JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, J. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 24.11.2001 rendered by the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala in Civil Appeal No.59 of 1999. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal are that respondent-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the “plaintiff) filed a suit in the trial court for vacant possession of the land by demolition of the structure, if any, found on the land comprising in Khewat No. 138 min, Khatauni No. 327, Khasra No. 1445, measuring 0-05-74 hectares situated in Mohal Borka Mouza Bhalli, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra (hereinafter referred to as the ‘suit land’) against the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, namely, Dayalu (hereinafter referred to as the “defendant” for convenience sake) on the pleadings that the suit land is recorded in the ownership of the plaintiff and other-co-sharers and in possession of defendant as “Kabiz” as per copy of Missal Hakiat and the suit land has been carved out from Khasra No. 386 min, measuring 16 Kanals 5 marlas (Khewat No. 151, Khatauni No. 218, Khasra No. 386 min) and the suit land was in personal cultivation of the owners recorded in the jamabandi for the year 1976-77. Defendant has no right, title or concern with the suit land. It was during the settlement 1983-84 in the month of November that the defendant encroached upon the suit land. 3. Suit was contested by the defendant. According to the defendant, he was in possession of the suit land for more than 25 years as a tenant and has become owner of the same after enactment of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. Learned Sub Judge 1st Class (1), Nurpur framed issues on 12.2.1997. He decreed the suit on 12.10.1998. Defendant preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. He dismissed the same. Hence, the present Regular Second Appeal. It was admitted on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the lower appellate court has wrongly and illegally dismissed the application under order 6 rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure moved by the appellant for amendment of the written statement and thereby the impugned judgment and decree are vitiated.” 4. Mr. Hence, the present Regular Second Appeal. It was admitted on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the lower appellate court has wrongly and illegally dismissed the application under order 6 rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure moved by the appellant for amendment of the written statement and thereby the impugned judgment and decree are vitiated.” 4. Mr. Ajay Sharma has strenuously argued that the application preferred by the defendant under order 6 rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been rejected by the learned District Judge without taking into consideration the well settled principles of law. 5. Mr. Sanjay Jaswal has supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records and pleadings carefully. 7. Plaintiff has appeared as PW-1. According to Missal Hakiat Ex.P-1, plaintiff alongwith other co-sharers is recorded owner of the suit land. Defendant is recorded in possession of the suit land without payment of any rent. PW-1 Desh Raj has deposed that the suit land was in possession of the owners and defendant has forcibly taken the possession of the suit land in the month of November, 1983. 8. Defendant has not led any evidence before the trial court, nor has he appeared in the witness box. In these circumstances, learned trial court has decreed the suit. Defendant before the first appellate court moved an application under order 6 rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as under order 41 rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He wanted to place on record copy of Khasra Girdawari from 1984 to 1987, copies of orders passed by the Assistant Collector Grade dated 13.6.1984 and 6.8.1984 and copy of statement of Uttam Chand. Learned trial court had granted five adjournments to the defendant to lead evidence on 28.11.1997, 11.12.1997, 27.2.1998, 24.4.1998 and 26.6.1998. Defendant has not led any evidence. He has not assigned any reason why the evidence could not be produced before the trial court. In these circumstances, the application preferred by the defendant under order 41 rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure was rightly disallowed. 9. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat Vs. Mahinder Kumar AIR 2006 SC 1864 have held as under: “10. In these circumstances, the application preferred by the defendant under order 41 rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure was rightly disallowed. 9. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat Vs. Mahinder Kumar AIR 2006 SC 1864 have held as under: “10. We shall first deal with the appeals preferred against the judgment and order of the High Court rejecting Civil Application Nos. 964 and 1150 of 2002 filed by the appellants herein for adducing additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The documents sought to be produced were contained in Annexure I to the applications. The applications were opposed by the respondents. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that the applications may be treated as one under Order XLI Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, apparently because the other provisions or the rule did not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court noticed that a similar Civil Application being No. 4849 of 2000 had been filed earlier when this appeal had been placed for hearing before another Division Bench of the High Court, but the said application was rejected by order dated June 22, 2000. The High Court further found that Rule 27(1)(b) of Order XLI can be invoked only if the Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause. In the instant case it was not as if the additional evidence was required by the Court to enable it to pronounce judgment and, therefore, additional evidence was sought to be adduced for "substantial cause" since serious prejudice would be caused to the appellants if the additional evidence was not permitted to be adduced. Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Lala Pancham and others : AIR 1965 SC 1008 wherein this Court held that though the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision did not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in the case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for purposes of pronouncement of judgment in a particular way. The High Court referred to the earlier proceedings before various authorities and came to the conclusion that though the appellants had sufficient opportunity to bring the evidence on record,, for reasons best known to it, the State did not produce the entire evidence before the trial court and it was only 8 years after the dismissal of the suit that the applications were filed for adducing additional evidence in the appeal. The High Court, therefore, dismissed the applications for adducing additional evidence. 11. We find no error in the approach of the High Court. We have earlier noticed the long history of litigation which preceded the filing of the suit. The documents sought to be brought on record are not documents which were discovered later or came into existence after the filing of the suit. The documents are part of the Government records and they could have been produced in the suit. 12. Mr. Sorabjee appearing on behalf of the respondents rightly submitted that Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked by a party to fill up the lacunae in his case. The State found itself in a dilemma when confronted with two sets of documents conflicting with each other. There was no plea that the documents sought to be produced by way of additional evidence could not be produced earlier despite efforts diligently made by the State or that such evidence was not within its knowledge. In fact no ground whatsoever was made out for adducing additional evidence, and the sole purpose for which the State insisted upon adducing additional evidence was to persuade the Court to accept the point of view urged on behalf of the State, since the evidence on record did not support the case of the appellants/State. Having considered all aspects of the matter we are satisfied that the High Court rightly rejected the applications filed by the State for adducing additional evidence at the stage of appeal which was intended only to fill up the lacunae in its case. 10. Having considered all aspects of the matter we are satisfied that the High Court rightly rejected the applications filed by the State for adducing additional evidence at the stage of appeal which was intended only to fill up the lacunae in its case. 10. Similarly, in Karnataka Board of Work Vs. Govt. of Indian 2004 (10) SCC 779 , their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held that a party is not entitled to produce additional evidence unless it is shown that evidence could not be produced before the learned trial Court despite exercise of due diligence. Their Lordships have explained the scope of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 as under: “6. In the circumstances, the learned counsel for the appellant, reiterated the claim made before the High Court that they should be permitted to adduce further evidence before the court to substantiate their claim but when the matters were pending before the Trial Court and the High Court they had ample opportunity to do so. If they had to produce appropriate documents, they could have done so and also it is not clear as to the nature of the documents which they seek to produce which will tilt the matter one way or the other. The scope of Order XLI, Rule 27, CPC is very clear to the effect that the parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, unless they have shown that in spite of due diligence, they could not produce such documents and such documents are required to enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. In this view of the matter, we do not think there is any justification for us to interfere with the orders of the High Court. However, in view of the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the appellant, we have also gone into various aspects of the matter and have given another look at the matter and our findings are that the view taken by the High Court is justified. However, one aspect needs to be noticed. The High Court need not have stated that the first respondent is entitled to the relief even on the basis of adverse possession. We propose to examine this aspect. 11. However, one aspect needs to be noticed. The High Court need not have stated that the first respondent is entitled to the relief even on the basis of adverse possession. We propose to examine this aspect. 11. It is settled law by now that party guilty of remissness in not producing evidence in trial court, cannot be allowed to produce it in appellate court. There must be satisfactory reasons for non-production of the evidence in trial court seeking production thereof in appellate court. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in Union of India versus Ibrahim Uddin and another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 have held as under: “36. The general principle is that the Appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order XLI Rule 27 CPC enables the Appellate Court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. The Appellate Court may permit additional evidence only and only if the conditions laid down in this rule are found to exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, provision does not apply, when on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the rule itself. (Vide: K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1526 ; The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1008 ; Soonda Ram & Anr. v. Rameshwaralal & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 479 ; and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 553 ). 37. The Appellate Court should not, ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the Court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide: Haji Mohammed Ishaq Wd. S. K. Mohammed & Ors. (Vide: Haji Mohammed Ishaq Wd. S. K. Mohammed & Ors. v. Mohamed Iqbal and Mohamed Ali and Co., AIR 1978 SC 798 ). 38. Under Order XLI, Rule 27 CPC, the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. [Vide: Lala Pancham & Ors. (supra) ]. 