannot be a ground for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. The mere fact that a different view is possible on reappreciation of the evidence cannot be a ground for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. In the instant case, we find that the High Court fell into an error in reappraising the entire evidence and recording a finding on the basis of that reappreciation without in any way pointing out any error of law or material irregularity as may have been committed by the trial court or the first appellate court." (Para 6, 7) 5.4 In Helper Girdharbhai (supra) also it was observed on the ambit of the powers that, "the High Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind by the lower court. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived at taking all material and relevant facts in mind. In order to warrant interference, the decision must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Lastly, such a decision does not lead to a miscarriage of justice. But, in the guise of revision, substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken a particular view, is not permissible. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction if it substitutes its own view in place of that of the courts below because it considers it to be a better view. The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant." (Para 2) 6. For the reasons aforestated, landlord's revision lacks merits and cannot be entertained. C.R.A. No. 308 of 1987 7. This Revision Application was preferred by the tenant who was aggrieved by the decree of eviction passed against him on the ground of arrears of rent. Regarding that ground it was the case of the plaintiff as emerged from the plaint and the evidence led, that the tenant was in arrears for total period of six years and 15 days and the rent due for the said period was Rs.688.65ps. Further amount of Rs.116.10ps was unpaid as education tax was claimed in the suit notice (Exh.50) dated 29th August 1978. The landlord produced receipts showing payment of education cess by him (Exhs. 62 and 63) which was required to be paid by him as the tenant failed to pay the same. Further amount of Rs.116.10ps was unpaid as education tax was claimed in the suit notice (Exh.50) dated 29th August 1978. The landlord produced receipts showing payment of education cess by him (Exhs. 62 and 63) which was required to be paid by him as the tenant failed to pay the same. It was the case that the notice under section 12(2) (Exh.50) was served (Exh. 51 and 52), yet, the tenant did not give reply, nor paid the rent demanded. It was tenant's case that he was not a tenant-in-arrears in as much as he had given the demand draft to plaintiff No.4 Taherbhai for Rs.351.50ps towards the rent and the said demand draft was returned by the landlord. According to the tenant, he paid the rent to said Taherbhai since he was managing the affairs of the suit premises. 8. Learned advocate Mr. Jinesh Kapadia for the applicant-tenant submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case it could not be said that the tenant had neglected to pay the rent. He submitted that the demand draft was given to Taherbhai and was received by the landlord. It was submitted that on the contrary by returning the demand draft along with the suit notice, the landlord showed his unwillingness to accept the rent. Learned advocate therefore submitted that when such was the situation emerging, the primary condition for passing eviction decree itself was not satisfied. Learned advocate for the applicant submitted that once the initial condition necessary for incurring the liability of eviction was absent, the further events were inconsequential and could not be taken into account. He relied on the decision in Lilavanti Dhirajlal Boradiya v. Soni Harjivan Devjibhai [ 1975 GLR 1002 ] to contend that the refusal on the part of the landlord to accept the amount would disentitled him from seeking eviction. 8.1 Learned advocate for the applicant relied on the language of section 12 of the Act and submitted that in the facts of the case, there was no neglect to pay rent on the part of the tenant. It was submitted that the willingness to pay rent was shown. Once the willingness of the tenant was there to pay the rent, it was submitted that decree for eviction could not have been passed. It was submitted that the willingness to pay rent was shown. Once the willingness of the tenant was there to pay the rent, it was submitted that decree for eviction could not have been passed. What could be termed as "neglect to pay", was explained in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi [ 1996 (1) GLH 455 ], and by seeking support from the said decision, learned advocate for the applicant, there was no "neglect to pay", when the tenant had tendered the amount by way of demand draft giving it to plaintiff No. 4 Taherbhai. 