JUDGMENT S.C. PARIJA, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed by the elected Ward Member of Ward No.2 of Mouza-Badanga, under Balia Gram Panchayat in the district of Jagatsinghpur, challenging the order dated 12.09.2012, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Kujanga, in Election Petition No.10 of 2012, allowing the document produced by the opposite party. No.3 at a belated stage to be marked as Exhibit-7, in violation of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure ('CPC' for short). 2. The brief facts of the case is that the opposite party No.3 contested the election for the post of Ward, Member of Ward No.2 under Balia Gram Panchayat, in the village of Kujanga and having lost the election to the petitioner. she filed election petition before the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Kujanga, which was registered as Election Petition No.10 of 2012, alleging therein that the petitioner has three children and her youngest child was born on 11.03.2004, after the cut off date and therefore she is disqualified for being nominated or elected as Ward Member under Section 25(1)(v) of the Orissa Grama Panchayat Act ('the Act' for short). 3. The present petitioner appeared pursuant to notice and filed her objection/show-cause to the allegations made in the election petition. During trial of the election petition, the opposite party No.3 filed a petition with a prayer to accept some documents as detailed in the memo as exhibits, on behalf of the petitioner, as those are public documents, with a further prayer to summon through Court, the PHEO Kujanga CHC and Smt. Abanti Rout, Female Health Worker, Balia, to adduce evidence before the Court. The present petitioner filed her objection to the said petition of the opposite party No.3. 4. Learned Civil Judge considering the documents sought to be exhibited by opposite party No.3 has allowed the photo copy of the Family Planning Sterlization 'Report of the petitioner, obtained under RTI Act by one Krutibasa Gochhayat, to be marked as Exhibit-7, as it was a public document, issued by the Medical Officer, Kujanga. 5. 4. Learned Civil Judge considering the documents sought to be exhibited by opposite party No.3 has allowed the photo copy of the Family Planning Sterlization 'Report of the petitioner, obtained under RTI Act by one Krutibasa Gochhayat, to be marked as Exhibit-7, as it was a public document, issued by the Medical Officer, Kujanga. 5. As one Smt. Abanti Rout, Female Health Worker of Balia Sub-Centre of Kujanga CHC had put her signature in the sterlization application form and the PHEO, Kujanga CHC, had issued the said document marked as Ext.7, learned Civil Judge felt that their evidence is necessary and has accordingly directed for issue of summons to them, with a direction to the PHEO, Kujanga CHC, to produce the original sterlization application form of the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as the opposite party No.3 has not disclosed as to why the document (Ext.7) was not filed along with the election petition, as required under Order 7 Rule 14 CPC or before settlement of issues, as provided under Order 13, Rule 1 CPC, learned Civil Judge was not justified in accepting the same at a belated stage, after the trial of the case had commenced and marking the same as Exhibit-7. In this regard, it is submitted that the opposite party No.3 was required to file all the documents upon which she relies, alongwith her election petition and in the present case opposite party No.3 having not done so, she cannot be permitted to produce those documents at a belated stage, during trial of the election petition and pray for acceptance of the same. It is accordingly submitted that the impugned order of the learned Civil Judge, accepting the said document and marking the same Exhibit-7 is in violation of the procedures prescribed under Order 7, Rule 14 and Order 13, Rule 1 CPC and therefore the same cannot be sustained. 7. Learned counsel for the opposite party No.3 has filed certified copy of the order of the learned Civil Judge, dated 09.10.2012, from which it reveals that in the meantime the evidence of P.Ws.6 and 7 have been recorded and the documents produced by them have been marked as Exhibit-7/a, 8/a, 8/b and 8/c. Accordingly, it is submitted that the impugned order having already been worked out, the present writ petition has become infructuous. 8. 8. It is further submitted that as the document (Ext.7) is a public document issued by the Medical Officer, Kujanga, which is necessary and relevant to adjudicate the dispute that the petitioner has more than two children after the cut off date and the learned Civil Judge having found it necessary for just and proper adjudication of the election petition, the impugned order cannot be faulted. 9. In the election petition filed by the opposite party No.3 as per Annexure-1, the main ground of challenge was that the present petitioner has more than two children after the cut off date and is therefore disqualified for being elected or nominated as a Ward Member of Balia Gram Panchayat. The opposite party No.3 has furnished material particulars and has relied upon some documents in support of her plea in the election petition. 