JUDGMENT : Ravi R. Tripathi, J. Rule. Learned advocate Mr.H.S. Munshaw waives service of rule on behalf of the respondent. At the request of the learned senior advocate for the petitioner the matter is taken up for final hearing. 2. Heard learned senior advocate Mr.Mihir Thakore appearing with Mr. Y.N. Ravani for the petitioner-BSEL Infrastructure Realty Limited. The learned senior advocate for the petitioner submitted that the matter is in a very narrow compass and he has highlighted that narrow compass. The learned senior advocate for the petitioner invited attention of the Court to the fact that the petitioner was put in possession of the property in question. For doing that lease deed was executed. A copy of the lease deed is produced at Annexure ‘C’ (Colly.), viz. pages 28 to 42. There is no dispute on the point that the petitioner was put in possession of the land in question by the respondent for a definite purpose on definite terms and conditions and there is no much controversy about there being some deficiency on the part of the petitioner in fulfilling the terms and conditions and carrying out the work expected from him, but then whether that is sufficient for the respondent to push the petitioner out from the land in question without there being any order to that effect from the competent Court. It was very emphatically and strenuously argued by learned advocate Mr.Munshaw for the respondent-Corporation that the Corporation issued not only various notices but also given an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It was only thereafter that as the petitioner was not able to report compliance of the terms and conditions which were breached that the respondent-Corporation took possession of the land in question. 3. It is settled position of law that howsoever grave may be the cause the respondent could not have dispossessed the petitioner by any method which is not known and acceptable to law. 3.1. The learned senior advocate for the petitioner submitted that there are various judgments of the Hon’ble the Apex Court, but of those judgments the learned senior advocate for the petitioner selected one judgment to bring home the point and that is the judgment of the Hon’ble the Apex Court in the matter of State of U.P. and others v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh, etc., reported in A.I.R. 1989 SC 997. 3.2. 3.2. The learned senior advocate for the petitioner submitted that possibly there could not be a better expression for putting his point through than the words in which the case was presented before the Hon’ble the Apex Court by Shri Sorabjee which is discussed by the Hon’ble the Apex Court in the following para: “15. Sri Sorabji submitted that great hardship and injustice would be occasioned to the respondents if the State Government on the self-assumed and self-assessed validity of its own action of cancellation of the lease, attempts at and succeeds in, a resumption of possession extra-judicially by physical force. Sri Sorabjee referred to the notice dated 19.11.1985 in which the Government, according to Sri Sorabjee, had left no-one in doubt as to its intentions of resorting to an extrajudicial resumption of possession. Sri Sorabjee referred to paras 3.10 and 4 of the order dated 19.11.1985. 3.3. A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry' in the lease-deed does not authorize extrajudicial methods to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and Governmental authorities should have a 'legal pedegree'. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab, ( AIR 1961 SC 1570 ), this Court said (at pp. 1574 and 1575 of AIR): “We must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab, ( AIR 1961 SC 1570 ), this Court said (at pp. 1574 and 1575 of AIR): “We must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order.” “Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basis principle of the rule of law.” (emphasis supplied) Therefore, there is no question in the present case of the Government thinking of appropriating to itself an extrajudicial right of re-entry. Possession can be resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. It cannot resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Government is accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than in due course of law.” (emphasis supplied) 3.4. The learned senior advocate for the petitioner submitted that the case on hand is on a better footing, because in the case before the Hon’ble the Apex Court there was a term used ‘re-entry’, but in our case, clause (13) of the lease deed only provided that, “Notwithstanding and without prejudice to the clause above of this lease deed, in the event of default, breach or non-compliance of any of the terms and conditions of this lease deed, the lessor may by notice in writing and after providing opportunity of hearing, terminate this lease and forfeit the whole of rent as well as premium paid.” 3.5. The learned senior advocate for the petitioner submitted that the lease deed does not provide for re-entry like it was provided in the document before the Hon’ble the Apex Court. The learned senior advocate for the petitioner submitted that let there be no misunderstanding that in the event in the lease deed on hand if there was provision of ‘re-entry’ that would have authorised the Government to take possession by any method, which is not known to law and recognised by law. The learned senior advocate for the petitioner submitted that let there be no misunderstanding that in the event in the lease deed on hand if there was provision of ‘re-entry’ that would have authorised the Government to take possession by any method, which is not known to law and recognised by law. The learned senior advocate for the petitioner submitted that the Hon’ble the Apex Court in that very judgment in the very next para made it clear that, ‘the moment the question of dispossession by extra-judicial means is decided the High Court must restrain itself from examining the merits of the matter’. The learned senior advocate for the petitioner submitted that he is conscious of the fact that in a matter like this where rights of the parties are accruing from lease deed the civil court is the right forum for determination of rights of the parties, but he reiterated that he is agitating only and the only question of dispossession by resorting to extra-judicial means which are neither known to law nor recognised by law. In this regard para 16 is also reproduced hereunder for ready perusal: “16. In the result, the appeals of the State of Uttar Pradesh (SLPs 4761 and 4762 of 1987) and of the LDA (SLPs 18298 and 11498 of 1987) directed against the common judgment dated 8.12.1986 in so far as it pertains to W.P. 6819 of 1985 and W.P. 367 of 1986 are allowed and the said two writ petitions are dismissed, leaving the question of the legality and validity of the purported cancellation of the lease and the defence of the lessees open to be urged in appropriate legal proceedings, whenever and wherever Government proceeds to initiate action in accordance with law for resumption of possession on the basis of the alleged cancellation or forfeiture of the lease. Any developmental work that may be made by the lessees or at their instance would, of course, be at their own risk and shall be subject to the result of such proceedings.” 