ORDER 1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated 12-10-2012, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 2, Sikar, Headquarter Srimadhopur, whereby the learned Judge has allowed the revision petition filed by the complainant. The learned Judge has quashed and set aside the order dated 13-12-2011, passed by the learned Magistrate, whereby the learned Magistrate, had refused to take cognizance for the offence under Section 307, IPC, and had refused to issue process against Shriram, the petitioner No.1. The learned Judge has remanded the case to the learned Magistrate. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioners has raised the following contentions before this Court : Firstly, this is the second round of revision petition being filed by the complainant. Initially, by order dated 22-10-2005, the learned trial Court had dismissed the complainants application for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 307, IPC and for issuing process against petitioner No.1, Shriram. Since the complainant was aggrieved by the said order, he had filed a revision petition before the learned Judge. However, by order dated 12-5-2010, the learned Judge not only quashed the order dated 22-10-2005, but also remanded the case back to the learned trial Court and direct it to re-hear the complainant and the petitioner Nos. 2 to 7, and to pass a fresh order. Consequently, the trial Court re-heard the case; by order dated 13-12-2011, the learned trial Court again rejected the complainants application and refused to take cognizance for the offence under Section 307, IPC and refused to issue process against Shriram. Since the complainant was aggrieved by the said order, he again filed a revision petition before the learned Judge. The learned Judge has allowed the revision petition by impugned order dated 12-10-2012; he has again remanded the case back to the learned trial Court. 3. According the learned counsel for the petitioners, it seems to be an endless process where the learned trial Court refuses to take cognizance for the offence under Section 307, IPC and refuses to issue process against Shriram, and the learned Judge remands the case back to it. According to the learned counsel, such a ping-pong match between the learned trial Court and the learned Judge is adversely affecting the interests and rights of the petitioners. 4. According to the learned counsel, such a ping-pong match between the learned trial Court and the learned Judge is adversely affecting the interests and rights of the petitioners. 4. Secondly, in its order dated 13-12-2011, the learned trial Court has given cogent reasons for not issuing process against Shriram, and for not taking cognizance of the offence under Section 307, IPC. Therefore, the learned Judge was not justified in remanding the case back to the trial Court. 5. Thirdly, the learned trial Court had clearly noted that according to two witnesses, namely Umraomal Meena and Jitendra Kumar, on the fateful day Shriram was with them, and he had appeared in an examination at Jaipur between 8.00-9.30 a.m. The learned trial Court had also noted that it takes about 1?½ hours for a person to travel from Jaipur to Reengus. Thus, it was highly improbable that Shriram would have reached Reengus by 2.30 p.m., the time of the incident. Therefore, relying on the statement of Umraomal Meena and Jitendra Kumar, the learned trial Court had refused to believe the statements of injured and other eye-witnesses that Shriram had assaulted the injured persons. According to the learned counsel, the learned Judge was not justified in concluding that the learned trial Court does not have the power to look into the evidence which is in favour of the alleged accused. Moreover, the learned Judge was not justified in concluding that it is possible for a person to cover the distance from Jaipur to Reengus and to reach Reengus by 2.30 p.m. 6. Fourthly, the learned trial Court had clearly held that accordingly to the medical evidence, the injuries caused to Kanaram were simple in nature. There was no evidence that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death, or were dangerous to life. Therefore, the learned trial Court was justified in concluding that the offence under Section 307, IPC was not made out. Further, the learned Judge was not justified in concluding that there was report dated 17-5-2003, according to which injuries were classified as being dangerous to life. Moreover, the learned Judge was not justified in concluding that merely because of injury on Kanarams head, the offence under Section 307, IPC was made out. Further, the learned Judge was not justified in concluding that there was report dated 17-5-2003, according to which injuries were classified as being dangerous to life. Moreover, the learned Judge was not justified in concluding that merely because of injury on Kanarams head, the offence under Section 307, IPC was made out. Hence, the learned Judge was not justified in quashing the order dated 13-12-2011 and in remanding the case back to the learned trial Court. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the impugned order. 8. Merely because twice the complainant has approached the Revisional Court and merely because twice the Revisional Court has remanded the case back to the learned trial Court, the petitioners cannot claim that their interests or right are being adversely affected. For, the complainant has a right to challenge the cognizance order, if he is aggrieved by the fact that the offence for which cognizance should have been taken is being left out, or the person who should be arrayed as an accused is also being left out. Moreover, if the Revisional Court, in its wisdom, feels that an illegal order has been passed, the Revisional Court has sufficient powers, under Section 397, Cr. P. C., to quash and set aside the order, and to remand the case back to the learned trial Court. Therefore, the first contention raised by the learned counsel that it seems to be an endless process and a ping-pong match between the trial Court and the Revisional Court, is unacceptable. A procedure established by the law, cannot be short-circuited only because the party is aggrieved by the fact that the complainant is exercising his rights given to him under the law. 9. In catena of cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has demarcated the jurisdiction of the trial Court while taking cognizance of the offence. The Apex Court has opined that cognizance is always taken of an offence and not