Judgment 1. The Petitioner has preferred the instant Writ of Mandamus praying for an issuance of an order by this Court in directing the Respondents to consider his claim for promotion as Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I by including his name in the panel for the year 2009-2010 as communicated by the First Respondent in G.O.Ms.No.598, Home (Pol-II) Department dated 02.07.2010 and to promote him as Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I and grant him all consequential service and monetary benefits on par with his junior. 2. The Germane Facts of the Writ Petition: The Petitioner, is a directly recruited Sub-Inspector of Police and appointed to service on 28.09.1987. He was promoted as Inspector of Police on 23.11.1998 by dint of hard work and coupled with his seniority. He had received 75 rewards. 3. The stand of the Petitioner is that he attained sufficient seniority and merit for consideration of his claim for promotion to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I by including his name in the panel for the year 2009-2010. The crucial date for preparation of the panel was 01.06.2009 and the date of consideration is on 02.07.2010. Further more, the First Respondent/ Secretary to Government, Home (Pol.II) Department, Chennai-9 published the temporary panel for Inspector of Police fit for promotion by recruitment by transfer of service as Deputy Superintendent of Police (Cat-I) for the year 2009-2010 approved in G.O.Ms.No.598, Home (Pol-II) Department dated 02.07.2010 in and by which his name was not included. However, junior by name Tr.Rajavelu was included in SI.No.110 and he was promoted as Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I. 4. In this connection, the plea of the Petitioner is that he was not communicated with the reason for his non-inclusion in the panel for Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I for the year 2009-2010. 5. According to the Petitioner his claim for promotion was deferred on the ground that he was facing a charge memo in PR No.3/NIB/2008 dated 17.08.2008 issued under Rule 3(b) of the TNPSS (D & A) Rules. He served as Inspector of Police in NIB CID, Dindigul Unit from 16.06.2006 to 07.12.2007. 5. According to the Petitioner his claim for promotion was deferred on the ground that he was facing a charge memo in PR No.3/NIB/2008 dated 17.08.2008 issued under Rule 3(b) of the TNPSS (D & A) Rules. He served as Inspector of Police in NIB CID, Dindigul Unit from 16.06.2006 to 07.12.2007. While he was on casual leave on 13.10.2007 and 14.10.2007, there was some allegation levelled against his subordinates who alleged to have intercepted a vehicle said to have been in possession of Ganja and they failed to register a case in time and on next day, the case was registered. Moreover, the allegation against the Petitioner was that he informed the Deputy Superintendent of Police about the alleged seizure on 13.10.2007 and 14.10.2007 but failed to instruct his subordinates to register a case. It is also alleged that the Petitioner connived with his subordinate one C.Vijayabaskar, Sub-Inspector of Police for his failure to register the case immediately on 13.10.2007 itself for the seizure of the vehicle with 380 kgs of Ganja at Rasipuram area in Salem District. 6. It transpires that on receipt of charge memo by the Petitioner, he submitted a detailed reply denying the charges. A common enquiry was conducted against the Petitioner and three other subordinates namely, Sub-Inspector of Police and 2 Head Constables. The Enquiry Officer viz., Additional Superintendent of Police, SIT, CB CID, Coimbatore conducted an enquiry by examining two witnesses on the side of the prosecution and marked 11 exhibits. The Petitioner submitted his written statement of defence on 10.03.2008 denying the charges. However, the Enquiry Officer finally held that charges were proved against the Petitioner and submitted a proved minute to the Disciplinary Authority on the last date of his superannuation on 31.05.2010. By that time, the panel for the promotional post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I for the year 2009-2010 was published on 02.07.2010. Further, his claim was deferred on the ground that he was facing formulated charges under Rule 3(b) of the TNPSS (D & A) Rules. 7. The Petitioner was furnished with the copy of the enquiry officer's report on 09.07.2010 and he submitted his reply on 28.07.2010 and made a request to accept his further Representation and to drop further action on the disciplinary proceedings. 7. The Petitioner was furnished with the copy of the enquiry officer's report on 09.07.2010 and he submitted his reply on 28.07.2010 and made a request to accept his further Representation and to drop further action on the disciplinary proceedings. The Joint Commissioner of Police, Chennai City (under whom the Petitioner served during the year 2010) considered his further Representation and in a detailed order held that both the charges against him were not proved and exonerated him from all the charges by means of an order dated 04.02.2011 in reference PR No.3/NIB/2008. His subordinate one C.Vijayabaskar (Sub-Inspector of Police), was proceeded departmentally along with him was imposed with a punishment of censure by the Disciplinary Authority namely, the Joint Commissioner of Police, Chennai City. However, on a Suo-motu review conducted by the Commissioner of Police, Chennai (the Appellate Authority) in regard to the orders passed by the Joint Commissioner of Police, Chennai City confirmed the exoneration order passed in his favour but, at the same time, the punishment imposed on the co-delinquent namely, Vijayabaskar was cancelled on the ground that there was no evidence for the allegations. As such, the categorical stand of the Petitioner is that he was exonerated of the charges which was pending against him as on the crucial date and on the date of consideration of the panel for promotion to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I for the year 2009-2010. 