JUDGMENT C.R. No. 1614 of 2009 is directed against the order dated 13.8.2009 passed by learned Sub Judge-I, Darbhanga in Misc. Case No. 19 of 2007 whereby the learned Court below has been pleased to dispose of the application dated 8.7.2009 filed by the petitioner raising issues of maintainability of Misc. Execution Case No. 4 of 2004 filed by the opposite party. 2. C.R. No. 1631 of 2009 also questions a similar order dated 13.8.2009 on a similar objections passed by learned Sub Judge-I, Darbhanga in Misc. Case No. 20 of 2007 arising from Misc. Execution Case No. 5 of 2004. 3. As both the civil revision applications raise common issues hence they were made analogous and have been heard together with the view to their final disposal. For the sake of conveniance I shall be referring to the Annexures as appearing in C.R.No.1614 of 2009 unless specified with specific reference to the other application. 4. The facts of the case in brief is that the opposite party No.1 filed two cases bearing House Control Case No. 23 of 1995 and House Control Case No. 25 of 1995 before the House Controller, Darbhanga under the provisions of Section 5 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) for fixation of fair rent. 5. The two miscellaneous cases were relatable to two different shops situated in House No. 2, Block No. 19 with the Khata No. 58 Plot No. 86 at Mohalla Hospital road, Benta, District Darbhanga. The petitioner herein is admittedly a tenant under the opposite party having taken on rent two shops situated in the premises. By order passed on 14.8.1995 the House Control Case Nos. 23 of 1995 and 25 of 1995 were disposed of fixing fair rent for the premises determined at the rate of Rs. 2.50 per Sqft. and thus quantifying the rent payable for each of the shops at Rs. 1734/- per month payable with effect from 18.7.1995. The order of the House Controller was questioned before the appellate authority being the Collector, Darbhanga by the petitioner by filing Appeal No. 9 of 1995-96 and Appeal No. 10 of 1996 and both the appeals were dismissed by the Collector vide order passed on 28.5.2002. 1734/- per month payable with effect from 18.7.1995. The order of the House Controller was questioned before the appellate authority being the Collector, Darbhanga by the petitioner by filing Appeal No. 9 of 1995-96 and Appeal No. 10 of 1996 and both the appeals were dismissed by the Collector vide order passed on 28.5.2002. Even while the appeal was pending consideration before the Collector, the petitioner moved this Court through C.W.J.C. No. 11363 of 1998 questioning the inspection report dated 26.7.1995 and a Bench of this Court upon consideration of the rival contentions, by order dated 19.7.1999 disposed of the writ application with liberty to the petitioner to raise all the issues during the course of hearing of the appeal. The petitioner at the same time was also directed to make payment of the arrears of rent in installments. 6. As already observed, the appeals were subsequently dismissed by order passed on 28.5.2002. Upon dismissal of the appeal and affirmation of the order passed by the House Controller, the opposite party filed execution case before the Sub Judge I, Darbhanga for execution of the order passed by the House controller giving rise to Misc. Execution Case No. 4 of 2004 and Misc. Execution Case No. 5 of 2004. The petitioner questioned the execution cases on several issues and upon being rejected, he moved this Court in C.R. No. 1904 of 2008 and C.R. No. 1905 of 2008. A bench of this Court being satisfied that the order impugned in the said civil revision application did not fulfill the test and requirement of a judicial order, while remitting the matter to the Executing Court, required the Court to pass fresh orders after considering the objections. The order of this Court dated 18.11.2008 is placed at Annexure-4 of this application. 7. In between the issue, whether or not an order passed by a House Controller under the provisions of the Act is executable, came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Revision No. 1500 of 2002(Sunil Kumar Gami Vs. Jogendra Mahto). In fact, there being a conflict of opinion on this issue in view of the judgment reported in 1999 (1)PLJR 362 (Md. Khaliquz Zaman Vs. Shri H.C. Joshi) and the judgment rendered in the case of Hardeo Prasad Vs. Jogendra Mahto). In fact, there being a conflict of opinion on this issue in view of the judgment reported in 1999 (1)PLJR 362 (Md. Khaliquz Zaman Vs. Shri H.C. Joshi) and the judgment rendered in the case of Hardeo Prasad Vs. Depo Manager reported in A.I.R.1997 Patna 137, the learned Single Judge in consideration of the issue in C.R. No. 1500 of 2002 (Sunil Kumar Gami Vs. Jogendra Mahto) considered it appropriate to refer the matter to the Division Bench for an authoritative pronouncement on this issue. The judgment of the Division Bench was rendered on 18.9.2008 and the Division Bench taking note of the statutory provisions underlying Section 23 of the Act was pleased to hold that the order passed by the House Controller determining fair rent is not executable. The judgment rendered in the case of Md. Khaliquz Zaman(supra) was overruled while the judgment rendered in the case of Hardeo Prasad (supra) was approved. 