Aruppukkottai Town Devangar Commercial Association v. Devangar Samooganala Vuyar Kalvi Valarchi Kuzhumam
2013-12-06
N.PAUL VASANTHAKUMAR, R.MAHADEVAN
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment R. Mahadevan, J. 1. This Writ Appeal has been filed against the order dated 02.03.2010 passed in an Interim Petition in M.P.No.8 of 2010 in W.P.No.12815 of 2003, whereby the learned Single Judge allowed the impleading petition filed by the first respondent herein. The 4th and 5th respondents in the Writ Petition aggrieved over the said order, have preferred this Appeal. 2. The Writ Petition was filed by the second respondent herein against the proceedings of the Liquidator dated 09.04.2003 and 12.04.2003 convening a General Body Meeting of the members of Aruppukottai Town Devangar Commercial Association and Aruppukottai Town Devangar Munru Mirasu Uravinmurai as stood in 1974. Interim directions were issued by this Court, directing the Aruppukottai Town Devangar Commercial Association and Aruppukottai Town Devangar Munru Mirasu Uravinmurai to decide on the Management of the College, which was earlier managed by Aruppukottai Devangar Arts College Paribalana Sabai, which became Defunct. 3. During the pendency of the Writ Petition, Devangar Samuga Nala Vuyarkalvi Valarchi Kuzhumam, represented by its Secretary, filed a petition to implead itself as a respondent in the above Writ Petition. The Writ Petitioner had no objection for impleading the first respondent herein. However, objections were raised by the appellants and after hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge allowed the impleading petition. 4. The learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants painstakingly argued that this petition is the second petition for impleading by the Association with same group of persons, who earlier filed an Impleading Petition in W.P.M.P.No.17463 of 2004 in the name of Aruppukottai Devangar Pothunala Uravinmurai and the same was dismissed by this Hon’ble Court on 30.08.2004 and therefore this petition should have been dismissed as not maintainable. The learned Senior Counsel further stressed that in a Liquidation proceedings under the Societies Registration Act, third parties are not necessary parties and they have no locus standi to claim any right to be heard. Further, the issue is relating to the administration and voting rights of the members of the Association as in 1971 and an Association formed in 2009 cannot have any right over the administration. 5.
Further, the issue is relating to the administration and voting rights of the members of the Association as in 1971 and an Association formed in 2009 cannot have any right over the administration. 5. The learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in CHIKKAIAH NAICKER EDUCATION BOARD vs. THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU [ 2009 (4) CTC 305 ], and held that a defunct Society cannot transfer its Management to another Agency, which was constituted after forming a new Society. Therefore, the impleaded party is not a necessary party to decide the Writ Petition. 6. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent emphasized that the appellants themselves only got impleaded, as they were not originally made as party in the Writ Petition. Further, the earlier directions given by this Court on 30.08.2004 is only an interim arrangement in the larger interest of the Educational Institution and the earlier impleading petition was filed by Meenakshi Sundaram in his individual capacity and the appeal is not maintainable as per the Letters Patent Act, as there is no adjudication on merits and only the impleading Petition has been allowed. 7. The learned Senior Counsel also pressed into service, the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in SHAH BABULAL KHIMJI vs. JAYABEN D. KANIA [ (1981) 4 SCC 8 ] to indicate that an appeal is maintainable only against a Judgment as defined under the Code of Civil Procedure, which must be a formal adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy and argued that just because the impleading petition has been allowed, it cannot be said that the Writ Petition has been decided on merits, and prayed for the dismissal of the Writ Appeal. 8. Heard the learned Senior Counsels for the Appellants and the first respondent and the learned Additional Government Pleader for the third respondent as well as the learned counsels for the respondents 2 and 4. In view of the limited scope of the Writ Appeal, we refrain from going into the merits of the case in Writ Petition. 9. Before going into the merits of the order of the learned Single Judge, we would like to examine the judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsels for the appellants and the first respondent. 10.
In view of the limited scope of the Writ Appeal, we refrain from going into the merits of the case in Writ Petition. 9. Before going into the merits of the order of the learned Single Judge, we would like to examine the judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsels for the appellants and the first respondent. 10. In the case of CHIKKAIAH NAICKER EDUCATION BOARD vs. THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU [ 2009 (4) CTC 305 ], the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court was dealing with a situation, wherein an application was filed by a defunct Society, which was administering a College jointly with a new Society for transferring the Management to the new Agency. The Division Bench ultimately held that since the existing agency had become defunct even before the submission of the application, such an application is not maintainable and administration of a College cannot be transferred to a new Agency constituted later. 11. In the instant case, the core issue is relating to the members, who are eligible to be part of the Management and who are entitled to vote and no decision has been taken on merits as yet. The appeal is directed only against the interim petition of impleading. Therefore, we are of the view that the said judgment is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. 12. Now going to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in SHAH BABULAL KHIMJI vs. JAYABEN D. KANIA [ (1981) 4 SCC 8 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the interpretation of the word “Judgment” in the context of Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. However, the Hon'ble Apex Court finally went on to hold that the word “Judgment” cannot be exhaustively defined and therefore has to be examined on the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, we are of the view that the above judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court is also not relevant to throw out the appeal on the ground of maintainability. A reading of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, would reveal that an appeal against any order passed in Original Jurisdiction is appealable under Clause 15. The Writ Petition is filed under Special Original Jurisdiction and therefore, any final order passed in a Miscellaneous Petition is Appealable. 13.
A reading of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, would reveal that an appeal against any order passed in Original Jurisdiction is appealable under Clause 15. The Writ Petition is filed under Special Original Jurisdiction and therefore, any final order passed in a Miscellaneous Petition is Appealable. 13. Now coming to the orders of the learned Single Judge, it can be seen that the learned Single Judge has rightly not gone into the merits of the Writ Petition and allowed the impleading petition leaving out the rights of the parties to be decided at the time of final hearing. The earlier impleading petition was filed by one Meenakshi Sundaram only in his individual capacity and the first respondent herein is a different Association. A specific stand was taken there claiming that the Association, which he was representing is the parent Association under whose control the College has to be administered. The said aspect was incorrect and therefore, the impleading petition was dismissed. This impleading petition has been filed completely in different aspect. It is pertinent to mention here that all the Associations have been formed for the welfare of the Devangar Community and the functioning of the College has been at large for several years now. 14. It is settled law that any interested party can implead himself so as to enable the Court to decide the issue on hand finally and settle the issue once and for all. The members of the first respondent Association are also from Devangar Community and therefore cannot be said to be uninterested parties. Just because the impleading petition is allowed, it cannot be said that the first respondent can be entrusted with the Management of the College. The rights of the first and other respondents would certainly be decided on merits at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. Therefore, considering that the interest at large, and the fact that there is no regular Management Committee for the College for a long time, we are not inclined to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge dated 02.03.2010. The Writ Petition is directed to be listed for final hearing before the appropriate Court. 15. With the above direction, the Writ Appeal is dismissed. No costs.