8. The Petitioner (after being exonerated of the charges) submitted a detailed Representation on 16.03.2011 to the Respondents and requested to promote him since he was exonerated of the charges levelled against him. At this stage, grievance of the Petitioner is that his subordinate namely, Vijayabaskar (Sub-Inspector of Police), his claim was considered after exoneration of the charges and he was promoted as Inspector of Police immediately. But the claim of the Petitioner was not considered for promotion to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I till date. 9. The Petitioner's contentions: The Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner urges before this Court as per the guidelines issued by the Tamil Nadu Government in respect of promotion, the person's claim for promotion could be deferred on the grounds namely, formulated charges, currency of punishment and also charge sheeted in a criminal case. 9. The Petitioner's contentions: The Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner urges before this Court as per the guidelines issued by the Tamil Nadu Government in respect of promotion, the person's claim for promotion could be deferred on the grounds namely, formulated charges, currency of punishment and also charge sheeted in a criminal case. Further, it is represented on behalf of the Petitioner that Petitioner's claim for promotion to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I was deferred on the basis that he was facing formulated charges. 10. The forceful submission of the Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner is that in terms of guidelines issued by the Tamil Nadu Government once a person's claim was deferred on the ground of formulated charges. However, if he was exonerated of the charges subsequently, then his claim should be considered within 15 days from the date of his exoneration of the charges and he ought to be promoted with all consequential service and monetary benefits like that of his junior. However, in the case of the Petitioner, such an exercise was not conducted by the Respondents till date and this had caused prejudice and hardships to him. 11. At this juncture, the Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner seeks in aid of the "TAMIL NADU STATE GOVERNMENT PREPARATION OF PANEL FOR PROMOTION CONSOLIDATED INSTRUCTIONS (LETTER No.18824/S/2005-2, P & AR (S) DEPARTMENT DATED 07.10.2005)" wherein under the caption Annexure-I in II under the Head 'Preparation of Panels:' in Annexure (iv)-Consideration of persons against whom enquiries are pending and specific charges have been framed or charge sheet has been filed in criminal cases in sub clause 1 and 3 it is stated as under: "(1) In the case of pending enquiries including Vigilance enquiries and in cases where specific charges have not been framed, promotions and appointments shall be considered on the basis of the performance of the officers coming under the zone of selection as on the date of consideration for promotion/appointment as revealed through the Personal Files/Record Sheets and of the punishments, if any previously imposed. In cases where specific charges have been framed or charge sheet has been filed in criminal case, promotion/appointment of such persons shall be deferred till the proceedings are concluded. The Government servants whose promotions etc. are deferred on account of pending charges etc. In cases where specific charges have been framed or charge sheet has been filed in criminal case, promotion/appointment of such persons shall be deferred till the proceedings are concluded. The Government servants whose promotions etc. are deferred on account of pending charges etc. should be informed of the fact as per the specimen letter given in Annexure-VII. They must, however, be considered for promotion if they are exonerated or acquitted from the charges. If found suitable with reference to all relevant criteria, they shall then be given the promotion with retrospective effect from the date on which their juniors were promoted. (3) The case of a Government servant whose promotion, etc., has been deferred should be reopened after disposal of the charges and appropriate orders should be passed on merits, i.e., (a)giving him his promotion as aforesaid if he was proved innocent and exonerated or acquitted of the charges and if there are no other adverse factors to be reckoned; or (b)denying him the promotion or giving the promotion from a later date depending upon the nature of punishment and other factors to be reckoned, in other cases. In all such cases, the Heads of Department must take suo-moto action within 15 days from the date of issue of final orders in the department disciplinary case/criminal case." 12. At this stage, it is represented on behalf of the Petitioner that no Suo-Moto has been taken by the Head of the Department within 15 days from the date of issuance of final orders in the Departmental Disciplinary Proceedings. Continuing further, the Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner brings it to the notice of this Court that the Petitioner (after being exonerated of the charges by means of an order passed by the Disciplinary Authority) was issued with a Show-Cause Notice dated 25.10.2011 as to why the exoneration order passed by the Disciplinary Authority should not be reviewed and in this regard, the Petitioner filed W.P.(MD) No.14300/2011 before the Madurai Bench of this Court and on 15.12.2011, the Petitioner was pleased to obtain interim stay for a period of three weeks and according to the Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner, the said interim order of stay originally granted has been periodically extended and as on date, the same is very much alive and is in force. 13. 13. The Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner projects a legal plea that subsequent Show Cause Notice dated 25.10.2011 on a Suo-motu review made by the Disciplinary Authority cannot be a reason to deny the Petitioner's legitimate and reasonable claim for promotion to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I for the panel for the year 2009-2010. 