8. The petitioner upon gathering knowledge about the Division Bench pronouncement in the case of Sunil Kumar Gami (supra), filed the miscellaneous case in each of the two execution proceedings giving rise to Misc. Case No. 19 of 2007 arising from Misc. Execution Case No. 4 of 2004 and Misc. Case No. 20 of 2007 arising from Misc. Execution Case No. 5 of 2004. Both the applications were disposed of by separate order(s) passed on 13.8.2009 inter alia on grounds that the Court below was bound to carry out the directions contained in the order of this Court passed in C.R. No. 1904 of 2008 and 1905 of 2008 and hence the two civil revision applications. 9. Mr. Vishwanath Prasad Sinha, learned Senior counsel has appeared for the petitioner in the two applications and has relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench as contained in Annexure-5 to support his contentions about the non maintainability of the execution execution case and the continuation of the execution proceeding before the Sub judge-I, being wholly without jurisdiction. 9. Mr. Vishwanath Prasad Sinha, learned Senior counsel has appeared for the petitioner in the two applications and has relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench as contained in Annexure-5 to support his contentions about the non maintainability of the execution execution case and the continuation of the execution proceeding before the Sub judge-I, being wholly without jurisdiction. It was submitted that even if the Sub Judge-I at the stage when the execution case was filed may have proceeded with the matter in view of the divergent opinion expressed in the judgments rendered by this Court but after the authoritative pronouncement by the Division Bench in the case of Sunil Kumar Gami (supra) there is no cloud remaining and the legal position is very clear regarding non maintainability of an execution case for enforcement of an order passed by the House Controller. It was submitted that the learned Court below having noticed the Division Bench pronouncement, has yet proceeded to continue with the proceeding and which is wholly without jurisdiction. 10. Mr. Shiv Nandan Rai, learned Senior counsel appearing for the landlord –opposite party has strongly contested the arguments of Mr. Sinha learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. 11. Mr. Rai, while referring to the order of this Court passed in C.R. No. 1904 of 2008 with C.R. No. 1905 of 2008 has submitted that the petitioner had raised two issues before the Executing Court as taken note of by this Court and as the Executing Court had failed to record any opinion on the said two issues, a Bench of this Court while disposing of the two civil revision applications by order passed on 18.11.2008 required the Executing Court to give its decision on the said two issues and if necessary, also to compute the amount which is required to be paid by the petitioner in compliance of the order of the House Controller. It is thus submitted that no challenge being made by the petitioner to the order of remand, the same has attained finality between the parties and the learned Court below has committed no infirmity when it has refused to entertain the objection raised by the petitioner as regarding the maintainability of the execution proceedings. It is thus submitted that no challenge being made by the petitioner to the order of remand, the same has attained finality between the parties and the learned Court below has committed no infirmity when it has refused to entertain the objection raised by the petitioner as regarding the maintainability of the execution proceedings. By referring to the obligation created under the orders of this Court as contained in Annexure-4, it was submitted that an order of remand has to be obeyed notwithstanding the order passed by the Division Bench. With reference to the judgments of this Court and the Supreme Court it was submitted that even if the order of remand has become erroneous in view of the Division Bench pronouncement yet it would bind the parties and the learned Court below is under an obligation to carry out the same and a subsequent development would not alter this position. It is further submitted that the order of the learned Single Judge in the two civil revision applications placed at Annexure-4 was passed after the Division Bench pronouncement and thus the petitioner had all opportunity to raise the issue in the two civil revision applications and having not done so, the issue raised in these applications would be barred on the principles of a constructive resjudicata. It was submitted that even if the order of House Controller has been held to be not executable, the obligation cast upon the Executing Court under the order of this Court as contained in Annexure-4 would have to be carried out. 12. Learned counsel in support of his submissions has relied upon the following judicial pronouncements :- (a) AIR 1970 Madras 328 paras 3 and 5 (Konappa Mudaliar Vs. Kusalaru @ Munuswami Pillai & Ors.) (b) 1995 PLR 227 para 13 (Ram Pratap Sah Vs. Ayodhaya Prasad Srivastava) (c) AIR 1971 SC 2177 para 9 (Mohan Lal Vs. Anandibai & Ors.) (d) AIR 1962 Patna 72 (F.B) (Baijnath Prasad Sah Vs. Ramphal Sahani) 13. It was thus submitted by Mr. Rai, learned Senior counsel that the order(s) impugned passed by the learned Executing Court while disposing of the objection of the petitioner, while accepting the obligation created under the order passed in the two civil revision applications placed at Annexure-4, suffers from no material irregularity and is inconsonance with the legal position and judicial propriety. 