JUDGMENT : 1. The plaintiffs are the petitioners. The first plaintiff is the property Secretary and the second and third petitioners are the duly constituted attorneys of the C.S.I.T.A.-C.S.I. Trust Association, diocese of North Kerala. The plaint schedule property measuring 5.13 hectares belongs to the C.S.I.T.A. St. Paul’s Church, CMS PG L.P. School, C.S.I. High School for Deaf, Boys Hostel for Deaf, Girls Hostel for Deaf, C.S.I. Heritage, Parish Quarters, Cemetery and other ancillary buildings are situated in the aforesaid property. This property is abutting Guruvayoor-Kunnamkulam Road and is separated by a compound wall. The respondent had constructed a multi-storied building on the other side of the road. Since that building does not have sufficient space for parking of vehicles the Corporate Manager of the School was stated to have entered into an agreement with the respondent as per which 25 cents of the property belonging to C.S.I.T.A. was permitted to be used by the respondent for parking the cars coming to the multi-storied building. For that purpose the boundary wall of the aforesaid property was directed to be demolished. 2. Petitioners contend that only the attorneys appointed by the C.S.I.T.A. who can act for the C.S.I.T.A. in matters of sale, lease or mortgage of property. As per the rules, the Diocesan, Executive Committee shall appoint a Diocesan Property Committee and a Diocesan Property Secretary from among the members of the Diocesan Council. It is further contended that for lease, mortgage or sale of the trust property, the approval of the Diocesan Property Committee and the Diocesan Executive Committee is required. The petitioners assert that no such permission was obtained by the Corporate Manager. Further as per S.6 of the Kerala Education Act and R.2 of Chapter X of Kerala Education Rules, 1959, the District Educational Officer alone is competent to give permission for creating any encumbrance over the school property. No such permission was obtained by the Corporate Manager. Thus the petitioners contend that the respondents should be restrained by a prohibitory injunction from trespassing into the plaint schedule property. 3. Respondent opposed the prayer for temporary injunction contending that the Corporate Manager had entered into a license agreement and as per the license agreement the respondent is parking the vehicle. It was also contended that a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was paid by the respondent to the Manager. 3. Respondent opposed the prayer for temporary injunction contending that the Corporate Manager had entered into a license agreement and as per the license agreement the respondent is parking the vehicle. It was also contended that a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was paid by the respondent to the Manager. Besides, the daily license fee is also paid by the respondent to the Manager and since the license period is three years, the petitioners are not entitled to get an injunction. 4. The learned Munsiff granted a temporary injunction restraining the respondent from keeping the vehicles in the suit property. The respondent filed appeal. In the C.M. Appeal, the learned Addl. District Judge vacated the order of injunction and the injunction petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. 5. Challenging the judgment of the appellate Court, this Original Petition is filed under Art.227 of the Constitution of India. It is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the school Manager had no right or authority to grant permission to use the school property for parking of the vehicles. The contention that there was no lease but only a license and so S.6 of the Kerala Education Act has no application is rather unsound and untenable. The contention that the plaint schedule property is not part of the school compound is also bereft of any merit. A perusal of the Commission Report and the sketch would make it clear that the 25 cents of land which was permitted to be used by the respondent by the school Manager is actually situated behind the school building. It is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that it is not actually a school compound since in the very same compound, hostel, cemetery and so many other buildings are situated. But the fact remains that it is the property of the C.S.I.T.A. In that big compound, schools are also situated. The fact that a very small portion of the property is used as cemetery and that there are so many other buildings like hostel buildings in the said property will not come to the rescue of the respondent since the 25cents of land which was allowed to be used by the respondent is just behind the school building. Admittedly, the car parking area given by virtue of Ext. B1 is part of 5.13 hectares of land. Even as per Ext. Admittedly, the car parking area given by virtue of Ext. B1 is part of 5.13 hectares of land. Even as per Ext. B1, the southern boundary is shown as C.M.S. P.G.L.P. School. It is the admitted fact that the school is situated just adjacent to the property covered by Ext. B1. Photographs also have been produced by the petitioners to show the lie and position of the property. It is stated that just behind the school building there were bushes and that on the strength of the license agreement respondent had cleared the bushes and wild growth and made it fit for parking the vehicles. 