14. The Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Jal Board Vs. Mahinder Singh [2000 (7) SCC at page 210 and at special page 212 and 213] whereby and where under in paragraph 5 it is observed as follows: "5. The right to be considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution of India, provided a person is eligible and is in the zone of consideration. The sealed cover procedure permits the question of his promotion to be kept in abeyance till the result of any pending disciplinary inquiry. But the findings of the disciplinary inquiry exonerating the officer would have to be given effect to as they obviously relate back to the date on which the charges are framed. If the disciplinary inquiry ended in his favour, it is as if the officer had not been subjected to any disciplinary inquiry. The sealed cover procedure was envisaged under the rules to give benefit of any assessment made by the Departmental Promotion Committee in favour of such an officer, if he had been found fit for promotion and if he was later exonerated in the disciplinary inquiry which was pending at the time when DPC met. The mere fact that by the time the disciplinary proceedings in the first inquiry ended in his favour and by the time the sealed cover was opened to give effect to it, another departmental enquiry was started by the Department, would not, in our view, come in the way of giving him the benefit of the assessment by the first Departmental Promotion Committee in his favour in the anterior selection. There is, therefore, no question of referring the matter to a larger Bench." 15. The Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner invites the attention of this Court to the order dated 15.09.2009 passed by this Court in W.P.No.1277 of 2009 [P.Chinnadurai Vs. There is, therefore, no question of referring the matter to a larger Bench." 15. The Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner invites the attention of this Court to the order dated 15.09.2009 passed by this Court in W.P.No.1277 of 2009 [P.Chinnadurai Vs. The Secretary to Government, Commercial Taxes & Registration Department, Chennai-9 & another] wherein in paragraphs 17 to 19, it is observed and laid down as follows: "17. It is relevant to point out that on the crucial date viz., 01.04.1999 for inclusion in the panel for District Registrar for the year 1999-2000 or on the date of consideration viz., 03.04.2003 or the date of actual promotion to the petitioner's junior viz., 30.04.2003, there was no charge memo pending, except, of course, the criminal case which subsequently ended in acquittal on 26.12.2007. In such circumstances, merely because a second charge memo was issued on 17.11.2008 by cancelling the earlier charge memo dated 28.04.2004, it does not mean that the petitioner will be losing his right of being considered for inclusion in the panel for the year 1999-2000 for District Registrar, if he is otherwise suitable. That was also the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court consisting of R.Jayasimha Babu, J. and F.M.Ibrahim Kalifulla, J., in the unreported judgment in W.P.No.21007 of 2001 (The State of Tamil Nadu rep. by its Secretary to Government and another Vs. C.Nagappan and another) by judgment dated 28.02.2002 and the relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: "The legal position remaining thus, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the writ petitioners would contend that though the panel related to the year 1995, the drawal of the same was made only on 31.12.1996 that on 02.12.1996 yet another charge sheet came to be issued to the first respondent herein and in the circumstances, since as on the actual date of drawal of the list, i.e., on 31.12.1996 there was a charge memo pending as against the first respondent, by virtue of the amended Rule to Rule 17(b), the name of the first respondent was not rightly included in the promotion panel for Forest Rangers. We are unable to accept the said contention raised on behalf of the petitioners. In fact though this contention was very much available with the petitioners, the same was not raised before the Tribunal. We are unable to accept the said contention raised on behalf of the petitioners. In fact though this contention was very much available with the petitioners, the same was not raised before the Tribunal. In any event, when admittedly, the panel related to the year 1995 and when even according to the petitioners themselves, the consideration of the various Foresters, who were appointed upto 31.12.1994 with reference to whom alone, service particulars were called for by the proceedings dated 03.08.1995 for the purpose of the drawal of panel for promotion during the year 1995, the present stand of the petitioners that irrespective of the said factual position, the subsequent charge memo issued on 02.12.1996 should also be taken into account, and thereby delete the name of the first respondent from the drawal of the panel of the year 1995 is not only not justified but cannot be said to be an action, which is in consonance with law. As held by the Honourable Supreme Court that when once the disciplinary proceedings in the earlier enquiry ended in favour of the delinquent, the said subsequent action cannot come in the way of giving him the benefit of the assessment by the earlier Departmental Promotion Committee in his favour in the anterior selection." 18. Merely considering a person for promotion does not mean that the employer loses his right to continue with the disciplinary proceedings, as held by another Division Bench of this Court consisting of P.K.Misra, J (as he then was) and K.K. Sasidharan, J. in the unreported judgment in W.A.No.115 of 2008 (E.Pitchaimari Vs. The Special Commissioner and Transport Commissioner, Chennai) dated 10.04.2008 and the relevant paragraph is as follows: "8. The learned counsel for the appellant has rightly contended that even though mere inclusion of name in the panel for promotion would not confer any right to be promoted on a particular date, atleast, on the date on which the juniors were promoted, i.e., on 28.06.2007, a right accrued to the appellant to be promoted. On the said date, atleast, it cannot be said that any charge memo was pending. Therefore, the appellant should have been promoted with effect from the date. As observed by the Supreme Court in AIR 2007 SC 1706 (cited supra), merely because a person is promoted, the employer is not in a helpless situation. On the said date, atleast, it cannot be said that any charge memo was pending. Therefore, the appellant should have been promoted with effect from the date. As observed by the Supreme Court in AIR 2007 SC 1706 (cited supra), merely because a