8.2 The next submission of learned advocate for the tenant was that since the payment of education cess and other taxes were the obligation of the tenant as per landlord's own case, the case would fall under section 12(3)(b) of the Act. He relied on the decisions in Dayalal Gangaram v. Bhimani Bhupatrai Chunilal [ AIR 1977 Guj 68 ], in which it was held that even in absence of a contract between landlord and tenant as regards payment of education cess the education cess would form part of the rent payable and Sec.12(3)(a) would not be attracted and the case would fall into any other case under Sec.12(3)(b). Learned advocate for the applicant further submitted that the word "regularly" was omitted from the section in 1985, and therefore, the requirement of payment of rent by the tenant has to be viewed in that light. 8.3 On the other hand learned advocate for the respondent landlord submitted that tendering of amount by demand draft did not amount to paying the due rent. It was submitted that the amount of Rs.351/- stated to have been given to Taherbhai was not the rent due and the tenant was in arrears in respect of more than six months for the amount of Rs.668/- plus the education cess. He submitted that there was total neglect to pay the rent. He submitted that the tenant did not pay the rent and his case was squarely covered under section 12(3) (a) of the Act. It was submitted by him alternatively without prejudice to the contention that the case was falling under section 12(3)(a), that even if the case could be treated to be falling under section 12(3)(b), the protection was not available to the tenant as he did not care to pay the rent regularly. 9. It was submitted by him alternatively without prejudice to the contention that the case was falling under section 12(3)(a), that even if the case could be treated to be falling under section 12(3)(b), the protection was not available to the tenant as he did not care to pay the rent regularly. 9. At the outset, the question may be considered whether there was a valid tendering of amount of rent due in eye of law. The defence on part of the tenant that he paid demand draft to plaintiff No.4 Taherbhai towards payment of rent did not hold good. Not only that the amount claimed to have been sent was lesser amount, the evidence on record did not stand in support of tenant's case that said Taherbhai was authorised to receive rent to collect on behalf of the landlord. It was in evidence (Exh.58, Exh. 82) that said Taherbhai was mentally sick; that he used to stay in ceylon and had come back. There was nothing to suggest and substantiate tenant's case that said Taherbhai was managing the affairs of the tenanted premises. According to Mansoor Ali (Exh.58), initially Nazamuddin and subsequently deceased Alibhai's son Gulamabbas was managing the property and was collecting the rent. Dasharathbhai (Exh. 82)'s evidence stated interalia that originally the rent was paid in cash to Taherbhai, but he expressed apprehension that his pocket might get cut and asked for demand draft, therefore, demand draft was given to him. The evidence further indicated that the plaintiffs had publicly disowned Taherbhai giving newspaper advertisement (Exh.72) that Taherbhai was mentally sick and unstable, warning that no one should enter into any transaction with regard to the property. All these aspects of evidence going against the tenant were unimpeached. Thus, the contention that paying Rs.651.50ps to Taherbhai satisfied the requirement of tendering the rent payable could not be countenanced. In order to be valid payment of rent, the amount has to be tendered to the landlord or the person authorised by him. 9.1 Furthermore, the amount claimed to have been paid to Taherbhai was less than the rent due demanded by the landlord. In Jagmohan R. Sheth v. Jayantilal L. Shankar (14 GLR 161), where the rent was due for more than six months but the tenant sent rent for four months, it was held that sending of short amount, time of arrears cannot be said to be reduced. In Jagmohan R. Sheth v. Jayantilal L. Shankar (14 GLR 161), where the rent was due for more than six months but the tenant sent rent for four months, it was held that sending of short amount, time of arrears cannot be said to be reduced. If the part of arrears is sent, the landlord is justified in refusing the same. It was held that by tendering rent of a smaller amount the tenant cannot show that he has paid rent or that he is ready and willing to pay the rent within the meaning of section 12(1) of the Act. The principle laid down in Jagmohan R. Sheth (Supra) is attracted to the facts of the case in contradistinction to the decision in Lilavanti Dhirajlal Boradia (supra) relied on by learned advocate for the tenant, wherein the entire amount due towards arrears of rent was sent by the tenant, which was refused by the landlord. The facts of that case there was not comparable to the facts emerging in the present case. 10. Before proceeding further, the basic facts may be recapitulated to consider the question whether the case falls under section 12(2)(a) or it could fall under section 12(3)(b) as was contended by learned advocate for the applicant-tenant. The tenant replied (Exh.53) to the suit notice dated 21.08.1978 (Exh. 50). In the reply of the tenant, dispute with regard to the standard rent was not raised. It is indisputable position that no payment of rent was made by the tenant between 1979 to 23rd March 1981. Even in the Written Statement (Exh.23), the defendant No.1 did not raise any dispute in respect of standard rent. On the contrary as is already stated, the tenant claimed that since he had sent Rs.351.50ps by way of demand draft through