Judgment 1. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioners. Despite printing the name of the respondent, there is no response from him. 2. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners / defendants 1 to 3, would echo the heart-burns of his clients to the effect that the I.A.No.836 of 2011 filed by the petitioners herein to get the delay of 149 days condoned in filing the I.A. to get set aside ex-parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC, was dismissed. The reason for the delay was jaundice of the first petitioner who claimed to have constructed the case on his behalf and on behalf of his son also. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioners the suit itself is one for specific performance and the defendants were set ex-parte as they could not cross-examine P.W.1 by making their appearance before the Court. 3. Perused the records. The Lower Court in paragraph No.4 of the order held that there is nothing to indicate as to when the defendants came to know about the date of ex-parte decree, etc. In my considered opinion, since the delay was only 149 days and that the suit itself is one for specific performance, one more opportunity could have been given to the defendants which the Lower Court failed to do so. I recollect the following decisions: 1) Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singhreported in (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 685. Certain excerpts from it, would run thus: "26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. ***** 29. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 , this Court took the view: (AIR pp. 363-65, paras 7 & 12) “7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan, ILR (1890) 13 Mad 269: * * * 12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration;” ***** 35. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration;” ***** 35. The expression “sufficient cause” implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word “sufficient” means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. 36. We find it unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall under either of these classes of cases. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn., 2005)" 2) Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh and others reported in (2010) 6 Supreme Court Cases 786. Certain excerpts from it, would run thus: "4. The property was put to an auction-sale on 12-8-1992. Respondent 5 herein M/s Jagan Singh and Company (hereinafter shall be referred to as “the Company”) offered Rs.22,65,000, and thus was declared as the highest bidder. Sale was knocked down in its favour, and later confirmed in its favour. 5. The appellant then woke up from its slumber and filed objections under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC raising various grounds. The executing court then framed issues, reproduced by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. The case was thereafter fixed for recording of the evidence of the judgment-debtor on 19-3-1993, 17-4-1993, 8-5-1993 and 29-5-1993. 5. The appellant then woke up from its slumber and filed objections under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC raising various grounds. The executing court then framed issues, reproduced by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. The case was thereafter fixed for recording of the evidence of the judgment-debtor on 19-3-1993, 17-4-1993, 8-5-1993 and 29-5-1993. However, on the aforesaid dates none appeared on behalf of the appellant. Consequently, the evidence of the appellant judgment-debtor was closed. As a necessary consequence thereof the appellant's objections came to be dismissed in default due to non-appearance. * * * * * 15. Be that as it may, we are of the opinion that the delay in filing the first appeal before the District Judge, Ludhiana, for setting aside the sale has not been so huge warranting its dismissal on such hypertechnical ground. In fact, according to us, the appellant had taken all possible steps to prosecute the matter within time. Had there been an intimation sent to the appellant by Mr. P.K. Jain, its erstwhile advocate, and if even thereafter the appellant had acted callously then we could have understood the negligent attitude of the appellant but that was not the case here. No sooner the appellant came to know about the dismissal of its objection filed before the executing court, under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC it made enquiries and filed the appeal. 16. While considering the application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not. Each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves. From the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the appellant it cannot be said that it had been absolutely callous and negligent in prosecuting the matter. * * * * * 20. Apart from the above, the appellant would not have gained in any manner whatsoever, by not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. It is also worth noticing that delay was also not that huge, which could not have been condoned, without putting the respondents to harm or prejudice. It is the duty of the court to see to it that justice should be done between the parties. 21. It is also worth noticing that delay was also not that huge, which could not have been condoned, without putting the respondents to harm or prejudice. It is the duty of the court to see to it that justice should be done between the parties. 21. For the aforesaid reasons the impugned orders passed by the appellate court, and the order passed by the High Court, are hereby set aside and quashed. As a consequence, the matter stands remitted to the executing court for deciding the appellant's application filed under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC at an early date on merits. Since there are only two contesting parties to the litigation that is to say the appellant and Respondent 5, both would appear before the executing court on 20-7-2010. Being an old case an endeavour would be made by the executing court to take up the case as far as possible, on day-to-day basis and no party would seek an undue adjournment in the matter. We make it clear that we have expressed no opinion on the merits of the matter and any observation made herein would not be construed as an expression of opinion on merits." 4. A bare perusal of the aforesaid decisions and also considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the delay could be condoned subject to payment of a sum of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand Only) as cost payable by the defendants to the plaintiff, within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. If the plaintiff refuses to receive the cost, it shall be deposited in the Lower Court, whereupon the Lower Court shall number the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC and process it as per law. 5. The Civil Revision Petition is disposed of accordingly. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. No costs.