person is promoted, the employer is not in a helpless situation. Therefore, it will be always open to the concerned employer to continue with the disciplinary proceedings and pass order in accordance with law and obviously, the promotion by virtue of the order of the Court will not stand in the way." 19. Therefore, in such circumstances, the mere pendency of second charge memo dated 17.11.2008 cannot be a bar for inclusion of the petitioner in the panel for District Registrar for the year 1999-2000, considering the fact that in respect of the panel for District Registrar for the year 1999-2000, either on the crucial date viz., 01.04.1999 or on the date of consideration viz., 03.04.2003 or on the date of actual promotion viz., 30.04.2003 in which his junior was promoted as District Registrar, there was no formulated charge memo pending against the petitioner except the criminal case which ultimately ended in acquittal, and the petitioner was not kept under suspension. In such circumstances, the reliance placed by the respondents on the instructions of the Government letter dated 07.10.2005, to deny the promotion on the basis of pendency of criminal case which later ended in acquittal is not sustainable and therefore, the writ petitioner is entitled to the reliefs claimed in this writ petition." 16. That apart, the Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner cites the order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 28.02.2002 in W.P.No.21007 of 2001 [State of Tamil Nadu rep. by its Secretary to Government, Environment and Forests Department, Chennai-9 and another Vs. C.Nagappan and another] wherein in paragraphs 2 and 3 it is observed as follows: "2. The first respondent herein was imposed with the punishment of stoppage of increment for three years without cumulative effect by an order dated 27.04.1995 by the District Forest Officer, Kanyakumari. The first respondent preferred an appeal on 20.06.1995 which appeal was stated to have been allowed on 11.10.1995. The order of punishment dated 27.04.1995 was also set aside. The first respondent herein was imposed with the punishment of stoppage of increment for three years without cumulative effect by an order dated 27.04.1995 by the District Forest Officer, Kanyakumari. The first respondent preferred an appeal on 20.06.1995 which appeal was stated to have been allowed on 11.10.1995. The order of punishment dated 27.04.1995 was also set aside. Be that as it may when the panel for promotion to the post of Ranger for the year 1995 fell due, all the Conservator of Forests were directed to furnish service particulars of the Foresters appointed upto 31.12.1994 by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest in his proceedings dated 03.08.1995. The first respondent was one of the candidates considered for promotion in the said panel for the year 1995. It is also admitted that the first respondent's name was considered and since he was undergoing the punishment on the crucial date of drawal of panel, which is stated to be 15.08.1995, he was not selected for inclusion in the panel. In the above stated circumstances, when the first respondent approached the State Administrative Tribunal by way of O.A., having regard to the fact that the punishment which was in force as on 15.08.1995 was subsequently set aside by the Appellate Authority on 11.10.1995 and thereby the first respondent was fully eligible to be included in the panel for promotion of Forest Rangers, the Tribunal allowed the application as mentioned in the earlier paragraph. In this context, useful reference can be had to the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Delhi Jal Board Vs. Mahinder Singh (2000) 7 SCC page 210, wherein, under an identical circumstances, the Honourable Supreme Court has stated the legal position as under in paragraph 3. The right to be considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution of India, provided a person is eligible and is in the zone of consideration. The sealed cover procedure permits the question of his promotion to be kept in abeyance till the result of any pending disciplinary inquiry. But the findings of the disciplinary inquiry exonerating the officer would have to be given effect to as they obviously relate back to the date on which the charges are framed. If the disciplinary inquiry ended in his favour, it is as if the officer had not been subjected to any disciplinary inquiry. But the findings of the disciplinary inquiry exonerating the officer would have to be given effect to as they obviously relate back to the date on which the charges are framed. If the disciplinary inquiry ended in his favour, it is as if the officer had not been subjected to any disciplinary inquiry. The sealed cover procedure was envisaged under the rules to give benefit of any assessment made by the Departmental Promotion Committee in favour of such an officer, if he had been found fit for promotion and if he was later exonerated in the disciplinary inquiry which was pending at the time when DPC met. The mere fact that by the time the disciplinary proceedings in the first inquiry ended in his favour and by the time the sealed cover was opened to give effect to it, another departmental enquiry was started by the Department, would not, in our view, come in the way of giving him the benefit of the assessment by the first Departmental Promotion Committee in his favour in the anterior selection. There is, therefore, no question of referring the matter to a larger Bench." 