14. Rai, learned Senior counsel that the order(s) impugned passed by the learned Executing Court while disposing of the objection of the petitioner, while accepting the obligation created under the order passed in the two civil revision applications placed at Annexure-4, suffers from no material irregularity and is inconsonance with the legal position and judicial propriety. 14. I have heard learned Senior counsel for the parties at length and have perused the materials on record. 15. The only issue that requires determination in the present proceeding is that once it has been held by the Division Bench that the House Controller has no power to determine liability after fixation of fair rent or to issue directions for payment of the arrears in absence of such powers, and an order of fixation of fair rent is not executable as a decree, whether the proceedings arising from Misc. Execution Case No. 4 of 2004 and Misc. Execution Case No. 5 of 2004 can yet be allowed to continue and/or whether even if the order is not executable yet the obligation created under the order passed in C.R. No. 1904 of 2008 and C.R. No. 1905 of 2008 requires to be obeyed. 16. It is not in issue that there was a difference of opinion as regarding the legal position on the issue, whether an order of the House Controller passed under Section 5 of the Act is executable. Perhaps, it was this reason that the execution case filed by the opposite party was being entertained by the learned Sub Judge-I, Darbhanga. In fact, even when the Division Bench pronouncement settling the legal position in the light of the statutory provisions underlying Section 23 of the Act came on 18.9.2008 but the said pronouncement was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge by either of the parties at the stage of consideration of Civil Revision application No. 1904 of 2008 with 1905 of 2008 disposed of on 18.11.2008. Perhaps had the pronouncement been brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge at the time of consideration of C.R. No. 1904 of 2008 with C.R.No.1905 of 2008, the order disposing of the civil revision application, would be different. Perhaps had the pronouncement been brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge at the time of consideration of C.R. No. 1904 of 2008 with C.R.No.1905 of 2008, the order disposing of the civil revision application, would be different. The question is even if an order has been passed by the learned Single Judge which recognizes a jurisdiction in the Executing Court for execution of an order passed by a House Controller in ignorance of the legal position settled by the Division Bench pronouncement, could the Executing Court proceed to pass any order when no jurisdiction existed in the said Court after the Division Bench pronouncement. The answer has to be in the negative. After the Division Bench pronouncement clarifying and settling at rest whatsoever cloud that was existing under the two divergent opinion expressed by two Single Bench decision of this Court, the learned Subordinate Judge, I, Darbhanga certainly can not pass any order in the execution proceedings, as it would be wholly without jurisdiction and in the teeth of the Division Bench pronouncement. 17. Mr. Rai had referred to a judgment rendered in the case of Konappa Mudaliar (Supra) to support his submission that the learned lower Court was duty bound to carry out the order of remand even if the same was not in accordance with law. It is by now well settled that a judgment is an authority for what it decides and not which logically flows therefrom. The opinion expressed by the learned Judge of the Madras High Court is in a completely different context. That was a case in which according to the High Court the Limitation Act of 1908 was applicable to the case but the trial Court felt that the Limitation Act of 1963 would be the appropriate Act and it is in this background that the Madras High Court held that the trial Court was bound by the order of remand and could not express its independent opinion. The issue of constructive resjudicata raised by Mr. Rai relying upon the said judgment(s) taken note of above again is in a different context. The issue of constructive resjudicata raised by Mr. Rai relying upon the said judgment(s) taken note of above again is in a different context. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal(supra) was a was a case of subsequent development and in that backdrop it was held that a matter cannot be reopened by reason of a subsequent development taking place after an order has been passed on remand. The situation is entirely different in the present case and in view of the Division Bench pronouncement which preceded the order of remand no order could have been passed by the trial Court. Even otherwise, the issue of constructive resjudicata would not arise in the present case inasmuch as the parties are not common in the two proceedings. Neither the petitioner nor the opposite party was a contesting party in the matter which was subject matter of the Division Bench pronouncement settling the issue that the order of House Controller is unexecutable. Thus in absence of evidence to the contrary it cannot be presumed that the petitioner had knowledge about the Division Bench pronouncement and could have raised the same at the time of the passing of the order of remand by the learned Single Judge of this Court present at Annexure-4. 