6. It is further argued on behalf of the respondents that no nuisance is caused by keeping the vehicles in the rear portion of the school. It is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that it appears that there is an internal squabble in the administration of the C.S.I.T.A. but the respondent should not be made a scapegoat only because there is a feud between two groups of C.S.I.T.A. But the fact remains that it is a compound where schools are situated. The plot measuring 25 cents covered by the agreement is situated just behind the school. Therefore, the contention that it is not an school compound cannot be accepted at all. 7. Section 6 of the Kerala Education Act Reads: “6. Restriction on alienation of property of aided school:- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force, no sale, mortgage, lease, pledge, charge or transfer of possession in respect of any property of an aided school shall be created or made except with the previous permission in writing of such officer not below the rank of a District Educational Officer, as may be authorised by the Government in this behalf. The officer shall grant such permission applied for unless the grant of such permission will, in his opinion adversely affect the working of the school. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order of the officer refusing or granting permission under sub-section (1) may in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed, appeal to the Government. (3) Any transaction made in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be null and void. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order of the officer refusing or granting permission under sub-section (1) may in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed, appeal to the Government. (3) Any transaction made in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be null and void. (4) If any educational agency or the manager of any school acts in contravention of sub-section (1) or of an order passed under sub-section (2) Government may withhold any grant to the school. 8. Section 6 makes it clear that no sale, mortgage, lease, pledge or transfer of possession in respect of any property of an aided school shall be created or made except with the previous permission in writing not below the rank of a District Educational Officer. Admittedly, the school manager who entered into the agreement with the respondent did not obtain previous sanction from the District Educational Officer. But the learned District Judge gave a strange reasoning that no lease was granted but only a license and since S.6 does not take in “license”, it cannot be said that there is any inhibition under S.6 of the Kerala Education Act. The view so taken by the lower appellate court is unreasonable. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that though the word ‘license’ is not mentioned in S.6 of the Kerala Education Act, we have to gather the intention behind S.6. According to the petitioners, restriction on lease, mortgage, pledge and charge etc. was made with a laudable object that no inconvenience or nuisance is caused to the students studying in the school. 9. Referring to the provisions of Kerala Education Act, 1958 it was held by the Division Bench of this Court in Kamaladevi M.R. v. Gopalakrishnan & Ors., ILR 2006 (1) Ker.110) thus: “These provisions would make it abundantly clear that despite the property rights of the manager or the educational agency over the school properties, the Kerala Education Act and Rules do put restrictions over the use of the school property, overriding the other laws relating to property rights in the interests of the well being of the children. Therefore, it is clear that property rights of owner of the school are only subservient to the welfare of the students and therefore, the welfare of the children statutorily overrides such rights. Therefore, it is clear that property rights of owner of the school are only subservient to the welfare of the students and therefore, the welfare of the children statutorily overrides such rights. This is further fortified by the non obstante clause with which S. 6 starts namely, “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force,.” This is with a view to developing the minds of the children in healthy surroundings and atmosphere so that they would grow up as better citizens who are to decide the fate of the country in the not so far off future. This laudable object cannot be fettered by the avaricious desire of the manager to make some fast and easy money by permitting use of the school property for putting up hoardings, for advertisements which might harm the mind of the children”. 10. The other contention that has been advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent is that in the Commissioner’s report, it can be seen that the said area allowed to be used by the respondent was actually covered with bushes and grasses etc. and that it was the respondent who got it cleared so as to allow the parking of the vehicles. That contention has been taken strong exception to by the learned counsel for the petitioner. There were only grasses behind the school. The fact that there was grasses or even small bushes behind the school is no reason to say that the said property can be allowed to be used by others on the basis of the permission granted by the school Manager which would be against the provisions of S.6 of the Kerala Education Act. The approach made by the leaned Addl. District Judge is seen to be incorrect. 