3. The legal position remaining thus, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the writ petitioners would contend that though the panel related to the year 1995, the drawal of the same was made only on 31.12.1996 that on 02.12.1996 yet another charge sheet came to be issued to the first respondent herein and in the circumstances, since as on the actual date of drawal of the list, i.e., on 31.12.1996 there was a charge memo pending as against the first respondent, by virtue of the amended Rule to Rule 17(b), the name of the first respondent was not rightly included in the promotion panel for Forest Rangers. We are unable to accept the said contention raised on behalf of the petitioners. In fact though this contention was very much available with the petitioners, the same was not raised before the Tribunal. We are unable to accept the said contention raised on behalf of the petitioners. In fact though this contention was very much available with the petitioners, the same was not raised before the Tribunal. In any event, when admittedly, the panel related to the year 1995 and when even according to the petitioners themselves, the consideration of the various Foresters, who were appointed up to 31.12.1994 with reference to whom alone, service particulars were called for by the proceedings dated 03.08.1995 for the purpose of the drawal of panel for promotion during the year 1995, the present stand of the petitioners that irrespective of the said factual position, the subsequent charge memo issued on 02.12.1996 should also be taken into account, and thereby delete the name of the first respondent from the drawal of the panel of the year 1995 is not only not justified but cannot be said to be an action, which is in consonance with law. As held by the Honourable Supreme Court that when once the disciplinary proceedings in the earlier enquiry ended in favour of the delinquent, merely because another Departmental enquiry was started by the Department, the said subsequent action cannot come in the way of giving him the benefit of the assessment by the earlier Departmental Promotion Committee in his favour in the anterior selection. The said principle applies in all force to the facts of this case. Therefore, there is absolutely no scope for interfering with the order of the Tribunal in this petition. The Writ Petition, therefore, fails and the same is dismissed. Consequently, connected W.V.M.P. And W.M.P. are closed. No costs." 17. Also, the Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner draws the attention of this Court to the order passed by this Court dated 02.08.2002 in W.P.No.29978 of 2011 [M.Rajasekaran Vs. The Director General of Police, Mylapore, Chennai and another] wherein in paragraph 6 it is held as under: "6. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing for the petitioner, as well as the respondents, and on a perusal of the records available, it is noted that, even though certain proceedings had been initiated on the file of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, Madurai, and it had been transferred to the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, Tiruchirapalli, no charges had been framed against the petitioner, till date. Nothing has been shown on behalf of the respondents to indicate that certain charges were pending against the petitioner, or that there had been a communication sent to the petitioner, relating to the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings. Further, the government orders, in G.O.Ms.No.368, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, dated 18.10.1993 and G.O.Ms.No.248, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, dated 20.10.1997, had not been placed before this Court to show that certain guidelines had been issued, with regard to the pendency of a vigilance enquiry/charges. Since, no charges were pending against the petitioner, and as no enquiry proceedings had been initiated or communicated to the petitioner, either on the crucial date, or on the date of its consideration, on 22.08.2011, for the preparation of the 'C' list, for the year 2010-2011, this Court finds it appropriate to direct the first respondent to consider the name of the petitioner, on par with those who had been considered as per the 'C' list prepared for the year 2010-2011, for promotion as Inspector of Police, if the petitioner is found to be otherwise qualified for such promotion and to pass appropriate orders thereon, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. No costs." 18. Apart from the above, the Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner relies on the order dated 12.07.2013 in W.P.(MD)13611 of 2011 [C.Vijayabaskar Vs. The Director General of Police, Mylapore, Chennai-4 and others] wherein in paragraphs 4 and 5 it is observed and held as under: 4. The question as to whether a second show cause notice in exercise of Suo-motu power under Rule 15(A)(1)(ii) of TNPSS (D & A) Rules is sustainable as per law was considered by this Court in W.P.No.13541 of 2007, decided on 14.10.2009, and held under: "16. I have considered the submissions made on either side. The submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner are well founded. The learned counsel for the petitioner is correct in his submissions that once the Head of the Department exercised its Suo-motu power of review under Rule 15-A(1)(ii) of the Rules, thereafter the Suo-motu power of review is not available to the Government, under the same Rule 15-A(1)(i) of the Rules. The learned counsel for the petitioner is correct in his submissions that once the Head of the Department exercised its Suo-motu power of review under Rule 15-A(1)(ii) of the Rules, thereafter the Suo-motu power of review is not available to the Government, under the same Rule 15-A(1)(i) of the Rules. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the word "OR" alone is used in Rule 15-A(1) of the Rules, instead of "AND". If the power of the respondent to invoke Rule 15-A(1)(i) of the Rules is accepted, even after the same power of review is exercised by the Head of the Department under Rule 15-A(1) of the Rules, then it makes no sense for using the word "OR" in the Rules. I am also in entire agreement with the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the word "OR" is used with the laudable objective of the exercises of the power for one time and thereafter, the power is dried up. The analogy drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner by reading Rules 15-A (3) and 15-A(4) deserves acceptance. The Rule permits the delinquent employee to prefer review petition either of the authorities. If the review application of the delinquent has reached finality in view of passing of an order by an authority, thereafter the review power under Rule 15-A(1) before different authority cannot be invoked by the delinquent employee. On the same analogy, the respondent also cannot invoke its suo motu power, once the Head of the Department had exercised the power of review, under Rule 15-A(1)(ii). 