of the offender. Further, while taking cognizance, the learned trial Court is not permitted to meticulously examine the evidence collected by the investigating agency. Even if there were contradictions within the evidence so collected, the learned trial Court cannot look into these contradictions. The scope and ambit of taking cognizance is limited only to seeing whether prima facie the offence is made out i.e. whether the ingredients of the offence exist or not. Even if there were contradictions within the evidence so collected, the learned trial Court cannot look into these contradictions. The scope and ambit of taking cognizance is limited only to seeing whether prima facie the offence is made out i.e. whether the ingredients of the offence exist or not. The evidence which may be in favour of the accused, and the facts which may be marshalled out as part of his defence during full-fledged trial, such evidence and facts cannot be considered at the stage of taking cognizance. For, at the initial stage of taking cognizance, the trial Court is only concerned with the existence of a prima facie case with regard to the commission of the offence. The legal position, so stated above, has been noted by the learned Judge also in the impugned order dated 12-10-2012. 10. A bare perusal of the order dated 13-12-2011, clear reveals that the learned trial Court had considered the contradictions between the statements of eye-witnesses, and the statements of Umraomal Meena and Jitendra Kumar. By doing so, the learned trial Court obviously overstepped its jurisdiction. Therefore, the learned Judge was certainly justified in concluding that the trial Court could not have done so. 11. Even if petitioner No.1, Shriram were to taking the plea of alibi and were to support the plea through the statements of Umraomal Meena and Jitendra Kumar, this plea could be considered only during the course of trial. For, it is a settled principle of the criminal jurisprudence that a plea of alibi needs to be established by the accused. Thus, obviously such a plea could not have been considered by the learned trial Court at the stage of taking cognizance. Hence, the second contention raised by the learned counsel that the learned trial Court was justified in considering and basing its decision on the statements of Umraomal Meena and Jitendra Kumar, is highly misplaced. 12. As far as the contention of the learned counsel with regard to taking cognizance for the offence under Section 307, IPC is concerned, it is imperative to note Section 307, IPC and illustration attached therewith. Section 307, IPC is as under : 307. Attempt to murder. 12. As far as the contention of the learned counsel with regard to taking cognizance for the offence under Section 307, IPC is concerned, it is imperative to note Section 307, IPC and illustration attached therewith. Section 307, IPC is as under : 307. Attempt to murder. Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to (imprisonment for life), or to such punishment as is here in before mentioned. Attempts by life convicts.- (When any person offending under this section is under sentence of (imprisonment for life), he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death). Illustrations (a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensured. A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section. (b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does not ensue. (c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of (the first paragraph of) this section. (d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in As keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. A places the food on Zs table or delivers it to Zs servant to place it on Zs table. A has committed the offence defined in this section. 13. A places the food on Zs table or delivers it to Zs servant to place it on Zs table. A has committed the offence defined in this section. 13. A bare perusal of the Section clearly reveals that when an act has been done with an intention or knowledge, under such circumstances, that if by such act, he caused death of a person, he would be guilty of murder, then, he may be punished for ten years and if hurt is caused by such act, then punishment may extend to life imprisonment. Illustration (c) makes it abundantly clear that for the purpose of Section 307, IPC, it is not essential that an injury be caused to a person. Therefore, the nature of the injury is absolutely immaterial. What is to be looked into by the Court for the purpose of Section 307 IPC, is the circumstances in which the occurrence took place, weapons used by the accused persons and the place of injury on the body of the injured. Therefore, the nature of the injury may be one of the pointer with regard to the intention or knowledge, but it cannot be the sole criteria. What is essential to note is that even if no injury were caused, even then an offence under Section 307 may still be committed. Further, what is punishable under Section 307 is the intention or the knowledge, with which the act is being done. This view has also been expressed by this Court in the case of Moti Ram alias Moti Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2012 (1) C J (Raj) (Cri) 1. 14. Therefore, the learned trial Court was certainly not justified in concluding that merely because the injuries were simple in nature, therefore, the offence under Section 307 did not occur. The learned trial Court has ignored Illustration (c), appended with Section 307, IPC and has also ignored the view of this Court as expressed in the case of Moti Ram alias Moti Lal (supra). 15. Thus, the learned Judge, having taken note of the case of Moti Ram alias Moti Lal (supra), is certainly justified in holding that there is prima facie case for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 307 IPC. 15. Thus, the learned Judge, having taken note of the case of Moti Ram alias Moti Lal (supra), is certainly justified in holding that there is prima facie case for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 307 IPC. Since, the learned trial Court has committed an illegality on both the counts, i.e. in not taking cognizance for the offence under Section 307, IPC and in not issuing process against petitioner No.1, Shriram, naturally the learned Judge was justified in remanding the case back to the learned trial Court. 16. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any merit in the petition; the same is, hereby, dismissed. The stay application also stands dismissed. Petition dismissed.