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2013 DIGILAW 413 (BOM)

Chief Officer, Mangalwedha Municipal Council v. Harihar Panduarang Patwardhan

2013-02-21

R.M.SAVANT

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. Rule with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties made returnable forthwith and heard. 2. The Writ Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is invoked against the order dated 14/08/2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Mangalwedha by which order the Application filed by the Petitioner-Municipal Council being Exhibit 106 came to be rejected, and the Trial Court also ordered the deletion of Issue No.1. 3. It is not necessary to burden this order with unnecessary details. Suffice it to say that the suit in question which is filed by the Respondent herein is one for injunction restraining the Petitioner-Municipal Council from demolishing the sheds/shops constructed which are mentioned in Para 1 of the plaint, and for restraining it from taking any action which would be prejudicial to the Plaintiff. It is the case of the Plaintiff that he is the owner of City Survey No.27B admeasuring 122 sq.meters. It is his case that he has constructed 8 shops/sheds each admeasuring 15 x 10 ft in the said premises. It is further the case of the Plaintiff that he had applied to the Municipal Council on 29/2/2000 seeking development permission. It is further his case that the Petitioner Municipal Council has not communicated to him anything in respect of the said development permission sought, and therefore, in terms of Section 189 (4) of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965, there is a deemed permission in his favour. It is further his case that on 5/5/2000 he had erected the said sheds/shops and the concerned persons have thereafter started their business in the said sheds. It is further the case of the Plaintiff that the Municipal Council vide letter dated 7/7/2000 intimated to him that the permission has been refused to him. It is further his case that on 24/7/2000 by letter Nos.879 and 890 he was intimated that action would be taken against the unauthorized sheds. As a result of which, he has filed the suit in question. The Plaintiff has thereafter made certain averments which are not relevant for the purpose of the present Petition. 4. The Petitioner Municipal Council which is the Defendant in the said suit filed its Written Statement and questioned the Plaintiff’s title to the property in question. As a result of which, he has filed the suit in question. The Plaintiff has thereafter made certain averments which are not relevant for the purpose of the present Petition. 4. The Petitioner Municipal Council which is the Defendant in the said suit filed its Written Statement and questioned the Plaintiff’s title to the property in question. The case of the Plaintiff of deemed permission has been denied by the Municipal Council. It has been specifically denied in the Written Statement that the City Survey No.27B in its entirety belongs to the Plaintiff. It has further been averred in the Written Statement that the proceedings are pending in the Civil Court as well before the Revenue Authorities in respect of the said Survey No.27B. 5. The Trial Court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties had framed the issues on 19/3/2002 and amongst the issues framed was the issue which was to the following effect:- “1. Does the plaintiff prove that he is the owner of C.T.S.No.27B of Mangalwedha admeasuring 1200 sq.m.?” In the light of the said issue which was framed by the Trial Court, the Petitioner herein filed an Application (Exhibit 106) in which Application it was prayed that the Plaintiff should be directed to pay proper court fees, as ultimately what the Plaintiff is claiming is the declaration of his ownership though the suit in question has been filed for simplicitor injunction. 6. The Trial Court considered the said Application (Exhibit 106) and by the impugned order dated 14/8/2012 rejected the said Application and after rejecting the said Application has also directed that the Issue No.1 adverted to herein above be deleted. The gist of reasoning of the Trial Court seems to be that the suit in question is one for simplicitor injunction and therefore there is no question of the issue of title arising in the said suit. As indicated above, it is the said order dated 14/8/2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Mangalwedha which is impugned in the present Petition. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner Shri Oak would reiterate the case of the Petitioner in the Application (Exhibit 106). As indicated above, it is the said order dated 14/8/2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Mangalwedha which is impugned in the present Petition. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner Shri Oak would reiterate the case of the Petitioner in the Application (Exhibit 106). The learned counsel would contend that though the suit is one for simplicitor injunction the same is founded on the basis of the claim of the Plaintiff that he has deemed permission in his favour and in view of the deemed permission, the Plaintiff is claiming injunction against the Municipal Council. The learned counsel for the Petitioner would contend that the deemed permission contemplates certain basis requirements to be there namely that the proposal for development being in accord with the Development Control Rules and Regulations and there being no dispute about the title of land in question, as along with the proposal for development the relevant documents concerning title have to be submitted. The learned counsel would contend that in the light of the dispute regarding the Plaintiff’s title, that the issue regarding title was rightly framed by the Trial Court. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent – original Plaintiff Shri Deshpande would support the impugned order and would contend that since the Plaintiff is not claiming declaration of his title and is merely claiming an injunction, the deletion of the said Issue No.1 would be of no consequence. The learned counsel would contend that the original Plaintiff therefore is not required to value the claim on the basis that he is claiming title to the property in question. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the rival contentions. By the averments in the plaint as indicated herein above the Plaintiff has sought to make out a case of deemed permission which the Plaintiff is claiming in respect of the plan which he has submitted to the Municipal Council. The basis of claiming the injunction against the Municipal Council is the deemed permission which the Plaintiff is claiming and the suit is therefore founded on the said basis. The basis of claiming the injunction against the Municipal Council is the deemed permission which the Plaintiff is claiming and the suit is therefore founded on the said basis. In so far as deemed permission is concerned, it is well settled that even if the declaration of deemed permission is to be granted, certain basic requirements in respect of the development proposal being in accord with the Development Control Rules and Regulations applicable, that the applicant has clear title to the property etc. are warranted. A deemed permission cannot be in respect of a plan wherein the basic requirements are lacking. It also cannot be in respect of a proposal which is in violation of the Development Control Rules and Regulations. In the instant case as indicated above the Municipal Council has raised a dispute in respect of the title of the Plaintiff in respect of the entire land comprised in City Survey No.27B. It is in the said context that the Trial Court had earlier rightly framed the issue of title which has been adverted to herein above. The said issue had undoubtedly arisen in view of the pleadings which were on record. The Trial Court it seems has deleted the said Issue No.1 as originally framed on the ground that the suit being one for simplicitor injunction. The Trial Court lost sight of the fact that the suit in question is founded on the alleged deemed permission claimed by the Plaintiff, therefore ought to have considered the said Application (Exhibit 106) on the basis of the said case of the Plaintiff and not merely proceeded on the basis of the final relief sought. The entitlement of the Plaintiff to the final relief would hinge upon whether the Plaintiff's case of a deemed possession is to be accepted. The consideration of the Trial Court of the said Application (Exhibit 106) being not inconsonance with the pleadings on record, in my view, the impugned order dated 14/8/2012 is required to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside and the matter is relegated back to the Trial Court for a de novo consideration of the Application (Exhibit 106). The said Application (Exhibit 106) on remand to be considered by the Trial Court within a period of one month of the parties appearing before it. The parties to appear before the Trial Court on 11/3/20132. The said Application (Exhibit 106) on remand to be considered by the Trial Court within a period of one month of the parties appearing before it. The parties to appear before the Trial Court on 11/3/20132. The Trial Court would decide the said Application (Exhibit 106) on its own merits and in accordance with law. The contentions of the parties are kept open to be agitated before the Trial Court. Rule is accordingly made absolute in the aforesaid terms with parties to bear their respective costs.