17. The judgment of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal in K.Palanichamy Vs State of Tamil Nadu and 4 others, dated 14.11.2002 also squarely applies to the facts of this case. Paragraph 5 of the said judgment, which is relevant to decide this case, is extracted hereunder:- "5. Therefore, if the Head of the Department has already taken a review, the State is precluded from taking further review. This is only in consonance with the general principle underlying the procedural law. There cannot be a review of review. Review is provided only to prevent miscarriage of justice and therefore, there cannot be a review of review order. Therefore, if the Head of the Department has already taken a review, the State is precluded from taking further review. This is only in consonance with the general principle underlying the procedural law. There cannot be a review of review. Review is provided only to prevent miscarriage of justice and therefore, there cannot be a review of review order. Moreover, either the State by itself can review the order if all other authorities mentioned in Rule 15-A failed to review and if review is called for, for rendering justice. If the Head of the Department has done it, the State is precluded from again reviewing the order of the reviewing authority namely the Head of the Department. Moreover, Rule 15(A)(3) and (4) provides that no application for review shall be preferred more than once in respect of the same order. A delinquent Government servant who has preferred a review against the punishment to one of the authorities specified in Rule 15-A, cannot prefer a second review to the other authority mentioned in Rule 15-A. So, even delinquent Government servant cannot prefer two reviews which only stands to the common sense and reason. The authorities also cannot undertake two review of the same order. Therefore, the second review by the State Government after the original order has been reviewed by the Head of the Department will not lie." In view of the aforesaid conclusions, the impugned order is liable to be interfered with. 5. The above decision of this Court is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. Applying the said judgment, the impugned show cause notice is liable to be set aside. and submits that Show Cause Notice dated 25.10.2011 issued by the Second Respondent/ Director General of Police, Chennai therein was set aside by this Court for the reasons therein. 19. Applying the said judgment, the impugned show cause notice is liable to be set aside. and submits that Show Cause Notice dated 25.10.2011 issued by the Second Respondent/ Director General of Police, Chennai therein was set aside by this Court for the reasons therein. 19. The Respondents submissions: Per contra, it is the contention of the Learned Additional Government Pleader for the Respondents that passing orders in the Punishment Roll by the punishing authority is not the end of Disciplinary proceedings and in fact, the Government and Head of the Department ( Second Respondent/ Director General of Police, Chennai) are vested with powers to call for and review any Punishment Roll or any order passed at any point of time and decide whether the punishment awarded is adequate or excess or inadequate or wrong and if considered necessary initiate action to enhance, or reduce or modify the punishment. Moreover, it is the plea of the Respondents that considering the gravity of the offence, the Second Respondent/ Director General of Police, Chennai reviewed the order passed by the punishment authority in the Punishment Roll against the Petitioner by invoking Rule 15(A)(1)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 and issued a Show Cause Notice to the Petitioner dated 25.10.2011. Also, that the Disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner was not concluded and as such his claim for inclusion in the temporary panel of Inspector of Police fit for appointment by recruitment by transfer as Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I for the year 2009-2010 does not arise till the disposal of the Show Cause Notice. 20. The pith and substance of the submission of the Learned Additional Government Pleader for the Respondents is that under Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, there is 'Appeal', 'Review' of the punishment etc., and the Second Respondent/Director General of Police, Chennai being the Head of the Department reviewed the case of the Petitioner and considering the gravity of the charge issued Show Cause Notice taking into account the findings of the enquiry officer. Therefore, it is always open to the Petitioner who is at liberty to state his defence through reply to the Show Cause Notice issued by establishing his innocence. Therefore, it is always open to the Petitioner who is at liberty to state his defence through reply to the Show Cause Notice issued by establishing his innocence. In effect, the contention of the Respondents is that after disposal of the Show Cause Notice dated 25.10.2011, the Petitioner's claim for promotion would be taken up for consideration. 21. The Learned Additional Government Pleader makes a reference to the Rule 15(A) of Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 which reads as under: "Rule 15(A)-(1)Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules: (i) the State Government; or (ii) the Head of the Department directly under the State Government, in the case of Government servant in a department or office under the control of such Head of the Department; or (iii) the appellate authority, within six months of the date of the order proposed to be reviewed; or (iv) any other authority specified in this behalf by the State Government by general or special order, and within such time as may be prescribed in such general or special order; may at any time, either on their or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made under these rules, after consultation with the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission where such consultation is necessary and may- a) confirm, modify or set aside the order; or b) confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed; or c) remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority, directing such authority to make such further enquiry, as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or