ORDER : Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. These appeals under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure, 'C.P.C.', for short, are heard on the issue as to whether the second proviso to section 52 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, for short, 'C.F. Act', applies to appeals arising from suits merely for "partition and separate possession of joint family property or property owned, jointly or in common, by a plaintiff who is in joint possession of such property", for which court fee is leviable in accordance with section 37(2) of that Act. It was thought appropriate, in the larger public interest, to pointedly hear this issue, having regard to the glaring pendency of fairly old appeals under Section 96 C.P.C., in the defect list on board, on the simple, but luxurious, ground of non-payment of balance court fee; a good lot of them being appeals only of that nature which would fall under section 52 read with section 37 (2) of the C.F. Act. 2. It needs to be clarified here and now, that we confine ourselves to the type of appeals noted above, to wit, those appeals which would fall squarely under section 52 read with section 37(2) of the C.F. Act and not to any appeal which would fall within the gaze of section 6 of the C.F. Act. The ratio decided of this decision will apply only to appeals under sections 96 and 100 of C.P.C., to which section 52 read with section 37(2) of the C.F. Act applies and to no other appeals. 3. Heard Adv. Sathish Ninan, Adv. Vinod Bhat and the learned Government Pleader, Adv. Noble Mathew. 4. It was as per Act 6 of 1991, that certain amendments were made to the C.F. Act with effect from 15.12.1990, extending to the litigants, the benefit of the provisos regarding payment of only 1/10th of the court fee at the institution of suits and only ?rd court fee at the stage of institution of appeals. 5. The fee leviable under section 37(2) of the C.F. Act does not depend upon the value of the subject matter of the suit. That charging provision applies to a suit where a plaintiff alleges the bundle of facts required to bring the suit as one for partition on the allegation of joint possession. 5. The fee leviable under section 37(2) of the C.F. Act does not depend upon the value of the subject matter of the suit. That charging provision applies to a suit where a plaintiff alleges the bundle of facts required to bring the suit as one for partition on the allegation of joint possession. Thereupon, the fee payable would be decided depending upon the forum before which that suit would be laid; the identity of the forum being dependent on the value of the subject matter for determining the pecuniary jurisdiction. 6. Section 52 of the C.F. Act provides that the fee payable in an appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable in the court of first instance on the subject matter of the appeal. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Devassia v. State of Kerala & Ors. ( 1965 KLT 69 : 1965 KLJ 33 ), is referred to by Adv. Vinod Bhat, contextually, to point out a nice distinction on the question as to what is meant by the term "subject matter."The distinction that he has rightly pointed out is that the value of the subject matter need not necessarily be the value of the property, movable or immovable, involved in the litigation, but the value of the crux of the litigation, that is to say, the value of the fruit aimed at in the litigation, we make reference to this nice distinction only in the context of the fact that while section 52 of the C.F. Act uses the term "subject matter of the appeal", S .37(2) of that Act does not depend upon any such term or determination of the subject matter of the suit or appeal. 7. Adv. Sathish Ninan points out that though the opening part of section 52 of the C.F. Act uses the phrase "subject matter", the second proviso thereto does not carry that phrase and that plain reading of section 4A and appreciation of different other provisions, in particular, section 6 dealing with multifarious suits, may indicate that any view taken in relation to section 52 qua section 37(2) may not ipso facto apply to institution of suits governed by section 4A. 8. 8. Going by the second proviso to section 52 of the C.F. Act, ?rd of the fee payable in an appeal shall be paid at the stage of admission of the first appeal or the second appeal, as the case may be. The fee payable in an appeal arising from a suit for partition instituted on the assertion of joint possession would be the fee payable in terms of' the table prescribed in sub-section (2) of section 37. This is how that provision gets incorporated for the purpose of the appeal, having regard to the manner in which section 52 of the C.F. Act stands. Therefore, the law is clear that insofar as appeals arising from suits for partition, which fall exclusively under section 37(2), are concerned, court fee payable is determined not on the subject matter of the appeal. What is to be paid as court fee is not dependent upon the subject matter; but dependent upon the statutory levy prescribed on the basis of the nature of the litigation: with reference to sub-section (2) of section 37 of the C.F. Act. That being so, the fee payable in such an appeal would not attract the benefit of the second proviso to section 52 of the C.F. Act. 9. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, we proceed to examine whether the underlying object of the amendment as per Act 6 of 1991 is in any manner defeated by the view that we have taken above. The paramount purpose of the inclusion of section 4A and the second proviso in section 52 of the C.F. Act by the amendment of 1991 was to provide measures in consonance with the recommendation made by the committees constituted for purposes, including advising the Government in that regard. As it emerges from the nature of section 4A and the second proviso to section 52 of the C.F. Act, one of the objects sought to be achieved by those provisions is to give the litigant a reasonable time frame within which the entire court fee due could be paid, obviously, the intention is in consonance with Article 39A of the Constitution which enjoins that the State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, also by ensuring that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. With this constitutional value in mind, we are unable to envisage that the Legislature ever intended to apply the benefit of the second proviso in section 52 of the C.F. Act, also to those appeals which arise from suits which fall exclusively under section 37(2) of that Act. Now, see the situational reality. The maximum court fee payable under section 37(2) read with section 52 is Rs.300/-. Non-payment of Rs.200/- being the two third and keeping the appeal as defective does not contribute to timely justice to the litigant who comes to the appellate court with an appeal. The pragmatic provisions contained in the second proviso to section 52, if interpreted contrary to the conclusions we have arrived at above on statutory interpretation, in the constitutional backdrop, would only defeat the course of substantial and timely justice. Hence, from the constitutional perspective as well, we are satisfied that the object of the amendment to section 52 as per Act 6 of 1991 will, in no manner, be hurt by the view taken above, on interpretation of relevant provisions; that in appeals which fall for levy of court fee under section 52 read with S .37(2) of the C.F. Act, the second proviso to section 52 does not apply. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, it is held that the second proviso to section 52 of the C.F. Act does not apply to appeals under section 96 or Section 100 of C.P.C., arising from suits for partition falling exclusively under section 37(2) of the C.F. Act and which do not involve any other type of claim that would make it a multifarious action that would fall under section 6 of that Act. List these matters before the Registrar (Judicial) for the appellants to report having paid the deficit court fee.