Taherbhai the rent was paid up by him and no amount was due. Further, the tenant did not pay any amount towards rent within one month from the date of receipt of the notice (Exh.50). Even if going by the tenant's case that his payment of the amount by way of demand draft was towards payment of rent, admittedly, the amount claimed in the suit notice towards arrears of rent was not sent or paid (Rs.688/- towards the rent and Rs.116/- towards education cess) by the landlord. Even if going by the tenant's case that his payment of the amount by way of demand draft was towards payment of rent, admittedly, the amount claimed in the suit notice towards arrears of rent was not sent or paid (Rs.688/- towards the rent and Rs.116/- towards education cess) by the landlord. The rent demanded in the suit notice was more than what was claimed to have been paid by way of demand draft. Therefore, it was obligatory on the part of the tenant in order to show his bonafides, and all the more to demonstrate his readiness and willingness to pay the due rent, that he paid up the rent as demanded in the suit notice. That was the criteria in law to judge his readiness and willingness. The duty of the tenant in law to pay the rent demanded in the suit notice was not extinguished notwithstanding the landlord returning the demand draft along with the suit notice which was in any case an amount falling short of the rent due. 10.1. The events which occurred subsequent to sending of the suit notice were even more damaging to the tenant for claiming any protection. Apparently the tenant did not pay the rent due even subsequent to institution of the suit and till framing of the issues. It further appears that landlord moved an application on 7th March 1981 under section 11(4) of the Act (Exh.35) seeking direction against the tenant to pay the amount of rent illegally withheld by him. Here again, the tenant failed to pay the amount of rent. The landlord was led to file another application (Exh.46) on 25th November 1982 with a prayer to strike of the defence of the tenant. At that stage, the tenant did not care to pay the rent. In fact, the tenant could not show that he ever paid any amount of rent after receipt of the suit notice or even after institution of the suit and during pendency thereof. Learned advocate for the applicant could not show that the tenant paid rent at any time in the entire proceedings. Then, no details are forthcoming about any rent having been paid. As already noted at no point of time the tenant had raised dispute on the standard rent. 10.2 From the above facts, it was evident that the tenant consistently failed and neglected to pay the rent. Then, no details are forthcoming about any rent having been paid. As already noted at no point of time the tenant had raised dispute on the standard rent. 10.2 From the above facts, it was evident that the tenant consistently failed and neglected to pay the rent. The contention that the case falls under section 12(3) (b) raised by the learned advocate for the applicant is without substance. The case of the landlord was that the education cess, etc. was payable by the tenant, whereas the tenant denied the same in his Written Statement. That apart, section 12(3)(b) requires certain conditions to be fulfilled before it could apply. The first requirement is that on the first date of the hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in the court the standard rent and permitted increases. Secondly, the tenant must continue to pay or tender in court the rent and the permitted increases till the suit is decided. 10.3 In Kushaldas Jethabhai v. Nanabhai Nathubhai [ (1997) 1 GLH 596 ] the court In Kushaldas Jethabhai v. Nanabhai Nathubhai [ (1997) 1 GLH 596 ] the court enlisted the requisite conditions to apply section 12(3)(b). The conditions necessary to seek protection under section 12(3)(b) by the tenant are where arrears of rent was for less than six months, or (ii) where entire rent is not payable monthly; (iii) where the dispute about standard rent and/or permitted increases has been raised within a period of one month after receipt of notice under Section 12(3). On the first day of hearing of the suit for arrears on the ground of non-payment of rent or on any other day as the court may direct upon request of the party, the tenant has paid the entire arrears of rent and permitted increases then due to the landlord and the tenant must continue to pay regularly during the pendency of the suit such rent and permitted increases periodically as the court may specify and also during the pendency of the appeal as it is in continuation of the suit. 10.4 The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ganpat v. Sashikant (1978(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 187 : AIR 1978 SC 955 ) has clearly held that in order to seek protection of provisions of Section 12(3)(b), the tenant must comply with the conditions laid down in the said provisions. The court cannot exercise discretion in favour of the tenant who has not fulfilled the conditions. If there is statutory default or neglect on the part of the tenant, whatever may be the cause, the landlord acquires a right under Section 13(3)(b) for getting' decree for possession. A tenant who is a defaulter and who failed to comply with the conditions set out in Section 12(3)(b) cannot be given protection and he cannot be allowed to defeat the landlord's claim for eviction. 