4. Learned advocate Mr. Munshaw appearing for the respondent-Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited contested the matter and tried his best to convince this Court that the Court should not grant any relief to the petitioner because relationship of the petitioner and the respondent is governed by lease deed. Learned advocate Mr. Munshaw appearing for the respondent-Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited contested the matter and tried his best to convince this Court that the Court should not grant any relief to the petitioner because relationship of the petitioner and the respondent is governed by lease deed. There are contractual obligations and in the matters of ‘contract’ High Court should not interfere with and the petitioner should be relegated to the civil court for getting its rights adjudicated. 4.1. This Court deems it proper to reiterate that the Court is conscious of the fact that the Court is examining only and the only question of dispossession of the petitioner by the respondent-Corporation by resorting to extra-judicial method which is not known to law and which is not recognised by law. 5. The learned advocate for the respondent-Corporation relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble the Apex Court in the matter of State of Bihar and others v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., reported in A.I.R. 2002 SC 206. The learned advocate for the respondent-Corporation invited attention of the Court to the Head Note thereof and paras 3 and 7 thereof. The learned advocate for the respondent-Corporation also relied upon certain other judgments which in the considered opinion of this Court are on the same lines. To illustrate, it is deemed proper to refer to at least one of the judgments in detail. In the matter of State of Bihar and others v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. (supra) the question involved is very well articulated in the Head Note itself. It reads as under: “Appellant invited tender for supply of PVC pipes and fittings and tender of respondent-Company was accepted, Respondent-Company delayed the supplies and finally appellant terminal of contract and purchased fittings at a higher price. Thereafter, while paying the final bill to the respondent, the difference of amount which required to be incurred by the appellants was deducted. Respondent filed a writ petition challenging the decision taken by the appellants to deduct differential sum for the loss suffered from the bills of respondent-Company while making the full and final payment. Question whether the alleged non-supply of road permits by the appellants would justify breach of contract by the respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Question whether the alleged non-supply of road permits by the appellants would justify breach of contract by the respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Such seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather than by a Court exercising prerogative of issuing writs.” 5.1. The Court is conscious of the fact that in this particular case the Court is not required to pronounce on the compliance and noncompliance of the terms and conditions by the petitioner. The Court is also not to pronounce on observance of principles of natural justice by the respondent-Corporation. The Court is also not to examine whether sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner by the respondent-Corporation before taking any action. The Court has to examine only one question, that is, whether the respondent-Corporation dispossessed the petitioner by resorting to extra-judicial means for and for that the respondent-Corporation was authorised in law, laid down by the Hon’ble the Apex Court by number of judgments of which one is referred to here in above in the matter of State of U.P. and others v. Maharaja Dharmandernder Prasad Singh, etc. (supra). 6. The learned advocate for the respondent-Corporation relied upon the observations made by the Hon’ble the Apex Court in the matter of State of Bihar and others v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. (supra) in paras 3 and 7, which read as under: “3. Settled law :- Writ is not remedy for enforcing contractual obligations. It is to be reiterated that writ petition under Article 226 is not the proper proceeding for adjudicating such disputes. Under the law, it was open to the respondent to approach the Court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate relief for breach of contract. It is settled law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the litigant, he should be quired to pursue that remedy and not invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue writ, but ordinarily that would be a good ground in refusing to exercise the discretion under Article 226.” 4. xxx 5. Equally, the existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue writ, but ordinarily that would be a good ground in refusing to exercise the discretion under Article 226.” 4. xxx 5. xxx 6. xxx 7. In our view, it is apparent that the order passed by the High Court is on the face of it illegal and erroneous. It is true that many matters could be decided after referring to the contentions raised in the affidavits and counter-affidavits, but that would hardly be ground for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of alleged breach of contract. Whether the alleged non-supply of road permits by the appellants would justify breach of contract by the respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Such seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the parties in an properly instituted civil suit rather than by a Court exercising “ 7. The aforesaid paras clearly show that the question considered by the Hon’ble the Apex Court was not of dispossessing the petitioner by resorting to extra-judicial means. The learned advocate for the respondent-Corporation next relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble the Apex Court in the matter of The Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., reported in A.I.R. 1981 SC 1368. The learned advocate for the respondent-Corporation also relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble the Apex Court in the matter of M/s Radhakrishna Agarwal and others v. State of Bihar and others, reported in A.I.R. 1977 SC 1496. The learned advocate also relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble the Apex Court in the matter of General Manager, Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd., Sultanpur, U.P. v. Satrughan Nishad and others, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 639 . 7.1. As discussed here in above the Court finds that these judgments do not deal with the same question which is involved in this matter. Therefore, they are of no help to the respondent. This Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 783 of 2013 in Special Civil Application No. 8939 of 2013 decided this issue by judgment and order dated 04.07.2013. As discussed here in above the Court finds that these judgments do not deal with the same question which is involved in this matter. Therefore, they are of no help to the respondent. This Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 783 of 2013 in Special Civil Application No. 8939 of 2013 decided this issue by judgment and order dated 04.07.2013. The learned advocate for the respondent-Corporation could not convince this Court as to why this Court should take a different view in this matter. 8. In the result, this petition is allowed. The respondent-Corporation is directed to restore possession of the property to the petitioner as early as possible, but not later than 12th August 2013. Rule is made absolute with no order as to cost. Petition allowed.