39. It is not the business of the Appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non-production of the evidence in the trial court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 ; and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 101 ). 40. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a "substantial cause" within the meaning of this rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. 41. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. 41. The words "for any other substantial cause" must be read with the word "requires" in the beginning of sentence, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court requires additional evidence, that this rule will apply, e.g., when evidence has been taken by the lower Court so imperfectly that the Appellate Court cannot pass a satisfactory judgment. 42. Whenever the appellate Court admits additional evidence it should record its reasons for doing so. (Sub-rule 2). It is a salutary provision which operates as a check against a too easy reception of evidence at a late stage of litigation and the statement of reasons may inspire confidence and disarm objection. Another reason of this requirement is that, where a further appeal lies from the decision, the record of reasons will be useful and necessary for the Court of further appeal to see, if the discretion under this rule has been properly exercised by the Court below. The omission to record the reasons must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. But this provision is only directory and not mandatory, if the reception of such evidence can be justified under the rule. 43. The reasons need not be recorded in a separate order provided they are embodied in the judgment of the appellate Court. A mere reference to the peculiar circumstances of the case, or mere statement that the evidence is necessary to pronounce judgment, or that the additional evidence is required to be admitted in the interests of justice, or that there is no reason to reject the prayer for the admission of the additional evidence, is not enough comp1iance with the requirement as to recording of reasons. 44. It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative order, but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the Court to record reasons while disposing of the case. 44. It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative order, but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the Court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is for the forum to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration of the justice – delivery system, to make it known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the Court and also as an essential requisite of the principles of natural justice. The reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected. (Vide: State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, AIR 2004 SC 1794 ; State of Uttaranchal & Anr. v. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi, AIR 2008 SC 2026 ; The Secretary & Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 1285 ; and Sant Lal Gupta & Ors. v. Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited & Ors., (2010) 13 SCC 336 ). 45. In The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore v. H. Narayanaiah etc. etc., AIR 976 SC 2403, while dealing with the issue, a three judge Bench of his Court held as under: “We are of the opinion that the High Court should have recorded its reasons to show why it found the admission of such evidence to be necessary for some substantial reason. And if it found it necessary to admit it an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its insistence by leading other evidence.” (Emphasis added). And if it found it necessary to admit it an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its insistence by leading other evidence.” (Emphasis added). A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Basayya I. Mathad v. Rudrayya S. Mathad and Ors., AIR 2008 SC 1108 . 46. A Constitution Bench of this Court in K. Venkataramiah (Supra), while dealing with the same issue held: “It is very much to be desired that the courts of appeal should not overlook the provisions of cl. (2) of the Rule and should record their reasons for admitting additional evidence….. The omission to record reason must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. Even so, we are unable to persuade ourselves that this provision is mandatory.” (Emphasis added) In the said case, the court after examining the record of the case came to the conclusion that the appeal was heard for a long time and the application for taking additional evidence on record was filed during the final hearing of the appeal. In such a fact-situation, the order allowing such application did not vitiate for want of reasons. 47. Where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record such application may be allowed. 48. To sum up on the issue, it may be held that application for taking additional evidence on record at a belated stage cannot be filed as a matter of right. The court can consider such an application with circumspection, provided it is covered under either of the prerequisite condition incorporated in the statutory provisions itself. The discretion is to be exercised by the court judicially taking into consideration the relevance of the document in respect of the issues involved in the case and the circumstances under which such an evidence could not be led in the court below and as to whether the applicant had prosecuted his case before the court below diligently and as to whether such evidence is required to pronounce the judgment by the appellate court. In case the court comes to the conclusion that the application filed comes within the four corners of the statutory provisions itself, the evidence may be taken on record, however, the court must record reasons as on what basis such an application has been allowed. However, the application should not be moved at a belated stage. Stage of Consideration : 38. An application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is to be considered at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find whether the documents and/or the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. The admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the Appellate Court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The true test, therefore is, whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. Such occasion would arise only if on examining the evidence as it stands the court comes to the conclusion that some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent to the Court. (Vide: Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 193 ; and Natha Singh & Ors. v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1053 ).” 