10.5 The aforesaid conditions must co-exist and they must be satisfied together for seeking protection against eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent under Section 12(3)(b).The tenant seeking protection under these provisions has to be vigilant and has to take steps to comply with the aforesaid conditions. Where there is willingness to pay the rent or not has to be judged from the totality of facts and over all conduct of the tenant. In order to apply section 12(3)(b), all the conditions mentioned therein have to be fulfilled together. When the conditions are not satisfied, the court cannot exercise discretion in favour of the tenant. 10.6 It is well settled that in order to bring the case within the purview of section 12(3)(a) for decree of eviction against the tenant certain conditions are to be satisfied and if those conditions stand satisfied, the court will have no alternative but to pass decree of eviction. The rent should be payable by month. There is no dispute about the standard rent and permitted increases. The arrears of rent must have been mounted for the period of six months or beyond. Notice under section 12(2) of the Act with its necessary ingredients is to be served upon the tenant, and lastly, the tenant has failed to pay the standard rent and permitted increases due as per the notice within a period of one month from the date of receipt of notice. These conditions stand satisfied in the facts of the present case. Therefore, section 12(3)(a) applies. 11. These conditions stand satisfied in the facts of the present case. Therefore, section 12(3)(a) applies. 11. While holding that the case falls within the purview of section 12(3)(a) of the Act, the lower appellate court has passed the decree of eviction observing and holding as under. "The only point, therefore, required to be seen is whether the defendant No.1 can be labelled as tenant in arrears. According to the plaintiff, they have received the rent from defendant No.1 only upto S.Y.2028 Aso Vadi Amas. Whereas, according to defendant No.1 he has paid the rent thereafter also and he has categorically mentioned that from S.Y. 2031 Aso Vadi Amas, he has paid the rent to the plaintiff No. 4 and he has also paid rented S.Y. 2032 to S.Y. 2034 Aso Vadi Amas and plaintiff No.4 has issued a rent receipts. The mention of the receipt issued by plaintiff No.4 dose not appear to be a mere slip of pen. But the defendant No.1 has repeatedly made mention of the receipts issued by the plaintiff No. 4 in para 6 and 13 of his written statement. It is, thereafter, abundantly clear that he has come before the court with a specific case that all the time, he is paying rent to the plaintiff No. 4 who is giving him the receipts. Further, in the oral examination before the Court, he back on his own words and in the cross-examination, he has admitted that he has falsely mentioned about rent receipt issued by plaintiff No.4. In paper book, page No.47, he has admitted about this false statement in written statement and he has stated that plaintiff No.4 was not giving him rent receipts. It means, thereafter that he has deliberately created false defence of the payment of rent and thereafter, he is not coming with clear hands before the court. He has also stated that he was maintaining a note of the rent paid by him to the plaintiff. No such note of the payment of rent is produced by the defendant No.1. With the result that not only that, it is proved that he tells lie, but it is proved that he has not paid the rent demanded by the plaintiff, or in other words, he has atleast failed to pay the rent demanded by the plaintiff. No such note of the payment of rent is produced by the defendant No.1. With the result that not only that, it is proved that he tells lie, but it is proved that he has not paid the rent demanded by the plaintiff, or in other words, he has atleast failed to pay the rent demanded by the plaintiff. I am, therefore not at all reluctant to believe that the due amount as claimed by the plaintiffs from the defendant does stand due and that the defendant No.1 is liable to pay the same." 12. Lastly, the contention of learned advocate for the applicant that the word "regularly" was omitted may be considered. The said contention is of no consequence in so far as the present case is concerned. No details were shown whether any rent was paid at all during the pendency of the suit or the appeal. In any view, the amendment by which the word `regularly' omitted was brought in section 12(3)(b) in 1985 whereas the suit notice in the instant case is of the year 1978 and the suit is of the year 1979. In Sakarbhai Devraj v. Ibrahim [1994 (2) GLR 10] that the amendment deleting the word `regularly' in section 12(3) (b) is prospective. It will not apply to cases where the cause of action arose much prior to the said date. Therefore, that aspect that does not apply in the present case as suit was filed in 1979 as noted above. 13. For the aforesaid discussion and reasons, there is no substance in the tenant's Revision Application. 14. In view of the above discussion, both the Revision Applications are dismissed. Revision dismissed.