11. The main argument that is advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the Manager is entitled to execute Ext. B1 deed and so the petitioner cannot now backout from Ext. B1 the agreement entered into between the Manager and the respondent. As has been mentioned above, S.6 of the Kerala Education Act says that no sale mortgage, pledge, charge or transfer of possession in respect of any property of an aided school shall be created or made except with the previous permission in writing of the District Educational Officer. B1 the agreement entered into between the Manager and the respondent. As has been mentioned above, S.6 of the Kerala Education Act says that no sale mortgage, pledge, charge or transfer of possession in respect of any property of an aided school shall be created or made except with the previous permission in writing of the District Educational Officer. Admittedly, no such permission was obtained from the D.E.O. The contention that it is only a license and not a lease is palpably unsound. The word “license” is used in Ext. B1 as a camouflage to circumvent the provisions contained in S.6 of the Education Act. The very object of S.6 is to see that the school premises are to be used and enjoyed by the teachers and students and that no disturbance is caused for the smooth running of the school. The paramount object is the welfare of the children. Sub-s.(3) of S.6 says that any transaction made in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be null and void. Therefore, the respondents cannot bank upon Ext. B1 to contend that his right to use the property covered by Ext. B1 should not be prevented. Though it is for a limited period or for a limited purpose, it partakes the characteristics of lease, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits. It is pointed out that admittedly the key of the property covered by Ext. B1 was given to the licensee as well though one key may be in the possession of the licensor also. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent had paid Rs.1,00,000/- and it was received in advance and the said amount was credited to the account of the C.S.I.T.A. The factum of payment of the amount was not disputed. But the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is for the respondent to realise the said amount from the Manager. The stand so taken by the petitioner cannot be accepted. The D.E.O. is the officer competent to give permission under R.2 of Chapter 10 of K.E.R. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred Ext. A8 the Constitution of the Diocese of North Kerala in the Church of South India where it is stated that the Bishop shall appoint a Manager on the recommendation of the Executive Committee. The D.E.O. is the officer competent to give permission under R.2 of Chapter 10 of K.E.R. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred Ext. A8 the Constitution of the Diocese of North Kerala in the Church of South India where it is stated that the Bishop shall appoint a Manager on the recommendation of the Executive Committee. The Manager shall be responsible to the Bishop for the management of the schools in accordance with the Kerala Education Rules. It is also stated, that referring to Ext. A8, that all immovable properties acquired for the benefit of the CSI or institutions shall be in the name of C.S.I.T.A. and that the documents of title relating to such properties shall be in the custody of the person appointed by the C.S.I.T.A. It is further stated that the Attorneys appointed by the C.S.I.T.A. shall act for the C.S.I.T.A. in matters of sale or lease or mortgage of property and in filing and defending suits in a court of law. Further it is stated that the Executive Committee shall appoint a Diocesan Property Committee and a Diocesan Property Secretary from among the members of the Diocesan Council. It was further stated that except as provided under R.18, Trust immovable property shall not be leased, mortgaged or sold without the sanction of Synod Executive Committee. Application for permission to lease, mortgage or sell trust property requires the approval of the Diocesan Property Committee and of the Diocesan Executive Committee and also of the C.S.I.T.A. before submission to the Synod Executive Committee. It was stated that the application for permission to lease, mortgage or sell the Trust property requires the approval of the Diocesan Property Committee. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that those are all matters concerning the internal arrangement or management but so far as the respondent is concerned, since the Manager granted lease of Ext. B1 property, he (the respondent) was not expected to find out what are the terms and conditions imposed as per Ext. A8 for sale and lease of the property. True, the C.S.I.T.A. cannot totally disown the act of the manager but at the same time it pertains to the property held or enjoyed by the school as the school premises. The limitation imposed under S.6 of the Kerala Education Act, cannot be overlooked. Therefore, the view taken by the lower appellate Court cannot be accepted. True, the C.S.I.T.A. cannot totally disown the act of the manager but at the same time it pertains to the property held or enjoyed by the school as the school premises. The limitation imposed under S.6 of the Kerala Education Act, cannot be overlooked. Therefore, the view taken by the lower appellate Court cannot be accepted. However, if the C.S.I.T.A. is approached by the respondent for lease/license of the land, and if they wish to grant lease or license it is for them to get permission from the D.E.O. for that purpose. 13. In view of the fact that the respondent is not a trespasser but who came to use Ext. B1 property on the strength of Ext. B1 license given by the Manager, in order to enable the respondent to find out a suitable/alternate arrangement some time has to be granted to him. Therefore, the following directions are issued: The respondent shall vacate the premises within two months from this date. He can make use of the premises by paying the license fee etc. only for that period of two months. The petitioner C.S.I.T.A. shall pay the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the respondent within two months from today. This Original Petition (Civil) is disposed of accordingly.