12. Now, as far as the application under order 6 rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure preferred by the defendant is concerned, he wanted to take new plea of adverse possession though initially his case was that he was tenant. The only ground assigned for taking this plea is that his advocate did not explain the plea of tenancy taken by him on his behalf in the trial court. The plea of tenancy taken by the defendant in the trial court could not be permitted to be withdrawn by taking a new plea of adverse possession. The admission made though can be explained, but in the present case, the same has not been explained by the defendant. 13. Mr. Ajay Sharma has relied upon Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi versus Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar, (1990) 1 SCC 166 . The admission made though can be explained, but in the present case, the same has not been explained by the defendant. 13. Mr. Ajay Sharma has relied upon Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi versus Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar, (1990) 1 SCC 166 . This judgment is not applicable in the present case. In this case, no fresh cause of action was sought to be introduced by the amendment applied for and what the appellant sought to do was to complete the cause of action for specific performance for which relief he had already prayed. In the case in hand, defendant wanted to take a new plea of adverse possession by withdrawing the earlier plea of tenancy. 14. Mr. Ajay Sharma has also relied upon Estralla Rubber versus Dass Estate (P) Limited, (2001) 8 SCC 97 . This judgment is also not applicable in the present case. In the instant case, the application for amendment has not been for elaborating the defence and for taking additional pleas, however, defendant wanted to take a new plea of adverse possession by withdrawing the plea of tenancy taken by him in the written statement. 15. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bollepanda P. Poonacha and another versus K.M. Madapa, (2008) 13 SCC 179 have held that the provision of amendment of pleadings is not available as a matter or right under all circumstances. One cause of action cannot be allowed to be substituted by another. Ordinarily, effect of an admission made in earlier pleadings shall not be permitted to be taken away. The Court must exercise its wide discretionary jurisdiction in a judicious manner. Their Lordships have held as under: “10. Order VI Rule 17 of the Code provides for amendment of pleadings. Subject of course to the applicability of the proviso appended thereto (which is not applicable in the instant case), such applications ordinarily are required to be considered liberally. It is also not much in doubt or dispute that amendment of written statement deserves more liberal consideration than an application for amendment of plaint. Order VIII Rule 9 again, subject to the statutory interdict enables a defendant to file additional pleadings. 15. A belated counter claim must be discouraged by this Court. See Ramesh Chand Vs. Anil Panjwani [ (2003) 7 SCC 350 ]. Order VIII Rule 9 again, subject to the statutory interdict enables a defendant to file additional pleadings. 15. A belated counter claim must be discouraged by this Court. See Ramesh Chand Vs. Anil Panjwani [ (2003) 7 SCC 350 ]. We are, however, not unmindful of the decisions of this Court where a defendant has been allowed to amend his written statement so as to enable him to elaborate his defence or to take additional pleas in support of his case. The Court in such matters has a wide discretion. It must, however, subserve the ultimate cause of justice. It may be true that further litigation should be endeavoured to be avoided. It may also be true that joinder of several causes of action in a suit is permissible. The Court, must, however, exercise the discretionary jurisdiction in a judicious manner. While considering that subservance of justice is the ultimate goal, the statutory limitation shall not be overstepped. Grant of relief will depend upon the factual background involved in each case. The Court, while undoubtedly would take into consideration the questions of serious injustice or irreparable loss, but nevertheless should bear in mind that a provision for amendment of pleadings are not available as a matter of right under all circumstances. One cause of action, cannot be allowed to be substituted by another. Ordinarily, effect of an admission made in earlier pleadings shall not be permitted to be taken away. See State of A.P & Ors. Vs. M/s. Pioneer Builders, A.P. [ (2006) 9 SCALE 520 ] and Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors. [ 2006 (9) SCALE 597 ] and Himmat Singh and Ors. Vs. I.C.I. India Ltd. and Ors., [ 2008 (2) SCALE 152 ].” 16. The civil suit was filed on 10.10.1995 and an application seeking amendment of written statement has been filed on 26.7.2001 whereby new ground of adverse possession was to be substituted and admissions made were to be withdrawn. There is no explanation for filing the application at the belated stage. The civil suit was filed on 10.10.1995 and an application seeking amendment of written statement has been filed on 26.7.2001 whereby new ground of adverse possession was to be substituted and admissions made were to be withdrawn. There is no explanation for filing the application at the belated stage. Though the admissions can be withdrawn after explaining the same, but in the instant case no endeavour has been made by the defendant to explain the admission of tenancy taken by him in the written statement satisfactorily except by stating that he was rustic villager and the lawyer has not explained the defence taken by him in the written statement. 15. Accordingly, in view of the observations and analysis made hereinabove, there is no question of law much less to say substantial question of law involved in the Regular Second Appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.