10. During trial of the election petition, opposite party No.3 filed an application for accepting the document detailed therein and to mark them as exhibits, as they were public documents and to summon PHEO, Kujang CHC and Smt. Abanti Rout, Female Health Worker of Salia Sub-Centre of Kujanga CHC to adduce evidence to prove the said documents. 11. Learned Civil Judge, considering the fact that the document, i.e. copy of the Family Planning Sterlization Report of the petitioner, obtained under the RTI Act from the Medical Officer, CHC, Kujanga, is a public document, has allowed the same to be marked as Exhibit-7. As the PHEO, Kujanga CHC had issued the said document (Ext.7) and Smt. Abanti Rout, Female Health Worker, Salia Sub-Centre of Kujanga CHC had signed the sterlization application form, learned Civil Judge has directed issue of summons to them to produce the original form and adduce evidence to prove the documents. Undoubtedly, the Family Planning Sterlizatian Report of the petitioner (Ext. 7) and the Form filled up by her before undergoing Family Planning Sterlization are relevant documents, necessary for a just and proper adjudication of the dispute whether the third child of the petitioner was born after the cut off date. 12. Coming to the plea of the petitioner with regard to application of the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14 and Order 13, Rule 1 CPC to a election dispute under the Act, Section 35 thereof provides for the procedure to be adopted by the Civil Judge, while deciding a election petition. 12. Coming to the plea of the petitioner with regard to application of the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14 and Order 13, Rule 1 CPC to a election dispute under the Act, Section 35 thereof provides for the procedure to be adopted by the Civil Judge, while deciding a election petition. Relevant provisions of Section 35 are extracted below: 35. Procedure before the Civil Judge (Junior Division) : (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder every election petition shall be tried by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) to the trial of suits. (2) The Civil Judge (Junior Division) shall, not be required to record or to have the evidence recorded in full but shall make a memorandum of the evidence sufficient in his opinion for the purpose of deciding the case. (3) The Civil Judge (Junior Division) shall, for the purpose of deciding any issue receive so much evidence, oral or documentary, as he considers necessary and may require the production of any evidence. xx xx xx xx" 13. From the aforesaid provisions contained under Section 35 of the Act it is clear that Civil Judge has to apply to the procedures provided under the CPC, as far as possible and for the purpose of deciding any issue may receive such evidence, oral or documentary, as is considered necessary. Therefore, from the language of Section 35 of the Act, it is clear that the applicability of the procedure provided for the trial of suits to the trial of election petitions is not attracted with all its rigidity and technicality. The rules of procedure contained in CPC apply to the trial of election petition under the Act with flexibility and only as guidelines (See-Kailash v. Nanhku and others, 2005 (1) OLR (SC) 718 : (2005) 4 SCC 480 ). 14. Most of the provisions relating to election and election petition in the laws governing Panchayats are in pari materia with the provisions contained in the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Yet the procedural laws relating to panchayat elections and election petitions cannot be allowed to be interpreted with too much of rigidity and by indulging in hair-splitting. 14. Most of the provisions relating to election and election petition in the laws governing Panchayats are in pari materia with the provisions contained in the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Yet the procedural laws relating to panchayat elections and election petitions cannot be allowed to be interpreted with too much of rigidity and by indulging in hair-splitting. A Constitution Bench of the apex Court in Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra v. Pramod Gupta, (2003) 3 SCC 272 , once again reminded us to remember that laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing substantive and real justice, Procedural laws must be liberally construed to really serve as handmaid of justice, make them workable and advance the ends of justice. Technical objections which tend to be stumbling blocks to defeat and deny substantial and effective justice should be strictly viewed for being discouraged, except where the mandate of the law inevitably necessitates it (See-Rupadhar Pujari v. Gangadhar Bhatra, (2004) 7 SCC 654 ). 15. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the provisions of CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the Court helpless to meet extra ordinary situation in the ends of justice. The observations made by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar, (1995) 1 SCC 774, are pertinent: "The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. ... Justice is the goal of jurisprudence processual, as much as substantive:" 16. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. ... Justice is the goal of jurisprudence processual, as much as substantive:" 16. In State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719 , the apex Court approved in no unmistakable terms the approach of moderating into wholesome directions what is regarded as mandatory on the principle that: "Processual law is not be tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice." 17. In Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India, (1984) 3 SCC 46 , the apex Court reiterated the need for interpreting a part of the adjective law dealing with procedure alone in such a manner as to subserve and advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it as all the laws of procedure are based on this principle. 18. In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 , the apex Court highlighted three principles while interpreting any portion of CPC. They are: (i) A code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is "procedure", something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to "both" sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. (SCR pp.8-9) (ii) There must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to (SCR p.9) (iii) No forms or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of the litigant's defence unless there be an express provision to the contrary. (SCR p.9) "19. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending, and if, by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. A procedural law should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory, the procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not be followed (See-Shreenath v. Rajesh, (1998) 4 SCC 543 ). 20. In Tarlok Singh v. Municipal Corpn. of Amritsar, (1986) 4 SCC 27 , Section 384 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 came up for the consideration of the apex Court. It provided for the procedure in the Code, in regard to suits, being followed, "as far as it can be made applicable", in the disposal of certain matters under the Act. The apex Court held that the relevant provisions of the Code were made applicable for the purposes of guidance of procedure and it is not expected that the procedure of a suit was to be followed technically and strictly in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code. 21. In Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715 , the expression "as far as applicable" came up for the consideration of the apex Court. It was held that such expression had the effect of making the rules or provisions contained else where applicable with realism and flexibility, true to life rather than with abstract absolutism. 22. The apex Court in Mahadev Govind Gharge and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project, Jamkhandi, Karnataka, (2011) 6 SCC 321 , has observed as under: "Procedural laws, like the Code, are intended to control and regulate the procedure of judicial proceedings to achieve the objects of justice and expeditious disposal of cases. 22. The apex Court in Mahadev Govind Gharge and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project, Jamkhandi, Karnataka, (2011) 6 SCC 321 , has observed as under: "Procedural laws, like the Code, are intended to control and regulate the procedure of judicial proceedings to achieve the objects of justice and expeditious disposal of cases. The provisions of procedural law which do not provide for penal consequences in default of their compliance should normally be construed as directory in nature and should receive liberal construction. The Court should always keep in mind the object of the statute and adopt an interpretation which would further such cause in light of attendant circumstances. To put it simply, the procedural law must act as a linchpin to keep the wheel of expeditious and effective determination of dispute" moving in its place. The procedural checks must achieve their end object of just, fair and expeditious justice to the parties without seriously prejudicing the rights of any of them." 23. Applying the principles of law as discussed above to the case at hand, the irresistible conclusion is that the rigors of the procedures provided under Order 7, Rule 14 arid Order 13, Rule 1 CPC are not attracted with all its rigidity and technicality to the trial of a election petition under the Act. Therefore, the technical objections raised by the petitioner cannot be accepted, especially when the same does not prejudice her rights. Even otherwise, as the impugned order has already been worked out and the official witnesses summoned, have already been examined as P.Ws.6 and 7 and the documents produced by them have been exhibited, the writ petition has been rendered infructuous. 24. In view of the above, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned order dated 12.09.2012, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Kujanga, so as to warrant any interference. The writ petition being devoid of merits, the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.