18. Even the submission of Mr. Rai, that the order of remand passed by this Court had to be obeyed by the Executing Court, is not legally sustainable for the reason that it would result in the Executing Court exercising such jurisdiction which stood divested under the Division Bench pronouncement and was not existing when the order of remand was passed. The proposition propounded by Mr. Rai to submit that a lower Court is bound by the order of remand, is incontrovertible provided the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and to pass such order. In fact after the Division Bench pronouncement no order could have been passed by the Executing Court. There is no question of obedience or disobedience of an order of the superior Court by a Subordinate Court if it does not possess jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of a Court goes to the root of the matter and any order passed by the Executing Court in obedience of the order of remand would be without jurisdiction and a nullity in view of the Division Bench pronouncement. Jurisdiction of a Court goes to the root of the matter and any order passed by the Executing Court in obedience of the order of remand would be without jurisdiction and a nullity in view of the Division Bench pronouncement. Even otherwise, the order of the House Controller was not executable as no liability had been fixed or created by the House Controller on the petitioner save and except determining a fair rent and the period from which the same was payable. In absence of any liability being created under the order of the House Controller and in absence of any quantification thereof, the order is not worthy of execution and could not have been executed. The fair rent having been fixed by the House Controller in House Control Case Nos. 23 of 1995 and 25 of 1995, with no quantification nor any liability being created under the order, the remedy for the applicant did not lie in an execution proceedings. As the Executing Court could not go beyond the decree and even if the order of the House Controller is for the time being assumed to be a decree, in absence of any liability or obligation created under the decree, nothing existed for execution. 19. Mr. Rai has relied upon a Full Bench judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Baijnath Prasad Sah (Supra) in support of his submission that the principles of constructive resjudicata is equally applicable in execution proceedings and that the petitioner not having objected to the maintainability of the execution proceedings at the initial stage and having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Executing Court, he cannot now question the execution on maintainability. The proposition formulated by Mr. Rai again though is supported by the Full Bench judgment of this Court but it does not apply to the facts of the present case. It is not in dispute that there was a cloud regarding the jurisdiction of the Executing Court in matters concerning execution of orders passed by the House Controller when the execution case was filed in the year 2004. The cloud was cleared only under the Division Bench pronouncement dated 18.09.2008 when the legal position was settled. It is not in dispute that there was a cloud regarding the jurisdiction of the Executing Court in matters concerning execution of orders passed by the House Controller when the execution case was filed in the year 2004. The cloud was cleared only under the Division Bench pronouncement dated 18.09.2008 when the legal position was settled. The petitioner having gathered knowledge about the judgment rendered in the case of Sunil Kumar Gami (supra) immediately drew the attention of the Executing Court on the jurisdiction aspect by filing the application in the two cases and which have been rejected by the orders impugned. The petitioner not being a party to the case of Sunil Kumar Gami(supra) there arises no issue of constructive resjudicata. 20. As I have already held that the issue of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter and once the legal position stood clarified by the Division Bench pronouncement in the case of Sunil Kumar Gami (supra) the continuation of the execution case would be without jurisdiction and without legal sanction. 21. For the reasons aforesaid, the orders impugned in the two civil revision applications are set aside and as the proceedings before the Executing Court itself are held without sanction of law and the Executing Court does not have jurisdiction to proceed in the matter, hence the entire proceedings arising from Execution Case No. 4 of 2004 and Execution Case No. 5 of 2004 pending in the Court of learned Sub Judge-I, Darbhanga are set aside. 22. Before parting, however, this Court would like to put on record that the finding given by this Court would not prejudice or preclude the applicant opposite party from taking recourse to such remedy as may be available to him under law for seeking relief flowing to him under the order of the House Controller passed in Misc. Case Nos. 23 of 1995 and 25 of 1995. These civil revision applications are allowed but in the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs. 23. Let the Lower Courts Record received in the proceedings be returned to the Court concerned in a sealed cover immediately and without any delay.