d) pass such other orders as it may deem fit. Provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by any reviewing authority unless the Government servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation against the penalty proposed. Provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by any reviewing authority unless the Government servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation against the penalty proposed. Where it is proposed to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (d), (e), (f), (h), (i) and (j) of Rule 2 or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be reviewed to any of the penalties specified in those clauses, no such penalty shall be imposed except after an inquiry in the manner laid down in sub-rule (b) of Rule (3) and after giving a reasonable opportunity to the Government servant concerned of showing cause against the penalty proposed on the evidence adduced during the inquiry and except after consultation with the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, where such consultation is necessary. Provided further that no power of review shall be exercised by the Head of Department, unless:- (i) the authority which made the order in appeal; or (ii) the authority to which an appeal would lie where no appeal has been preferred, is subordinate to him. (2) No proceeding for review shall be commenced until after, (i) the expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal; or (ii) the disposal of the appeal, where any such appeal has been preferred. (3) An application for review shall be dealt with in the same manner as if it were an appeal under these rules. (4) No application for review shall be preferred more than once in respect of the same order. Provided that members of the Constabulary (Police Constables and Head Constables) shall be eligible to make one representation to the Government against the orders of dismissal or removal from service after exhausting the right of appeal. Provided further that no application for review shall be entertained if it has not been made within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the order on which such application for review is preferred." 22. Provided further that no application for review shall be entertained if it has not been made within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the order on which such application for review is preferred." 22. A mere running of the eye over the contents of the order of exoneration dated 04.02.2011 passed by the disciplinary authority (Joint Commissioner of Police, South Zone, Chennai police) makes it pellucidly clear that in regard to the two charges levelled against the Petitioner, the disciplinary authority had come to the resultant conclusion that "both the charges were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and exonerated delinquents officer (the Petitioner). 23. A panoramic spectrum of decisions: At this stage, this Court worth recalls and recollects the following decisions:- 1) JT 2000 (Suppl. 2) SC 446 [Aryendra Nath Gupta Vs. Union of India & Others] wherein at page 447 in paragraph 3 it is observed and laid down as follows:- "The grievance of the appellant before us is that his suspension having been revoked unconditionally, it could not be said that he was not entitled to promotion during the period he was actually under suspension and that aspect should have been examined by the concerned authority. In the circumstances, we find great force in the submission made on behalf of the appellant. Inasmuch as the order of suspension having been revoked unconditionally, his case for promotion as Surveyor or Works/Executive Engineer should have been considered for that period also. If the order of suspension had no effect upon his service, due promotion should be given to him by taking note of this fact. Hence we direct the respondents to consider the case of the appellant as aforesaid in accordance with the Rules and make appropriate adjustments if necessary in the promoted cadre within a period of three months. The appeal is allowed accordingly." 2) In the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India & Others Vs. Jagmohan Sharma and Others [(1998) 9 Supreme Court Cases at page 219 and at page 220], in paragraph 6 it is held as under: "6. The appeal is allowed accordingly." 2) In the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India & Others Vs. Jagmohan Sharma and Others [(1998) 9 Supreme Court Cases at page 219 and at page 220], in paragraph 6 it is held as under: "6. In the facts, as noticed by the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, the appropriate direction would have been to the appellants to consider the case of Respondent 1 for his promotion to the post of Assistant Divisional Manager/Senior Branch Manager from the date his juniors from amongst Respondents 5 to 67 in the writ petition were promoted on the same criteria on which those respondents were promoted. We, therefore, modify the direction of the learned Single Judge, as noticed above, and direct that the appellants shall consider the case of Respondent 1 for his promotion with effect from the date his juniors from amongst Respondents 5 to 67 in the writ petition were promoted and if found fit for promotion, to grant to him all the consequential benefits. The consideration of Respondent 1 for promotion shall be on the same basis and on such material as was considered for promoting Respondents 5 to 67. The needful shall be done by the appellant within three months. The order of the Division Bench dismissing the LPA shall also, thus, stand modified accordingly. The appeal is allowed and disposed of to the extent indicated above. No costs." 3) In the decision of V.K.Gupta Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [1993 (Labour and Industrial cases) at page 55 and at special page 56] in paragraphs 4 and 5, it is observed and held thus: "4. Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has not been able to show any law to the contrary. He has merely stated that it is a selection post and the respondent could appoint any one. There could be some substance in this contention only if there were lessor number of posts and they were considering each candidate's merit and selecting some out of those. That is not the case here. Here there were 7 posts and there were 7 candidates and the petitioner and another Mr.R.K.Jain were ignored on the sole ground of vigilance cases being pending against them. That is not the case here. Here there were 7 posts and there were 7 candidates and the petitioner and another Mr.R.K.Jain were ignored on the sole ground of vigilance cases being pending against them. Such action is clearly contrary to the law laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the aforesaid ruling as also what had been held by the Division Bench of this Court. 5. In these circumstances, I allow the writ petition and issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to promote the petitioner to the post of Superintending Engineer on ad hoc basis like the other five persons who were so appointed with effect from 22-11-90 with all consequential benefits including pay and allowance etc. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. " 4) In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India, etc., Vs. K.V.Jankiraman, etc., [AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2010 at page 2010 and 2011] it is held as follows: "It is only when a charge-memo in a disciplinary proceedings or a charge-sheet in a criminal prosecution is issued to the employee it can be said that the departmental proceedings/criminal prosecution is initiated against the employee. The sealed cover procedure is to be resorted to only after the charge-memo/charge-sheet is issued. The pendency of preliminary investigation prior to that stage will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt the sealed cover procedure. The plea that when there are serious allegations and it takes time to collect necessary evidence to prepare and issue charge-memo/charge-sheet, it would not be in the interest of the purity of administration to reward the employee with a promotion, increment etc., would not be tenable. The preliminary investigations take an inordinately long time and particularly when they are initiated at the instance of the interested persons, they are kept pending deliberately. Many times they never result in the issue of any charge-memo/charge-sheet. If the allegations are serious and the authorities are keen in investigating them, ordinarily it should not take much time to collect the relevant evidence and finalise the charges. What is further, if the charges are that serious, the authorities have the power to suspend the employee under the relevant rules, and the suspension by itself permits to resort to the sealed cover procedure. The authorities thus are not without a remedy. What is further, if the charges are that serious, the authorities have the power to suspend the employee under the relevant rules, and the suspension by itself permits to resort to the sealed cover procedure. The authorities thus are not without a remedy. The promotion etc. cannot be withheld merely because some disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against the employee. To deny the said benefit, they must be at the relevant time pending at the stage when charge-memo/charge-sheet has already been issued to the employee. When an employee is completely exonerated in criminal/disciplinary proceedings and is not visited with the penalty even of censure indicating thereby that he was not blameworthy in the least, he should not be deprived of any benefits including the salary of the promotional post. The normal rule of "no work no pay" is not applicable to such cases where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R.17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases. 24. A perusal of the proceedings of the Commissioner of Police, Chennai dated 31.03.2011 [in respect of co-delinquent C.Vijayabaskar (Sub-Inspector of Police)] shows that the said individual's punishment of censure dated 04.02.2011 (awarded by the Joint Commissioner of Police, South Zone) deferred for six months was cancelled. It cannot be gainsaid that co-delinquent C.Vijayabaskar (Sub-Inspector of Police) was later promoted as Inspector of Police. 25. It cannot be gainsaid that co-delinquent C.Vijayabaskar (Sub-Inspector of Police) was later promoted as Inspector of Police. 25. In the upshot of detailed qualitative and quantitative discussions as mentioned supra and on a careful consideration of respective contentions and also, this Court taking note of the entire conspectus of the facts and circumstances in an integrated fashion comes to an inevitable and irresistible conclusion that on the crucial date of preparation of panel for promotion to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I namely, on 01.06.2009 and also, on the date when panel was prepared and published on 02.07.2010, the Petitioner was exonerated of the charges levelled against him and when once the Petitioner was exonerated of the charges levelled against him, then, in law it is to be construed that all the allegations levelled against him got automatically erased and therefore, he is clearly eligible to be considered for promotion to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I for the year 2009-2010 and in this regard, the Respondents cannot deprive the vested right accrued to him. To put it differently in a given case, if the disciplinary enquiry ended in favour of the delinquent, then it is to be construed in law as if he was not subjected to any 'Disciplinary Enquiry'. Viewed in that perspective, the denial of promotion to the Petitioner to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I by the Respondents for the year 2009-2010 is not valid in the eye of law. As such, this Court to secure the ends of justice and also as an equitable relief, directs the Respondents to consider the case of the Petitioner for inclusion of his name in the panel for promotion to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I for the year 2009-2010 and promote him as Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cat-I for the year 2009-2010, (if he is otherwise found fit and eligible) and shower him with all attendant and monetary benefits. This exercise is to be undertaken by the Respondents within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 26. In the result, the Writ Petition is disposed of in the above terms. No costs.