JUDGMENT Hon’ble B.S.Verma, J. (Oral) 1. Heard Sri Arvind Vashisth, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sharad Sharma, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Pradeep Chamyal, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has sought a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated 13.10.2011 passed by District Judge, Haridwar in SCC Revision No.23 of 2010 Secretary Khadi Gramodyog Vikas Mandal vs. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta. 3. Relevant fact of the case are that S.C.C. suit was filed by the petitioner against the tenant/respondent stating that he is owner/landlord of a shop situated in Kankhal District Haridwar and this shop was given on rent to the respondent on payment of Rs.500/- per month and for this purpose an agreement was written on 30.9.1999 which was initially for a period of 11 months. Thereafter the rent was enhanced and at the time of filing of the suit the rent was Rs.605/- per month on that basis an arrear of rent of Rs.3630/- and arrear of water tax and house tax of Rs.625/-, a total amount of Rs.4,255/- was lying outstanding, which was not paid by respondent/defendant inspite of repeated requests. The disputed property was newly constructed whose first tax assessment was made in April 1992, hence, the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short, U.P. Act No.13 of 1972) do not apply in the said shop. As the landlord/petitioner was unable to continue the defendant as its tenant, hence, his tenancy was terminated vide a registered notice sent to the respondent/tenant on 16.07.2007, which was received by the respondent/tenant and was wrongly replied by him on 24.07.2007. Therefore, the suit was filed by the landlord/petitioner for eviction of the tenant/respondent and arrears of rent and mense profit. 4. The tenant/respondent contested the suit by filing written statement wherein it was pleaded that property was constructed before 1985 and the provision of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 apply to it. It was also pleaded in the written statement that no rent was due against the defendant and it was sent through Money Order. A wrong notice was given, which was properly replied and the tenancy has not been terminated legally and this suit has been filed just to get the property vacated for letting out to some other person on higher rent. 5. A wrong notice was given, which was properly replied and the tenancy has not been terminated legally and this suit has been filed just to get the property vacated for letting out to some other person on higher rent. 5. On the basis of pleadings, the learned Judge, S.C.C. framed as many as six points for determination in the suit as follows: i) Whether defendant is the tenant of plaintiff in the disputed property @ Rs.605/- per month? ii) Whether any dues of rent since 01.07.2007 is lying outstanding against defendant? iii) Whether the disputed property is newly constructed and the provisions of U.P. Act No.13/1972 does not apply to it? iv) Whether the tenancy of defendant was terminated vide notice dated 16.07.2007? If so, its effect. v) Whether the rent for the period for 01.07.2007 to 30.06.2007 of Rs.3630/- was paid by the defendant to the plaintiff through Money Order, which was received by the plaintiff on 25.07.2007? vi) Whether an amount of Rs.5,080/- on account of dues of rent and other taxes were paid on 31.12.2007 by the defendant as per provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 of C.P.C.? 6. After hearing both the parties and on the basis of evidence led by the parties, learned Judge, S.C.C., decided issue nos.1, 2, 5 and 6 in favour of tenant/respondent and against the plaintiff. Issue nos.3 and 4 were decided in favour of landlord/petitioner and against the tenant/respondent, and ultimately by judgment and order dated 17.08.2010, learned Judge S.C.C. decreed the suit for relief of eviction and for payment of pendenlite and future mesne profit @ Rs.200/- per month till the vacation of premises. 7. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 17.08.2010, the tenant/respondent preferred a revision before the District Judge, Hardwar. The revisional court, after hearing the parties, came to the conclusion that a 30 days’ notice u/s 106 of the T.P. Act would be given only in absence of any agreement. However, in the present case there was a written agreement wherein a condition was stipulated according to which a three months’ prior notice was required to be given for termination of tenancy. On this ground alone, the revisional court allowed the revision of the tenant/respondent by judgment and order dated 13.10.2011. 8. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order of the revisional court, the landlord/petitioner has filed the present writ petition before this Court. On this ground alone, the revisional court allowed the revision of the tenant/respondent by judgment and order dated 13.10.2011. 8. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order of the revisional court, the landlord/petitioner has filed the present writ petition before this Court. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the document/agreement relied by the revisional court is an unregistered document and it was only for a period of eleven months and proper stamp duty was not paid on it in accordance with law, therefore, it cannot be read into evidence for any purpose. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next contended that clause no.11 of alleged agreement which stipulates three months’ notice would be attracted only in case where the landlord/petitioner requires the shop during the period of tenancy of eleven months and this condition will not be applicable after the expiry of period of eleven months. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that the revisional court in last paragraph of the impugned judgment has observed that this fact is not proved whether any notice u/s 106 of T.P. Act was given to the tenant/respondent. Reply of the said notice was given by the tenant/respondent therefore it is admitted that notice was given to the tenant/respondent by the landlord/petitioner. Finding given by the revisional court on this issue is a perverse finding. 12. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in case of Manvendra Kumar Chatterjee vs. Shailendra Kumar Jain [2011 (3) UC2220, 2011 (1) U.D. 557 ]*. 13. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the tenant/respondent has vehemently contended that clause no.11 stipulated in the agreement would be attracted even after expiry of period of agreement as the rent was enhanced with the consent of both the parties and there was another condition in the agreement that after three years 10% rent would be increased. It is contended that the landlord/petitioner received the enhanced rent till the filing of the suit. Therefore, the terms and conditions of the lease agreement would be deemed to continue till then. 14. It is contended that the landlord/petitioner received the enhanced rent till the filing of the suit. Therefore, the terms and conditions of the lease agreement would be deemed to continue till then. 14. Learned senior counsel has further contended that the learned revisional court in its judgment has clearly observed that the landlord/petitioner has himself admitted in oral statement that the condition of three months’ prior notice before eviction written in agreement was binding on both the parties and the landlord/petitioner himself admitted that it was written in Kirayanama that before eviction from the shop three months’ notice was required. Landlord/petitioner has himself admitted that initially rent was Rs.500/- per month, which was Rs.605/- after enhancement at the time of filing the suit. Learned senior counsel has contended that on the basis of statement of landlord/petitioner the learned appellate court has rightly held that three months’ prior notice, as mentioned in the agreement, was necessary to be given instead of a 30 days’ notice. 15. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record as well as perused the averments made in the writ petition, counter affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit. 16. At the outset it may be mentioned that the scope of writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 is limited. This Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot sit like a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate or re-evaluate the evidence so as to arrive at a different conclusion. Only perversity in the impugned order can be seen to find out whether there is a case of mis-reading of evidence by the courts concerned. 17. It has been observed by the Apex Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and others [(2003) 6 Supreme Court Cases, 675 that “On the other hand, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.” 18. In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash” [(2004) 3 S.C.C. page 682], the Apex Court has observed inter alia in paragraph 4 of the judgment that “An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” 19. In Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through L.RS. and others [(2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases, 1], the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has observed as under:- “38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law.” 20. The only issue which is to be decided by this Court is whether the appellate court was justified in holding that three months’ prior notice was necessary to be given to the tenant/respondent before vacating the shop in dispute or the notice u/s 106 of Transfer of Property Act would be sufficient. 21. This issue has been dealt by this Court in Manvendra’s case (supra). 21. This issue has been dealt by this Court in Manvendra’s case (supra). In that case also, there was an unregistered lease deed and tenancy was for a period of three years which was not extended in writing. In para-22 of the said judgment, this Court relied upon a judgment of Apex Court in Bharat Petroleum vs. Khaja Midhat Noor and others (1988 SCR (3) 811), wherein the Apex Court held that in the absence of registered instrument, the lease shall be deemed to be “lease from month to month”. 22. It has been further observed in para-22 of the said judgment as follows:- “In the case at hand, admitted the lease/rent agreement was executed between the parties on 15.9.1986. It is mentioned in clause 2 of this agreement that the petitioner shall pay the rent of Rs.250/- per month in advance. In clause 19, it is mentioned that the rent deed is for a period of three years. The period of three years had already been expired on 15.9.1989. Thus, in any view of the matter, since the rent-deed relied upon by the petitioner is an unregistered document, the tenancy shall be deemed to be month to month. That being so, the respondent had taken recourse to the provision of Section 106 of the Act read with clause (h) of Section 111 of the Act and has determined the tenancy of the petitioner by a registered notice.” 23. In the case at hand, the tenancy was created by way of lease/rent agreement executed between the parties by an unregistered document, which was neither renewed nor the same has been got registered, therefore, a 30 days’ notice u/s 106 of the Act has rightly been given by the landlord/petitioner to the tenant/respondent. The findings of the learned revisional court that three months’ prior notice was required to be given is a perverse finding and the judgment and order of the revisional court is liable to be set aside and the writ petition deserves to be allowed on this ground. 24. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Impugned judgment and order dated 13.10.2011 passed by District Judge, Haridwar in S.C.C. Revision No.23 of 2010 Secretary Khadi Gramodyog Vikas Mandal vs. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, is set aside. Judgement and order dated 17.8.2010 passed by Judge, S.C.C., in S.C.C. Suit no.12 of 2007, is affirmed.